林毅夫(Justin
Lin)代表著一種相對新興的現象：他既是一位自信的中國學者，也是一位全球政策制定者。他現在是世界銀行(World
Bank)首席經濟學家兼高級副行長。雖然獲得過芝加哥大學(University of Chicago)博士學位，但他卻是一位地道的中國人：專業、愛國，最重要的是務實。
《解密中國經濟》(Demystifying
the Chinese Economy)一書由林毅夫教授在北京大學授課的講義翻譯而成，為讀者呈現了一位“局內人”對我們這個時代最重大經濟事件——中國之崛起——的見解。我發現他的許多見解很有說服力。不管讀者是否認同他的見解，我們都有必要了解一下像他這樣的人是怎麼想的。
那麼，該書告訴了我們什麼呢？
首先，中國的成就是驚人的。“自1978年以來，中國經濟連續33年保持快速增長。年均……增長率為9.9%，對外貿易的年均增長率為16.3%。”
其次，中國的增長也惠及整個世界。因此，“危機期間中國的強勁增長是全球經濟最重要的推動力。”同樣，“在2000-07年間，非洲有三分之二的經濟體的年增長率超過5.5%，有將近三分之一的經濟體達到7%。這種增長速度在非洲是史無前例的，它同樣可以在很大程度上歸功於中國的帶動。”
然而，書中所說的遠不止這些。
該書討論了一個耐人尋味的問題：為什麼中國在19世紀落到了西方的后面？今天有些人把這歸結於西方的運氣，認為西方幸運地把合適的資源配置到了合適的地方。林毅夫卻不然。他認為個中的原因是西方在科學方法上取得了重大突破。中國知識分子被科舉考試的要求束縛住了手腳，所以中國才在這方面落了下風。
與政策關系更大的一個論點是，林毅夫把發展戰略分為“違背比較優勢”和“遵循比較優勢”兩種。他認為，採用前一種戰略是大多數發展中國家的特點。這種戰略會催生缺乏生命力的企業、巨額的補貼、扭曲的財政、普遍的腐敗和虛弱的增長。在他看來，中國在當代取得成功的根源，就在於政策制定者鼓勵經濟朝著有利其強大比較優勢發揮的方向發展。這正是“改革開放”的真義。
但該書還認為，政策必須具有靈活性。例如，該書反對“休克療法”。一個理由似乎是，社會沒有能力應對巨大的動蕩。考慮到中共加諸於人民身上的諸多“休克”，這個理由聽上去很不可思議。還有一個理由是，政策制定者往往不知道什麼因素會起作用。書中列舉了許多失敗實驗的例子，這些實驗之所以失敗，就是因為人們不明白哪些動因在起作用。中國長期以來實行“雙軌制”改革，也就是“控制”與“放開”並行。中國所取得的成功，証明採取這種謹慎態度是有道理的。
創新是書中的一個重要話題。像中國這樣的“后發國家”應該把重點放在吸收已有的技術上。這樣做會降低發展的成本。許多這類創新體現在新機器上，正因如此，大舉投資引進新機器才有著至關重要的意義。
林毅夫並未忽視那些尚需努力的地方。例如，他擔心不平等加劇的問題。他強調，城鄉收入差距（目前為3.3:1）的進一步擴大將是爆炸性的。但他並非再分配理論的擁躉。相反，他認為，進一步改善市場機制會更有效。他強調的一個政策是發展中小銀行，以扶持中小企業。另一項政策是“建設社會主義新農村”，著重建設農村基礎設施，扶持投資和消費。
他還密切關注“三個過度”——過度投資、過度信貸以及過度的貿易順差。中國經濟確實處於失衡狀態，這一點再明顯不過了。
本書決非中國發展問題的權威著述。許多重要議題都被遺漏了，比如中國在世界經濟中扮演的角色。不可避免的是，它基本上也忽略了政治議題。但該書還是提供了豐富的信息，見解也很深刻。最重要的是，它源自一種稀罕得令人沮喪的思想立場：林毅夫教授堅信市場的益處。但他也認識到在政策上需要採取務實做法：在教科書中是找不到現實世界的。我想，這正是世界應該期許中國技術官僚領導人會抱持的態度——在未來幾十年裡，中國領導人將在全球事務中施加越來越大的影響。假如真是這樣的話，這未嘗不是一種好的態度。
Martin Wolf:An
insider’s view of China’s economy
Justin Lin (林毅夫) is an example of a relatively new phenomenon: the
self-confident Chinese scholar and global policymaker. He is now chief
economist and senior vice-president of the World Bank. Though armed with a
doctorate from the University of Chicago,
he is distinctively Chinese: professional, patriotic and, above all, pragmatic.
The book [《解密中國經濟》(Demystifying the Chinese Economy)] is a translation of lectures Professor Lin gave at Peking University. It offers an insider’s view of the biggest economic event of our era: the rise of China. Whether one agrees, or not – I find much of his argument persuasive – we have to understand how such a man thinks.
So what does the book tell us?
First, China’s performance has been astonishing: “Since 1978 China has maintained rapid economic growth for 33 consecutive years. The average annual . . . growth is 9.9 per cent and the average annual growth of foreign trade is 16.3 per cent.”
Second, China’s growth has also benefited the world. Thus, “China’s strong growth during the crisis was the most important driving force for the global economy.” Similarly, “over 2000-07 two-thirds of the economies in Africa grew at more than 5.5 per cent a year, and nearly one-third reached 7 per cent. Again, such unprecedented growth in Africa was in large part thanks to China.”
Yet there is far more here than this.
One intriguing discussion is of why China fell behind the west in the 19th century. Prof Lin does not ascribe this, as some now do, to western luck in having the right resources in the right places. He argues, instead, that the west made the big breakthrough of the scientific method. China failed to match this because its intellectuals were caught in the demands of its civil service examinations.
A point more relevant to policy is the distinction Prof Lin draws between “comparative-advantage-defying” and “comparative-advantage-following” development strategies. The former, he argues, have characterised most developing countries. The results included unviable enterprises, huge subsidies, distorted finance, pervasive corruption and feeble growth. In his view, the basis of Chinese contemporary success is that its policymakers encouraged the economy to evolve in the direction of its dynamic comparative advantage. That is what “reform and opening up” means.
Nevertheless, the book argues, policy must be flexible. It rejects “shock therapy”, for example. The argument seems to be partly that society cannot cope with huge disruption, which is strange, given the shocks imposed on the Chinese people by the Communist party. But it is also that policymakers too often simply do not know what is going to work. The book contains many examples of experiments that failed because people did not understand the incentives at work. The caution shown in China’s two-track approach to reform, which had controls and liberalisation side by side for a long time, is justified by its success
An important discussion is of innovation. A “catch-up” country, such as China, should focus on absorbing technology that already exists. This lowers the costs of development. Much of this innovation will be embodied in new machinery, which is why high investment is so important.
Prof Lin is not blind to what still needs to be done. He is concerned about rising inequality, for example. He stresses that a further widening of the urban-rural income gap, already 3.3:1, would be explosive. But he is no fan of redistribution. He believes, instead, that further improvement of the market mechanism will be more effective. One policy he emphasises is development of small and medium banks, to support small and medium enterprises. Another is “building a new socialist countryside”, with stress on rural infrastructure, in support of investment and consumption.
He also pays close attention to “the three excessives” –
excessive investment, excessive credit and excessive trade surpluses. That the
economy is indeed unbalanced is all too clear.
