NEW DELHI – In 2001, when Jim O’Neill
of Goldman Sachs coined the acronym BRIC to refer to Brazil, Russia, India, and
China, the world had high hopes for the four emerging economies, whose combined
GDP was expected to reach $128.4 trillion by 2050, dwarfing America’s projected
GDP of $38.5 trillion. When the four countries’ leaders gather on March 26 in South
Africa – which joined their ranks in 2010 –
for the fifth BRICS summit,
their progress and potential will be reassessed.
The summit’s hosts have set ambitious goals, reflected in the summit’s
theme: “BRICS and Africa – a partnership for
development, integration, and industrialization.” They seek to advance national
interests, further the African agenda, and realign the world’s financial,
political, and trade architecture – an agenda that encompasses objectives from
previous summits, while reflecting South Africa’s
goal of harnessing its membership to benefit all of Africa.But, while strengthening ties with African countries might seem like the kind of pragmatic development issue that should bring consensus, the seeds of doubt are already being sown. Lamido Sanusi, the governor of Nigeria’s central bank, has called for Africans to recognize that “their romance with China” has helped to bring about “a new form of imperialism.”
Moreover, the central item on the summit’s agenda, a proposed “BRICS development bank,” is one that has gone nowhere at previous summits. This time, armed with a “feasibility study” put together by the five BRICS finance ministers, some progress may at last be made. With trade, both among the BRICS countries and between the BRICS and the rest of Africa, expected to increase from roughly $340 billion in 2012 to more than $500 billion in 2015, there is also much to discuss on the commercial front.
So far, the goal of “global realignment” away from the advanced countries has catalyzed these five very disparate countries’ efforts to forge their own bloc. But the primacy given to “advancing national interests” has always precluded real concerted action, at least until now.
This is why the idea of establishing a BRICS development bank has taken on such importance. And the recently conducted feasibility study might spur long-awaited progress. But toward what end?
According to China’s official news agency, the development bank’s primary objective would be “to direct development in a manner that reflects the BRICS’ priorities and competencies.” Once the bank is established, a working group will be tasked with building the necessary technical and governance capacity. But this stock rhetoric fails to address the discrepancies between the BRICS’ interests, or to define the bank’s role in reconciling and advancing them.
The fact that China is already Africa’s top trading partner, for example, invites questions about the proposed bank’s potential contributions. And China’s answer – that the bank would foster the “development of more robust and inter-dependent ties between the BRICS” – provides little substance. Is the bank supposed to serve as a counterweight to global multilateral development banks like the World Bank, or to reduce American and European dominance over the Bretton Woods institutions?
Whatever the underlying objective, it must be identified, and its concomitant risks addressed, if the BRICS are to make genuine progress. For example, if the proposed bank is simply an additional funding institution aimed at supporting the BRICS’s development agenda, the participating countries’ leaders must establish how it will interact with national institutions, such as the Brazilian Development Bank, the China Development Bank, and the Export-Import Bank of India.
But the problem of aligning the BRICS’ interests is a much deeper one. Consider India’s need for massive investments in infrastructure, made evident in its just-proposed 2013-2014 budget. Some hopeful Indians see a BRICS bank as a way to channel China’s surplus funds – as well as its expertise and experience – to such investments (especially railways), as well as to strengthen Sino-Indian ties. But, given the two countries’ many serious bilateral problems, will either government really want to bind itself so closely to the other?
Likewise, it is unclear what South Africa has to gain from the BRICS. Over the last few decades, the country has used mining revenues to pave roads, strengthen law enforcement, advance education, and revitalize cities and towns. The country’s most serious remaining problems – poverty and social inequality – are unlikely to be ameliorated through cooperation with the other BRICS countries, all of which rank among the world’s most unequal societies.
Other shared problems – such as corruption, poverty, and social underdevelopment – would be similarly difficult to address together. And it seems that the BRICS may not even be willing to try. Although Wen Jiabao, in his final address as Prime Minister, highlighted the enduring obstacles to China’s economic development (many of which its fellow BRICS share), China’s new president, Xi Jinping, insists that his country will not sacrifice its “sovereignty, security, or development interests” for the sake of more trade.
Meanwhile, Russia’s impaired democracy and resource-driven economy are a poor example for its fellow BRICS – and, in fact, could serve as a warning to the others about the risks of excessive reliance on the state. And Brazil, like India a genuine democracy, also seems sui generis. Despite the commodities boom of the last decade, its industrial output relative to GDP is no higher than it was when the effort to create a BRICS bloc began.
The BRICS’ ambitions – and the world’s expectations for them – may yet be fulfilled. But shared potential does not translate into collaborative action. On the contrary, each of the BRICS will have to pursue its goals, and confront its challenges, individually.
分裂的金磚國家
新德裡—2001年，高盛的奧尼爾（Jim
O’Neill）創造了“金磚四國”一詞用以指代巴西、俄羅斯、印度和中國這四個世界寄予厚望的新興經濟體，到2050年，四國GDP總量預計將達128.4萬億美元，遠遠高於美國的預計GDP38.5萬億美元。3月26日，四國領導人將在南非——該國於2010年加入金磚四國行列——舉行了第五屆金磚國家峰會，屆時，這些國家的進步和潛力將會得到重新評估。
峰會東道主設定了相當宏大的目標，這反映在峰會主題中：“金磚國家和非洲——面向發展、融合和工業化的合作伙伴關係”。它們尋求推進國家利益、深化非洲日程並重組世界金融、政治和貿易格局——這一日程包括了前幾次峰會的目標，同時也反映了南非引導這一集團為非洲謀利的目標。
但是，加強與非洲國家的聯繫固然看起來像是個應該形成一致的現實發展問題，但懷疑的種子已經生根了。尼日利亞央行行長薩努西（Lamido Sanusi）呼吁非洲認識到“和中國打得火熱”在助長“新形式的帝國主義”。
此外，峰會日程的核心議題，即成立“金磚國家開發銀行”在前幾次峰會中沒有形成任何結果。這一次，五國財政部長因“可行性研究”而走到了一起，或許最終能夠取得一些進展。金磚國家之間及它們與非洲其他國家之間的貿易額預計將從2012年的約3400億美元增至2015年的5000億美元，因此在商業領域也有很多內容有待討論。
目前，擺脫發達國家，實現“全球重組”的目標刺激著這五個截然不同的國家打造它們自己的集團。但將“推進國家利益”作為首要任務總是會妨礙真正的聯合行動，至少到目前為止是如此。
這就是成立金磚國家開發銀行的觀點如此重要的原因。最新完成的可行性研究或能刺激期待已久的進展。但是向哪個方向的進展？
據中國官方新聞社報道，這一開發銀行的主要目標是“用能夠反映金磚國家當務之急和自身能力的方式來指導其發展”。一旦該銀行成立，將任命一個工作組處理必要的技術和治理問題。但這一信息並沒有解決金磚國家之間的利益分歧問題，也沒有給出該銀行在協調和促進金磚國家方面的角色。
中國已然是非洲最大的貿易伙伴，這一事實讓人質疑金磚國家開發銀行的潛在作用。中國的回答——該銀行能夠促進“金磚國家間更穩健、更深入的關係的發展”——並沒有提供多少實質內容。新銀行將成為類似世界銀行的全球多邊發展開發銀行界的新平衡點，還是為了削弱美國和歐洲在布雷頓森林體系機構中的主導力？
不管基本目標是什麼，都必須對此有所認識，並處置好相應的風險，如果金磚國家意在推動真正的進步的話。比如，如果金磚國家開發銀行僅僅是一個新的旨在支持金磚國家發展日程的融資機構，那麼參與國領導人必須想好它將如何與國家層面的機構的互動，比如巴西開發銀行、中國國家開銀行、印度進出口銀行等。
但協調金磚國家的利益是一個層次遠遠更深的問題。就拿印度來說吧。它需要大規模基礎設施投資，這一點在最新公布的2013—2014年預算中顯露無疑。一些滿懷希望的印度人將金磚國家開發銀行視為引入中國富餘資金——及其專業和經驗——投向這些項目（特別是鐵路）並加強中印關係的辦法。但中印之間存在許多嚴重的雙邊問題，雙方政府真的願意與對方緊密相聯嗎？
類似地，沒有明確的跡象表明南非一定要從金磚國家中獲得什麼好處。過去幾十年來，南非用礦業收入鋪設道路、強化法律實施、改善教育並激活城鎮。南非最嚴重的待解決問題——貧困和社會不平等性——不可能通過與其他金磚國家合作解決，這五個國家名列世界最不平等社會行列。
其他共同問題——比如腐敗、貧困和社會欠發達——也難以一並糾正。且金磚國家可能根本不願意一試。盡管溫家寶在其作為總理的最後一次講話中強調了中國經濟發展所面臨的頑固障礙（其中許多也存在於其他金磚國家中），但中國新國家主席習近平堅持中國不會犧牲“主權、安全和發展利益”來追求更多的貿易。
與此同時，俄羅斯的不完善民主和資源驅動型經濟為其他金磚國家樹立了不好的榜樣——事實上，俄羅斯可以稱為一個警示信號，過度以來政府會產生風險。與印度同屬真正民主國家的巴西也是自成一格。盡管過去十年中經歷了商品繁榮，但其工業產出佔GDP的比重並沒有比金磚國家名詞誕生前高。
金磚國家的雄心——以及全世界寄予它們的厚望——或許能夠實現。但共同潛力並不會轉變為合作行動。相反，金磚國家中的每一個都必須追求自己的目標，直面自己的挑戰。
