NEWPORT BEACH – Let me set the scene:
an increasingly discredited economic policy approach gives rise to
growing domestic social and political opposition, street protests and
violence, disagreements among official creditors, and mounting concerns
among private creditors about a disorderly default. In the midst of all
of this, national leaders commit to more of the same harsh austerity
measures that they have been unable to implement for two years. Official
creditors express skepticism, in private and public, but hold their
collective nose and get ready to disburse yet another tranche of money
into what they fear is a bottomless pit.
Sound familiar? It should, but not just because it encapsulates Greece today. It is also what Argentina faced in 2001. Unless Europe reflects on key lessons from that experience, the parallels that extend to Greece may also end up including a financial meltdown, a deep output collapse, and social and political turmoil.
I remember 2001 well. I was serving on PIMCO’s Emerging Market desk, where we were closely following developments in Argentina. In August of that year, the country was again begging the International Monetary Fund for more money in order to avoid a default. The authorities were willing to enter into yet another set of commitments knowing that they had consistently over-promised and under-delivered, and that the country had failed to make any progress on restoring growth, halting its competitiveness decline, and containing the rise in debt.
A blame game broke out over who was responsible for “losing”
Argentina. Official creditors, led by the IMF, pointed to the Argentine
government’s repeated policy failures. The government countered that
official creditors were nickel-and-diming the country, rather than
providing the financial cushion needed to restore confidence and
re-engage private capital. Neither side seemed willing to acknowledge
what was obvious to many: the country’s economic and financial framework
gave it little chance of addressing the dual problem of too little
growth and too much debt.
Not surprisingly, Argentine citizens were becoming increasingly fed
up with the whole lot, caring little about distinctions between the
government and official creditors. They had lost trust in an approach
that continued to sell austerity as the price of stability, even as
virtually every economic and financial indicator had worsened in the
meantime, with scant hope of a brighter future.Then there were Argentina’s neighbors – particularly fellow members of Mercosur, the regional political and economic agreement – which feared a tidal wave of contagion. Having experienced technical dislocations in their financial markets, they were urging Argentina to get its act together – while also building stronger defenses in case it did not. Meanwhile, Argentina complained that other Mercosur countries’ policies were magnifying its economic challenges.
To understand much of what is happening today in Europe, one need only replace Argentina with Greece, and Mercosur with the eurozone. Of course, Greece is a more advanced economy than Argentina. It is part of a far stronger regional arrangement than Mercosur, with vastly greater financial resources and better-developed economic and institutional underpinnings. Yet the similarities are strong enough to ask whether Europe can learn from Argentina’s experience a decade ago.
After the Argentine parliament approved yet another new austerity package, the IMF agreed to release its financing tranche. But it was too late to save a discredited approach, further undermining the Fund’s standing.
Indeed, rather than engendering confidence, Argentine citizens withdrew their bank deposits over the next few months. Capital flight accelerated. The government again failed to deliver on its policy commitments. Most important of all, social and political pressures mounted, reaching a tipping point.
Argentina defaulted in December 2001, closed its banks, and experienced the mother of all “economic sudden stops.” The country was forced to dismantle its economic framework in a highly disorganized manner, staging a messy, unplanned transition to a new currency system in the midst of capital controls and domestic-asset confiscation.
Greece’s future will resemble that of Argentina if its government and
official creditors (namely, the European Central Bank, the European
Union, and the IMF) fail to internalize some of Argentina’s lessons and
do not undertake an urgent mid-course correction.Specifically, they should take four steps. First, they should stop repeating the claim that there is no “Plan B.” Telling people that there is no alternative to a discredited policy merely pushes them either to resist an approach that does not work, or to opt for mayhem. Recent official remarks heard in Greece (“We must show that Greeks, when they are called on to choose between the bad and the worst, choose the bad to avoid the worst”) do little to engender hope.
Second, Greece and its foreign interlocutors must recognize that Plan B, while not easy, has become critically necessary. It entails much deeper economic and debt restructuring, as well as institutional changes so that Greece can gain greater policy flexibility, improve competitiveness, and promote investment. All of this inevitably involves short-term risks, but it also promises brighter prospects for growth, employment, and the restoration of financial soundness.
Third, Greece’s official creditors should be more attentive to the expected return on their assistance. Every euro disbursed to Greece under the current approach is diluted in many ways. Rather than a general approach implying multiple “leakages,” official creditors would do better to target the country’s key needs more directly. Moreover, given Europe’s worries about its banking system, interventions should be coupled with greater pressure on banks to raise capital and improve asset quality.
Finally, the integrity and credibility of the ECB and IMF require much greater protection. Europe’s opportunism undermines the future effectiveness of these two key institutions at a time when they will be needed not only to stabilize Greece, but also to prevent liquidity problems from turning into solvency crises in other European countries and elsewhere, as well as to limit global contagion.
Greece need not continue to follow Argentina’s miserable example of ten years ago. Yet, unless Greek and European officials reflect on that example and adapt accordingly, Greece will be driven down the same dangerous dead-end path.
Mohamed A. El-Erian is CEO and co-CIO of PIMCO, and author of When Markets Collide.
Mohamed A. El-Erian: 希臘會重蹈阿根廷悲慘的覆轍？
先讓我設置一個場景：名聲越來越差的經濟政策方針導致國內社會和政治反對層出不窮、出現街頭抗議
和暴力活動、官方債權人之間出現分歧、私人債權人對無序的債務違約日益擔憂。在這種情況下，國家領導人仍然致力於實施更多同樣嚴厲的財政緊縮措施，兩年來
這些措施一直沒有得到落實。官方債權人在私下裡和公共場合都表達了懷疑的態度，但是他們都忍了下來並准備再次向他們所恐懼的無底洞注一筆資金。
似曾相識吧？應該是，但不僅僅是因為它就是今日希臘的寫照。它也是2001時阿根廷面臨的困境。如果歐洲不反思那次經歷的主要經驗教訓，希臘面臨的同樣危機可能還包括金融危機，產出一瀉千裡、社會和政治動蕩。
2001年讓我印像深刻。當時，我在太平洋投資管理公司的新興市場部門工作，在那裡我們緊密關注了阿根廷事態的發展。那年8月，阿根廷政府再次請求國際貨 幣基金組織注資以避免債務違約。當局願意作出一系列新的承諾，盡管知道自己一直允諾過多而無法兌現承諾，本國在重振經濟增長上沒有取得任何進展，無法阻止 競爭力下降，債務增多。
一場關於誰該為輸掉阿根廷負責的推脫責任的遊戲爆發了。由國際貨幣基金組織率領的官方債權人指出是阿根廷政府一再失敗的政策。阿根廷政府反駁說，官方債權 人是在剝削自己的國家，而沒有為自己國家提供重振信心和重獲私人資本所需的金融緩衝。雙方似乎都不願意承認對於許多人而言顯而易見的事實：阿根廷的經濟和 金融框架無力解決增長緩慢和債務過多的雙重難題。
阿根廷人民越來越厭倦這一切，對政府和官方債權人之間的區別關心甚少就不足為奇了。他們對如下做法失去了信任：即使在實際上幾乎各項經濟和金融指標都惡化、更加光明的未來希望渺茫的情況下，繼續以穩定為代價推行財政緊縮。
緊接著就是阿根廷的鄰國——尤其是南方共同市場（區域政治和經濟協定）的成員國，它們害怕受到影響。經歷了本國金融市場的技術混亂後，他們敦促阿根廷共同 採取行動，與此同時以防萬一還建造了更強的防御體系。同時，阿根廷政府抱怨，其他南方共同市場成員國的政策正在加大其經濟挑戰。
如要了解今天發生在歐洲的危機，人們只需將阿根廷更換為希臘，南方共同市場更換為歐元區。當然，希臘的經濟實力要強於阿根廷，它也是一個更為強大的區域組 織的一員，歐元區要比南方共同市場要強大得多，擁有更多的金融資源和更為成熟的經濟和制度基礎。然而，其相似性足以提出這樣的問題：歐洲是否能從十年前阿 根廷的危機中吸取教訓。
阿根廷議會再次批准一攬子新的財政緊縮政策後，國際貨幣基金組織同意了對其融資。然而要挽救焦頭爛額的經濟狀況為時已晚，這進一步破壞了國際貨幣基金組織的信譽。
事實上，在接下來的幾個月裡，民眾信心不僅不增，他們還取出了銀行存款，加速了資本外逃。政府又一次未能兌現其政策承諾。最重要的是，社會和政治壓力增加，已經不堪重負。
2001年12月，阿根廷違約，關閉了銀行，這是所有經濟突然停止的始祖。該國被迫以一種高度混亂的方式拆分其經濟體系，在資本控制和國內資產沒收中混亂、無計劃地採用了新貨幣。
如果希臘政府及其官方債權人(即歐洲中央銀行、歐盟、國際貨幣基金組織)無法吸取阿根廷危機的一些教訓，也不進行緊急的中期調整，希臘的未來將重蹈阿根廷的覆轍。
具體地來說，他們應該採取四個步驟。首先，它們要停止不斷聲稱沒有B計劃。告訴人們除了採用失信的政策外別無選擇會迫使他們抵制這種毫無作用的做法，或者 選擇混亂。近日，希臘的官方說法「我們必須表明，當希臘人被迫面臨在壞與最壞之間選擇時，希臘人會選擇壞以避免最壞」並沒有帶來什麼希望。
其次，希臘及其外國對話者必須認識到B計劃盡管艱難，但至關必要。希臘需要深入得多的經濟和債務重組，以及體制變革，這樣希臘就可以獲得更大的政策靈活 性，提高競爭力，並促進投資。不可避免的是，這一切都有短期風險，但是也預示著更加光明的增長、就業和恢復金融健康的前景。
再次，希臘的官方債務人應該更專注於其援助所帶來的回報。按照目前的做法給希臘提供的每一個歐元都大打折扣了。與遍地撒網式的救援相比，集中財力解決關鍵問題更值得推崇。此外，鑒於歐洲國家擔心其銀行體系，在干預的同時，要給銀行施加更大的壓力以便其融資並提高資產質量。
最後，歐洲中央銀行與國際貨幣基金組織的誠信和信譽需要更悉心地維護。這兩大機構不僅可以穩定希臘，還可以防止歐洲其他國家及其他地方的國家的流動性問題 轉變成償還債務的危機，限制危機在全球蔓延。正當需要這兩大機構發揮這樣的作用時，歐洲的機會主義破壞了這兩大關鍵機構的效率。
希臘不必繼續走十年前阿根廷走過的悲慘之路。然而，如果希臘和歐洲官員不反思相關教訓並作出相應調整，希臘將重蹈覆轍，走上不歸路。
作者是太平洋投資管理公司首席執行官兼聯席首席投資官，著有《When Markets Collide》
似曾相識吧？應該是，但不僅僅是因為它就是今日希臘的寫照。它也是2001時阿根廷面臨的困境。如果歐洲不反思那次經歷的主要經驗教訓，希臘面臨的同樣危機可能還包括金融危機，產出一瀉千裡、社會和政治動蕩。
2001年讓我印像深刻。當時，我在太平洋投資管理公司的新興市場部門工作，在那裡我們緊密關注了阿根廷事態的發展。那年8月，阿根廷政府再次請求國際貨 幣基金組織注資以避免債務違約。當局願意作出一系列新的承諾，盡管知道自己一直允諾過多而無法兌現承諾，本國在重振經濟增長上沒有取得任何進展，無法阻止 競爭力下降，債務增多。
一場關於誰該為輸掉阿根廷負責的推脫責任的遊戲爆發了。由國際貨幣基金組織率領的官方債權人指出是阿根廷政府一再失敗的政策。阿根廷政府反駁說，官方債權 人是在剝削自己的國家，而沒有為自己國家提供重振信心和重獲私人資本所需的金融緩衝。雙方似乎都不願意承認對於許多人而言顯而易見的事實：阿根廷的經濟和 金融框架無力解決增長緩慢和債務過多的雙重難題。
阿根廷人民越來越厭倦這一切，對政府和官方債權人之間的區別關心甚少就不足為奇了。他們對如下做法失去了信任：即使在實際上幾乎各項經濟和金融指標都惡化、更加光明的未來希望渺茫的情況下，繼續以穩定為代價推行財政緊縮。
緊接著就是阿根廷的鄰國——尤其是南方共同市場（區域政治和經濟協定）的成員國，它們害怕受到影響。經歷了本國金融市場的技術混亂後，他們敦促阿根廷共同 採取行動，與此同時以防萬一還建造了更強的防御體系。同時，阿根廷政府抱怨，其他南方共同市場成員國的政策正在加大其經濟挑戰。
如要了解今天發生在歐洲的危機，人們只需將阿根廷更換為希臘，南方共同市場更換為歐元區。當然，希臘的經濟實力要強於阿根廷，它也是一個更為強大的區域組 織的一員，歐元區要比南方共同市場要強大得多，擁有更多的金融資源和更為成熟的經濟和制度基礎。然而，其相似性足以提出這樣的問題：歐洲是否能從十年前阿 根廷的危機中吸取教訓。
阿根廷議會再次批准一攬子新的財政緊縮政策後，國際貨幣基金組織同意了對其融資。然而要挽救焦頭爛額的經濟狀況為時已晚，這進一步破壞了國際貨幣基金組織的信譽。
事實上，在接下來的幾個月裡，民眾信心不僅不增，他們還取出了銀行存款，加速了資本外逃。政府又一次未能兌現其政策承諾。最重要的是，社會和政治壓力增加，已經不堪重負。
2001年12月，阿根廷違約，關閉了銀行，這是所有經濟突然停止的始祖。該國被迫以一種高度混亂的方式拆分其經濟體系，在資本控制和國內資產沒收中混亂、無計劃地採用了新貨幣。
如果希臘政府及其官方債權人(即歐洲中央銀行、歐盟、國際貨幣基金組織)無法吸取阿根廷危機的一些教訓，也不進行緊急的中期調整，希臘的未來將重蹈阿根廷的覆轍。
具體地來說，他們應該採取四個步驟。首先，它們要停止不斷聲稱沒有B計劃。告訴人們除了採用失信的政策外別無選擇會迫使他們抵制這種毫無作用的做法，或者 選擇混亂。近日，希臘的官方說法「我們必須表明，當希臘人被迫面臨在壞與最壞之間選擇時，希臘人會選擇壞以避免最壞」並沒有帶來什麼希望。
其次，希臘及其外國對話者必須認識到B計劃盡管艱難，但至關必要。希臘需要深入得多的經濟和債務重組，以及體制變革，這樣希臘就可以獲得更大的政策靈活 性，提高競爭力，並促進投資。不可避免的是，這一切都有短期風險，但是也預示著更加光明的增長、就業和恢復金融健康的前景。
再次，希臘的官方債務人應該更專注於其援助所帶來的回報。按照目前的做法給希臘提供的每一個歐元都大打折扣了。與遍地撒網式的救援相比，集中財力解決關鍵問題更值得推崇。此外，鑒於歐洲國家擔心其銀行體系，在干預的同時，要給銀行施加更大的壓力以便其融資並提高資產質量。
最後，歐洲中央銀行與國際貨幣基金組織的誠信和信譽需要更悉心地維護。這兩大機構不僅可以穩定希臘，還可以防止歐洲其他國家及其他地方的國家的流動性問題 轉變成償還債務的危機，限制危機在全球蔓延。正當需要這兩大機構發揮這樣的作用時，歐洲的機會主義破壞了這兩大關鍵機構的效率。
希臘不必繼續走十年前阿根廷走過的悲慘之路。然而，如果希臘和歐洲官員不反思相關教訓並作出相應調整，希臘將重蹈覆轍，走上不歸路。
作者是太平洋投資管理公司首席執行官兼聯席首席投資官，著有《When Markets Collide》
