Even if there is no consensus on what a solution might be, can’t they meet and thrash out a plan that goes beyond their repeated half-measures? It is only because of the European Central Bank’s bold decision to lend long term to banks that we have seen some respite recently, or so their argument goes. Politicians, in contrast, are failing Europe by being forever behind the curve. Why do they find it so hard to lead?
One answer that can be easily dismissed is that politicians simply don’t understand the gravity of the situation. Political leaders need not be economic geniuses to understand the advice that they hear, and many are both intelligent and well-read.
A second answer – that politicians have short time horizons, owing to electoral cycles – may contain a kernel of truth, but it is inadequate, because the adverse consequences of timid action often become apparent well before they are up for re-election.
The best answer that I have heard comes from Axel Weber, the former
president of Germany’s
Bundesbank and an astute political observer. In Weber’s view, policymakers
simply do not have the public mandate to get ahead of problems, especially
novel ones that seem small initially, but, if unresolved, imply potentially
large costs.If the problem has not been experienced before, the public is not convinced of the potential costs of inaction. And, if action prevents the problem, the public never experiences the averted calamity, and voters therefore penalize political leaders for the immediate costs that the action entails. Even if politicians have perfect foresight of the disaster that awaits if nothing is done, they may have little ability to persuade voters, or less insightful party members, that the short-term costs must be paid.
Talk is cheap, and, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the status quo usually appears comfortable enough. So leaders’ ability to take corrective action increases only with time, as some of the costs of inaction are experienced.
Calamity can still be averted if the costs of inaction escalate steadily. The worst problems, however, are those with “inaction costs” that remain invisible for a long time, but increase suddenly and explosively. By the time the leader has the mandate to act, it may be too late.
A classic example was Winston Churchill’s warnings against Adolf Hitler’s
ambitions. Hitler’s plans were outlined in Mein Kampf for all to read –
and he did not disguise them in his speeches. Yet few in Britain
wanted to give them credence, and many thought that communism was the greater
threat, especially in the bleak years of the Great Depression.The Nazis’ dismembering of Czechoslovakia in 1938 made the sincerity of Hitler’s ambitions all too clear. But it was only after the invasion of Poland the following year that Churchill was appointed First Lord of the Admiralty, and he became Prime Minister only after the invasion of France in 1940, when Britain stood alone.
Britain might well have been better off had Churchill held power earlier, but that would have meant costly rearmament, which was unacceptable so long as there was a chance that Hitler proved to be a paper tiger. And, of course, it would also have meant entrusting Britain’s fate to a politician who, though now regarded as an indomitable leader, was widely distrusted at the time.
Non-linear costs of inaction are most obvious in the financial sector. At the same time, financial-sector problems may be particularly difficult to address: if politicians emphasize the need for action too strongly in order to get a mandate, they might precipitate the very turmoil that they seek to contain.
Between the Bear Stearns crisis and the failure of Lehman Brothers, the United
States government could do little to get
ahead of the growing problem (though, of course, the government-backed mortgage
underwriters Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were placed under conservatorship in
the interim). It took the post-Lehman panic for Congress to authorize the
Troubled Asset Relief Program, which threw a financial lifeline to banks and
the auto industry, among others. And only frenetic action by the Federal
Reserve and Treasury (with authorities around the world joining) prevented a
systemic meltdown. A subprime-mortgage problem that was initially estimated to
imply losses of a few hundred billion dollars imposed far higher costs on the
entire world.Similarly, eurozone politicians have obtained a mandate to take bolder action only as the markets have made the costs of inaction more salient. Even setting aside Germany’s understandable attempt to limit how much it would have to pay, it is difficult to see how politicians could have gotten ahead of the problem.
While the ECB has bought the eurozone some time, the calming effect on markets may be a mixed blessing. Have Europeans seen enough of the abyss to tolerate stronger action by their leaders? If not, markets might have to deteriorate further to make possible a comprehensive resolution to the eurozone crisis.
Similarly, with government bond yields as low as they are in the US, the
public has little sense of urgency about its fiscal problems, though some
doomsayers, like Peter Peterson of the Blackstone Group, have been trying their
best to awaken it. One hopes that the coming US
presidential election will lead to a more enlightened public debate about tax
and entitlement reform. Otherwise, a rapid escalation of yields in the bond
market might be necessary for the public to accept that there is a problem, and
for politicians to have the room to resolve it.Don’t blame the leaders for appearing short-sighted and indecisive; the fault may lie with us, the public, for not listening to the worrywarts.
Raghuram Rajan is Professor of Finance at the Booth
School
of Business, University
of Chicago,
and the author of Fault Lines: How Hidden Fractures Still Threaten the
World Economy.
Raghuram Rajan: 世界經濟的難題
在近期訪歐期間，我發現似乎所有的經濟學家，媒體和商界人士都對本國政界深感絕望。他們百思不得其解：政治家們為何敢無視橫亙在身前的萬丈深淵，為何不能團結起來一鼓作氣解決當前的歐債危機。
即便在解決方案上未能達成共識，那麼那些政治家們何不拋棄那些治標不治本的方案，一起開會制定一個超越一切的全面性計劃？只有在歐洲央行最近做出向銀行發放長期貸款的勇敢決定後他們才看到了一絲困難緩解的景像。相比之下政治家們卻總是跟不上形勢，而這樣下去只能搞垮歐洲。領導國家真有那麼難嗎？
其中一個很容易被排除的答案就是政治家們根本沒意識到事態的嚴重性。政治家們無需具備經濟學家的頭腦就能理解他們所聽到的建議，更可況其中許多人還是博學多才，飽讀詩書之輩。
另一個答案——政治家們都是短視的，被選舉周期所主導——可能有些道理，卻也不甚充分。因為即便一個微小的政治動作所產生的反作用都會在連任選舉來臨之前徹底顯現。
而我所聽到的最佳答案來自德國聯邦銀行前行長Axel Weber——此人同時也是一位敏銳的政治觀察家。在Weber看來原因很簡單，政策制定者顯然無法從公眾那裡獲得提前應對問題的授權，尤其是那些一開始看似非常微小，一旦爆發卻需要花費極大成本才能解決的新問題。
由於從未經歷過這些問題，公眾也就無從得知不作為的話將產生多少潛在成本。因為不知道災難的後果究竟有多嚴重，公眾甚至會懲罰那些防患於未然的政治家，因為後者的果斷行為帶來了某些額外支出。即便政治家們完全意識到不作為將引發極大的災難，他們也很難去說服選民或者那些短視的政黨成員去支付一些短期成本。
任何說辭都是廉價的，更何況還缺乏證據，相比之下現狀往往令人感覺一切正常。因此領導人只能等待，等到人們吃過了苦頭才能採取正確的行動。而如果不作為所付出的成本逐漸增加的話也能有助於避免災難的發生。但最可怕的莫過於那些“不作為成本”長期處於不可見狀態，但卻突然出現爆發式飆升的情況。當領導人隨之獲得行動授權時，一切往往都已經太晚了。
這方面的一個經典案例就是丘吉爾對希特拉野心的警告。希特拉的計劃在《我的奮鬥》一書中早有描述——甚至在其演說中也毫不掩飾。但只有很少英國人相信這一切會發生，許多人甚至認為共產主義才是更重大的威脅，尤其是在大蕭條的那段死氣沉沉的時期。
納粹1938年肢解捷克斯洛伐克的行為使得希特拉的野心暴露無疑。但直到第二年閃擊波蘭之後丘吉爾才被任命為海軍大臣，隨後在1940年德軍揮師入侵法國之後才升任首相，可那時的英國已經完全陷入孤立了。
如果丘吉爾能提前上台的話英國的日子或許會好過很多，但卻意味著要提前付出大量金錢來重整軍備，這對那些心存僥幸，認為希特拉不過是只紙老虎的人來說是無法接受的。與此同時，這還意味著將英國的命運托付給一個如今以絕不屈服聞名，當年卻根本不受大眾信任的政治家。
而非線性增加的不作為成本在金融部門顯得尤為突出。同時金融部門的問題可能尤其棘手：如果政治家們過度強調行動的緊迫性以換取授權，結果往往非但沒能遏制危機，反而加速其爆發。
在貝爾斯登危機直到雷曼兄弟破產的那段中間時期，美國政府在遏制危機發展方面確實沒有多少行動空間（雖然房地美和房利美這兩個政府撐腰的抵押貸款擔保人都被臨時保護了起來）。只有在經歷了雷曼兄弟的陣痛之後國會才通過問題資產救助計劃，最終在財政上救了銀行和汽車行業一命。於是我們看到的是美聯儲和財政部（還有全球各國當局聯手）只有很短的時間去手忙腳亂地安排如何防止一場系統性崩潰。一場原本估計只會造成幾千億美元損失的次級抵押貸款問題最後為全球帶來了極大的處理成本。
同樣，歐羅區的政治家們只有在市場更加關注不作為成本時才能獲得授權。你很難看見政治家們如何能先一步解決問題，更別提德國試圖限制自己援助出資額的（即使負面但卻可以理解的）做法了。
當歐洲央行為歐羅區爭取了一點時間的時候，市場的鎮定效應可能會帶來好壞參半的影響。歐洲人是否受夠了其領導人不願采取更強硬行動的狀況？如果答案是否定的話，那麼市場將進一步惡化以促成一個歐羅區危機綜合性解決方案的出台。
同樣，隨著政府債券收益變得像美國一樣低下，即使像黑石集團創始人Peter Peterson這類末日預言家一直在大聲疾呼，公眾照樣會對財政問題失去緊迫感。有人希望接下來的美國總統選舉將在稅務和授權改革方面激起一場更為理性開明的公眾討論。否則的話就只有靠債務市場收益的迅速上升來使公眾意識到事態嚴重，並留給政治家們足夠的空間來解決問題。
因此請不要指責政治家的短視和猶豫不決；真正有錯的可能是我們，一群不願聆聽忠言的公眾。
作者為前國際貨幣基金組織首席經濟學家，芝加哥大學布斯商學院經濟學教授，著有"Fault Lines: How Hidden Fractures Still Threaten
the World Economy"一書
