As 2012 begins, however, investors are wondering if emerging markets may be due for a correction, triggered by a new wave of “risk off” behavior. Will China experience a hard landing? Will a decline in commodity prices hit Latin America? Will the European Union’s sovereign-debt woes spread to neighbors such as Turkey?
Indeed, few believe that the rapid economic growth and high trade deficits that Turkey has experienced in recent years can be sustained. Likewise, high GDP growth rates in Brazil and Argentina over the same period could soon reverse, particularly if global commodity prices fall – not a remote prospect if the Chinese economy begins to falter or global real interest rates rise this year. China, in turn, could land hard as its real-estate bubble deflates and the country’s banks are forced to work off the bad loans.
This is not wild doom-and-gloom speculation. The World Bank has just downgraded economic forecasts for developing countries in its 2012 Global Economic Prospects, released this month. For example, Brazil’s annual GDP growth, which came to a halt in the third quarter of 2011, is forecast to reach 3.4% in 2012, less than half the 7.5% rate recorded in 2010. Reflecting a sharp slowdown in the second half of the year in India, South Asia is slowing from a torrid six years, which included 9.1% growth in 2010. Regional growth is projected to decelerate further, to 5.8%, in 2012.
Three possible lines of argument – empirical, literary, and causal, each admittedly tentative and tenuous – support the worry that emerging markets’ economic performance could suffer dramatically in 2012.
The empirical argument is simply historically based numerology: emerging-market crises seem to come in a 15-year cycle. The international debt crisis that erupted in mid-1982 began in Mexico, and then spread to the rest of Latin America and beyond. The East Asian crisis came 15 years later, hitting Thailand in mid-1997, and spreading from there to the rest of the region and beyond. We are now another 15 years down the road. So is 2012 the year for another emerging-markets crisis?
The hypothesis of regular boom-bust cycles is supported by a long-standing scholarly literature, such as the writings of the American economist Carmen Reinhart. But I would appeal to an even older source: the Old Testament – in particular, the story of Joseph, who was called upon by the Pharaoh to interpret a dream about seven fat cows followed by seven skinny cows.
Joseph prophesied that there would come seven years of plenty, with abundant harvests from an overflowing Nile, followed by seven lean years, with famine resulting from drought. His forecast turned out to be accurate. Fortunately, the Pharaoh had empowered his technocratic official (Joseph) to save grain in the seven years of plenty, building up sufficient stockpiles to save the Egyptian people from starvation during the bad years. That is a valuable lesson for today’s government officials in industrialized and developing countries alike.
For emerging markets, the first seven-year phase of plentiful capital flows occurred in 1975-1981, with the recycling of petrodollars in the form of loans to developing countries. The international debt crisis that began in Mexico in 1982 catalyzed the seven lean years, known in Latin America as the “lost decade.” The turnaround year, 1989, was marked by the first issue of Brady bonds (dollar-denominated bonds issued by Latin American countries), which helped the region to get past the crisis.
The second cycle of seven fat years was the period of record capital flows to emerging markets in 1990-1996. Following the East Asia crisis of 1997 came seven years of capital drought. The third cycle of inflows occurred in 2004-2011, persisting even through the global financial crisis. If history repeats itself, it is now time for a third “sudden stop” of capital flows to emerging markets.
Are a couple of data points and a biblical parable enough to take the hypothesis of a 15-year cycle seriously? Perhaps, if we have some sort of causal theory that could explain such periodicity to international capital flows.
Here is a possibility: 15 years is how long it takes for individual loan officers and hedge-fund traders to be promoted out of their jobs. Today’s young crop of asset pickers knows that there was a crisis in Turkey in 2001, but they did not experience it first hand. They think that perhaps this time is different.
If emerging markets crash in 2012, remember where you heard it first – in ancient Egypt.
Jeffrey Frankel is Professor of Capital Formation and Growth
at Harvard
University.
Jeffrey Frankel:
2012：新興市場墜落之年？
伯爾尼—過去7年來，新興市場的表現令人刮目。在經濟增長、債務-GDP比率、反周期財政政策以及評級機構和金融市場評分方面，它們的表現遠好於發達工業化國家。
但是，進入2012年，投資者開始懷疑新興市場可能會因新一波“去險”行為而遭遇回調。中國會經歷硬著陸嗎？商品價格的下跌會打擊拉丁美洲嗎？歐盟主權債務亂象會蔓延到土耳其等鄰邦嗎？
事實上，鮮有人認為土耳其在近年來所出現的快速經濟增長和巨額貿易赤字共存的現象會持續下去。類似地，巴西和阿根廷的高GDP增長時代也有可能很快便會逆轉，特別是全球商品價格出現下跌的話，而如果中國經濟走弱或全球真實利率在今年開始上升，商品價格下跌並非不可能。至於中國，可能因房地產泡沫的破裂以及銀行被迫處理壞賬而出現硬著陸。
這絕不是杞人憂天。世界銀行已經在其《2012年全球經濟展望》中調降了發展中國家的經濟增長預測。巴西的GDP年增長率在2011年第三季度出現了停滯，2012年預計將增長3.4%，比2010年的記錄低了一半。由於印度在今年下半年出現了急劇減速，因此南亞也將結束為期6年的高速增長（2010年增速達到了9.1%）。預計2012年，該地區增長率將繼續下降，隻有5.8%。
三個方面——實証、理論和推理，每個方面都帶有假設性，並非板上釘釘——支持關於新興市場的經濟表現將在2012年大幅疲軟的擔憂。
市政方面，我們可以看歷史數字：新興市場似乎每隔15年就會發生一次危機。1982年年中爆發哦的國際債務危機始於墨西哥，然后蔓延到拉美和其他地區。東亞危機發生於15年以后，在1997年年中襲擊了泰國，然后蔓延到東南亞各國和其他地區。如今，又是15年過去了，如此看來，2012年正是又一次新興市場危機爆發之年？
規律性枯榮周期假說受長期學術文獻的支持，比如美國經濟學家卡門·萊因哈特（Carmen Reihart）的著作。但我想指出更老的源頭：《舊約全書》，特別是約瑟夫的故事，法老召他前去解釋夢境——七隻肥牛，然后又是七隻瘦牛。
約瑟夫預言將會發生七個豐年，庄家將因尼羅河的泛濫而獲得大量豐收﹔而此后將是七個荒年，大旱將帶來飢荒。他的預言最后都應驗了。幸運的是，法老及早地派技術官僚（約瑟夫）在七個豐年時儲存了足夠的谷物，足以讓埃及人民安度七個荒年。對於如今的工業化國家和發展中國家來說，這個故事仍具有極高的學習價值。
對新興市場來說，1975—1981年這七年中出現了大量的資本流入，石油美元通過貸款的方式流向了發展中國家。1982年肇始於墨西哥的國際債務危機引發了七個荒年，被稱為拉美的“失去的十年”。而在轉折之年（1989年），最醒目的事件是首次發行了布雷迪債券（拉美國家發行的美元債券），為拉美走出危機助了一臂之力。
第二次七個豐年是1990—1996年，流入新興市場的資本創出了歷史記錄。從1997年開始，東亞經歷了七個資本荒年。接著又是第三次七個資本豐年（2004—2011），甚至連全球金融危機都沒有阻止新興市場的繁榮。如果歷史會重復，那麼現在就是流向新興市場的資本流第三次“突然停止”的時候了。
那麼，數據和聖經預言是否足以讓15年周期假說可信呢？也許可以，如果我們能夠找到解釋國際資本流周期性波動的成因理論的話。
一種可能的解釋是，15年正好是個體貸款投資者和對沖基金交易員賺到足夠的錢隱退江湖的時間。今天的年青一代資產管理人知道2001年的土耳其危機，但沒有人有第一手的經歷。他們會認為，也許這次會不一樣。
如果新興市場真的在2012年崩盤，請記住這個規律的最早發生地——古埃及。
Jeffrey
Frankel是哈佛大學資本形成和增長教授。
