NEW YORK – A
surprising number of elections and political transitions is scheduled to occur
over the coming months. An incomplete list includes Russia,
China, France,
the United States,
Egypt, Mexico,
and South Korea.
The first is that no country is entirely its own master. In today’s world, no country enjoys total autonomy or independence. To one degree or another, all depend on access to foreign markets to sell their manufactured goods, agricultural products, resources, or services – or to supply them. None can eliminate economic competition with others over access to third-country markets. Many countries require capital inflows to finance investment or official debt. Global supply and demand largely set oil and gas prices. Economic interdependence and the vulnerability associated with it is an inescapable fact of contemporary life.
But economic dependence on others is not the only international reality with which governments must contend. It is equally difficult – if not impossible – for countries to isolate themselves from terrorism, weapons, pandemic disease, or climate change.
After all, borders are not impermeable. On the contrary, globalization – the immense flow across borders of people, ideas, greenhouse gases, goods, services, currencies, commodities, television and radio signals, drugs, weapons, emails, viruses (computer and biological), and a good deal else – is a defining reality of our time. Few of the challenges that it raises can be met unilaterally; more often than not, cooperation, compromise, and a degree of multilateralism are essential.
A second universal challenge is technology. George Orwell’s vision of 1984 could hardly have been more wrong, because the hallmark of modern technology is not Big Brother, but decentralization. More computing power can now be held on a desktop or in a person’s hand than could be gathered in a room only a generation ago.
As a result, people everywhere now have more access to more sources of information than ever before. making it increasingly difficult for governments to control, much less monopolize, the flow of knowledge. Citizens also have a growing ability through mobile phones and social networking to communicate directly and discreetly with one another.
One consequence of this trend is that authoritarian governments can no longer wield control over their citizens as easily as they once did. Technology is, no doubt, one explanation for the uprisings that we are seeing in much of the Arab world. But modern technology also has implications for well-established democracies. It is far more difficult to generate social consensus and to govern in a world in which citizens can choose what they read, watch, and listen to, and with whom they talk.
A third widespread challenge that awaits emerging leaders is the inescapable reality that citizens’ demands increasingly overwhelm the capacity to satisfy them. This was always true in the so-called developing (and often relatively poor) world. But now it is also the case in the relatively well-off mature democracies, as well as among those countries that have been growing fastest.
Economic growth is slower in many cases than the historic norm. This is readily apparent for much of Europe, Japan, and the US. But growth is also slowing in China and India, which together account for more than one-third of the world’s population. Unemployment rates are high, especially in the US and Western Europe, and especially among the young and those nearing the end of their careers (but who are still expected to live for decades). More worrying still, much of this will translate into long-term unemployment.
The net result of these economic and demographic shifts is that a growing share of national income is now being directed to provide health, pensions, and other forms of basic support, while a declining percentage of citizens in nearly every society is now working to support a growing number of fellow citizens. This rising dependency ratio is made worse by widening economic inequality; as more wealth is concentrated in fewer hands, the promise of ever-improving standards of living for most people may not be fulfilled.
Together, these three trends – a loss of economic and physical autonomy, the diffusion of information technology, and slower growth against a backdrop of larger and older populations – will create enormous political challenges in virtually every country. Demands are mounting at the same time as the ability of governments to satisfy them is diminishing. The leaders who will take power after this year’s transitions will confront this fundamental reality.
Leaders will also have to confront the byproducts of increased nationalism, populism, and, in some cases, extremism. Hostility to immigration and economic protectionism, already visible, can be projected to increase.
These developments within countries will make more difficult the challenge of generating global consensus on how to meet threats beyond borders: as governing successfully at home becomes more difficult, so will governing abroad. For citizens and leaders alike, tough times lie ahead.
Richard N. Haass, President of the Council on Foreign Relations since
2003, previously served as Director of Policy Planning for the US
State Department (2001-2003), and was President George W. Bush’s special envoy
to Northern Ireland and Pakistan,
before resigning from the Bush administration in protest against the Iraq war.
He was also Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Near
East and South Asian Affairs on the National Security Council under President
George H.W. Bush.
成功之路雄關漫道
紐約—在未來幾個月中,選舉和政治接班日程表驚人地滿。拒不完全統計,俄羅斯、中國、法國、美國、埃及、墨西哥和韓國都將發生權力交接。
乍一看,這些國家基本沒有共同點,它們中有的是老牌民主國家,有的是獨裁制度,還有的介於兩者之間。但是,盡管差別萬萬千,這些國家的政府——以及它們所領導的人民——面臨著許多同樣的挑戰。尤為顯著者有三。
首先,這些國家都不能完全掌握自己的命運。當今世界,沒有哪個國家可以享受完全的自治和獨立。各國或多或少都依賴外國市場出售或提供制造品、農產品、資源和服務。沒有人可以在不和其他國家競爭的情況下獨享第三國市場。許多國家需要資本流入來為投資和官方債務融資。全球供給和需求決定了原油和天然氣的價格。經濟上的相互依賴及其伴生的脆弱性是現代生活中無可躲避的宿命。
但經濟上依賴他國並不是各國政府所需面臨的唯一國際現實。想要免於恐怖主義、武器、大范圍流行病和氣候變化困擾同樣十分困難(如果不是不可能的話)。
畢竟,邊境線並不是滴水不漏的。相反,全球化——人口、思想、溫室氣體、商品、服務、貨幣、商品、電視和廣播信號、毒品、武器、電子郵件、電腦和生物病毒和其他種種的大面積跨境流動——是當今世界的顯著特征。上述挑戰沒有哪個可以由某國單槍匹馬地解決,合作、妥協以及一定程度的多邊主義至關重要,這與其說是特例,不如說是常態。
第二大普遍存在的挑戰是技術。從這一點來說,奧威爾(George Orwell)的《1984》大錯特錯了,因為現代技術的標志絕非老大哥(Big
Brother),而是分散化。一代人之前需要用大如房間的計算機才能實現的計算能力,現在在一台桌面電腦或個人手持設備上就能實現了。
結果,如今各國人民所能獲得信息源前所未有地豐富,政府想要控制信息源越來越困難,知識流的壟斷程度越來越低。公民通過手機和社交網絡進行直接、私密的溝通越來越容易。
這一趨勢的一大結果是獨裁政府越來越難以向從前那樣將公民玩弄於股掌之間。毫無疑問,技術是我們現在所看到的阿拉伯世界起義爆發的原因之一。但現代技術對老牌民主國家同樣具有影響。獲得社會一致更加困難了,治理一個公民可以選擇讀什麼、看什麼、聽什麼、和誰說的世界難於上青天。
等待未來領導人的第三大廣泛挑戰是公民之所欲遠遠超過滿足能力這一無可避免的現實。這一點在所謂的發展中(通常也是相對貧困)國家中是永恆的真理。但如今,境況相對較佳的成熟民主國家也在日漸面臨這一問題,增長最快的國家亦然。
從諸多方面看,如今經濟增長不如歷史正常水平。歐洲大部、日本和美國的頹勢相當明顯。但人口總和相當於世界總數三分之一強的中國和印度也在減速。失業率高企,特別是美國和西歐,而年輕人和接近退休年齡(但還有幾十年壽命)者又是重災區。更令人擔心的是,許多失業者會淪為長期失業者。
這些經濟和人口變遷的淨結果是,國民收入中越來越多的部分被用於提供衛生、養老和其他形式的基本支持﹔幾乎在所有國家,勉力工作供養數量與日俱增的同胞的公民比例正在下降。贍養比的上升之勢因經濟不平等性的加劇而惡化﹔由於更多的財富集中在更少的人手中,因此大多數人生活水平持續改善的承諾可能將無法實現。
總而言之,這三大趨勢——經濟和實體獨立性的喪失、信息技術的擴散以及人口增長和老化背景下的增長減速——將在幾乎所有國家造成重大政治挑戰。需求在不斷增長,而政府滿足需求的能力卻在降低。即將在明年掌權的領導人將不得不面對這一基本現實。
領導人還必須面對民族主義、民粹主義以及(在某些國家)極端主義的抬頭。抵制移民和經濟保護主義苗頭已經清晰可見,而且可以預見將會愈演愈烈。
這些國家內部的發展形勢將使形成關於如何面對跨境威脅的全球共識變得難上加難:既然安內都在日益艱難,更遑論攘外了。不管對公民還是對領導人,艱苦時代正在前方等著。