CLAREMONT, CALIFORNIA – When US President Richard Nixon embarked on his
historic trip to China 40 years ago, he could not have imagined what his gamble
would unleash. The immediate diplomatic impact, of course, was to reshape Eurasia’s
geopolitical balance and put the Soviet Union on the
defensive. But the long-term outcome of America’s
rapprochement with China
became visible only recently, with the economic integration of the People’s
Republic into the world economy.
Had Nixon not acted in 1972, China’s
self-imposed isolation would have continued. Deng Xiaoping’s reform and opening
of China to the
world would have been far more difficult. Four decades after the “Nixon shock,” no one disputes that China has benefited enormously. Today, the impoverished and autarkic country that Nixon visited is history. Global reintegration has turned China into an economic powerhouse. It is the world’s largest exporter in volume terms, and is the world’s second-largest economy. China’s presence is felt around the world, from mines in Africa to Apple stores in the United States.
As we reflect on China’s remarkable progress since 1972, it is also an opportune time to consider how China continues to fall short in overcoming systemic obstacles to long-term success. Because China is widely regarded as a winner of globalization, it is natural to assume that the country has developed the means to meet its challenges. But, while China has implemented policies to maximize the benefits of free trade (undervaluing its currency, investing in infrastructure, and luring foreign manufacturing to increase competitiveness), the country remains unprepared for deeper integration with the world.
One sign of this is China’s
lack of the necessary institutions and rules. For example, China
has become a significant player in providing economic development assistance
(often tied to its strategy for acquiring natural resources). Its loans and grants to Africa
have now surpassed those made by the World Bank. But China
has no specialized agency in charge of international development assistance. As
a result, its foreign-aid programs are poorly coordinated and often seem
counterproductive. Instead of earning goodwill, they are viewed as part of a
sinister neocolonial plot to grab natural resources in poverty-stricken
nations.Another example is China’s lack of an immigration policy. Even though China is beginning to attract labor from around the world, it has yet to promulgate a comprehensive legal framework that would allow the country to compete for the most talented people or to deal with the complexities of international migration.
A third example is the absence of independent policy-research organizations. Owing to political control and inadequate professional development, government-run research institutions can seldom provide the high-quality, unbiased analysis of global issues on which sound policymaking depends.
Perhaps most importantly, two decades of rapid GDP growth have masked
serious weaknesses on the economic front. Because China
continues to favor state capitalism and discriminates against the private
sector, it lacks strong private firms that can take on Western multinational
giants. Except for Huawei, Lenovo, and perhaps Haier (which is nominally
collectively owned), there are no private Chinese firms with a global
footprint.Until now, China has not paid dearly for this. Its role in the global economy is confined to low-to-medium-end processing and assembly functions. The most critical, sophisticated, and profitable parts of the value chain – research and development, product design, branding, marketing, service, and distribution – are occupied by American, European, Japanese, South Korean, and Taiwanese companies. China simply “outsources” these high value-added functions to the likes of Apple and Walmart.
Of course, China
does have huge firms, but they are inefficient state-owned behemoths that owe
their size and profitability to their legal monopolies and government subsidies. They may have the heft needed
for global operations, but they lack the motivation to compete with world-class
Western firms and are greeted with suspicion and fear around the world.A China deeply embedded in globalization also needs a large pool of talented people, comparable to the best that the West can produce. Today’s China lacks that pool. While tens of millions of Chinese young people display impressive innate abilities, the country’s system of higher education does an abysmal job cultivating their talents. For most, the curriculum is largely obsolete, and skewed toward rote learning of theory at the expense of basic analytical and critical-thinking skills.
Education in social sciences and humanities is particularly deficient, owing to lack of investment in these disciplines and excessive political control of curricula. As a result, Chinese graduate from colleges and universities having learned relatively little about the outside world in fields such as anthropology, sociology, international relations, comparative literature, and history. Unless China reforms its ossified system, the country will not be able to produce enough highly trained talent to compete with the world’s best and brightest.
None of these shortcomings – the lack of globalization-friendly institutions, rules, corporations, and talent – is an insurmountable obstacle. The real question is whether China can remove them under a one-party regime that is hostile to the liberal values that inspire and underpin globalization.
Nixon himself was probably not bothered by the nature of the Chinese regime four decades ago. The fact that the question must be addressed now attests to China’s astonishing progress since then. But it also shows that China’s long march toward global integration remains unfinished.
Minxin Pei
is Professor of Government at Claremont
McKenna College.
裴敏欣: 那時的尼克遜, 此時的中國
四十年前美國總統尼克遜踏上訪華之路時,他不可能想像到自己這次賭博會釋放多大能量。如果一九七二年尼克遜沒有採取行動,中國會繼續走自我孤立之路。鄧小平的改革開放可能會面臨更大的難度。
「尼克遜衝擊波」釋放四十年後,已經沒有人否認中國在今天獲益良多,重返國際社會,讓中國轉而成為經濟強國。從數量上,中國已經是世界最大的出口國和世界第二大經濟體。從非洲的礦井到美國的蘋果專賣店,世界每個角落都能感受到中國的影響。
在回顧一九七二年來中國驚人成就的同時,也應該思考一下中國怎樣在克服系統性障礙方面做得非常不夠。儘管中國的政策最大限度地發揮了自由貿易的好處(通過壓低貨幣估值、投資基礎設施、吸引國外製造業以提升自身競爭力),但卻並沒有做好準備與世界深層次融合。
中國缺乏制度和規則
中國缺乏必要的制度和規則。比如,中國對非洲的貸款和撥款已經超過了世界銀行,但中國並沒有設立專業機構對國際援助進行管理。結果巨額發展援助不僅沒有為中國贏得聲譽,反而被視為新殖民主義在貧窮國家掠奪自然資源的險惡陰謀。
另一個例子是中國缺乏移民政策。中國沒有頒佈全面的法律框架,使國家能夠參與對最優秀人才的爭奪。
第三個例子是缺乏獨立的政策研究機構。由於政治控制,政府管理的研究機構很少能夠提供合理決策所必須的公正、高品質的全球分析報告。
或許最重要的是,二十年的快速GDP增長掩蓋了經濟領域的嚴重缺陷。因為中國持續倚重國家資本主義並歧視私營部門,導致其缺乏能與西方跨國巨頭相抗衡的強大的私營企業。除名義上歸集體所有的華為、聯想和海爾外,中國私營企業都沒有實現國際化。
迄今為止,中國在全球經濟中發揮的作用僅限於中低端加工和組裝。美國、歐洲、日本、韓國和台灣企業仍然佔據着價值鏈最關鍵、最複雜、也最有利可圖的部份,包括研發、產品設計、品牌、行銷、服務和銷售。中國只是把這些高附加值產業外包給像蘋果和沃爾瑪這樣的巨頭。
障礙在仇視自由價值
當然,中國同樣存在着巨型企業,但它們是效率低下的國有龐然大物,其體量和盈利基本來源於合法的壟斷和政府補貼。它們也許具備全球運營所必須的體量,但卻缺乏與世界一流西方公司競爭的積極性,並引來世界各地懷疑和恐懼的目光。
深層全球化的中國同樣需要能與西方頂尖人才相媲美的大量人才儲備。而今天的中國還遠未實現這一目標。儘管數以千萬計的中國年輕人表現出的天賦令人讚歎,但國家高等教育系統在開發潛能方面做得非常糟糕。絕大多數課程基本偏重於對理論的死記硬背,而犧牲了對基本分析和批判性思維技能的培養。
由於在社會及人文科學領域缺乏投資和對課程實行過多政治控制,導致中國的高校及大學畢業生在人類學、社會學、國際關係、比較文學和歷史等領域對外界了解較少。除非改革僵化體制,否則中國將無法教育出足夠數量的訓練有素的人才參與全球頂級人才競爭。
缺乏適應全球化的制度、規則、企業和人才都並非不可逾越的障礙。自由價值觀是全球化的靈感來源和基礎,真正的問題在於而中國能否在對自由價值觀持仇視態度的一黨專制下掃除這些障礙。
中國實現全球一體化的長征遠未畫上句號。
裴敏欣
Claremont McKenna College政治學教授
