Al-Mulla’s message was that the Islamists’ victory in Egypt’s recent election gives them neither executive power nor control of the framing of a new constitution. But General Sami Anan, Chief of Staff and the SCAF’s deputy head, quickly countered that al-Mulla’s statement does not necessarily represent the official views of the Council.
So, one year after the revolution that overthrew Hosni Mubarak, who, exactly, will set Egypt’s political direction?
The electoral victory of the Muslim Brotherhood’s political wing and the Salafi parties, which together won more than 70% of the parliamentary seats, will give them strong influence over the transitional period and in drafting the constitution. But they are not alone. Aside from the Islamists, two other powerful actors will have their say: the “Tahrirists” and the generals.
Tahrir Square-based activism has not only brought about social and political change, but also has served as the ultimate tool of pro-democracy pressure on Egypt’s military rulers. Indeed, while the army, the most powerful of the three actors, still officially controls the country, there is little confidence in the generals’ commitment to democracy. “The SCAF are either anti-democratic….or some of their advisers told them that democracy is not in their best interest,” says Hazem Abd al-Azim, a nominee in the first post-Mubarak government.
If the generals do not want democracy, nor do they want direct military rule à la Augusto Pinochet. So, what do they want? Ideally, they would like to combine the Algerian army’s current power and the Turkish army’s legitimacy. This implies a parliament with limited powers, a weak presidency subordinate to the army, and constitutional prerogatives that legitimate the army’s intervention in politics.
The minimum that they insist on is reflected in statements by Generals al-Mulla, Mamdouh Shahim, Ismail Etman, and others. That would mean a veto in high politics, independence for the army’s budget and vast economic empire, legal immunity from prosecution on charges stemming from corruption or repression, and constitutional prerogatives to guarantee these arrangements.
The new parliament and constitutional assembly will have to lead the negotiations with the SCAF. But, given that any successful democratic transition must include meaningful civilian control over the armed forces and the security apparatus, the SCAF’s minimum demands could render the process meaningless.
The veto in high politics would include any issues that touch on national security or sensitive foreign policy, most importantly the relationship with Israel. With an Islamist majority in the parliament promising to “revise” the peace agreement with Israel, tensions over foreign policy are likely to rise.
The independent military-commercial empire, which benefits from preferential customs and exchange rates, no taxation, land-confiscation rights, and an army of almost-free laborers (conscripted soldiers), is another thorny issue. With the Egyptian economy suffering, elected politicians might seek to improve conditions by moving against the military’s civilian assets – namely, by revising the preferential rates and imposing a form of taxation.
Immunity from prosecution is no less salient. “The Field-Marshal should be in jail now,” screamed the elected leftist MP, Abu Ezz al-Hariri, on the second day of the new parliamentary session. When Mahmoud Ghozlan, the Muslim Brotherhood spokesperson, proposed immunity (known in Egypt as the “safe-exit” option), he faced a wave of harsh criticism.
Pressure from the United States has also influenced the SCAF’s decision-making. “The military establishment receives $1.3 billion from the US….They are very sensitive to US requests,” according to Saad Eddin Ibrahim, who lobbied the Obama administration to support the revolution in January 2011.
But most of the SCAF’s pro-democracy decisions have come as a result of massive pressure from Tahrir Square. This includes the removal of Mubarak, his trial (and that of other regime figures), and bringing forward the presidential election from 2013 to June 2012.
Two other factors are equally, if not more, influential: the status quo inherited from the Mubarak era and the army’s internal cohesion. With few exceptions, the SCAF’s members benefited significantly from Mubarak’s regime. They will attempt to preserve as much of it as possible.
“The sight of officers in uniform protesting in Tahrir Square and speaking on Al Jazeera really worries the Field Marshal,” a former officer told me. And one way to maintain internal cohesion is to create “demons” – a lesson learned from the “dirty wars” in Algeria in the 1990’s and Argentina in the 1970’s and 1980’s.
In particular, Coptic protesters are an easy target against which to rally soldiers and officers. Last October, amid an unnecessary escalation of sectarian violence, state-owned television featured a hospitalized Egyptian soldier screaming, “The Copts killed my colleague!” The systematic demonization of the Tahririst groups, and the violent escalation that followed in November and December, served the same purpose.
Despite everything, democratic Egypt is not a romantic fantasy. A year ago, Saad al-Ketatni, the Muslim Brotherhood leader, would never have dreamed of being Speaker of Parliament. The same applies to the leftists and liberals who now hold around 20% of the parliament’s seats.
If 2011 witnessed the miracle of Mubarak’s removal, a brave parliament’s institutional assertiveness, coupled with non-institutional Tahririst pressure, could force the generals to accept a transfer of power to civilian rule (with some reserved domains for the army establishment) in 2012. What is certain is that this year will not witness a return to the conditions of 2010. Egypt may become stuck in democratization’s slow lane, but there will be no U-turn. The hundreds of thousands who marched to Tahrir Square on the revolution’s anniversary will guarantee that.
Omar Ashour is a visiting scholar at the Brookings Doha Center
and Director of Middle East Graduate Studies at the Institute of Arab and
Islamic Studies, University of Exeter. He is the author of The
De-Radicalization of Jihadists: Transforming Armed Islamist Movements.
Omar Ashour: 埃及將軍想怎樣？
開羅——“無論哪個黨派在議會獲得大多數議席，他們都是受人歡迎的，原因是他們無法實施任何人民不願意實施的措施。”埃及最高軍事委員會 (SCAF)委員穆赫塔爾•阿爾•穆拉
(Mukhtar al-Mulla) 將軍這樣聲言。
阿爾•穆拉的意思是，雖然伊斯蘭主義者在埃及最近的選舉中獲勝，但是他們既不能獲得行政權也無法控制新憲法的形成。但是參謀長兼最高軍事委員會副委員長薩米•阿南 (Sami Anan) 將軍立即反駁說，阿爾•穆拉的觀點並不代表該委員會的官方觀點。
革命推翻胡斯尼•穆巴拉克 (Hosni Mubarak) 一年後，到底誰訂定埃及的政治方向？
穆斯林兄弟會
(Muslim Brotherhood) 的政治支派和薩拉菲 (Salafi) 各派在選舉中獲勝，總共獲得了議會中百分之七十的席位，這將在過渡階段給予他們強大的影響力並制定憲法。但是並不是只有他們。除了伊斯蘭主義者，還有兩個強大有發言權的參與者：解放廣場的抗議者 (Tahrirists) 和將軍們。
以解放廣場為基地的活動不僅引發了社會和政治變革，最後還迫使埃及軍方領導人支持民主。實際上，三個參與者中，軍隊最強大，還正式控制著這個國家，不過人們不相信將軍們會致力於民主。“最高軍事委員會不是反對民主……就是一些顧問告訴他們，民主並不符合他們利益。”穆巴拉克政府倒台後首次選舉的候選人哈齊姆•阿卜德•阿爾•阿齊姆 (Hazem Abd al-Azim) 說。
就算將官們不想要民主，他們也不想利用軍隊直接統治國家。那麼他們想怎樣？在理想的情況下，他們想融合阿爾及利亞軍隊當前的權力和土耳其軍隊的合法地位。這意味著有限權力的議會，權力薄弱的總統, 受制於於軍隊◦ 軍隊享有憲法的特權，能夠干預政事。
阿爾•穆拉、馬姆杜•沙希姆和伊斯梅爾•伊特曼等將軍的聲明反映了他們堅持的底線，即在重要政治問題上享有否決權、軍隊預算和大量的財政收入獨立、享有因貪污或鎮壓而遭指控的豁免權、享有憲法特權以確保這些權益。
新國會和憲法議會必須與最高軍事委員會談判。但是鑒於任何成功的民主轉型必須包括文官確切控制軍隊和國家安全機構，最高軍事委員會的最低要求可能會使這個過程失去意義。
在重要問題上享有否決權意味著在涉及國家安全或敏感外交政策（最重要的是與以色列的關係）等問題時都享有否決權。佔大多數國會議席的伊斯蘭主義者一定“重新修訂”與以色列的和平協議，很可能出現外交政策的緊張關係。
獨立的軍事商業帝國又是一個棘手的難題。它從優惠的關稅和匯率、免稅、土地沒收權和大批幾乎免費的勞動力（徵召士兵）中受益匪淺。由於埃及的經濟萎靡不振，當選的政客可能會試圖改善經濟狀況, 會向軍隊的民用資產開刀——如修訂優惠稅率並採用新收稅項。
免受指控特權備受觸目。當選的左翼議員阿布•伊茲•阿爾•哈裡利在新國會選舉的第二天喊道：“陸軍元帥現在應該關在監獄了。”當穆斯林兄弟會的發言人馬哈茂德•戈茲朗提議豁免權（在埃及稱為“安全脫身”的選擇）時，他受到了嚴厲的批評。
美國的壓力也影響了最高軍事委員會的決策。“埃及軍方接受了美國13億美元的資助……他們很重視美國的要求。”薩德•埃丁•易卜拉欣說。2011年1月，他曾游說奧巴馬政府支持革命。
但是最高軍事委員會大多數支持民主的決定都是解放廣場抗議者大力施壓的結果。其中包括推翻穆巴拉克政府、審訊穆巴拉克（以及其他穆巴拉克政府的官員）和將總統大選從2013年提前到2012年6月。
另外兩個因素至少具有相同的影響力：從穆巴拉克時代下來的現狀和軍隊內部的凝聚力。幾乎沒有什麼特例，最高軍事委員會的委員都從穆巴拉克政府中受益匪淺。他們將竭盡全力保住利益。
“在解放廣場抗議並在阿拉伯半島新聞電視台講話的軍人叫陸軍統帥擔憂，”一位前官員對我說。保持內部凝聚力的一種方法是打造“惡魔”——這是從二十世紀九十年代阿爾及利亞和二十世紀七八十年代阿根廷的“骯臟戰爭”中學來的。
科普特的抗議者特別容易成為士兵和軍官整治的目標。去年十月，在不必要的宗派暴力升級過程中，國有電視特別報道一位住院的埃及士兵喊道，“科普特人殺了我的同事！”有系統地妖魔化解放廣場上的抗議者以及十一月和十二月的暴力升級都是為了達到相同的目的。
儘管如此，埃及實現民主並不是天方夜譚。一年前，穆斯林兄弟會的領袖薩德•阿爾•卡塔尼根本想不到自己會當上國會的發言人。左翼人士和自由人士也是，他們現在竟然佔到了國會大約百分之二十的席位。
如果2011年見証了穆巴拉克下台的奇跡，2012年將見証勇敢的國會機制力量和解放廣場抗議者壓力的非機制力量迫使將軍們接受向文官統治轉變（軍方在一些領域將保有權力）。埃及可能在民主的道上慢車前行，但是不會倒退。成千上萬的人到解放廣場游行紀念革命一周年將保証這種趨勢。
Omar Ashour 是布魯金斯多哈研究中心的訪問學者，艾塞克斯大學阿拉伯和伊斯蘭研究中心中東研究生院院長，著有《去聖戰分子的極端思想：轉變暴力的伊斯蘭運動》。
