Raghuram Rajan: Central Bankers under Siege

CHICAGO – Poor Ben Bernanke! As Chairman of the United States Federal Reserve Board, he has gone further than any other central banker in recent times in attempting to stimulate the economy through monetary policy. He has cut short-term interest rates to the bone. He has adopted innovative new methods of monetary easing. Again and again, he has repeated that, so long as inflationary pressure remains contained, his main concern is the high level of US unemployment. Yet progressive economists chastise him for not doing enough.

What more could they possibly want? Raise the inflation target, they say, and all will be well. Of course, this would be a radical departure for the Fed, which has worked hard to convince the public that it will keep inflation around 2%. That credibility has allowed the Fed to be aggressive: it is difficult to imagine that it could have expanded its balance sheet to the extent that it has if the public thought that it could not be trusted on inflation. So why do these economists want the Fed to sacrifice its hard-won gains?

The answer lies in their view of the root cause of continued high unemployment: excessively high real interest rates. Their logic is simple. Before the financial crisis erupted in 2008, consumers buoyed US demand by borrowing heavily against their rising house prices. Now these heavily indebted households cannot borrow and spend any more.

An important source of aggregate demand has evaporated. As consumers stopped buying, real (inflation-adjusted) interest rates should have fallen to encourage thrifty households to spend. But real interest rates did not fall enough, because nominal interest rates cannot go below zero. By increasing inflation, the Fed would turn real interest rates seriously negative, thereby coercing thrifty households into spending instead of saving. With rising demand, firms would hire, and all would be well.

This is a different logic from the one that calls for inflation as a way of reducing long-term debt (at the expense of investors), but it has equally serious weaknesses. First, while low rates might encourage spending if credit were easy, it is not at all clear that traditional savers today would go out and spend. Think of the soon-to-retire office worker. She saved because she wanted enough money to retire. Given the terrible returns on savings since 2007, the prospect of continuing low interest rates might make her put even more money aside.

Alternatively, low interest rates could push her (or her pension fund) to buy risky long-maturity bonds. Given that these bonds are already aggressively priced, such a move might thus set her up for a fall when interest rates eventually rise. Indeed, America may well be in the process of adding a pension crisis to the unemployment problem.

Second, household over-indebtedness in the US, as well as the fall in demand, is localized, as my colleague Amir Sufi and his co-author, Atif Mian, have shown. Hairdressers in Las Vegas lost their jobs partly because households there have too much debt stemming from the housing boom, and partly because many local construction workers and real-estate brokers were laid off. Even if we can coerce traditional debt-free savers to spend, it is unlikely that there are enough of them in Las Vegas.

If these debt-free savers are in New York City, which did not experience as much of a boom and a bust, cutting real interest rates will encourage spending on haircuts in New York City, which already has plenty of demand, but not in Las Vegas, which has too little. Put differently, real interest rates are too blunt a stimulus tool, even if they work.

Third, we have little idea about how the public forms expectations about the central bank’s future actions. If the Fed announces that it will tolerate 4% inflation, could the public think that the Fed is bluffing, or that, if an implicit inflation target can be broken once, it can be broken again? Would expectations shift to a much higher inflation rate? How would the added risk premium affect long-term interest rates? What kind of recession would the US have to endure to bring inflation back to comfortable levels?

The answer to all of these questions is: We really don’t know. Given the dubious benefits of still lower real interest rates, placing central-bank credibility at risk would be irresponsible.
Finally, it is not even clear that the zero lower bound is primarily responsible for high US unemployment. Traditional Keynesian frictions like the difficulty of reducing wages and benefits in some industries, as well as non-traditional frictions like the difficulty of moving when one cannot sell (or buy) a house, may share blame.

We cannot ignore high unemployment. Clearly, improving indebted households’ ability to refinance at low current interest rates could help to reduce their debt burden, as would writing off some mortgage debt in cases where falling house prices have left borrowers deep underwater (that is, the outstanding mortgage exceeds the house’s value).

More could be done here. The good news is that household debt is coming down through a combination of repayments and write-offs. But it is also important to recognize that the path to a sustainable recovery does not lie in restoring irresponsible and unaffordable pre-crisis spending, which had the collateral effect of creating unsustainable jobs in construction and finance.

With a savings rate of barely 4% of GDP, the average US household is unlikely to be over-saving. Sensible policy lies in improving the capabilities of the workforce across the country, so that they can get sustainable jobs with steady incomes. That takes time, but it might be the best option left.

Raghuram Rajan is a professor of finance at the University of Chicago’s Booth School of Business. He previously served as the International Monetary Fund’s youngest-ever chief economist, and was Chairman of India’s Committee on Financial Sector Reforms. He is the author of Fault Lines: How Hidden Fractures Still Threaten the World Economy.

Raghuram Rajan: The Public and Its Problems

CHICAGO – On a recent visit to Europe, I found economists, journalists, and business people thoroughly frustrated with their politicians. Why, they ask, can’t politicians see the abyss that yawns before them, and come together to resolve the euro crisis once and for all?

Even if there is no consensus on what a solution might be, can’t they meet and thrash out a plan that goes beyond their repeated half-measures? It is only because of the European Central Bank’s bold decision to lend long term to banks that we have seen some respite recently, or so their argument goes. Politicians, in contrast, are failing Europe by being forever behind the curve. Why do they find it so hard to lead?

One answer that can be easily dismissed is that politicians simply don’t understand the gravity of the situation. Political leaders need not be economic geniuses to understand the advice that they hear, and many are both intelligent and well-read.

A second answer – that politicians have short time horizons, owing to electoral cycles – may contain a kernel of truth, but it is inadequate, because the adverse consequences of timid action often become apparent well before they are up for re-election.

The best answer that I have heard comes from Axel Weber, the former president of Germany’s Bundesbank and an astute political observer. In Weber’s view, policymakers simply do not have the public mandate to get ahead of problems, especially novel ones that seem small initially, but, if unresolved, imply potentially large costs.

If the problem has not been experienced before, the public is not convinced of the potential costs of inaction. And, if action prevents the problem, the public never experiences the averted calamity, and voters therefore penalize political leaders for the immediate costs that the action entails. Even if politicians have perfect foresight of the disaster that awaits if nothing is done, they may have little ability to persuade voters, or less insightful party members, that the short-term costs must be paid.

Talk is cheap, and, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the status quo usually appears comfortable enough. So leaders’ ability to take corrective action increases only with time, as some of the costs of inaction are experienced.

Calamity can still be averted if the costs of inaction escalate steadily. The worst problems, however, are those with “inaction costs” that remain invisible for a long time, but increase suddenly and explosively. By the time the leader has the mandate to act, it may be too late.

A classic example was Winston Churchill’s warnings against Adolf Hitler’s ambitions. Hitler’s plans were outlined in Mein Kampf for all to read – and he did not disguise them in his speeches. Yet few in Britain wanted to give them credence, and many thought that communism was the greater threat, especially in the bleak years of the Great Depression.

The Nazis’ dismembering of Czechoslovakia in 1938 made the sincerity of Hitler’s ambitions all too clear. But it was only after the invasion of Poland the following year that Churchill was appointed First Lord of the Admiralty, and he became Prime Minister only after the invasion of France in 1940, when Britain stood alone.

Britain might well have been better off had Churchill held power earlier, but that would have meant costly rearmament, which was unacceptable so long as there was a chance that Hitler proved to be a paper tiger. And, of course, it would also have meant entrusting Britain’s fate to a politician who, though now regarded as an indomitable leader, was widely distrusted at the time.

Non-linear costs of inaction are most obvious in the financial sector. At the same time, financial-sector problems may be particularly difficult to address: if politicians emphasize the need for action too strongly in order to get a mandate, they might precipitate the very turmoil that they seek to contain.

Between the Bear Stearns crisis and the failure of Lehman Brothers, the United States government could do little to get ahead of the growing problem (though, of course, the government-backed mortgage underwriters Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were placed under conservatorship in the interim). It took the post-Lehman panic for Congress to authorize the Troubled Asset Relief Program, which threw a financial lifeline to banks and the auto industry, among others. And only frenetic action by the Federal Reserve and Treasury (with authorities around the world joining) prevented a systemic meltdown. A subprime-mortgage problem that was initially estimated to imply losses of a few hundred billion dollars imposed far higher costs on the entire world.

Similarly, eurozone politicians have obtained a mandate to take bolder action only as the markets have made the costs of inaction more salient. Even setting aside Germany’s understandable attempt to limit how much it would have to pay, it is difficult to see how politicians could have gotten ahead of the problem.

While the ECB has bought the eurozone some time, the calming effect on markets may be a mixed blessing. Have Europeans seen enough of the abyss to tolerate stronger action by their leaders? If not, markets might have to deteriorate further to make possible a comprehensive resolution to the eurozone crisis.

Similarly, with government bond yields as low as they are in the US, the public has little sense of urgency about its fiscal problems, though some doomsayers, like Peter Peterson of the Blackstone Group, have been trying their best to awaken it. One hopes that the coming US presidential election will lead to a more enlightened public debate about tax and entitlement reform. Otherwise, a rapid escalation of yields in the bond market might be necessary for the public to accept that there is a problem, and for politicians to have the room to resolve it.

Don’t blame the leaders for appearing short-sighted and indecisive; the fault may lie with us, the public, for not listening to the worrywarts.

Raghuram Rajan is Professor of Finance at the Booth School of Business, University of Chicago, and the author of Fault Lines: How Hidden Fractures Still Threaten the World Economy.

 

Raghuram Rajan: 世界經濟的難題

在近期訪歐期間，我發現似乎所有的經濟學家，媒體和商界人士都對本國政界深感絕望。他們百思不得其解：政治家們為何敢無視橫亙在身前的萬丈深淵，為何不能團結起來一鼓作氣解決當前的歐債危機。

即便在解決方案上未能達成共識，那麼那些政治家們何不拋棄那些治標不治本的方案，一起開會制定一個超越一切的全面性計劃？只有在歐洲央行最近做出向銀行發放長期貸款的勇敢決定後他們才看到了一絲困難緩解的景像。相比之下政治家們卻總是跟不上形勢，而這樣下去只能搞垮歐洲。領導國家真有那麼難嗎？

其中一個很容易被排除的答案就是政治家們根本沒意識到事態的嚴重性。政治家們無需具備經濟學家的頭腦就能理解他們所聽到的建議，更可況其中許多人還是博學多才，飽讀詩書之輩。

另一個答案——政治家們都是短視的，被選舉周期所主導——可能有些道理，卻也不甚充分。因為即便一個微小的政治動作所產生的反作用都會在連任選舉來臨之前徹底顯現。

而我所聽到的最佳答案來自德國聯邦銀行前行長Axel Weber——此人同時也是一位敏銳的政治觀察家。在Weber看來原因很簡單，政策制定者顯然無法從公眾那裡獲得提前應對問題的授權，尤其是那些一開始看似非常微小，一旦爆發卻需要花費極大成本才能解決的新問題。

由於從未經歷過這些問題，公眾也就無從得知不作為的話將產生多少潛在成本。因為不知道災難的後果究竟有多嚴重，公眾甚至會懲罰那些防患於未然的政治家，因為後者的果斷行為帶來了某些額外支出。即便政治家們完全意識到不作為將引發極大的災難，他們也很難去說服選民或者那些短視的政黨成員去支付一些短期成本。

任何說辭都是廉價的，更何況還缺乏證據，相比之下現狀往往令人感覺一切正常。因此領導人只能等待，等到人們吃過了苦頭才能採取正確的行動。而如果不作為所付出的成本逐漸增加的話也能有助於避免災難的發生。但最可怕的莫過於那些“不作為成本”長期處於不可見狀態，但卻突然出現爆發式飆升的情況。當領導人隨之獲得行動授權時，一切往往都已經太晚了。

這方面的一個經典案例就是丘吉爾對希特拉野心的警告。希特拉的計劃在《我的奮鬥》一書中早有描述——甚至在其演說中也毫不掩飾。但只有很少英國人相信這一切會發生，許多人甚至認為共產主義才是更重大的威脅，尤其是在大蕭條的那段死氣沉沉的時期。

納粹1938年肢解捷克斯洛伐克的行為使得希特拉的野心暴露無疑。但直到第二年閃擊波蘭之後丘吉爾才被任命為海軍大臣，隨後在1940年德軍揮師入侵法國之後才升任首相，可那時的英國已經完全陷入孤立了。

如果丘吉爾能提前上台的話英國的日子或許會好過很多，但卻意味著要提前付出大量金錢來重整軍備，這對那些心存僥幸，認為希特拉不過是只紙老虎的人來說是無法接受的。與此同時，這還意味著將英國的命運托付給一個如今以絕不屈服聞名，當年卻根本不受大眾信任的政治家。

而非線性增加的不作為成本在金融部門顯得尤為突出。同時金融部門的問題可能尤其棘手：如果政治家們過度強調行動的緊迫性以換取授權，結果往往非但沒能遏制危機，反而加速其爆發。

在貝爾斯登危機直到雷曼兄弟破產的那段中間時期，美國政府在遏制危機發展方面確實沒有多少行動空間（雖然房地美和房利美這兩個政府撐腰的抵押貸款擔保人都被臨時保護了起來）。只有在經歷了雷曼兄弟的陣痛之後國會才通過問題資產救助計劃，最終在財政上救了銀行和汽車行業一命。於是我們看到的是美聯儲和財政部（還有全球各國當局聯手）只有很短的時間去手忙腳亂地安排如何防止一場系統性崩潰。一場原本估計只會造成幾千億美元損失的次級抵押貸款問題最後為全球帶來了極大的處理成本。

同樣，歐羅區的政治家們只有在市場更加關注不作為成本時才能獲得授權。你很難看見政治家們如何能先一步解決問題，更別提德國試圖限制自己援助出資額的（即使負面但卻可以理解的）做法了。

當歐洲央行為歐羅區爭取了一點時間的時候，市場的鎮定效應可能會帶來好壞參半的影響。歐洲人是否受夠了其領導人不願采取更強硬行動的狀況？如果答案是否定的話，那麼市場將進一步惡化以促成一個歐羅區危機綜合性解決方案的出台。

同樣，隨著政府債券收益變得像美國一樣低下，即使像黑石集團創始人Peter Peterson這類末日預言家一直在大聲疾呼，公眾照樣會對財政問題失去緊迫感。有人希望接下來的美國總統選舉將在稅務和授權改革方面激起一場更為理性開明的公眾討論。否則的話就只有靠債務市場收益的迅速上升來使公眾意識到事態嚴重，並留給政治家們足夠的空間來解決問題。

因此請不要指責政治家的短視和猶豫不決；真正有錯的可能是我們，一群不願聆聽忠言的公眾。

作者為前國際貨幣基金組織首席經濟學家，芝加哥大學布斯商學院經濟學教授，著有"Fault Lines: How Hidden Fractures Still Threaten the World Economy"一書

Raghuram Rajan: A Crisis in Two Narratives / 一個危機，兩種解讀

CHICAGO – With the world’s industrial democracies in crisis, two competing narratives of its sources – and appropriate remedies – are emerging. The first, better-known diagnosis is that demand has collapsed because of high debt accumulated prior to the crisis. Households (and countries) that were most prone to spend cannot borrow any more. To revive growth, others must be encouraged to spend – governments that can still borrow should run larger deficits, and rock-bottom interest rates should discourage thrifty households from saving.

Under these circumstances, budgetary recklessness is a virtue, at least in the short term. In the medium term, once growth revives, debt can be paid down and the financial sector curbed so that it does not inflict another crisis on the world.

This narrative – the standard Keynesian line, modified for a debt crisis – is the one to which most government officials, central bankers, and Wall Street economists have subscribed, and needs little elaboration. Its virtue is that it gives policymakers something clear to do, with promised returns that match the political cycle. Unfortunately, despite past stimulus, growth is still tepid, and it is increasingly difficult to find sensible new spending that can pay off in the short run.

Attention is therefore shifting to the second narrative, which suggests that the advanced economies’ fundamental capacity to grow by making useful things has been declining for decades, a trend that was masked by debt-fueled spending. More such spending will not return these countries to a sustainable growth path. Instead, they must improve the environment for growth.

The second narrative starts with the 1950’s and 1960’s, an era of rapid growth in the West and Japan. Several factors, including post-war reconstruction, the resurgence of trade after the protectionist 1930’s, the introduction of new technologies in power, transport, and communications across countries, and expansion of educational attainment, underpinned the long boom. But, as Tyler Cowen has argued in his book The Great Stagnation, once these “low-hanging fruit” were plucked, it became much harder to propel growth from the 1970’s onward.

Meanwhile, as Wolfgang Streeck writes persuasively in New Left Review, democratic governments, facing what seemed, in the 1960’s, like an endless vista of innovation and growth, were quick to expand the welfare state. But, when growth faltered, this meant that government spending expanded, even as its resources shrank. For a while, central banks accommodated that spending. The resulting high inflation created widespread discontent, especially because little growth resulted. Faith in Keynesian stimulus diminished, though high inflation did reduce public-debt levels.

Central banks then began to focus on low and stable inflation as their primary objective, and became more independent from their political masters. But deficit spending by governments continued apace, and public debt as a share of GDP in industrial countries climbed steadily from the late 1970’s, this time without inflation to reduce its real value.

Recognizing the need to find new sources of growth, towards the end of Jimmy Carter’s presidency, and then under Ronald Reagan, the United States deregulated industry and the financial sector, as did Margaret Thatcher in the United Kingdom. Productivity growth increased substantially in these countries over time, which persuaded Continental Europe to adopt reforms of its own, often pushed by the European Commission.

Yet even this growth was not enough, given previous governments’ generous promises of health care and pensions – promises made even less tenable by rising life expectancy and falling birth rates. Public debt continued to grow. And the incomes of the moderately educated middle class failed to benefit from deregulation-led growth (though it improved their lot as consumers).

The most recent phase of the advanced economies’ frenzied search for growth took different forms. In some countries, most notably the US, a private-sector credit boom created jobs in low-skilled industries like construction, and precipitated a consumption boom as people borrowed against overvalued houses. In other countries, like Greece, as well as under regional administrations in Italy and Spain, a government-led hiring spree created secure jobs for the moderately educated.

In this “fundamental” narrative, the advanced countries’ pre-crisis GDP was unsustainable, bolstered by borrowing and unproductive make-work jobs. More borrowed growth – the Keynesian formula – may create the illusion of normalcy, and may be useful in the immediate aftermath of a deep crisis to calm a panic, but it is no solution to a fundamental growth problem.

If this diagnosis is correct, advanced countries need to focus on reviving innovation and productivity growth over the medium term, and on realigning welfare promises with revenue capacity, while alleviating the pain of the truly destitute in the short run. For example, Southern Europe’s growth potential may consist in deregulating service sectors and reducing employment protection to spur creation of more private-sector jobs for retrenched government workers and unemployed youth.

In the US, the imperative is to improve the match between potential jobs and worker skills. People understand better than the government what they need and are acting accordingly. Many women, for example, are leaving low-paying jobs to acquire skills that will open doors to higher-paying positions. Too little government attention has been focused on such issues, partly because payoffs occur beyond electoral horizons, and partly because the effectiveness of government programs has been mixed. Tax reform, however, can provide spur retraining and maintain incentives to work, even while fixing gaping fiscal holes.

Three powerful forces, one hopes, will help to create more productive jobs in the future: better use of information and communications technology (and new ways to make it pay), lower-cost energy as alternative sources are harnessed, and sharply rising demand in emerging markets for higher-value-added goods.

The advanced countries have a choice. They can act as if all is well, except that their consumers are in a funk, and that “animal spirits” must be revived through stimulus. Or they can treat the crisis as a wake-up call to fix what debt has papered over in the last few decades. For better or worse, the narrative that persuades these countries’ governments and publics will determine their future – and that of the global economy.

Raghuram Rajan is Professor of Finance at the Booth School of Business, University of Chicago, and the author of Fault Lines: How Hidden Fractures Still Threaten the World Economy.

Raghuram Rajan: 一個危機，兩種解讀

芝加哥—世界發達民主國家陷入了危機，關於什麼是危機的源頭以及如何補救，出現了兩種相互對立的聲音。第一種為人所熟知的診斷是需求因為危機前積累的高債務而崩潰。最具支出傾向的家庭（以及國家）再也無法借到錢了。為了重振增長，必須鼓勵其他家庭和國家來支出——仍然能夠借錢的政府應該擴大赤字，同時極低的利率應該阻止節約的家庭繼續儲蓄。

這種觀點認為，粗獷的預算是一種美德，至少在短期看是如此。從中期看，只要增長能夠得到提振，債務就能活得償付，而金融部門得到了抑制，因此不會在世界上掀起另一場危機。

這種觀點是標准的凱恩斯主義，只是根據債務危機做了些許修正。該觀點受到了大部分政府官員、中央銀行和華爾街經濟學家的支持，已無需再贅述了。其優點在於向決策者明確指出了行動方向，還給出了符合政治周期的預期回報。不幸的是，盡管已經實施了刺激措施，但增長仍然疲軟，而且，從短期看，要找到給力的新支出之源越來越困難了。

於是，人們的目光開始轉移到第二種觀點。這種觀點認為，發達經濟體通過生產有用的東西獲得增長的基本能力下滑已經持續了數十年之久了，其特征便是用債務來支撐支出。更多的同類支出無法給這些國家帶來可持續的增長。相反，它們必須改善增長環境。

第二種觀點的著眼點始於20世紀五六十年代，當時正是西方和日本的高速增長期。幾大因素——包括戰後重建、20世紀30年代保護主義風潮過去之後的貿易復興、電力、運輸和跨國通信方面的新技術，以及教育程度的改善——推動了長期繁榮。但是，泰勒·柯萬（Tyler Cowen）在其《大停滯》（The Great Stagnation）一書中指出，這些“低處的果實”被摘取殆盡後，進入20世紀70年代以來，提振增長就變得日益困難了。

與此同時，沃爾夫岡·斯特裡克（Wolfgang Streeck）在《新左翼評論》（New Left Review）中雄辯地寫道，民主政府在20世紀60年代面臨著看似永遠光明的創新和增長前景，因此大踏步地進入了福利國家的行列。但是，當增長開始放緩時，這意味著政府支出的膨脹（盡管此時其創收資源出現了萎縮）。在一定的時間裡，央行承擔起了支出的重任。由此產生的高通脹引起了廣泛的不滿，特別是在增長不見提振的情況下。人們對凱恩斯主義刺激的信任度下降了，儘管高通脹確實降低了公債水平。

此後，央行開始將穩定的低通脹作為其首要目標，並越來越獨立於行政。但政府的赤字支出並沒有放慢腳步，發達國家公債水平佔GDP的比例從20世紀70年代末開始穩步攀升，這一次不再有通脹來幫它們拉低債務的真實價值了。

美國從吉米·卡特任期后半段和羅納德·裡根任期內開始認識到需要尋找新的增長源，並對產業和金融部門實施了去監管化，與此同時，撒切爾夫人在英國也採取了相似的動作。多年來，這些國家的生產率有了顯著提高，受此影響，歐洲大陸國家也採取了改革（大多由歐洲委員會推動）。

但由於此前政府承諾了過於慷慨的醫療和養老承諾，如此增長仍舊顯得力不從心，而預期壽命的增加和出生率的下降使得政府愈加不堪重負了。公債水平繼續增加。而教育程度適中的中產階級在去監管化帶來的增長中並沒有獲得好處（盡管作為消費者，他們獲益良多）。

發達經濟體瘋狂尋找增長的最新階段，各國可謂八仙過海各顯神通。在有的國家（以美國為甚），私人部門的信貸繁榮為低技能行業（如建筑業）帶來了大量工作崗位，而居民則通過以價值高估的房地產作抵押，借錢來維持消費繁榮。在其他國家（如希臘以及西班牙和意大利的部分地區），政府領導的招工潮為教育程度不高者提供了就業保障。

在這一“基本面”觀點看來，發達國家的危機前GDP增長是不可持續的，是用借貸和非生產性冗余工作崗位堆出來的。“借”來的繁榮——即凱恩斯模式——可以造成一種常態幻覺，在深度危機襲來後可以起到平息恐慌的作用，但絕非基本增長問題的解決辦法。

如果這一診斷正確，那麼發達國家就需要將注意力集中於重塑中期創新和生產率增長，同時根據收入能力重新定義福利承諾，在短期則致力於減輕真正赤貧者的痛苦。比如，南歐國家的增長潛力或許在於放鬆服務部門的監管、減少就業保護以為丟掉工作的政府員工和失業青年創造更多的私人部門工作崗位。

在美國，當務之急是改善潛在工作崗位和工人技能之間的匹配度。個人要比政府更清楚知道他們需要什麼，並據此行動。比如，大量婦女正在脫離低收入崗位，以便獲得更好的技能叩開高收入職位之門。政府在這些方面的關注度遠遠不夠，部分是因為其好處要在在任者任期結束後才會顯現，也有部分是因為政府計劃的效率不夠高。稅收改革可以刺激人們參與再培訓，也可以激勵人們繼續工作，且不耽誤填補財政窟窿。

有三大力量有助於在未來創造更多的生產性崗位：對信息和通訊技術的更好的使用（以及新的收費方式）、隨著替代資源的開發而實現的低成本能源，以及新興市場快速增長的對高附加值產品的需求。

發達國家有的選擇。它們可以若無其事（儘管消費者如同驚弓之鳥，“動物精神”也需要刺激來予以提振）。它們也可以將此次危機視為修正過去數十年來產生債務的問題的契機。無論如何，政府和公眾選擇相信哪種觀點將決定它們的未來——以及全球經濟的未來。

Raghuram Rajan 是芝加哥大學布斯商學院金融學教授，著有《斷層線：隱藏的裂縫是如何繼續維持世界經濟的》。