BEIJING – In the
last 200 years, there have been more than 250 cases of sovereign-debt default,
and 68 cases of domestic-debt default. None of these was an isolated incident.
Indeed, such defaults – combined with factors like large current-account or
fiscal deficits, overvalued currencies, high public-sector debt, and
insufficient foreign-exchange reserves – have always triggered financial
crises, from the Mexican peso crisis in 1994 to the Russian ruble crisis in
1998 to the American subprime mortgage crisis in 2008.
Now China is experiencing a fourth instance of elevated debt risk, this time characterized by high levels of accumulated local-government and corporate debt. To be sure, China’s national balance sheet, which boasts positive net assets, has garnered significant attention in recent years. But, in order to assess China’s financial risk accurately, policymakers and economists must consider the risks that lie in the country’s asset structure – and the liabilities that are not included on its balance sheet.
The current problems are rooted in the government’s response to the 2008 global financial crisis. The first round of fiscal stimulus, supported by credit easing, led local governments and the financial sector to increase their leverage ratios. As a result, by 2010, China’s overall leverage ratio had risen by 30%.
In 2011, local-government debt totaled ¥10.7 trillion ($1.7 trillion), with only 54 of more than 2,500 county governments debt-free. Debts incurred by local government investment vehicles (LGIVs) totaled almost ¥5 trillion – 46.4% of overall debt.
At the end of 2011, China’s Treasury-bond debt stood at ¥7.2 trillion, and its ratio of foreign debt to foreign-exchange reserves reached 21.8%, having grown by 27% since 2010. But, while this represents an increase for China, it remains well below the widely recognized danger threshold of 100%.
Likewise, China’s debt/GDP ratio is rising, though it remains within the “safe” boundary of 60% – and is considerably lower than the ratio in most developed economies. At the end of 2011, China’s central-government debt amounted to 16.5% of GDP, and overall government debt totaled ¥18 trillion, or 38% of GDP.
Judging from its balance sheet, then, the Chinese government has a relatively large stock of net assets and a low debt ratio, and thus seems to be in a solid position to manage its liabilities. Indeed, according to China’s Academy of Social Sciences, China’s sovereign net assets increased every year from 2000 to 2010, reaching ¥69.6 trillion – enough to cover the government’s obligations.
But positive net assets are not sufficient to eliminate financial risk, which also depends on asset structure (the liquidity of assets and the alignment of maturities of assets and liabilities). If a large proportion of a country’s assets cannot be liquidated easily, or would be greatly depreciated by a large-scale sell-off, the fact that assets exceed liabilities would not rule out the possibility of debt default.
In China, this proportion of fixed, illiquid assets exceeds 90%. Resource assets account for roughly 50% of total government assets, with operating assets amounting to 39% and administrative (or non-operating) assets comprising another 6%.
The latter two are difficult to liquidate. And, given that resource assets are scarce and non-renewable, the traditional practice of auctioning and leasing land to keep the fiscal deficit under control is unsustainable – especially at a time when external shocks or a domestic economic downturn could easily trigger a short-term solvency crisis or debt default. While fiscal revenues are on the rise, they account for only about 6% of China’s total assets – and their growth rate is slowing.
China faces additional debt risks from contingent liabilities and inter-departmental risk conversion, especially in the form of implicit guarantees on debts incurred by local governments and state-owned enterprises. Indeed, such guarantees constitute the most significant medium- and long-term financial risks to China.
In recent months, there has been a surge in LGIV bond issuance, aimed at supporting local governments’ efforts to stabilize economic growth through stimulus-style investment projects. But the implicit guarantees on these bonds – as well as on existing bank loans – amount to hidden extra-budgetary liabilities for the central government.
Local governments have also accumulated massive amounts of non-explicit debt through arrears, credits, and guarantees. Once this debt’s cumulative risk exceeds a local government’s financial capacity, the central government is forced to assume responsibility for servicing it, directly endangering its own financial capacity.
At the same time, China’s corporate sector relies excessively on debt financing, rather than equity. China’s non-financial corporate debt accounts for roughly 62% of total debt – 30-40% higher than in other countries. According to GK Dragonomics, China’s total corporate debt amounted to 108% of GDP in 2011, and reached a 15-year high of 122% of GDP in 2012.
Many of these heavily indebted enterprises are state-owned, and have borrowed from state-controlled banks. The implicit guarantees on this debt, too, suggest that the government’s liabilities are much higher than its balance sheet indicates.
China is not too big to fail. In a fragile economic environment, policymakers cannot afford to allow the size of China’s balance sheet to distract them from the underlying structural risks and contingent liabilities that threaten its financial stability.
Zhang Monan is a fellow of the China Information Center, a fellow of the China Foundation for International Studies, and a researcher at the China Macroeconomic Research Platform.
中國國家資產負債表到底有沒有風險？
北京 – 近期三份有關中國國家資負債表的研究報告引發人們的高度關注。三份報告（德意志銀行、中行、社科院）從不同的角度測算了國家資產負債，但三者所得出的結論卻分歧較大。我們到底該如何看待中國龐大的“正淨資產”，又該如何評估中國的債務風險？
回顧全球債務危機的歷史，在過去200多年時間裡，全球至少發生了250次以上的主權債務違約，68次國內債務違約，債務違約幾乎每隔幾年或十幾年就集中爆發一次。歷史上，債務違約往往不是孤立事件，總是與經常項目逆差、本幣匯率高估、公共部門債務高企、財政虧空、外匯儲備不足等因素相互交織，共同觸發危機。從墨西哥金融危機(1994)、亞洲金融危機(1997)、到後來的俄羅斯(1998)、巴西金融危機(1999)，再到2008年美國次貸危機及仍在進行中的歐洲主權債務危機。
改革開放至今，中國也出現過四次較大規模的財政赤字和政府債務問題。1978年後的債務問題，主要是中央財政赤字﹔1988年後的債務問題，主要是企業間“三角債”﹔1998年後的債務問題，主要是國企經營問題造成的金融機構壞賬﹔2008年後中國地方債風險、企業債務風險也在不斷累積。
本輪中國債務風險始於2008年的全球金融危機。金融危機後的2008-2010年間，中國總體杠杆率上升了30個百分點。上一輪財政刺激計劃，以及信貸寬鬆相應推升了政府部門和金融部門的杠杆率。而截止2011年，除54個縣級政府沒有政府性債務外，全國省、市、縣三級地方政府性債務餘額共計10.7萬億元，其中融資平台公司的政府性債務餘額為4.97萬億元，佔比46.38%。而如果按照2011年末，中央財政國債餘額7.2萬億元計算，兩者相加18萬億的政府債務共佔到2011年GDP比重的38%左右。與國際通行60%（債務佔GDP的比率）的警戒線標准相比，中國債務佔比尚在可控范圍之內，並且大大低於大多數發達經濟體。然而，風險並不完全在於中國債務的規模，最大的問題是其背後的結構性風險。
從資產負債表規模看，中國政府有較大的“正淨資產”，政府債務規模不大，全社會整體債務水平也處於警戒線之下。2011年末，中央政府國債餘額佔GDP比重為16.47%，外債餘額佔外匯儲備比重為21.8%，但風險在於其背後的結構性問題。
“正淨資產”並不代表國家資產負債表無風險。當前，一些觀點認為，與深陷主權債務危機的發達國家“低增長-高赤字-高負債”，且幾乎均為“負淨資產”的境況相比，中國“高增長-低赤字-低負債”，同時又擁有相當規模的“正淨資產”，因此不會有主權債務風險。根據社科院對2000-2010年國家資產負債表估算，中國各年主權淨資產呈上升趨勢。按寬口徑匡算，2010年中國淨資產為69.6萬億元，這意味著政府有足夠主權資產來覆蓋主權負債。
然而，擁有“正淨資產” 只是不發生債務危機的必要條件，而不是充分條件。“正淨資產”並不代表不存在償債或債務違約風險。在任何一個時點，是否存在償債風險不光取決於淨資產是否為正，還取決於資產的可變現能力和資產負債期限的匹配性。如果大量資產是無法變現的固定資產，或者一旦集中拋售就會使資產大幅貶值，即便在賬面上有正的淨資產也可能面臨違約風險。
從資產結構看，資源性資產大約佔到中國政府總資產的50%，經營性資產佔到總資產的39%，行政性資產與財政收入佔總資產的比重均為6%左右。由於出售經營性資產換取現金流則需經過較長的時間和較復雜的程序，資源性資產在數量上的稀缺性和不可再生性，原來依靠拍賣土地和批租土地維持財政赤字規模的做法必然是不可持續的，特別是當遭遇外部沖擊和國內經濟不景氣，很可能會引發短期償付危機或債務違約。
此外，隱性擔保、或有負債及各部門間風險轉換。隱性負債是中國面臨最大的中長期風險。首先，中國已經形成了一個“以中央政府為核心，以地方政府為主體”的完整的隱性擔保體系。政府對企業的支持方式從過去的直接支持轉為擔保或隱性承諾，這些擔保或承諾並未被納入政府預算收支，但它們卻是一種隱性的預算外開支或責任。
其次，地方政府通過各種形式的欠款、挂賬和擔保產生了巨大的非顯性債務。由於各級政府間償債職責不清、事權界限不明，一旦累計的債務風險超過地方財政的承受能力，勢必逐級向上轉嫁償債風險，直接危及中央財政安全。
再次，企業部門資產負債表的影響。中企業過度依賴負債融資，而資本金或所有者權益在融資結構中的比例過低，導致資本結構錯配。相關研究顯示，中國非金融企業債務佔總債務的比重為62.4%，比其他國家的比重要高30到40個百分點。而GK
Dragonomics公佈的統計數據，中國企業債務從2011年佔GDP的108%上升至2012年的122%，創出近15年新高，企業負債率飆升將會導致政府或有負債大幅增加，尤其是國有企業對政府資產負債表的沖擊不可小視。
可見，中國的資產負債風險不在於規模而在於其背後的結構性風險及或有負債。無論結論如何，通過國家資產負債表核算摸清債務風險的“來龍去脈”才是管控風險，並“對症下藥”的關鍵。
