The slow-motion implosion of Henry Tang, Beijing's
pick to be Hong Kong's next chief executive, brings to
mind a speech given shortly before the 1997 handover by former Far Eastern
Economic Review Editor Derek Davies. Entitled "Two Cheers for
Colonialism," it attempted to explain why the city flourished under the
British. Fifteen years later, the Chinese officials who are having trouble
running Hong Kong might want to give it a read.
The Brits created a relatively incorrupt and competent civil service to run the city day-to-day. Mr. Davies' countrymen might not appreciate his description of them: "They take enormous satisfaction in minutes, protocol, proper channels, precedents, even in the red tape that binds up their files inside the neat cubby holes within their registries." But at least slavish adherence to bureaucratic procedure helped to create respect for the rule of law and prevented abuses of power.
Above the civil servants sat the career-grade officials appointed from London. These nabobs were often arrogant, affecting a contempt for journalists and other "unhelpful" critics. But they did respond to public opinion as transmitted through the newspapers and other channels.
Part of the reason was that Hong Kong officials were accountable to a democratically elected government in Britain sensitive to accusations of mismanaging a colony. But local officials often disobeyed London when it was in the local interest—for this reason frustrated Colonial Office mandarins sometimes dubbed the city "The Republic of Hong Kong." For many decades it boasted a higher standard of governance than the mother country.
Mr. Davies nailed the real reason Hong Kong officials were so driven to excel: "Precisely because they were aware of their own anachronism, the questionable legitimacy of an alien, non-elected government they strove not to alienate the population. Their nervousness made them sensitive."
The communists claim that the European powers stripped their colonies of natural resources and used them as captive markets for their manufacturers. But Hong Kong, devoid of resources other than refugees from communism, attracted investment and built up light industry to export back to Britain. And as for taking back the profits, Mr. Davies noted, "No British company here would have been mad enough to have repatriated its profits back to heavily-taxed, regularly devaluing Britain."
Most expatriate officials retired to Blighty, so they were less tempted to do favors for the local business elite. The government rewarded them with pensions and OBEs. A Lands Department bureaucrat didn't have to worry whether his child would be able to find employment in Hong Kong if a decision went against the largest property developer.
Contrast all this with Hong Kong post-handover. The government is still not democratic, but now it is accountable only to a highly corrupt and abusive single-party state. The first chief executive, Tung Chee Hwa, and Beijing's favorite to take the post next month, Henry Tang, are both members of the Shanghainese business elite that moved to the city after 1949. The civil service is localized.
Many consequences flow from these changes, several of which involve land, which is all leased from the government. Real estate development and appreciation is the biggest source of wealth in Hong Kong, a major source of public revenue and also the source of most discontent.
In recent years, the Lands Department has made "mistakes" in negotiating leases that have allowed developers to make billions of Hong Kong dollars in extra profit. Several high-level officials have also left to work for the developers. This has bred public cynicism that Hong Kong is sinking into crony capitalism.
This helps explain why the public is so upset with Mr. Tang for illegally adding 2,400 square feet of extra floor space to his house. Likewise Michael Suen, now the secretary for education, failed to heed a 2006 order from the Lands Department to dismantle an illegal addition to his home. His offense was arguably worse, since he was secretary for housing, planning and lands at the time.
In both cases the issue is not just a matter of zoning and safety; illegal additions cheat the government out of revenue. But it's unlikely Mr. Tang will face prosecution because nobody above or below him is independent enough to demand accountability. So now there is one set of rules for the public and another for the business and political elites.
Under the British, Hong Kong had the best of both worlds, the protections of democracy and the efficiency of all-powerful but nervous administrators imported from London. Now it has the worst of both worlds, an increasingly corrupt and feckless local ruling class backstopped by an authoritarian regime. The only good news is that the media remains free to expose scandals, but one has to wonder for how much longer.
Hong Kong's Chinese rulers have been slow to realize that, to paraphrase Lampedusa, the only way to keep Hong Kong the same is to accept change. It is no longer a city of refugees happy to accept rule by outsiders. And democracy is the only system that can match the hybrid form of political accountability enjoyed under the British.
Mr. Davies ended his appraisal of colonialism's faults and virtues thus: "I only hope and trust that a local Chinese will never draw a future British visitor aside and whisper to him that Hong Kong was better ruled by the foreign devils." Fifteen years later, that sentiment is becoming common.
The Brits created a relatively incorrupt and competent civil service to run the city day-to-day. Mr. Davies' countrymen might not appreciate his description of them: "They take enormous satisfaction in minutes, protocol, proper channels, precedents, even in the red tape that binds up their files inside the neat cubby holes within their registries." But at least slavish adherence to bureaucratic procedure helped to create respect for the rule of law and prevented abuses of power.
Above the civil servants sat the career-grade officials appointed from London. These nabobs were often arrogant, affecting a contempt for journalists and other "unhelpful" critics. But they did respond to public opinion as transmitted through the newspapers and other channels.
Part of the reason was that Hong Kong officials were accountable to a democratically elected government in Britain sensitive to accusations of mismanaging a colony. But local officials often disobeyed London when it was in the local interest—for this reason frustrated Colonial Office mandarins sometimes dubbed the city "The Republic of Hong Kong." For many decades it boasted a higher standard of governance than the mother country.
Mr. Davies nailed the real reason Hong Kong officials were so driven to excel: "Precisely because they were aware of their own anachronism, the questionable legitimacy of an alien, non-elected government they strove not to alienate the population. Their nervousness made them sensitive."
The communists claim that the European powers stripped their colonies of natural resources and used them as captive markets for their manufacturers. But Hong Kong, devoid of resources other than refugees from communism, attracted investment and built up light industry to export back to Britain. And as for taking back the profits, Mr. Davies noted, "No British company here would have been mad enough to have repatriated its profits back to heavily-taxed, regularly devaluing Britain."
Most expatriate officials retired to Blighty, so they were less tempted to do favors for the local business elite. The government rewarded them with pensions and OBEs. A Lands Department bureaucrat didn't have to worry whether his child would be able to find employment in Hong Kong if a decision went against the largest property developer.
Contrast all this with Hong Kong post-handover. The government is still not democratic, but now it is accountable only to a highly corrupt and abusive single-party state. The first chief executive, Tung Chee Hwa, and Beijing's favorite to take the post next month, Henry Tang, are both members of the Shanghainese business elite that moved to the city after 1949. The civil service is localized.
Many consequences flow from these changes, several of which involve land, which is all leased from the government. Real estate development and appreciation is the biggest source of wealth in Hong Kong, a major source of public revenue and also the source of most discontent.
In recent years, the Lands Department has made "mistakes" in negotiating leases that have allowed developers to make billions of Hong Kong dollars in extra profit. Several high-level officials have also left to work for the developers. This has bred public cynicism that Hong Kong is sinking into crony capitalism.
This helps explain why the public is so upset with Mr. Tang for illegally adding 2,400 square feet of extra floor space to his house. Likewise Michael Suen, now the secretary for education, failed to heed a 2006 order from the Lands Department to dismantle an illegal addition to his home. His offense was arguably worse, since he was secretary for housing, planning and lands at the time.
In both cases the issue is not just a matter of zoning and safety; illegal additions cheat the government out of revenue. But it's unlikely Mr. Tang will face prosecution because nobody above or below him is independent enough to demand accountability. So now there is one set of rules for the public and another for the business and political elites.
Under the British, Hong Kong had the best of both worlds, the protections of democracy and the efficiency of all-powerful but nervous administrators imported from London. Now it has the worst of both worlds, an increasingly corrupt and feckless local ruling class backstopped by an authoritarian regime. The only good news is that the media remains free to expose scandals, but one has to wonder for how much longer.
Hong Kong's Chinese rulers have been slow to realize that, to paraphrase Lampedusa, the only way to keep Hong Kong the same is to accept change. It is no longer a city of refugees happy to accept rule by outsiders. And democracy is the only system that can match the hybrid form of political accountability enjoyed under the British.
Mr. Davies ended his appraisal of colonialism's faults and virtues thus: "I only hope and trust that a local Chinese will never draw a future British visitor aside and whisper to him that Hong Kong was better ruled by the foreign devils." Fifteen years later, that sentiment is becoming common.
Hugo Restall《華爾街日報》: 英國統治香港時更好 (林書翻譯)
北京欽點的香港下任特首唐英年的慢動作內爆，讓人想起1997年回歸不久前，前《遠東經濟評論》編輯戴維斯 (Derek Davies) 的演說。該演說題為《兩讚殖民主義》，旨在嘗試解釋為何香港會在英國管治下興盛。十五年後，那些難以管治香港的中國官員，可能應該看一看這篇演說。
英國人創造了一個相對廉潔並能幹的公務員隊伍，每天管理這城市。戴維斯先生的英國同胞未必會喜歡他對英國人的描述：「他們沈醉於各類的會議記錄、草案、正當渠道、先例，甚至是他們用來防止檔案夾內紙張的圓孔破裂的紅膠紙，都喜愛不已。」不過，起碼這些程序有助令人尊重法律，並防止濫權。
在公務員之上的，是由倫敦委任的高級官員。這些上等人通常都自視過人，鄙視記者和其他「不利」的批評，但他們倒是會透過報紙和其他途徑在回公眾的意見。
其中部份原因，是因為香港官員要向英國的民選政府負責，而英國民選政府對有關管理殖民地不力的指責十分敏感。不過，在港官員在處理本地事務時，不時會叛逆倫敦的意思，令殖民部的保守官員沮喪，有時甚至戲稱香港為「香港共和國」。有數十年的時間，香港的管治水準比英國的還要高。
戴維斯先生完全命中香港官員力爭卓越的真正原因：「正因為他們明白自己的過時，明白自己作為外族的官治權受質疑，本港政府並非選舉而生，故而致力避免與民眾疏離。他們的憂慮使他們觸覺敏銳。
共產黨指歐洲列強掠奪了殖民地的資源，並強使殖民地成為宗主國的生產商的市場。不過，香港除了逃避共產黨的難民外，甚麼資源也沒有，卻吸引了投資者，並建立了輕工業，把產品輸回英國。論到抽回利潤，戴維斯先生指出：「沒有英國公司會如此瘋狂，把利潤轉回重稅且不斷貶值的英國。」
大部份駐港官員退休時會返回英國老家，故此他們不易受誘惑把利益輸送予本港精英商家。退休時，政府會給他們頒贈退休金，和大英帝國勛章。地政總署的官員，不用擔心在作出對最大地產發展商不利的決定後，自己的孩子可能難以在港找到工作。
與回歸後的香港比較，政府依然不是民選的，但現政府卻要向一個貪污嚴重並濫權的一黨專政國家負責。香港首任特首董建華，還有北京屬意在數月後成為特首的唐英年，都是在1949年後移居香港的上海精英商家的一份子。行政架構只局限在某一撮人手上。
這些轉變引來連串後果，當中一些與土地有關，而土地全是由政府釋出的。地產發展和增值是香港財富的最大來源，是財政收入的主要來源，也是引發最多不滿的來源。
地政總署近年在土地發放的談判上作出不少「錯誤」，讓發展商得到以十億計的額外利潤，數名高級官員在離任後轉為地產商工作。這些都令公眾嘲諷香港已淪為裙帶資本主義之地。
這解釋了為何公眾對唐英年非法加建2400呎地牢如此反感。同樣，現任教育局局長孫明揚，在2006年未有依地政總署要求拆除僭建物，其實作為當時的房屋及規劃地政局局長，他的罪行可算更為嚴重。
在這兩個例子中，問題並不只是規劃和安全。僭建面積欺騙了政府的收入，但唐英年要面對檢控的可能並不高，因為無論在他以上或以下，都沒有足夠獨立的人能要求他負責。於是，現在形成對公眾有一套法則，對商家權貴又有另一套法則。
在英國管治下，香港兼享兩極的好處：既有民主的保護，又有倫敦輸入的高效能而心存憂慮的行政人員。現在的香港卻兼受兩極的壞處：既有越益嚴重的貪污，又有得到專制政權加持的軟腳蟹本地管治班子。唯一的好消息，是媒體還能自由揭發醜聞，不過這種自由也不知能再維持多久。
管治香港的中國政府不直不太理解的一件事，就是若要香港維持不變，就只能接受轉變。這個城市的人，再不是甘於受外人統治的難民，而民主是唯一能與英國管治下的混合式政治負責制匹敵的制度。
戴維斯先生最後如此評鑑殖民主義的優劣：「我只期盼並相信，在未來，不會發生香港人把英國遊客拉到一角，悄悄說，香港還是在外國的惡魔管治時比較好。」十五年後，越來越多人如此感觸。
