George Soros: A Europe of Solidarity, Not Only Discipline / 團結與紀律並重的歐洲

BERLIN – Originally, the European Union was what psychologists call a “fantastic object,” a desirable goal that inspires people’s imaginations. I saw it as the embodiment of an open society – an association of nation-states that gave up part of their sovereignty for the common good and formed a union dominated by no one nation or nationality.

The euro crisis, however, has turned the EU into something radically different. Member countries are now divided into two classes – creditors and debtors – with the creditors in charge. As the largest and most creditworthy country, Germany occupies a dominant position. Debtor countries pay substantial risk premiums to finance their debt, which is reflected in their high economy-wide borrowing costs. This has pushed them into a deflationary tailspin and put them at a substantial – and potentially permanent – competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis creditor countries.

This outcome does not reflect a deliberate plan, but rather a series of policy mistakes. Germany did not seek to occupy a dominant position in Europe, and it is reluctant to accept the obligations and liabilities that such a position entails. Call this the tragedy of the European Union.

Recent developments seem to offer grounds for optimism. The authorities are taking steps to correct their mistakes, especially with the decision to form a banking union and the outright monetary transactions program, which would allow unlimited intervention by the European Central Bank in the sovereign-bond market. Financial markets have been reassured that the euro is here to stay. That could be a turning point, provided it is adequately reinforced with additional steps toward greater integration.
Unfortunately, the EU’s unfolding tragedy characteristically feeds on such glimmers of hope. Germany remains willing to do the minimum – and nothing more – to hold the euro together, and the EU’s recent steps have merely reinforced German resistance to further concessions. This will perpetuate the division between creditor and debtor countries.

A widening gap in economic performance and political dominance is such a dismal prospect for the EU that it must not be allowed to become permanent. There must be a way to prevent it – after all, history is not predetermined. The EU, originally conceived as an instrument of solidarity, is today held together by grim necessity. That is not conducive to a harmonious partnership. The only way to reverse the trend is to recapture the spirit of solidarity that animated the European project from the start.

To that end, I recently established an Open Society Initiative for Europe (OSIFE). In doing so, I recognized that the best place to start would be where current policies have created the greatest human suffering: Greece. The people who are suffering are not those who abused the system and caused the crisis. The fate of the many migrant and asylum seekers caught in Greece is particularly heart-rending. But their plight cannot be separated from that of the Greeks themselves. An initiative confined to migrants would merely reinforce the growing xenophobia and extremism in Greece.

I could not figure out how to approach this seemingly intractable problem until I recently visited Stockholm to commemorate the centenary of Raoul Wallenberg’s birth. This reawakened my memories of World War II – the calamity that eventually gave birth to the EU.
Wallenberg was a hero who saved the lives of many Jews in my home city of Budapest by establishing Swedish safe houses. During the German occupation, my father was also a heroic figure. He helped to save his family and friends and many others. He taught me to confront harsh reality rather than to submit to it passively. That is what gave me the idea.
We could set up solidarity houses in Greece, which would serve as community centers for the local population and also provide food and shelter to migrants. There are already many soup kitchens and civil-society efforts to help the migrants, but these initiatives cannot cope with the scale of the problem. What I have in mind is to reinforce these efforts.

The EU’s asylum policy has broken down. Refugees must register in the member country where they enter, but the Greek government cannot process the cases. Some 60,000 refugees who sought to register have been put into detention facilities where conditions are inhumane. Migrants who do not register and live on the street are attacked by the hooligans of the neo-fascist Golden Dawn party.

Sweden has made migration and asylum policy a high priority, while Norway is concerned about the fate of migrants in Greece. So both countries would be prime candidates to support solidarity houses. And other better-off countries could join them. OSIFE is ready to provide support for this initiative, and I hope other foundations will be eager to do the same. But this has to be a European project – one that eventually must find its way into the European budget.

Currently, Golden Dawn is making political headway by providing social services to Greeks while attacking migrants. The initiative that I propose would offer a positive alternative, based on solidarity – the solidarity of Europeans with Greeks and of Greeks with migrants. It would provide a practical demonstration of the spirit that ought to infuse the entire EU.

As soon as possible, I will dispatch an OSIFE needs-assessment team to Greece to contact the authorities – and the people and organizations already helping the needy – to work out a plan for which we can generate public support. My goal is to revive the idea of the EU as an instrument of solidarity, not only of discipline.


George Soros is Chairman of Soros Fund Management and Chairman of the Open Society Foundations. A pioneer of the hedge-fund industry, he is the author of many books, including The Alchemy of Finance and The New Paradigm for Financial Markets: The Credit Crisis of 2008 and What it Means.

George Soros: 團結與紀律並重的歐洲

柏林——歐盟原本被心理學家稱為“如夢似幻的目標”，如此這般的理想目標可以徹底激發人們的想象。我認為它是開放社會的化身——民族國家為了共同的利益而放棄部分主權，結成任何國家或民族都無法操縱的聯盟。

但歐元危機後的歐盟已變得截然不同。會員國現在割裂為債權國和債務國兩大陣營——這兩大陣營由債權國佔據主導。德國作為最大也最有信譽的債權國佔統治地位。債務國為籌資還債被迫支付高額的風險溢價，導致其經濟借貸成本一直居高。他們也因此陷入通貨緊縮的失控狀態，這使他們在與債權國的競爭中處於明顯——或許會是永久的劣勢之中。

導致如此結果的並不是深思熟慮的計劃，而是一系列的政策失誤。德國並不想在歐洲佔據主導地位，也不願承擔由上述地位所帶來的責任和義務。我們可以將這稱為歐盟的悲劇。

近來的事態發展似乎讓我們有理由感到樂觀。當局正採取措施糾正自己的錯誤，特別是決策成立銀行工會和完全貨幣交易計劃，以便歐洲央行借此不受限制地干預主權債務市場。金融市場得到了歐元將繼續存在的保証。只要進一步充分落實一體化政策，這有可能成為歐元危機的重要轉折。

遺憾的是，歐盟正在逼近的悲劇總是會扼殺希望的曙光。德國仍然只願為保住歐元付出最低限度的努力（僅此而已、別無其他），而歐盟近來的舉措只是強化了德國對更多讓步要求的抵觸立場。這會導致債權國和債務國的鴻溝成為永久現象。

對歐盟而言，經濟表現和政治地位差距拉大的前景是如此可怕，絕不能任其發展為一種永久現象。一定能找到阻止噩夢成真的方法——歸根結底，歷史不是預先注定的。原本被設想為團結利器的歐盟，今天依然存在僅僅是因為別無選擇。這種情況不利於和諧伙伴關系的建立。力挽狂瀾的唯一方法是重新找回歐洲計劃伊始就令其充滿活力的團結精神。

為此我最新成立了歐洲開放社會計劃（OSIFE）。在此過程中，最好從現行政策造成痛苦最深的地方開始，這個地方就是希臘。受苦受難的並非那些濫用制度、引發危機的罪魁禍首。陷入困境的眾多移民和尋求庇護者的命運尤其令人感傷。但我們沒辦法將他們的困境與希臘人分開。僅限於移民的援助計劃只會給希臘正在滋長的排外和極端主義火上澆油。

直到最近訪問斯德哥爾摩紀念羅爾·瓦倫堡誕辰一百周年之前，我都找不到這個看似棘手問題的解決方法。這喚起了我對二戰災難的記憶，正是這場災難導致了歐盟的誕生。

瓦倫堡是位英雄人物，他在我的家鄉布達佩斯建立瑞典安全屋，挽救了眾多猶太人的生命。德國佔領期間我父親也是位英雄人物。他挽救了家人、朋友和其他很多人。他教會我要面對殘酷的現實，而不是被動地屈服於它。我因此有了這樣的想法。

我們可以在希臘設立團結屋，在充當當地居民社區中心的同時為移民提供食物和住所。已經有不少舍粥場和民間力量在幫助移民，但這些計劃應對如此規模的問題還遠遠不夠。我要做的是強化這些力量。

歐盟的庇護政策已經陷入癱瘓。難民必須在入境成員國進行注冊，但希臘政府卻無力應對他們的情況。大約60,000名尋求注冊的難民被投入條件很不人道的拘留中心，沒有注冊的移民則露宿街頭，成為新法西斯金色黎明黨流氓的襲擊對象。

瑞典優先重視移民和庇護政策，而挪威則非常關注希臘的移民狀況。因此上述兩國可以作為援建團結屋的主要候選力量。其他富裕國家也可以助他們一臂之力。歐洲開放社會計劃願意支持這項行動，我希望其他基金會也熱忱參與這項行動。但這必需成為一項歐洲計劃——也就是說這項計劃必需納入歐洲預算之中。

目前，金色黎明借著為希臘人提供社會服務和襲擊移民來為自己撈取政治資本。我所提議的計劃可以提供一項建立在團結（歐洲與希臘人的團結和希臘人與移民的團結）基礎上的積極選擇。它可以讓人們在現實中看到本應滲透整個歐盟的團結精神。

我會盡快派遣一支歐洲開放社會計劃需求評估團隊到希臘與當局（及已經在幫助需要者的民眾和組織）聯系，以便制定一項能爭取公眾支持的計劃。我的目標是重新喚起歐盟的團結作用，而不讓歐盟僅僅淪為執行機構。

George Soros: New Year, Same Crisis / 新的一年，危機不變

DAVOS – The measures introduced by the European Central Bank last December, especially the Long Term Refinancing Operation (LTRO), have relieved the liquidity problems of European banks, but have not cured the financing disadvantage of the highly indebted member states. Since high-risk premiums on government bonds endanger the capital adequacy of banks, half a solution is not enough.

Indeed, that supposed solution leaves half the eurozone relegated to the status of Third World countries that have become highly indebted in a foreign currency. Instead of the International Monetary Fund, it is Germany that is acting as the taskmaster imposing tough fiscal discipline on them. This will generate both economic and political tensions that could destroy the European Union.

I have proposed a plan that would allow Italy and Spain to refinance their debt by issuing treasury bills at around 1%. I named it in memory of my friend Tomasso Padoa-Schioppa, who, as Italy’s central banker in the 1990’s, helped to stabilize that country’s finances. The plan is rather complicated, but it is legally and technically sound. I describe it in detail in my new book Financial Turmoil in Europe and the United States.

European authorities rejected my plan in favor of the LTRO. The difference between the two schemes is that mine would provide instant relief to Italy and Spain. By contrast, the LTRO allows Italian and Spanish banks to engage in a very profitable and practically riskless arbitrage, but has kept government bonds hovering on the edge of a precipice – although the last few days brought some relief.

My proposal is to use the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) to insure the European Central Bank against the solvency risk on any newly issued Italian or Spanish treasury bills that it may buy from commercial banks. This would allow the European Banking Authority to treat these various T-bills as the equivalent of cash, because they could be sold to the ECB at any time.

Banks would then find it advantageous to hold their surplus liquidity in the form of T-bills as long as these bills yielded more than bank deposits held at the ECB. Italy and Spain would then be able to refinance their debt at close to the ECB’s deposit rate, which is currently 1% on mandatory reserves and 25 basis points on excess-reserve accounts.

This would greatly improve the sustainability of these countries’ debt. Italy, for instance, would see its average borrowing cost decline from the current 4.3%. Confidence would gradually return, yields on outstanding bonds would decline, banks would no longer be penalized for owning Italian government bonds, and Italy would gradually regain access to the market at more reasonable interest rates.

One obvious objection to this strategy is that it would reduce the average maturity of Italian and Spanish debt. I believe that, on the contrary, this would be an advantage in the current exceptional circumstances, because it would keep the Italian and Spanish governments on a short leash; no country concerned could afford to lose the ECB facility.

In the case of Italy, the short leash would dissuade former Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi from seeking to topple Mario Monti’s new government (which has only a fragile majority), because if Berlusconi precipitated an election, the electorate would punish him. This would help to reestablish political stability and accelerate Italy’s return to the market.

My proposal fulfills both the letter and the spirit of Article 123 of the Lisbon Treaty. The ECB’s task is to provide liquidity to banks, while the EFSF and ESM are designed to absorb solvency risk. The ECB would not be facilitating additional borrowing by member countries; it would merely allow them to refinance their debt at a lower cost.

Together, the ECB and the EFSF could do what the ECB cannot do on its own. This would provide temporary relief from a fatal flaw in the euro design’s until the member countries devise a more permanent solution.

The EFSF would have practically unlimited capacity to insure eurozone T-bills in this way, because no country could default as long as the scheme was in operation. Nor could a country abuse the privilege, lest it be automatically withdrawn, causing the country’s cost of borrowing to rise immediately.

For the first time in this crisis, the European authorities would undertake an operation for which they have more than sufficient resources. Coming as a positive surprise to the markets, it would reverse their mood. After all, markets do have moods; indeed, that is what the authorities have to learn in order to deal with financial crises.

Contrary to the current discourse, the long-term solution must provide a stimulus to get Europe out of a deflationary vicious circle – structural reform alone will not do it. The stimulus must come from the EU, because individual countries will be under strict fiscal discipline. It will have to be guaranteed jointly and severally – and that means eurobonds in one guise or another.

George Soros is Chairman of Soros Fund Management and of the Open Society Institute.

George Soros: 新的一年，危機不變

達沃斯——去年12月份，歐洲央行推出的措施，尤其是“長期再融資操作”，緩解了歐洲各銀行的流動性問題，但是並沒有消除高負債成員國的融資劣勢。自從政府債券的高風險溢價危及各銀行的資本充足性以來，治標不治本的解決辦法已經不夠。

實際上，這種解決辦法使一半歐元區成員國淪為了第三世界的國家，背負了大量以外幣計價的債務。迫使它們實行嚴厲財政紀律的不是國際貨幣基金組織而是德國，德國充當了監管者的角色。這會導致經濟和政治關系緊張，破壞歐盟。

我提出了一個計劃，它能夠通過發行收益率約為1%的國庫券為其債務重新融資。我有一位朋友叫托馬索•派多亞•夏歐帕，他在20世紀90年代曾任意大利央行行長，幫助穩定了該國的金融業。為了紀念他，我用他的名字命名了我的計劃。這個計劃相當復雜，但是從合法性和技術上來說都是相當不錯的。我在自己的新著《歐洲和美國的金融亂局》中詳細介紹了這個計劃。

歐洲當局拒絕了我的計劃，採用了“長期再融資操作”。這兩個方案的不同之處在於，我的方案能夠立即為意大利和西班牙紓困。相比之下，“長期再融資操作”能夠讓意大利和西班牙各銀行參與利潤豐厚、實際上毫無風險的套利活動，卻讓政府債券的收益率徘徊在危險的邊緣——盡管最后一段時間會有所緩解。

我的提議是，利用歐洲金融穩定基金和歐洲穩定機制確保歐洲央行為意大利或西班牙新發行的國庫券的償付能力風險提供擔保，歐洲央行可能會從各商業銀行購買這些債券。這將允許歐洲銀行管理局把各類國庫券當做現金，因為這些國庫券可以隨時賣給歐洲央行。

隻要這些國庫券的收益率比歐洲央行的銀行利率高，各銀行就會發現以國庫券的形式持有過剩的流動性有優勢。那時意大利和西班牙就能以接近於歐洲央行存款利率的收益率為其債務重新融資了。目前強制性存款的利率為1%，非強制性存款的利率要高25個基點。

這將大大改善這些國家的債務的可持續性。比如，意大利的平均借貸成本將從當前的4.3%降下來。信心將逐漸回升，未償還債券的收益率將下降，各銀行也不會再因持有意大利政府的債券受到懲罰，意大利將以比較合理的利率逐漸重返市場。

這項戰略的一個明顯目標是，將縮短意大利和西班牙債務到期的平均時間。相反，我認為，在當前的特殊時期，這是一種優勢，因為這將使意大利和西班牙政府暫時受到約束﹔沒有一個相關國家能夠脫離歐洲央行。

就意大利而言，暫時的約束將打消前首相西爾維奧•貝盧斯科尼推翻馬裡奧•蒙蒂新政府（新政府隻有脆弱的絕大多數）的念頭，因為如果貝盧斯科尼倉促進行選舉，選民將懲罰他。這將有助於重建政治穩定並促進意大利回歸市場。

我的提議體現了《裡斯本條約》第123款的內容和精神。歐洲央行的任務是為各銀行提供流動性，而歐洲金融穩定基金和歐洲穩定機制旨在承受償付能力的風險。歐洲央行不會助長成員國增加借貸，隻允許它們以較低的成本為其債務重新融資。

歐洲央行和歐洲金融穩定基金一起能夠完成歐洲央行自身無法完成的任務。在成員國沒有想出更加永久的解決辦法之前，這能夠紓一時之困，減弱歐元設計中致命缺陷的影響。

這樣的話，歐洲金融穩定基金實際上就有無限的能力擔保歐元區的國庫券了，因為隻要這個方案在運行，沒有一個國家會違約。也沒有一個國家能濫用這項特權，否則會自動退出該方案，導致該國的借貸成本立即上升。

在這次危機中，歐洲當局將首次在沒有足夠資源的情況下採取行動。對市場來說，這是一個積極的驚喜，扭轉了市場情緒。畢竟，市場是有情緒的﹔實際上，要應對金融危機，這是當局必須知道的。

與當前的論斷相反，長期的解決方案必須提供刺激，讓歐洲擺脫通貨緊縮的惡性循環——單單進行結構性改革無濟於事。必須由歐盟推出刺激計劃，因為每個成員國都將遵守嚴肅的財政紀律。它必須獲得共同和單獨擔保，而這意味著要採用歐元區債券的某種形式。

喬治•索羅斯是索羅斯基金管理公司和開放社會研究所的主席。