Obama and his congressional allies enacted an $800 billion “stimulus” bill that was loaded with programs geared to key Democratic constituencies, such as environmentalists and public employees; adopted a sweeping and highly unpopular health-care reform (whose constitutionality will be determined by the Supreme Court this year); imposed vast new regulations on wide swaths of the economy; embraced an industrial policy that selects certain companies for special treatment; engaged in borrowing and spending at levels exceeded only in World War II; and centralized power in Washington, DC (and, within the federal government, in the executive branch and regulatory agencies).
The last election that was followed by such a sweeping change in policy direction occurred in 1980, when President Ronald Reagan overhauled taxes, spending, and regulation, and supported the Federal Reserve’s course of disinflation. While the 1988, 1992, and 2000 elections were also quite consequential, the policy shifts were not nearly as large as in 1980 and 2008.
The country rebelled against Obama and the Democrats’ lurch to the left with historic Congressional election victories for Republicans in 2010. Since then, many Republicans have been deeply disappointed that the House of Representatives has been unable to roll back much of Obama’s agenda. But the US political system is set up to make it much harder to accomplish something than to block it. It is not easy to do a lot while controlling only one-half of one-third of the federal government.
The 2012 election is shaping up as a referendum on Obama’s policies and performance. The economy is improving slowly, but it remains in bad shape, with high unemployment and millions having left the labor force. Republicans are expected to retain control of the House and regain a majority in the Senate.
Former Massachusetts Governor Mitt Romney, the Republican frontrunner to challenge Obama in November, and the party’s other leading candidates, including former House Speaker Newt Gingrich, want less spending, major reforms of government programs, lower taxes, trade expansion, and less and more-targeted regulation than does Obama.
Romney, for example, has a detailed 59-point economic program, including a cap on federal spending at 20% of GDP, which would require reductions similar to those in the 1980’s and 1990’s. Gingrich and the other Republicans have an even more aggressive agenda of cutting taxes and reducing the size and scope of government. The eventual nominee would be wise to incorporate his opponents’ best ideas and top people into his campaign.
A Republican presidential victory, together with Republican control of the House and Senate, would likely lead to substantial reduction, repeal, and replacement of many Obama initiatives, attempts to reform taxes and entitlements, and measures to impose greater fiscal discipline. High on Romney’s agenda is a reduction of the corporate-tax rate, from 35% to 25%, the OECD average level (the other Republican candidates would lower it still more), which would redress a major competitive disadvantage for American multinational companies’ global business.
A Republican victory would also most likely lead to a major push to open up many more energy-exploration opportunities within America, which Obama has stymied. Romney has promised tougher negotiations on trade and currency with China, but is generally far more likely to push new trade agreements than the labor-supported Obama administration. If, however, Democrats retain control of the Senate, this will be far more difficult to accomplish. A Republican president also would make appointments to many key policymaking positions, from the Federal Reserve and the Treasury to regulatory agencies.
If Obama is re-elected, and Republicans control the House and Senate, his legislative agenda will essentially be a dead letter, and he will spend the next two years, at least, negotiating its reform and rollback. In this scenario, the policy center of gravity in the Republican party would shift to House Speaker John Boehner, the chairman of the House Budget Committee, Paul Ryan, House Majority Leader Eric Cantor, and other key Representatives, including David Camp, Kevin Brady, and Kevin McCarthy, along with several Senators.
In that case, Obama would be wise to move to the center (as Bill Clinton did after the Democrats lost control of Congress in 1994) and work with congressional Republicans to shape sensible tax and entitlement reforms. But that seems unlikely: since the Democrats’ massive defeat in 2010, Obama has moved even further to the left, embracing a more populist agenda.
Regardless of the outcome of this year’s presidential and congressional elections, various Republican state governors are likely to gain a higher national profile. All of them – including Mitch Daniels of Indiana, Chris Christie of New Jersey, Bob McDonnell of Virginia, and former Governor Jeb Bush of Florida – declined to seek the Republican presidential nomination, but will be on the short list for 2016 should Obama win in November.
Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis famously described the states as “laboratories”: they should be allowed to experiment and learn from each other which policies work. For example, Clinton and the Republican Congress based landmark 1996 welfare reform on policies originated by Wisconsin Governor Tommy Thompson and successfully emulated by New York City Mayor Rudy Giuliani, both reformist Republicans. The current cohort of Republican governors offers similarly innovative state-level solutions – for example, on spending, debt, and unfunded pension and health liabilities – as models for the country.
Until November, divided government and contentious campaigning will most likely prevent significant policy moves. But, following the election, taxes and spending, trade policy, federalism, regulation, and defense will take a different course – how different depends on who wins – with important implications for America’s fiscal position, external balance, and much else, including its relations with the rest of the world.
Michael Boskin, currently Professor of Economics at Stanford
University and a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, was Chairman of
President George H. W. Bush’s Council of Economic Advisers, 1989-1993.
Michael Boskin: 奧巴馬面臨全民公投
斯坦福—成功的政治候選人總是盡力實施他們所提出的政策主張。2009年，奧巴馬總統和民主黨控制著眾議院和（壓到多數優勢）參議院，可以隨心所欲地做想做的事，而他們也確實做了。
奧巴馬及其國會盟友們簽署了8 000億美元的“刺激法案”——該法案充斥著有利於民主黨票源（如環保主義者和公務員）的項目﹔實施了普遍覆蓋但相當不受歡迎的醫保改革（今年最高法院將裁決此項改革是否合憲）﹔對經濟的方方面面實施了新的廣泛監管﹔採取了區別對待某些公司的產業政策﹔借入並花掉了僅次於二戰時期水平的資金﹔還將權力都集中於華盛頓（在聯邦政府內，則把權力都集中在執行部門和監管部門）。
上一次在政策發生如此大的轉變之後進行大選是1980年，當時裡根總統大刀闊斧地改革了稅收、支出和監管政策，並支持美聯儲的反通脹立場。1988、1992和2000年的選舉也發生在政策轉向之后，但轉向之徹底遠遠不能和1980和2008年相提並論。
美國背叛了奧巴馬和民主黨的突然左轉，2010年，共和黨在國會選舉中贏得歷史性勝利。此后，許多共和黨人對眾議院沒能駁回奧巴馬的政策主張感到十分失望。但美國政治體系的初衷是讓阻撓成事易於成事。如果你只能控制聯邦政府的一半或三分之一，那麼你有很多事情就很難做成。
2012年的大選將是對奧巴馬政策和表現的一次全民公投。經濟在緩慢改善，但仍萎靡不振，失業率依舊高企，而且好幾百萬人已經退出了勞動力市場。共和黨可能會繼續控制眾議院，而且將在參議員獲得多數。
前馬薩諸塞州州長、最有希望成為奧巴馬11月大選競爭對手的羅姆尼以及其他共和黨候選人（包括前眾議院發言人紐特·金裡奇）希望能夠減少支出、對政府項目做出重大改革、降低稅率、擴張貿易，並減少監管、增加監管的針對性。
比如，羅姆尼提出了一個59條內容的詳細經濟計劃，包括將聯邦支出限制在GDP的20%（這要求類似於20世紀80年代和90年代的支出削減）。金裡奇和其他共和黨人的減稅和縮小政府規模與范圍的計劃比羅姆尼還要激進。最終從共和黨提名戰中勝出者將明智地整合其反對者的好主意，壯大自己的陣營。
若共和黨在大選中勝出並控制眾議院和參議院，那麼他們可能會大幅度地削減、取消甚至逆轉奧巴馬的不少舉措，實行稅收和福利改革，採取更有紀律性的財政政策。在羅姆尼的計劃中，最重要的是把公司稅從35%削減至25%，即經合組織的平均水平（其他共和黨人提出的減稅幅度更大），這將顯著改善美國跨國公司全球業務競爭力低下的問題。
共和黨的勝利還會導致大規模開放美國國內的能源勘探機會，而奧巴馬是抵制這一點的。羅姆尼還承諾將就貿易和貨幣問題和中國展開更強硬的談判，但總的來說，與支持美國勞動力的奧巴馬政府相比，共和黨更有可能與中國達成新的貿易協定。不過，如果民主黨仍能保持對參議院的控制，則共和黨要在這方面取得成就將變得很難。共和黨總統還能任命眾多關鍵的決策性職位，比如美聯儲主席、財政部部長以及監管機構首腦。
如果奧巴馬連任，而共和黨控制眾議院和參議院，則前者的立法計劃將泡湯，至少在未來2年裡，奧巴馬將面臨政策談判和扯皮。如果發生這樣的情景，則共和黨政策中心將轉移至參議院發言人約翰·博納、眾議院預算委員會主席保羅·瑞恩、眾議院多數黨領袖埃裡克·康托和其他眾議員，包括大衛·坎普、凱文·布雷迪、凱文·麥卡錫，以及部分參議員。
無論如何，奧巴馬肯定會轉向政治中心（正如比爾·克林頓在1994年民主黨失去對國會的控制後所做的那樣），與國會中的共和黨一起制定明智的稅收和福利改革。但這似乎是不可能完成的任務：自從民主黨在2010年慘遭滑鐵盧以來，奧巴馬便與左翼漸行漸遠，採取了更加民粹主義的立場。
不管今年大選和國會選舉結果如何，不少共和黨州長將贏得高度支持。他們——包括印第安納州的米奇·丹尼爾斯、新澤西州的克裡斯·克裡斯蒂、弗吉尼亞州的鮑勃·麥克唐納以及佛羅裡達州前州長杰布·布什——都沒有需求獲得共和黨總統候選人提名，但如果奧巴馬在11月的大選中獲勝，那麼他們很可能會在2016年成為民主黨的對手。
最高法院大法官路易斯·布蘭代斯有一個著名論斷，州是“實驗室”，是彼此學習政策效果的試驗場。比如，克林頓和共和黨國會1996年的福利改革便是基於最先由威斯康辛州州長湯米·湯普森實施、然后被紐約市市長魯迪·朱利安尼成功模仿的政策的。如今，這群共和黨州長也提供了類似的創新性州級解決方案（包括支出、債務和養老金及醫保開支缺口等問題），可以作為全國的參考樣板。
在11月之前，分裂的政府和各自為戰的競選想必將阻撓重大政策動作的產生。但是，在大選結束后，稅收和支出政策、貿易政策、聯邦主義、監管以及防務政策都將出現改變（改變有多劇烈，取決於誰能勝出），並對美國的財政狀況、國際收支和其他方方面面（包括美國與世界其他地區的關系）產生重大影響。
Michael Boskin現為斯坦福大學經濟學教授，胡佛研究所高級研究員。他曾經是喬治·H·W·布什總統經濟顧問委員會主席（1989—1993）。
