PARIS – Mali is a landlocked West African country of 15
million people, covering 1,240,000 square kilometers (478,800 square miles),
three-quarters of it desert. In the fourteenth century, the powerful Mali
Empire included parts of modern-day Senegal,
Guinea, and Niger.
Defeated and divided, it became a French colony in the nineteenth century,
regaining independence in 1960.
Mali’s
population is diverse: desert nomads, notably Tuaregs, in the north, and a
majority of sedentary black populations in the south. Many languages are
spoken, but Islam, to which almost 95% of the population adheres, is a unifying
factor. Agriculture is the main economic activity, notably in the vast internal
delta of the Niger River, home to many tribes, including
the Dogon, a people remarkable for their sculpture and architecture.Long a military dictatorship, Mali became an African democratic success story from 1991 to 2012, before a coup crippled its rudimentary public institutions. In the north, Tuaregs traveling to Mauritania, Algeria and Niger, were particularly weakened by persistent drought and the collapse of the caravan economy. Many have turned to weapons, slave, or gold trafficking; some are demanding independence.
In the wake of the ferocious religious war that tore Algeria apart in the 1990’s, a great number of Muslim fundamentalist Arabs fled south to the vast Sahara that covers part of Mali. Then, in 2011, Western-backed regime change in Libya toppled Colonel Muammar el-Qaddafi and drove more fundamentalists to flee into the desert – but not before they had gotten their hands on a significant part of Qaddafi’s heavy weaponry, as well as many vehicles.
These fundamentalists, becoming bandits of sorts, came to terms with the nomadic traffickers. All, including the traffickers, ended up embracing the fundamentalist rhetoric of revenge against infidels.
In January 2013, these groups formed a convoy of several hundred pick-ups and ATVs, armed with heavy machineguns. The desert cities of Gao, Kidal, and Timbuktu quickly fell to them. Islamic monuments, including some of Timbuktu’s glories, were destroyed. Sharia law was applied; women who were never forced to do so before had to wear the veil. The convoys even threatened Bamako, the capital, composed mostly of black Africans.
In a panic, acting President Dioncounda Traoré, a colonel from the south, called upon the French authorities to enforce a bilateral defense agreement, though he had contributed to the coup that drove the legally elected former president, Amadou Toumani Touré, into exile, causing the state to collapse and straining relations with France.
France has no interest in Mali other than the protection of its citizens and the stability of the Sahel region. Indeed, France withdrew all of its permanently based military forces from Mali years ago. And, with fewer than a thousand French citizens still living in Mali, even its pragmatic interest is relatively slight.
Although isolated, French President François Hollande courageously decided to respond firmly to Traoré’s call for help. In France, everyone understood and approved.
Few suggest that French military intervention was a means to recapture its colonial empire. And the United States – indifferent to the integrity of the Malian state and the welfare of its citizens in normal circumstances – was aware of the possibility that Mali’s vast territory could fall under fundamentalist/terrorist control. So it decided to take part in the transport, communications, logistical, and intelligence components of the French-led operation.
For similar reasons, Great Britain, though allergic to any common European defense policy, offered two planes. As for Europe, it did nothing – which was foreseeable.
France performed marvelously. In just a few days, it managed to send in nearly 3,000 men, heavily armed and efficiently motorized. Gao, Kidal, and Timbuktu were recaptured; Bamako was saved. The fundamentalists, having lost most of their vehicles and arms to French aerial bombing, fled headlong into the desert.
French troops are now set to return home. But, with thousands of fundamentalist killers in the desert, now poorly motorized but still armed, should they do so?
Mali, of course, is not the only country facing a fundamentalist insurrection. Such violence is typical of Islam’s contemporary crisis. The learned, cultured, and radiant traditions of earlier centuries seem to have vanished. Having missed their economic takeoff, many Muslim-majority countries appear open to the call of Islamist fundamentalism.
These countries now require painful, far-reaching reforms to attain economic prosperity, a goal that presupposes cultural change as well. In Christianity, the Reformation was essential to forging democracy and capitalism. But, in contemporary Islam, the powerful have always managed to eliminate would-be reformers. As a result, the Islamic world is mostly weak, partly colonized, humiliated, and economically powerless. Oil benefits a handful of princes.
Despite their travails, only a few thousand of the world’s 1.5 billion Muslims have embraced the extremist project of killing infidels and moderates. But, amid the resulting political and religious confusion – and, because religious authorities remain silent in the face of Islamist rhetoric – no Muslim state can solve its problems domestically.
External help is needed. Mali was the first to ask for it, with local religious authorities supporting the government’s request for military assistance from France. Now Mali’s army must be reconstituted, its police trained, and its government restructured. This, too, will be possible only if religious authorities back the necessary reforms.
But, as in Mali, the task of assisting reform in Muslim states is not for France alone. It is the responsibility of the West as a whole.
Michel Rocard, one of Europe’s leading statesmen, was Prime Minister of France from 1988-1991. As Prime Minister he created the Revenu minimum d’insertion social-welfare program and oversaw a decline in unemployment and reform of the state’s financing system. Following his term, he served as First Secretary of the French Socialist Party and as a member of the European Parliament for 15 years.
馬里和伊斯蘭宗教改革
巴黎—馬里是一個西非內陸國家，有1 500萬人口，1
240 000平方公裡領土，其中四分之三是沙漠。在14世紀，強大的馬里帝國統治著今天的塞內加爾、圭亞那和尼日爾。被擊敗並分崩離析後，19世紀馬里成為法國殖民地，1960年贏得獨立。
馬里的 人口十分多樣化：北方分布著沙漠游牧部落，主要是圖阿雷格人（Tuareg），南方分布著佔據多數的定居黑人。馬里語言眾多，但伊斯蘭教徒佔全國人口的95%，成為一個穩定要素。農業是主要經濟活動，主要分布在廣袤的尼日爾河內陸三角洲，這裡也是眾多部落的大本營，包括以雕塑和建筑著稱的多貢族（Dogon）。
馬里經歷過長時間的軍事獨裁統治，但1991—2012年，馬里成為非洲民主成功的典范，接著，一場政變摧毀了馬里尚顯幼稚的公共制度。在北方，圖阿雷格人向毛里塔尼亞、阿爾及利亞和尼日爾遷移，他們對持續乾旱和大篷車經濟的崩潰最為敏感。許多人開始從事武器、奴隸和黃金買賣﹔一些人開始要求獨立。
20世紀90年代，殘酷的宗教戰爭讓阿爾及利亞陷入了分裂，大量原教旨主義阿拉伯穆斯林向南逃入廣袤的撒哈拉沙漠——馬里正是撒哈拉沙漠的一部分。接著，2011年，在西方的支持下，利比亞推翻了卡扎菲政權，這讓更多的原教旨主義者逃入撒哈拉——此時他們已經控制了卡扎菲龐大武庫的主要部分，還掌握了大批車輛。
這些淪為匪幫的原教旨主義者與游牧商人勾搭成奸。他們——包括游牧商人在內——最終都皈依了清算異教徒的原教旨主義思想。
2013年1月，這些匪幫集合了幾百配有重機槍的輛皮卡和越野車。加奧（Gao）、基達爾（Kidal）和廷巴克圖（Timbuktu）等沙漠城市很快淪陷。包括廷巴克圖的一些功德碑在內的伊斯蘭紀念碑被摧毀。什葉派法律被推行﹔婦女被強迫佩戴面紗（此前從未有過如此要求）。這支匪幫部隊甚至還威脅到了主要由非洲黑人組成的首都巴馬科。
在恐慌中，來自南方的代理總統特勞雷上校求助於法國當局派兵履行雙邊防務協定，儘管他也參與了推翻合法當選的前總統圖雷迫使其流亡的政變。這場政變導致了國家的崩潰，也惡化了與法國的關系。
除了保護國民和維持薩赫勒地區穩定之外，法國在馬里並無別的利益。事實上，多年前法國便已撤走了在馬里的常駐軍。居住在馬里的法國僑民還不到一千人，及時從現實角度看，法國的利益也十分微小。
儘管孤軍奮戰，但法國總統奧朗德仍鼓起勇氣決定給予特勞雷的求助積極響應。在法國，所有人都表示理解並批准了這一決定。
幾乎沒人認為法國的軍事干預是重建其殖民帝國的舉措。對馬里國家統一及其國民在常規環境內的福利漠不關心的美國十分清楚，馬里廣袤的國土可能在原教旨主義/恐怖主義的控制下分崩離析。因此它決定參與由法國領導的行動，擔任運輸、通信、物流和情報工作。
出於類似的理由，英國——它討厭任何歐洲共同國防政策——也派了兩架飛機。歐洲則無動於衷——這也是可以預見的。
法軍表現出色。不出幾天，法國就派出了近三千充分機動化的重裝軍隊。加奧、基達爾和廷巴克圖相繼收復﹔巴馬科成功獲救。法國的轟炸摧毀了原教旨主義者的大部分車輛和武器，他們倉皇逃入撒哈拉沙漠。
現在，法軍即將回國。但是，沙漠中還潛藏著數千原教旨主義者，他們雖然機動性能較差但仍握有武器。法國的撤軍合理嗎？
當然，馬里並非唯一一個面臨原教旨主義者暴動的國家。此類暴力行為在當代伊斯蘭危機中稀鬆平常。過去幾百年中學習、培育和發展出來的傳統似乎已經消失殆盡。失去經濟起飛機會的許多穆斯林多數國家似乎正在敞開胸腓接受伊斯蘭原教旨主義的召喚。
這些國家如今需要痛苦、深遠的改革以實現經濟繁榮，這既是目標，也是文化變革的先決條件。在基督教歷史上，宗教改革是促成民主和資本主義的根本原因。但是，在當代伊斯蘭教，當權者總是設法排除潛在改革者。結果，伊斯蘭世界大部分十分孱弱，一部分淪為殖民地，喪權辱國，經濟萎靡。石油收益則是一小撮貴族的禁臠。
儘管經歷著如此痛苦，在全球15億穆斯林中，只有幾千人持有殺光異教徒和溫和派的極端主義思想。但是，在隨之而來的政治和宗教混亂中——也因為宗教當局在面對伊斯蘭口號時保持緘默——沒有一個穆斯林國家可以從內部解決問題。
它們需要外部幫助。馬里是第一個提出訴求的國家，地方宗教當局支持政府求助法國的軍事援助。如今，馬里必須重新組建軍隊、訓練警察、重組政府。而這些也只有在宗教當局支持必要改革時才能實現。
但是，正如馬里所顯示的，協助穆斯林國家改革的任務並不專屬於法國。這是整個西方的責任。
