Output growth in the US remains anemic, and the economy continues to face three significant deficits: a jobs deficit, an investment deficit, and a long-run fiscal deficit, none of which is likely to be addressed in an election year.
Although output is now higher than it was in the fourth quarter of 2007, it remains far below what could be produced if labor and capacity were fully utilized. That gap – between actual and potential output – is estimated at more than 7% of GDP (more than $1 trillion).
The output gap reflects a deficit of more than 12 million jobs – the number of jobs needed to return to the economy’s peak 2007 employment level and absorb the 125,000 people who enter the labor force each month. Even if the economy grows at 2.5% in 2012, as most forecasts anticipate, the jobs deficit will remain – and will not be closed until 2024.
America’s jobs deficit is primarily the result of inadequate aggregate demand. Consumption, which accounts for about 70% of total spending, is constrained by high unemployment, weak wage gains, and a steep decline in home values and consumer wealth. The uptick in consumption in the last months of 2011 was financed by a decline in the household saving rate and a large increase in consumer credit. Neither of these trends is healthy or sustainable.
With an unemployment rate of 8.5%, a labor-force participation rate of only 64%, and stagnant real wages, labor income has fallen to an historic low of 44% of national income. And labor income is the most important component of household earnings, the major driver of consumption spending.
Even before the Great Recession, American workers and households were in trouble. The rate of job growth between 2000 and 2007 slowed to only half its level in the three preceding decades. Productivity growth was strong, but far outpaced wage growth, and workers’ real hourly compensation declined, on average, even for those with a university education.
Indeed, the 2002-2007 period was the only recovery on record during which the median family’s real income declined. Moreover, job opportunities continued to polarize, with employment growing in high-wage professional, technical, and managerial occupations, as well as in low-wage food-service, personal-care, and protective-service occupations.
By contrast, employment in middle-skill, white-collar, and blue-collar occupations fell, particularly in manufacturing. Hard-pressed American households slashed their savings rates, borrowed against their home equity, and increased their debt to maintain consumption, contributing to the housing and credit bubbles that burst in 2008, requiring painful deleveraging ever since.
Three forces have driven the US labor market’s adverse structural changes:
· Skill-biased technological change, which has automated routine work while boosting demand for highly educated workers with at least a college degree.
· Global competition and the integration of labor markets through trade and outsourcing, which have eliminated jobs and depressed wages.
· America’s declining competitiveness as an attractive place to locate production and employment.
Technological change and globalization have created similar labor-market challenges in other developed countries. But US policy choices are responsible for the erosion of America’s competitiveness.
In particular, the US is underinvesting in three major areas that help countries to create and retain high-wage jobs: skills and training, infrastructure, and research and development.
Spending in these areas accounts for less than 10% of US government spending, and this share has been declining over time. The federal government can currently borrow at record-low interest rates, and there are many projects in education, infrastructure, and research that would earn a higher return, create jobs now, and bolster US competitiveness in attracting high-wage jobs.
President Barack Obama has offered numerous proposals to invest in the foundations of national competitiveness, but Congressional Republicans have rebuffed them, claiming that the US faces an impending fiscal crisis. In fact, the federal deficit as a share of GDP will shrink significantly over the next several years, even without further deficit-reduction measures, before rising to unsustainable levels by 2030.
The US does indeed face a long-run fiscal deficit, largely the result of rising health-care costs and an aging population. But the current fiscal deficit mainly reflects weak tax revenues, owing to slow growth and high unemployment, and temporary stimulus measures that are fading away at a time when aggregate demand remains weak and additional fiscal stimulus is warranted.
At the very least, to keep the economy on course for 2.5% growth this year, the payroll tax cut and unemployment benefits proposed by Obama should be extended through the end of the year. These measures would provide insurance to the fragile recovery and add nothing to the long-run fiscal gap.
So, how should the US economy’s jobs deficit, investment deficit, and long-run fiscal deficit be addressed?
Policymakers should pair fiscal measures to ameliorate the jobs and investment deficits now with a multi-year plan to reduce the long-run fiscal deficit gradually. This long-run plan should increase spending on education, infrastructure, and research, while curbing future growth in health-care spending through the cost-containment mechanisms contained in Obama’s health-reform legislation.
Approving a long-run deficit-reduction plan now but deferring its starting date until the economy is near full employment would prevent premature fiscal contraction from tipping the economy back into recession. Indeed, enactment of such a package could bolster output and employment growth by easing investor concerns about future deficits and strengthening consumer and business confidence.
Painful choices about how to close the long-run fiscal gap should be decided now and implemented promptly once the economy has recovered. But, for the next few years, the priorities of fiscal policy should be jobs, investment, and growth.
Laura Tyson, a former chair of the US President's Council of
Economic Advisers, is a professor at the Haas School of Business at the
University of California, Berkeley.
Laura Tyson: 美國的三大赤字
伯克利——新年伊始的一系列報告都在令人興奮地表明，美國經濟復蘇得到了提振。就業崗位創造速度增加了，制造業和服務業指標改善了，消費支出也要強於預期。但是，不要高興得太早了。
美國的產出增長依然相當低迷，美國經濟依然面臨三大赤字：就業赤字、投資赤字和長期財政赤字，這三大赤字都不可能在選舉年得到解決。
儘管如今產出已經高於2007年第四季度，但仍要比勞動力和產能充分調動情形低很多。其中的缺口——即實際產出和潛在產出之差——大約在GDP的7%（1萬億美元）以上。
產出缺口反映了超過1
200萬的就業赤字，即使就業率達到2007年頂峰時期的水平並吸收每個月進入勞動力市場的125
000人所需要增加的就業量。即使2012年經濟增長如許多人預計的那樣達到2.5%，就業赤字仍然無法消除，可能將一直持續到2024年。
美國就業赤字的主因是總需求不足。佔美國總支出水平七成的消費受高失業、低工資增長和房價及消費者財富快速縮水的約束。2011年12月消費水平的上升是受家庭儲蓄下降和消費信貸大增的提振。這兩個趨勢都不是健康趨勢，也不可能持續。
目前失業率高達8.5%，勞動市場參與率只有64%，真實工資一直停滯不前，這導致勞動收入佔國民收入的比重隻有44%，為歷史最低值。勞動收入是家庭收入的最重要組成部分，也是消費支出的主要推動力。
在大衰退之前，美國工人和家庭便已經陷入了困境。2000—2007年就業增長率較之前30年下降了整整一半。生產率的增長相當強勁，但遠遠超出了工資增長，而工人的平均真實時薪在下降，即使是大學生也無法幸免。
事實上，2000—2007年這段時期只是中位家庭真實收入下降趨勢中的一次反彈。此外，就業機會繼續呈現兩極分化的態勢，高收入的專業、技術和管理職位，以及低工資的食品服務、個人看護和防護職位的數量在增長。
相反，技能要求中等的白領和藍領職位在減少，尤其是制造業職位。壓力重重的美國家庭不得不削減儲蓄率、用房屋所有權作抵押借貸，以債務的增加為代價維持消費水平，這導致了房地產和信貸泡沫。2008年，這一泡沫破裂，此後便開始了痛苦的去杠杆化過程。
三大因素導致了美國勞動力市場的有害結構變化：
· 基於技能的技術變遷，即傳統工作的自動化和至少需要本科學歷的高技能員工需求增加同時發生。
· 貿易和外包帶來的全球勞動市場競爭和一體化減少了就業崗位，壓低了工資。
· 美國競爭力下降，不再具有對生產和崗位的吸引力。
技術變遷和全球化在其他發達國家也造成了類似的勞動力市場挑戰。但美國競爭力下降卻是政策選擇的結果。
特別是，在創造和維持高工資崗位等方面，美國在三個領域上投資不足：技能與培訓、基礎設施，以及研發。美國政府在這三個領域的支出隻有總支出的不到10%，而且這一比重還在不斷下降。當前，聯邦政府能夠以極低利率借錢，而在教育、基礎設施和研究領域，有很多項目都能帶來較高的回報、立刻產生新增就業並提振美國吸引高工資崗位的競爭力。
奧巴馬總統提出了大量方案投資於美國國家競爭力基礎，但國會中的共和黨拒絕了這些方案，他們說，美國的當務之急的財政危機。事實上，在2030年上升到不可持續水平之前，聯邦赤字佔GDP的比重將在未來數年內大幅下降，就算沒有進一步的赤字削減手段也是如此。
美國確實面臨著長期財政赤字問題，這是由上漲的醫保成本和老齡化的人口導致的。但當前財政赤字主要是由稅收收入不足造成的，其原因是低增長、高失業以及在總需求依然疲軟的情況下，暫時性刺激措施到期、需要投入新的刺激措施。
無論如何，為了保証美國經濟今年能有2.5%的增長，奧巴馬所提出的工資稅削減和失業救濟方案應該延期到今年年底。這些措施能夠為脆弱的復蘇上保險，而對長期財政缺口毫無影響。
那麼，如何解決美國經濟的就業赤字、投資池子和長期財政赤字呢？
決策者應該在財政政策方面雙管齊下，在當下消除就業和投資池子，同時提出一個多年計劃逐漸削減長期財政赤字。這一長期計劃應該增加教育、基礎設施和研究方面的支出，同時限制醫保支出的進一步增長（比如通過奧巴馬醫療改革立法中提出的成本限制機制）。
現在就通過長期赤字削減計劃，但推遲到經濟達到接近充分就業時再實施，這樣可以防止財政收縮操之過急，把經濟重新拖入衰退。事實上，頒布這一攬子計劃可以大小投資者對未來赤字的擔憂，提振消費者和商業信心，從而增加產出和就業。
怎樣填補長期財政缺口？痛苦的選擇應該馬上做出，並等到經濟復蘇後大力推行。但是，在未來幾年中，財政政策的額當務之急是就業、投資和增長。
Laura Tyson是前美國總統經濟顧問委員會主席，現任加州大學伯克利分校哈斯商學院教授。
