SEOUL – East
Asia could learn two valuable lessons from the eurozone crisis.
First, do not rush the process of financial and monetary integration; and,
second, develop adequate institutional frameworks before proceeding.
In fact, East Asian countries are unlikely to move toward a regional fixed
exchange-rate system or a monetary union with a single currency in the
immediate future, owing to the region’s great diversity in terms of economic
and political conditions. Perhaps, in a few decades, the region’s countries
will develop institutions to promote financial integration, such as a single
bank supervisory agency of the type that the European Union is now creating.Nevertheless, Asian policymakers should improve cooperation mechanisms designed to prevent and manage crises. Most promising is the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization (CMIM) of the ASEAN+3 – the 10 members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations plus China, Japan, and South Korea. This $120 billion regional reserve pool was launched in 2010 to provide short-term liquidity to members in an emergency.
The ASEAN+3 is now strengthening the CMIM by doubling the total fund size to $240 billion. The group also agreed to enhance the CMIM’s flexibility by reducing the minimum portion of crisis lending to be tied to the International Monetary Fund’s lending program from 80% to 70%.
The CMIM has yet to be tested in a crisis. In its infancy, it might not be able to provide adequate emergency support in a timely and flexible manner. The $240 billion fund is small, amounting to only about 1.5% of the region’s GDP. European experience suggests that large-scale systemic shocks call for greater financial support.
Unlike the IMF or the European Stability Mechanism, CMIM contributions are self-managed by the respective country’s authorities. And countries may choose not to contribute to a swap request. This suggests that the CMIM could be especially constrained amid a systemic shock or political disputes among member countries.
Moreover, an “IMF stigma” remains among those countries in the region that were discontented with the Fund’s role during the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis. IMF conditionality for the activation of the majority of their borrowing could make countries reluctant to turn to the CMIM for support.
Another challenge is the CMIM’s limited capacity for economic surveillance and monitoring. Last year, ASEAN+3 established a regional surveillance unit, the ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research Office (AMRO), to monitor regional economies, detect emerging vulnerabilities, and support effective decision-making by the CMIM. But it is unclear whether AMRO has sufficient capacity and expertise to monitor 13 countries effectively.
Indeed, East Asian countries may find it difficult to conduct candid surveillance of one another’s policies and enforce firm policy conditionality. The example of Greece before and during the eurozone crisis shows that it is often hard for countries to be tough on their neighbors.
The ASEAN+3 must continue to increase its resources, enhance its independence and improve its operational procedures. A fully capable regional financial safety net could contain the contagion of financial shocks emanating from individual economies and prevent disruptions to the region’s key growth drivers – intra-regional trade and investment. The CMIM could help East Asian countries to reduce their reliance on accumulating, as a form of self-insurance, costly reserves that fuel global imbalances.
With greater resources and an improved governance structure, AMRO could play a more effective role in regional economic surveillance and monitoring, without which moral-hazard risks associated with financial safety nets would rise. Enhanced regional control would contribute to better information-sharing and decision-making as well, implying that the IMF-linked portion of CMIM crisis lending could be reduced in step with the strengthening of AMRO’s capacity and performance.
The ASEAN+3 should aim to develop the CMIM into a full-capacity regional financial safety net supported by AMRO as a capable and credible secretariat – a de facto Asian Monetary Fund, possibly with broader membership. But, until the CMIM and AMRO are fully developed, their close cooperation with the IMF is desirable. Indeed, at the Cannes G-20 Summit in November 2011, leaders agreed on principles for cooperation between the IMF and regional financing arrangements, including open information-sharing and joint missions.
In particular, the IMF and ASEAN+3 financing arrangement should establish a regular channel of dialogue to facilitate information exchange and prepare concrete guidelines for cooperation and an appropriate division of tasks. Establishing constructive and effective guidelines could help to prevent the sort of conflicts and confusion over lending conditions during crises that we have seen among the IMF, EU, and the European Central Bank in the eurozone. Given the “IMF stigma” in Asia, a co-financing facility that provides precautionary credit lines without policy conditionality to qualified member countries would be useful.
Asian countries have learned from their region’s own crisis in the 1990’s, as well as from the eurozone’s ongoing crisis, that effective management of cross-border capital flows requires well-constructed national, regional, and global responses. To respond effectively to crises, East Asian countries must continue to improve the regional financial safety net and surveillance mechanism, while strengthening their cooperation with the IMF.
Lee Jong-Wha, a senior adviser to the president of South Korea and Professor of Economics at Korea University, was Chief Economist and Head of the Office of Regional Economic Integration at the Asian Development Bank. His most recent book, edited with Robert Barro, is Costs and Benefits of Economic Integration in Asia.
歐元區給東亞的教訓
發自首爾——東亞可以從歐元危機中得到兩個寶貴的教訓。首先，不要倉卒於實施推進金融以及貨幣的結合﹔其次，在實施這一切之前先要制定出合適的體制框架。
事實上，由於東亞地區內部的經濟和政治狀況存在著極大的差異，因此各國都不太願意在短期內向一個區域性的固定匯率體系或者單一貨幣聯盟推進。或許在幾十年後該地區的國家會發展出一套推進財政一體化的體制，例如類似歐盟現在正在創設的那種單一銀行監管機構。
但即便如此，亞洲地區的政策制定者們應當攜手改善旨在預防和管控危機的合作機制。而其中最有前景的則要數東盟+3——10個東南亞國家聯盟會員國加上中日韓三國——所制定的《清邁倡議多邊化協議》。這個總額1200億美元的區域性貨幣儲備池在2010年啟動以在緊急關頭為成員國提供短期流動性。
東盟+3集團現在正通過將資金池總規模翻倍到2400億美元來強化該上述協議。集團各成員國同時也同意把即將與國際貨幣基金組織借款計劃挂鉤的危機借款最低比例從80%降低到70%來增加協議的靈活性。
清邁協議還需要經過一場危機的檢驗。在其初創之時，它或許無法足夠及時和靈活地提供合適的緊急支持。2400億美元也相對較少，僅相當於東亞地區GDP總規模的1.5%。歐洲的經驗告訴我們大范圍額系統性沖擊必須要有更大規模的金融支持來應對。
與國際貨幣基金組織或者歐洲穩定機制（European Stability Mechanism）不同的是，清邁倡議多邊化協議的捐款由各國當局自行管理。而各國也可以選擇不向貨幣互換協議提供款項。這意味著在系統性沖擊期間或在成員國間發生政治沖突之時該協議都會尤其受到限制。
此外，“國際貨幣基金組織惡名”依然在該地區的一些國家心中縈繞，因為它們都對該組織在1997-1998年亞洲金融危機宗所扮演的角色感到不滿。國際貨幣基金組織為各國大多數借款所設下的附加啟動條件會令各國不願向清邁協議尋求支持。
另一個挑戰就是清邁協議有限的金融監控能力。去年，東盟+3建立了一個區域監察機構——東盟+3宏觀經濟研究室——來監測區域經濟，探測新出現的脆弱節點，並為協議的有效決策提供支持。但還尚不清楚該研究室擁有足夠的能力和專業水平去有效監測13個國家。
事實上，東亞國家或許會發現難以對各個國家的政策進行公正的監測並執行堅決的政策實施條件。在歐元區危機之前和期間的希臘就表明讓各國對鄰國採取強硬往往都是非常困難的。
東盟+3集團必須持續增加其資源，強化自身獨立性並優化運作程序。一個全力運作的區域金融安全網可以遏制那些來自單一經濟體的金融沖擊蔓延開來並防止對該區域關鍵推動力——區域內貿易和投資——的破壞。清邁協議可以幫助東亞國家減少對積累的依賴，而這種積累其實是一種助長全球不平衡的自保式且成本巨大的儲蓄。
利用更多的資源和優化的治理架構，東盟+3宏觀經濟研究室可以在區域經濟監測上扮演一個更加有效的角色，而且也無須承擔一個可能由金融安全網相關的道德風險。強化的區域控制還將有利於更好地信息分享和決策，暗示著清邁協議的危機借款中與國際貨幣基金組織相關的部分能在增強經濟研究室能力和表現的同時得到削減。
東盟+3應該致力於將清邁協議在經濟研究室的這個得力而可靠的秘書支持下發展成為一個功能全面的區域金融安全網——也就是一個事實上的亞洲貨幣基金，而且或許能容納更多的成員國。但在協議和辦公室兩者完全成熟之前，它們與國際貨幣基金組織的緊密合作還是可取的。事實上，在2011年11月的嘎納G2峰會上，領導人們都對國際貨幣基金組織和區域性金融協議之前的合作原則表示同意，其中就包括公開的信息分享和聯合行動。
尤其是，國際貨幣基金組織和東盟+3金融協議應該建立一個長期性的對話渠道來促進信息交流並起草一份關於合作和任務合理分配的具體指引。制定建設性且有效的指引將有助於防止出現歐元危機期間我們在國際貨幣基金組織，歐盟和歐洲央行之間所看見的那些沖突和誤會。考慮到亞洲的“國際貨幣基金組織污名”，一個可以在不預設政策前提的情況下向合資格的成員國提供預先信貸額度的聯合援助實體將非常有用。
除了歐元區危機之外，亞洲國家也應當在本區域1990年代的危機中的得到教訓，認識到對跨境資金流的有效管理需要構建完善的國家，區域和全球應對措施。為了有效應對危機，亞洲國家必須繼續優化區域金融安全網絡和監察機制，同時強化自身與國際貨幣基金組織的合作。
