NEW DELHI – A
favorite theme in international debate nowadays is whether Asia’s
rise signifies the West’s decline. But the current focus on economic malaise in
Europe and the United
States is distracting attention from the
many serious challenges that call into question Asia’s
continued success.But Asia faces major constraints. It must cope with entrenched territorial and maritime disputes, such as in the South China Sea; harmful historical legacies that weigh down its most important interstate relationships; increasingly fervent nationalism; growing religious extremism; and sharpening competition over water and energy.
Moreover, Asia’s political integration badly lags behind its economic integration, and, to compound matters, it has no security framework. Regional consultation mechanisms remain weak. Differences persist over whether a security architecture or community should extend across Asia, or be confined to an ill-defined “East Asia.”
One central concern is that, unlike Europe’s bloody wars of the first half of the twentieth century, which made war there unthinkable today, the wars in Asia in the second half of the twentieth century only accentuated bitter rivalries. Several interstate wars have been fought in Asia since 1950, when both the Korean War and the annexation of Tibet started, without resolving the underlying Asian disputes.
To take the most significant example, China staged military interventions even when it was poor and internally troubled. A 2010 Pentagon report cites Chinese military preemption in 1950, 1962, 1969, and 1979 in the name of strategic defense. There was also China’s seizure of the Paracel Islands from Vietnam in 1974, and the 1995 occupation of Mischief Reef in the Spratly Islands, amid protests by the Philippines. This history helps to explain why China’s rapidly growing military power raises important concerns in Asia today.
Indeed, not since Japan rose to world-power status during the reign of the Meiji Emperor (1867-1912) has another non-Western power emerged with such potential to shape the global order. But there is an important difference: Japan’s rise was accompanied by the other Asian civilizations’ decline. After all, by the nineteenth century, Europeans had colonized much of Asia, leaving in place no Asian power that could rein in Japan.
Today, China is rising alongside other important Asian countries, including South Korea, Vietnam, India, and Indonesia. Although China now has displaced Japan as the world’s second largest economy, Japan will remain a strong power for the foreseeable future. On a per capita basis, Japan remains nine times richer than China, and it possesses Asia’s largest naval fleet and its most advanced high-tech industries.
When Japan emerged as a world power, imperial conquest followed, whereas a rising China’s expansionist impulses are, to some extent, checked by other Asian powers. Militarily, China is in no position to grab the territories that it covets. But its defense spending has grown almost twice as fast as its GDP. And, by picking territorial fights with its neighbors and pursuing a muscular foreign policy, China’s leaders are compelling other Asian states to work more closely with the US and each other.
In fact, China seems to be on the same path that made Japan an aggressive, militaristic state, with tragic consequences for the region – and for Japan. The Meiji Restoration created a powerful military under the slogan “Enrich the country and strengthen the military.” The military eventually became so strong that it could dictate terms to the civilian government. The same could unfold in China, where the Communist Party is increasingly beholden to the military for retaining its monopoly on power.
More broadly, Asia’s power dynamics are likely to remain fluid, with new or shifting alliances and strengthened military capabilities continuing to challenge regional stability. For example, as China, India, and Japan maneuver for strategic advantage, they are transforming their mutual relations in a way that portends closer strategic engagement between India and Japan, and sharper competition between them and China.
The future will not belong to Asia merely because it is the world’s largest, most populous, and fastest-developing continent. Size is not necessarily an asset. Historically, small, strategically oriented states have wielded global power.
In fact, with far fewer people, Asia would have a better balance between population size and available natural resources, including water, food, and energy. In China, for example, water scarcity has been officially estimated to cost roughly $28 billion in annual industrial output, even though China, unlike several other Asian economies, including India, South Korea, and Singapore, is not listed by the United Nations as a country facing water stress.
In addition to its growing political and natural-resource challenges, Asia has made the mistake of overemphasizing GDP growth to the exclusion of other indices of development. As a result, Asia is becoming more unequal, corruption is spreading, domestic discontent is rising, and environmental degradation is becoming a serious problem. Worse, while many Asian states have embraced the West’s economic values, they reject its political values.
So make no mistake. Asia’s challenges are graver than those facing Europe, which embodies comprehensive development more than any other part of the world. Despite China’s aura of inevitability, it is far from certain that Asia, with its pressing internal challenges, will be able to spearhead global growth and shape a new world order.
Brahma Chellaney, Professor of Strategic Studies at the New Delhi-based
Center for Policy Research, is the author of Asian Juggernaut and Water:
Asia’s New Battleground.
可阻擋的亞洲崛起？
新德裡—如今，國際爭論最熱門的話題是亞洲的崛起是不是意味著西方的衰落。但最近一段時間，歐洲和美國的經濟窘境吸引了人們的目光，以至於許多事關亞洲能否持續保持成功的嚴峻挑戰都被忽視了。
誠然，當今世界正在發生的實力轉移主要與亞洲令人矚目的經濟崛起相關，亞洲速度是人類歷史上所罕見的。亞洲擁有世界增長最快的經濟體、膨脹最迅速的軍費開支、最激烈的資源競爭。而最重要的熱點在於，全球秩序的鑰匙顯然含在亞洲嘴裡。
但亞洲也面臨著沉重的約束。亞洲必須處理好根深蒂固的領土和領海糾紛（比如南海問題）、妨礙其最重要國際關系的歷史遺留問題、愈演愈烈的民族主義、日滋月長的宗教極端主義，以及日益尖銳的水和能源之爭。
此外，亞洲政治一體化嚴重滯後於經濟一體化，更嚴重的問題是，亞洲缺少安全框架。地區協商機制仍然相當無力。亞洲存在持久的分歧——安全機構或共同體應該將整個亞洲納入其中，還是隻局限於定義模糊不清的“東亞”？
一個關鍵問題在於，亞洲和歐洲不同。歐洲在20世紀上半葉經歷了兩次慘烈的戰爭，時至今日，歐洲人已對戰爭深惡痛絕。而亞洲在20世紀下半葉所經歷的戰爭加劇了各種仇恨。自1950年的朝鮮戰爭和解放西藏戰事以來，亞洲經歷了多場戰爭，但基本爭端仍未得到解決。
一個顯著的例子是，中國在其一窮二白、仍面臨諸多國內麻煩時仍進行了軍事干預。五角大樓一份2010年的報告援引了中國在1950、1962、1969和1979年以戰略防御為名進行的先發制人。1974年中國從越南手中奪取西沙群島、1995年在菲律賓的抗議聲中佔領南沙群島美濟礁亦是明証。這段歷史有助於解釋中國快速膨脹的軍力為何會引起當今亞洲的嚴重憂慮。
事實上，日本在明治時期（1867—1912年）躋身世界強國之林方才開創了非西方勢力參與決定全球秩序的局面。但日本的例子有一個絕大不同點：其崛起伴隨著其他亞洲文明的衰落。畢竟，19世紀時，歐洲人已經在亞洲廣開殖民地，因此沒有哪個亞洲國家可以制約日本。
如今，中國正在與其他重要亞洲國家一同崛起，包括韓國、越南、印度和印尼。儘管中國現已超越日本成為世界第二大經濟體，但在可預見的將來，日本仍將保持超群的實力。從人均水平看，日本仍比中國富裕九倍，而且擁有亞洲最大的海軍艦隊和最先進的高科技產業。
日本崛起為世界一強后便開始了帝國主義征服，而中國的擴張沖動在某種程度上受著其他亞洲力量的制約。從軍事上看，中國還無力染指其所覬覦的土地。但其國防開支增長速度要比其GDP幾乎快出一倍。此外，通過與其鄰國的領土角力和強硬外交政策，中國領導人正在迫使其他亞洲國家加強與美國和彼此之間的聯系。
事實上，中國似乎走在讓日本成為激進軍事化國家的老路上，這將給地區（以及日本）帶來災難性後果。當年明治維新在“富國強兵”的口號下創造了一支強大的軍隊，終於造成了尾大不掉之局，文職政府不得不受軍隊擺布。中國也可能發生這一幕，共產黨越來越依賴軍隊維持權力壟斷。
從更廣的角度看，亞洲實力格局可能仍將維持變局，新的（或變化的）盟友關系和軍事實力的增強將繼續對地區穩定構成挑戰。比如，中國、印度和日本都在追求戰略優勢，正在形成一種印日戰略合作日漸緊密、與中國競爭日漸尖銳的關係。
未來不會因為亞洲是世界最大、人口最多、發展最快的大洲而屬於亞洲。規模並不一定是優勢。從歷史上說，戰略導向的小國也可以成為列強。
事實上，如果人口再少一點，亞洲可以獲得更佳的人口規模與自然資源（包括水、食品和能源）之間的平衡。比如，據中國官方數據估計，水資源短缺每年要造成大約280億美元的工業產出損失，儘管中國並沒有出現在聯合國面臨水壓力國家的名單中（印度、韓國和新加坡在列）。
除了日益嚴峻的政治和自然資源挑戰，亞洲還犯了過度強調GDP以至於忽視了發展指標的錯誤。結果，亞洲的不平等問題愈演愈烈，腐敗橫行，國內不滿情緒日益高漲，環境破壞也日益嚴重。更糟糕的是，儘管許多亞洲國家接受了西方的經濟價值觀，但卻拒絕接受其政治價值觀。
因此，不要搞錯了。亞洲面臨的挑戰比歐洲還要嚴峻，歐洲的整體發展是其他任何地區所不能比你的。儘管亞洲打上中國烙印已成定局，但面臨嚴峻內部挑戰的亞洲能否充當全球增長領頭羊並創造新的世界秩序還遠未可知。
