CAMBRIDGE – India’s
recent fall from macroeconomic grace is a lamentable turn of events. After many
years of outperformance, GDP growth has slowed sharply. Annual output will most
likely rise by less than 5% this year, down from 6.8% in 2011 and 10.1% in
2010.
India’s
recent torpor has underpinned a remarkable shift in global opinion. Just a
couple of years ago, India
was developing a reputation as the cool place to invest. Heads of state tripped
over one another to meet business leaders in Mumbai, hoping to pave the way for
a significant expansion of trade and investment. Now their interest has faded,
along with the macroeconomic numbers.
And yet changes currently afoot might
just turn things around. India’s
octogenarian prime minister, Manmohan Singh, has recently awakened to the
desperate need for renewed momentum. Economists around the world have taken
note of the arrival of Raghuram
Rajan as chief economist in the finance ministry. Rajan is a superstar
academic researcher, a brilliant writer on political economy, and a former
chief economist for the IMF. But it is far from obvious that Sonia Gandhi,
President of the Indian National Congress and the country’s most powerful
politician, shares Singh’s reform agenda.
True, the cabinet is being reshuffled
to elevate younger ministers. But the process points to a continuation of the
tradition whereby most ministers are appointed on the basis of their loyalty to
the Gandhi family rather than their merit and accomplishments.
Unfortunately, for a country as poor
as India, only
sustained rapid growth can lead to enduring development gains. India’s
poverty rate (an indicator that is admittedly both conceptually and practically
difficult to measure) fell by half between 1981 and 2010, to just under 30% – a
remarkable achievement. But faster-growing East Asia has
experienced significantly greater progress, with the poverty rate falling from
77% to 14% over the same period.
Why has India’s
growth acceleration fizzled? For many years, India
benefited from the long-lasting impact of economic liberalization in the early
1990’s. Back then, Singh, as finance minister, played a central role. He could
count on the IMF – which had real policy leverage, owing to India’s
need for a bailout program in 1991 – to provide external support to counter the
huge internal obstacles to reform. Today, however, there is no external
counterweight to the domestic political pressure that is stalling further
liberalization.
True, India’s
government must now consider growing threats to the country’s investment-grade
credit rating. The major ratings agencies are increasingly complaining about
the country’s lack of a growth strategy and its outsize budget deficits. But
the impact has been limited, owing to the authorities’ ability to stuff debt
down the throats of captive local banks, insurance companies, and pension
funds.
Indeed, this “financial repression”
tax on domestic savers remains a huge opaque source of funding for India’s
debt-ridden government. It also prevents funds from being channeled to
private-sector investment projects with far higher rates of return than the
government can offer.
The good news is that, from an
economic perspective, there is still plenty of low-hanging fruit for restoring
growth. Although India
is right to avoid taking financial liberalization to the extreme that the United
States did in the decades before the recent
meltdown, it can do quite a lot without assuming inappropriate risks, as a commission
headed by Rajan detailed a few years back.
The retail sector is a huge source of
inefficiency that effectively places a massive tax on India’s
poor by driving up prices. Instead of suing foreign retailers like Wal-Mart,
India should be finding
ways to emulate and benefit from their hyper-efficient methods. Infrastructure
is slowly improving, but roads, ports, water access, and the electricity grid
are still horrific across large parts of the country.
Of course, India’s
democratic government cannot simply bulldoze through people and the environment
to create infrastructure. But the obstacles also include layers of corrupt
bureaucrats and politicians – a vast network of resistance to reform.
Some argue that central-government
paralysis is inevitable in a democracy of 1.2 billion people, and that the only
way to re-energize India
is to establish a looser confederation of its constituent states. Devolution
would unshackle the economically more successful states. And, by combating the
culture of aid dependency in economically weaker states, India’s
poorer regions might benefit in the long run as well.
As dysfunctional as a decentralized Europe
seems to be these days, India
might benefit from moving a few steps in that direction, even as Europe
itself struggles to become more centralized. Devolution might sound
unrealistic, but once upon a time so did the European Union. If Singh’s new
reform agenda is again blocked, perhaps it will be time for a more radical
assessment.