Joschka Fischer: The Arab Revolutions’ Reality Check / 阿拉伯革命的現實考驗

BERLIN – Two years after popular uprisings began to convulse the Middle East, few people speak of an “Arab Spring” anymore. Given Syria’s bloody civil war, the rise to power of Islamist forces through free elections, the ever-deepening political and economic crises in Egypt and Tunisia, increasing instability in Iraq, uncertainty about the future of Jordan and Lebanon, and the threat of war over Iran’s nuclear program, the bright hope of a new Middle East has vanished.

Add the region’s eastern and western peripheries – Afghanistan and North Africa (including the Sahel and South Sudan) – and the picture becomes even grimmer. Indeed, Libya is increasingly unstable, al-Qaeda is actively engaged in the Sahel (as the fighting in Mali shows), and no one can foresee what will happen in Afghanistan after the US and its NATO allies withdraw in 2014.

All of us tend to make the same mistake repeatedly: we think at the beginning of a revolution that freedom and justice have prevailed over dictatorship and cruelty. But history teaches us that what follows is usually nothing good.

A revolution not only overthrows a repressive regime; it also destroys the old order, paving the way for a mostly brutal, if not bloody, fight for power to establish a new one – a process that affects foreign and domestic policy alike. Normally, revolutions are followed by dangerous times.

Indeed, exceptions to this pattern are rare: South Africa is one, owing to the genius of one of the century’s most outstanding statesmen, Nelson Mandela. The alternative option can be observed in Zimbabwe.

Central and Eastern Europe after 1989, though a very interesting reference point for analysts of the Arab revolutions, is not an appropriate reference point, because the region’s new domestic and foreign order resulted from the change in external conditions stemming from the collapse of Soviet power. Internally, nearly all of these countries had a very clear idea about what they wanted: democracy, freedom, a market economy, and protection from the return of the Russian empire. They wanted the West, and their accession to NATO and the European Union was logical.

Nothing of the sort applies to the crisis belt of the Middle East. No power anywhere, within the region or without, is willing and able to implement the barest vision of a new regional order – or even a vision for parts of it. Chaos is a constant threat, with all of its accompanying risks and threats to world peace.

In addition to poverty, backwardness, repression, rapid population growth, religious and ethnic hatred, and stateless peoples (such as the Kurds and the Palestinians), the region has unstable borders. Many were drawn by the colonial powers, Great Britain and France, after World War I, and most, with the exception of Iran’s and Egypt’s, have little legitimacy.
As if this were not enough, some countries – including Iran, Saudi Arabia, and even tiny (but very rich) Qatar – have ambitions to be regional powers. All of this worsens an already tense situation.

All of these contradictions are currently exploding in Syria, whose population is suffering a humanitarian catastrophe, while the world stands by, up to now unwilling to intervene. (If chemical weapons are deployed, intervention will become inevitable.) Although intervention would be temporary and technically limited, everyone seems to be avoiding it, because the stakes are very high: not only a devastating civil war and massive human suffering, but also a new order for the whole of the Middle East.

Any military intervention would entail a confrontation not only with the Syrian military (supported by Russia and China), but also with Shia Iran and its Lebanese proxy, Hezbollah. Moreover, no one can guarantee that intervention would not quickly lead to another war with Israel. The dangers of both action and inaction are very high.

The most likely outcome in Syria is that the human catastrophe will continue until President Bashar al-Assad’s regime collapses, after which the country very likely could be divided along ethnic and religious lines. And Syria’s disintegration could further balkanize the Middle East, potentially unleashing new violence. Frontline states like Lebanon, Iraq, and Jordan will not manage to remain aloof from a disintegrating Syria. What will happen with Syria’s Kurds and Palestinians, or its Christians, Druze, and smaller Muslim minorities? And what about the Alawites (the backbone of Assad’s regime), who could face a terrible destiny, regardless of whether the country splits up?

Unanswered questions abound. Of course, even in the face of this misery, we should not lose hope in agreements reached by diplomatic means; but, realistically, the chances are dwindling every day.

The whole of the Middle East is in motion, and a new and stable order will take a long time to establish. Until then, the region will remain very dangerous, not only internally, but also for its neighbors (including Europe) and the world.

Joschka Fischer was German Foreign Minister and Vice Chancellor from 1998-2005, a term marked by Germany's strong support for NATO’s intervention in Kosovo in 1999, followed by its opposition to the war in Iraq. Fischer entered electoral politics after participating in the anti-establishment protests of the 1960’s and 1970’s, and played a key role in founding Germany's Green Party, which he led for almost two decades.
 

阿拉伯革命的現實考驗

震撼中東的群眾暴亂爆發兩年後，如今已不再有人大談“阿拉伯之春”了。敘利亞血腥內戰、伊斯蘭通過自由選舉上台、埃及和突尼斯不斷加深的政治和經濟危機、伊拉克的日漸動蕩、約旦和黎巴嫩未來的不確定性以及伊朗核計劃頭上的戰爭陰影，這些因素讓新中東的美好前景消失殆盡。

若再考慮東西方邊緣——阿富汗和北非（包括薩赫勒和南蘇丹），前景就更加悲觀了。事實上，伊比亞正在日漸動蕩，基地組織在薩赫勒活動頻繁（馬裡內戰就是明証），沒人可以預見阿富汗在2014年美國和北約盟軍撤走後會發生什麼。

我們所有人都反覆犯著同樣的錯誤：革命一開始，我們認為自由和公正會壓倒獨裁和殘暴。但歷史告訴我們，隨之而來的往往不會有好結果。

革命不但席卷了鎮壓性政權，也摧毀了舊秩序，造成殘酷（如果不是血腥的話）的新權力爭奪——這一過程會影響國內和國外政策。通常，隨革命而來的是危機四伏的歲月。

事實上，很少有國家能逃出這一宿命：南非是一個例外，這是因為南非出了一位不世出的偉大政治家納爾遜·曼德拉。其他選擇可以看看津巴布韋。

1989年後的中歐和東歐是阿拉伯革命分析的有趣參照點，但卻不是合適的參照點，因為該地區的新國內外秩序來源於外部條件的變化——蘇聯解體。從內部而言，幾乎所有中東歐國家都有著非常明確的願望：民主、自由、市場經濟以及免收俄帝國卷土重來的威脅。它們希望西方，希望被北約和偶們接納，這是自然而然的需求。

中東危機地帶則完全不是這樣。中東內外沒有任何一股勢力願意也能夠推行哪怕是最原始的新秩序，連帶來新秩序部分要素的打算都沒有。混亂是永遠的威脅，給世界和平也帶來了風險和威脅。

除了貧困、退步、鎮壓、快速人口增長、宗教和種族仇恨以及無家可歸的民族（比如庫爾德人和巴勒斯坦人），該地區還存在邊境不穩定。大量邊境又殖民國家（英國和法國）在一戰後劃定，除了伊朗和埃及之外，大部分邊境毫無合理性可言。

一些國家——伊朗、沙特甚至蕞爾小國（但極其富有）卡塔爾——好像還嫌不夠亂，對地區權力雄心勃勃。所有這些讓已然緊張的局面進一步惡化了。

所有這些矛盾目前在敘利亞出現了大爆發。敘利亞人民正在遭遇人道主義災難，而世界冷眼旁觀，到目前為止不願施以援手（如果動用了化學武器，則干預將不可避免）。儘管干預可以是暫時性的、技術上也存在限制，但所有人都在避免這麼做，因為干預的代價極高：不但包括災難性內戰和大規模人道傷害，也包括整個中東的新秩序。

任何軍事干預都將不但面對敘利亞軍隊（有俄羅斯和中國支持），還將面對伊朗什葉派及其代理人黎巴嫩真主黨。此外，沒人能保証干預不會立刻導致另一場與以色列的戰爭。作為和不作為的危險都很高。

敘利亞最有可能的結果是，人道災難將一直持續到總統巴沙爾·阿薩德政權倒台，此後，敘利亞極有可能會因種族和宗教原因分裂。敘利亞的分裂將導致中東的進一步巴爾干化，形成新的保暴力。前線國家，如黎巴嫩、伊拉克和約旦等國，不可能在敘利亞分裂時獨善其身。敘利亞庫爾德人和巴勒斯坦人，或基督徒、德魯茲派以及人數更少的穆斯林少數派命運會如何？阿拉維派（巴沙爾政權的基石）將面臨可怕的命運，不管敘利亞是否分崩離析。

有待回答的問題很多。當然，即使如此悲觀，我們也不能失去通過外交途徑達成協議的希望﹔但從現實角度看，希望在日漸渺茫。

整個中東都在震動，新的穩定秩序要很長時間才能建立。在此之前，該地區將一直非常危險，不僅對國民是如此，對鄰國（包括歐洲）和世界也是如此。

Joschka Fischer: Chinese Values? / 中國價值觀？

BERLIN – There can be little reasonable doubt today that the People’s Republic of China will dominate the world of the twenty-first century. The country’s rapid economic growth, strategic potential, huge internal market, and enormous investment in infrastructure, education, and research and development, as well as its massive military buildup, will see to that. This means that, in political and economic terms, we are entering an East and Southeast Asian century.

Lest we forget, the outcome for the world would have been far worse if China’s ascent had failed. But what will this world look like? We can foresee the power that will shape its geopolitics, but what values will underlie the exercise of that power?

The official policy of “Four Modernizations” (industrial, agricultural, military, and scientific-technological) that has underpinned China’s rise since the late 1970’s has failed to provide an answer to that question, because the “fifth modernization” – the emergence of democracy and the rule of law – is still missing. Indeed, political modernization faces massive opposition from the Chinese Communist Party, which has no interest in surrendering its monopoly of power. Moreover, the transition to a pluralist system that channels, rather than suppresses, political conflict would indeed be risky, though the risk will grow the longer one-party rule (and the endemic corruption that accompanies it) persists.

Ideologically, Chinese leadership’s rejection of human rights, democracy, and the rule of law is based on the contention that these supposedly universal values are a mere stalking horse for Western interests, and that repudiating them should thus be viewed as a matter of self-respect. China will never again submit to the West militarily, so it should not submit to the West normatively either.

And here we return to the concept of “Asian values,” originally developed in Singapore and Malaysia. But until this day, three decades later, its meaning remains unclear. Essentially, the concept has served to justify collectivist-authoritarian rule by aligning it with local tradition and culture, with autonomy defined in terms of otherness – that is, differentiation from the West and its values. Thus, “Asian values” are not universal norms, but rather a self-preservation strategy harnessed to identity politics.

Given the history of Western colonialism in Asia, the desire to maintain a distinct identity is both legitimate and understandable, as is the belief in many Asian countries – first and foremost China – that the time has come to settle old scores. But the effort to preserve one’s power, the need for a distinct “Asian” identity, and the desire to settle historical scores will not solve the normative question raised by China’s emergence as the century’s dominant power.

How that question is answered is crucially important, because it will determine the character of a global power, and thus how it deals with other, weaker countries. A state becomes a world power when its strategic significance and potential give it global reach. And, as a rule, such states then try to safeguard their interests by imposing their predominance (hegemony), which is a recipe for dangerous conflict if based on coercion rather than cooperation.

The world’s acclimation to a global hegemonic structure – in which world powers guarantee an international order – survived the Cold War. The Soviet Union wasn’t ideologically anti-Western, because Communism and Socialism were Western inventions, but it was anti-Western in political terms. And it failed not only for economic reasons, but also because its internal and external behavior was based on compulsion, not consent.

By contrast, the United States’ economic and political model, and that of the West, with its individual rights and open society, proved to be its sharpest weapon in the Cold War. The US prevailed not because of its military superiority, but because of its soft power, and because its hegemony was based not on coercion (though there was some of that, too), but largely on consent.

Which path will China choose? While China will not change its ancient and admirable civilization, it owes its re-emergence to its embrace of the contemporary Western model of modernization – the huge achievement of Deng Xiaoping, who put the country on its current path more than three decades ago. But the decisive question of political modernization remains unanswered.

Clearly, national interests, and sometimes pure power, play a part in how the US and other Western countries apply values like human rights, the rule of law, democracy, and pluralism. But these values are not mere ideological window dressing for Western interests; in fact, they are not that to any significant extent. They are indeed universal, and all the more so in an era of comprehensive globalization.

The contribution of Asia – and of China, in particular – to the development of this universal set of values is not yet foreseeable, but it will surely come if the “fifth modernization” leads to China’s political transformation. China’s course as a world power will be determined to a significant extent by the way it confronts this question.

Joschka Fischer was German Foreign Minister and Vice Chancellor from 1998-2005, a term marked by his strong defense of Germany’s participation in NATO’s intervention in Kosovo in 1999, followed by his strong opposition to the war in Iraq. Fischer entered electoral politics after participating in the anti-establishment protests of the 1960’s and 1970’s, and played a key role in the establishment of the German Green Party, which he led for nearly two decades.

中國價值觀？

柏林——中華人民共和國會在21世紀主導整個世界已沒有多大存疑。該國高速的經濟增長，戰略潛力，龐大的國內市場以及對基礎設施，教育和科研的巨額投資，還有大規模軍備建設都確保這一事實。無論在政治和經濟，我們正進入一個東亞和東南亞的世紀。

我們切勿忘記，如果中國沒有成功崛起，這個世界肯定更糟糕。但如今這個世界又是怎麼樣？可以預期這股勢力將塑造自己的地緣政治格局，但在這些勢力行使的背後是一種什麼樣的價值觀？

於1970年代後期以來為中國崛起打下基礎的“四個現代化”（工業、農業，軍事和科學技術）政策並不能提供答案，因為“第五個現代化”——民主的崛起以及法治——依然缺乏。事實上，政治現代化進程遭到了中國共產黨的極力反對，因為他們根本不想放棄權力的壟斷。此外，轉型到一個多黨（而非專制）政治, 疏導而非壓制衝突, 本身也充滿風險，然而一黨制（以及附之而來的內部腐敗）繼續統治亦會增加風險。

在意識形態上，中國領導層對人權，民主和法治這類事物的抵制是認為這些普世價值是西方為利益而巧立名目的藉口，因此對這些事物的否定也應該被視為一種自尊之舉。既然中國已經不會再屈服於西方軍事力量之下，因此也不能再度就範於西方的標準。

現在讓我們回到這個起源於新加坡和馬來西亞的“亞洲價值觀”概念。但時至該概念提出整整30年後的今日，其意義依然不清。從本質上，這一概念是為了確立集體專制主義統治是糅合當地傳統和文化，而自治則被定義為是一種不一樣的東西，一種與西方及其價值觀完全不相同的事物。因此，“亞洲價值”並不是普世規範，而是一種緊扣於身份認同政治的自保策略。

考慮到西方在亞洲的殖民歷史，這種希望保持獨特身份的意願合情合理，對許多亞洲國家, 尤其是中國, 現在是時候算一下舊賬了。但企圖維護自身實力，營造獨特“亞洲”身份以及渴求清算歷史舊賬都不能解決由中國崛起成為本世紀支配力量所帶來的規範問題。

而這個問題的答案極端重要，因為它將決定一個世界強國的特性，並以此決定它將如何與那些比它弱小的國家相處。一個國家成為世界強國是由於它的戰略重要性和潛力無遠弗屆。而一般來說，這類國家隨後將加強其對弱小國家的支配（霸權主義）來維護自身利益，此舉若基於威迫而非合作的話，實是產生危險衝突的方程式。

世界對一個全球霸權架構的順從, 一個由世界強國維護的國際秩序在冷戰後幸存了下來。蘇聯並非在意識形態上反對西方，因為共產主義和社會主義其實都是源自西方，但它在政治層面上卻反西方。其崩潰並不僅僅是由於經濟原因，更因為它國內外的行為都是出於威逼而非協同。

相比之下，美國（以及西方）的經濟和政治模式，及其對個人權利和公開社會的倡導，成為了冷戰中最有力的武器。美國的獲勝並不來自其軍事優勢，而是出自其軟實力，出自其支配地位並不是來自於威脅強迫（雖然某些時候也有類似情況出現）而大致上是基於協同。

那麼中國會選擇哪條道路呢？中國一方面沒有更換其令人敬仰的古老文明，另一方面也因為採取了西方現代化模式而重新崛起, 這正是鄧小平的豐功偉績，30多年前讓中國走上了這條道路。但政治現代化的關鍵問題依然沒有答案。

明顯地國家利益以及其他純粹權力的行為是美國和其他西方國家在推行人權、法治，民主和多黨制過程中會計算其中, 但這些價值觀不僅是西方利益的門面粉飾﹔而其功用事實上並沒有那麼收效。它們就是一種普世的東西﹔尤其是在這個廣泛全球化的時代。

我們無法預計亞洲, 尤其是中國將對這一整套價值觀有什麼貢獻，但當“第五個現代化”為中國帶來政治轉型的話, 必將貢獻良多。中國晉身成為世界強國的進程將取決於它如何面對這個問題。

Joschka Fischer: The Chancellor Who Played with Fire / 玩火的總理

BERLIN – German Chancellor Angela Merkel should be happy nowadays: her party’s approval ratings aren’t bad, and her own are very good. She no longer has serious rivals within the center-right Christian Democratic Union (CDU), while the left opposition is fragmented into four parties. Her response to the European crisis has prevailed – or at least that is the impression that she conveys, and that most Germans believe. So everything is fine and dandy, right?

Not so fast. Two issues could complicate Merkel’s re-election bid in the autumn of 2013. Domestically, her coalition partner, the liberal Free Democrats (FDP), is disintegrating. Even if the FDP survives the next election (which is by no means certain), the current coalition is unlikely to retain its parliamentary majority, leaving Merkel increasingly dependent on the Social Democrats (SPD). While this needs not matter to her too much as long as she retains the chancellorship, in Sigmar Gabriel, the SPD’s leader, she faces – for the first time – an opponent whom she would underestimate at her peril.

But the real danger to Merkel is external: the European crisis. If she is unlucky, the crisis will come to a head at the start of the German election year, and all previous calculations could be moot, because, despite Germans’ frustration with Europe, the electorate would punish severely those who allowed Europe to fail.

The European Union’s economy is sliding into a severe and, in all likelihood, long-lasting recession, largely self-inflicted. While Germany is still trying to banish the specter of hyperinflation with strict eurozone austerity measures, the EU crisis countries are facing a real threat of deflation, with potentially disastrous consequences. It is only a question of time – no longer very much time – before economic destabilization gives rise to political instability.

Hungary, where democratic backsliding appears to be taking hold, provides a foretaste of a Europe in which the eurozone crisis and deflation persist. The mood in the Mediterranean EU members, as well as in Ireland, is heating up, owing not only to the tightening squeeze of austerity, but also – and perhaps more importantly – to the absence of policies that offer people hope for a better future. The explosive nature of current trends, which point to eventual re-nationalization of sovereignty from the bottom up, is greatly underestimated in Berlin.

The crisis has now reached Italy and is threatening to spread to France. With Mario Monti’s premiership, Italy has mobilized its best people, and neither Italy nor Europe will get a better government for the foreseeable future. If Monti’s administration is toppled – either in parliament or in the streets – the EU’s fourth-largest economy could come crashing down. Monti is urgently calling for help. Where is it?

Developments in France (the second-largest eurozone economy) should also not be underestimated in this presidential election year. If a majority of the French come to believe that a course of action is being imposed on them from outside – and by Germany, no less! – they will respond with traditional Gallic stubbornness.

What is at stake is less the election’s outcome than the margin between President Nicolas Sarkozy and the far-right National Front leader, Marine Le Pen – and whether she overtakes him to qualify for the second-round run-off against the Socialist candidate. While she would be unlikely to win the presidency, she could reshape and realign the French right. For that reason, a Sarkozy debacle would drastically reduce his Socialist successor’s room for maneuver on European policy, fundamentally altering France’s position in Europe.

But, while the French election’s outcome will hinge to a crucial extent on European crisis politics, Germany’s government acts as if this were none of its concern. Instead, the main – almost exclusive – topic in Berlin is the upcoming election. And the central question is not, “What needs to be done now in the interest of Europe?” Rather, it is, “How much can people in Germany be expected to accept – in particular, how much honesty?”

No one will act in a way that jeopardizes their electoral prospects, at least while there are still alternatives. So it is conceivable that Germany is not at all interested in a serious effort to resolve Europe’s crisis, because that would mean taking big risks and investing a lot of money.
The CDU-FDP coalition prefers to sugarcoat the situation by convincing themselves of an Anglo-Saxon conspiracy, abetted by those in the European crisis countries unwilling to perform and reform and whose only purpose is to make the Germans pay. So far, Merkel’s coalition is like someone driving against traffic, dead certain that everyone else is going the wrong way.

Europe’s disintegration has already advanced much further than it might appear. Distrust and national egoism are spreading rapidly, devouring European solidarity and common purpose.

Institutionally, Europe has been on the right track since the last summit, but it threatens to disintegrate from the bottom up. To save the euro – which is essential, because the European project’s fate depends on the success of monetary union – Europe needs action now: in addition to indispensable austerity measures and structural reforms, there is no way to succeed without a viable economic program that will assure growth.

That won’t come cheap. If Merkel’s government believes that paying lip service to growth is enough, it is playing with fire: a euro collapse in which not only Germans would be badly burned.

Joschka Fischer, Germany’s foreign minister and vice-chancellor from 1998 to 2005, was a leader in the German Green Party for almost 20 years.

Joschka Fischer: 玩火的總理

柏林——近來德國總理默克爾應該很高興﹔因為她所在的黨派以及她個人的支持率都不低。在中間偏右基督民主聯盟內，已經不再有對手，而且左派反對勢力也分裂成四個黨派。至少對她而言，她處理歐洲危機的方法廣為人們接受，也為大多數德國人所信任。因此，一切事都進展地十分順利，運行良好，不是嗎？

等一下! 有兩件事可能會使默克爾2013年秋天競選連任的局勢變得複雜。從國內的角度而言，她的聯合黨夥伴, 自由民主黨, 正面臨著分裂。即使自由民主黨能夠維持到下一次大選（這種情況可能不在），現在的聯合黨也不太可能保住議會的絕大多數。這使得默克爾越來越依賴社會民主黨。然而，只要她能夠連任總理，這對她來說A算不了什麼大事。在這次總理競選中，她首次面對的是社會民主黨的領導Sigmar Gabriel，是個她不可輕視的對手。

但是對默克爾來說真正的危險來自於國外---歐洲債務危機。如果她並不那麼走運，這場危機在德國大選年的伊始就發展到了危機關頭，那之前所精心制定的所有計劃都可能會毫無實際意義。這是因為儘管德國人民對歐洲感到很失望，選民都會嚴厲地去懲罰那些使歐洲垮台的人。

歐盟的經濟正在下滑。已經到達了非常不景氣的蕭條時期，這種大蕭條極有可能長久地持續下去，而經濟滑坡的主要原因是歐洲內部問題。儘管德國仍在試圖用嚴苛的歐元區貨幣緊縮政策來抑制極度通貨膨脹這一禍根，但歐盟債務危機國家正在面臨通貨緊縮這一威脅，而通貨緊縮可能會帶來災難性後果。經濟不穩定遲早會導致政局不穩定，這僅僅是一個時間問題，並不需要太多的時間。

匈牙利的民主退步似乎開始逐漸產生影響。目前歐元區經濟危機和通貨緊縮在歐洲持續發展，匈牙利的情形成了整個歐洲的預兆。包括愛爾蘭在內的一些地中海地區歐盟成員國的情緒變得越發激烈。導致這一情緒的原因不僅僅是緊縮的政策所帶來的高壓，而且更為重要的原因是缺乏能夠給人們帶來希望去憧憬更好的將來的政策。當今趨勢本質具有爆炸性，而德國人卻大大地低估了這一本質，這種趨勢會最終導致從根本上合理改革國家主權。

這場危機目前已經蔓延到了意大利而且正在威脅著法國。在意大利總理馬裡奧-蒙蒂 (Monti) 的領導下，意大利已經動員了本國最優秀的一批人才。意大利和歐洲在可預測的未來內都不會有更為出色的政府產生。如果蒙蒂的政權被推翻，無論是通過議會還是通過示威游行，歐盟的第四大經濟體都可能會面臨崩潰。蒙蒂正在極力地四處尋求幫助。幫助從何而來？

法國（歐元區第二大經濟體）的發展同樣也不應在這一總統大選年被低估。如果絕大多數的法國人相信這一連串的行動都是由德國出台從外部強加於他們，法國人一定會用高盧人固有的倔強來予以還擊。

真正使法國總統薩科奇處於危險的並不是總統選舉的結果，而是他和極右派民族陣線領導人勒龐之間的隔閡，以及是否她會代替薩科奇參加第二輪對抗社會主義代表的決定性競選。盡管她可能贏得不了總統大選，但她可以重組、重新聯盟法國右派勢力。由於這個原因，如果薩科奇的慘敗，會大幅削減其社會主義黨派繼任者在歐洲政策制定上的發言權，從而在根本上得改變了法國在歐洲的地位。

但是，盡管法國的大選結果很大程度地取決於歐洲債務危機的策略，德國政府的行為似乎表明這一結果與其毫無關系。但相反，柏林的中心話題，甚至可以說是幾乎獨家話題卻是將要到來的大選。目前的中心問題不是“需要採取什麼樣的措施來為歐洲謀利”，而是“德國人能夠接受多少，具體來說，接受多少誠信。”

沒有人願意做出危及其大選前景的行動，更何況他們至少還有其他方案可供選擇。因此，人們可以想到德國人一點也沒有興趣為解決歐洲債務危機而做出認真的努力，因為解決債務危機意味著承擔大的風險和投資大筆的錢。

基督民主聯盟和自由民主黨的聯合政黨喜歡粉飾目前的局面。他們十分清楚這是一個安格魯薩克遜陰謀。這一陰謀是那些歐債危機國中不願實施行動、不願改革的人們所慫恿出的概念，他們的目的就是想要德國人買賬。目前為止，默克爾的聯盟就像是違反交通規則開車的人一樣，非常肯定地認為其他所有人的行動都錯了。

歐洲的分裂已經比其可能表現出來的情況發展地更為嚴重。不信任和國家利己主義迅速地傳播開來，將歐洲的團結和共同目標吞噬，使之喪失殆盡

從制度上來講，自從上一次峰會以來歐洲已經走到了正確的路線上，但是仍舊存在徹底瓦解的危險。想要拯救歐元，歐洲需要立即採取行動。拯救歐元十分重要，因為歐洲計劃的命運取決於貨幣聯盟的成功與否。除了必不可少的緊縮政策和結構改革，沒有任何方式可以不採取既切實可行又保証增長的經濟項目而取得成功。

這種方式花費會很巨大。如果默克爾認為僅僅說說好聽的話去刺激增長就足夠了的話，這就相當於是在玩火，一旦這場大火燒垮整個歐洲，不僅僅是身在其中的德國人會被燒得遍體鱗傷。

Joschka Fischer 是德國1998年-2005年的外交大臣和副總理。他曾經領導德國黨近二十年。