A period of 84 years, most of them spent as a proscribed secret
society languishing in prison or in exile, is a long time to wait. Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood
had to spend one hour more. That was the time it took Farouq Sultan,
the head of the election commission, to read out a statement dealing
with, it seemed, every one of the 456 objections made as a result of the
presidential runoff. When he finally came to the point, Sultan could
not get to the end of his sentence before the press conference, Tahrir
Square and the country erupted. Mohamed Morsi had become the first
Islamist to be elected head of an Arab state.
This is a historic moment for Egypt. Another nail has been hammered into the coffin of the old regime. The reaction of Tahrir Square on Sunday night was every bit as ecstatic as the toppling of Hosni Mubarak himself. Yet power itself has not changed hands, and the conflict with an ageing group of generals in the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (Scaf) might yet drag on for weeks or months. Scaf thinks it owns the country, and by some reckoning it does. Its corrupt business empire could account for as much as 40% of Egypt's GNP. Like all CEOs, they will not depart swiftly or cheaply. Theirs will be a slow and bitter rearguard action.
But after Sunday's events few can doubt the direction of travel. The generals face a bald choice: declare a military coup or beat the retreat. How long that decision will take, no one knows. The generals now face an incomparably larger and more emboldened foe. The secular leftist and Islamic forces that comprise the revolution are still mutually distrustful and represent an unwieldy spectrum of political forces, many still half-formed.
However, from now on their torchbearer will not just be a crowd hundreds of thousands strong. It will be a president who represents the democratic and constitutional will of the Egyptian people. As Scaf represents neither, it will be hard put to keep the legislative, constitutional and executive powers it grabbed in the dying days of the presidential count.
Much will depend on the character of Egypt's new president. Derided as a spare tyre by the Egyptian press – because he was not the Brotherhood's first choice as presidential candidate – Morsi may be an accidental president, but he may also turn out to be a powerful one.
Dismissed as a boring and unquotable technocrat, he produced his best speech on the very night, 11 days ago, the military council issued its constitutional decree.
He is a dogged negotiator and, supporters say, a man of courage. Although the election result was announced on Sunday, it was known on Thursday afternoon. By then it became clear that the number of ballot papers ruled ineligible had not been enough to dent the one million strong lead Morsi had over the army's candidate, Ahmed Shafiq.
The Brotherhood then met the military council and made its three principal demands – that parliament be reinstated, the military's right of arrest of civilians be rescinded, and a new constitutional assembly formed. The Brotherhood offered to put the military's constitutional decree to a referendum. The military refused, and the Brotherhood returned to Tahrir Square.
The three days that followed were a battle of wills that Morsi won. His first act as president-elect was to resign his membership of the Brotherhood. His vice-presidents will all come from other groups, including Egypt's Coptic Christians. All these moves are vital if a government of national unity is to be created.
The battle of wills between Morsi and the generals will continue. And as reaction poured in from the region – notably, Binyamin Netanyahu, Israel's prime minister, said he respected the outcome – the US, Britain and Europe were all notably silent in the hours immediately after the victory, considering this is a triumph not just of one candidate but of democracy. Not for the first time in the Middle East, western powers could have found themselves on the wrong side of history.
This is a historic moment for Egypt. Another nail has been hammered into the coffin of the old regime. The reaction of Tahrir Square on Sunday night was every bit as ecstatic as the toppling of Hosni Mubarak himself. Yet power itself has not changed hands, and the conflict with an ageing group of generals in the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (Scaf) might yet drag on for weeks or months. Scaf thinks it owns the country, and by some reckoning it does. Its corrupt business empire could account for as much as 40% of Egypt's GNP. Like all CEOs, they will not depart swiftly or cheaply. Theirs will be a slow and bitter rearguard action.
But after Sunday's events few can doubt the direction of travel. The generals face a bald choice: declare a military coup or beat the retreat. How long that decision will take, no one knows. The generals now face an incomparably larger and more emboldened foe. The secular leftist and Islamic forces that comprise the revolution are still mutually distrustful and represent an unwieldy spectrum of political forces, many still half-formed.
However, from now on their torchbearer will not just be a crowd hundreds of thousands strong. It will be a president who represents the democratic and constitutional will of the Egyptian people. As Scaf represents neither, it will be hard put to keep the legislative, constitutional and executive powers it grabbed in the dying days of the presidential count.
Much will depend on the character of Egypt's new president. Derided as a spare tyre by the Egyptian press – because he was not the Brotherhood's first choice as presidential candidate – Morsi may be an accidental president, but he may also turn out to be a powerful one.
Dismissed as a boring and unquotable technocrat, he produced his best speech on the very night, 11 days ago, the military council issued its constitutional decree.
He is a dogged negotiator and, supporters say, a man of courage. Although the election result was announced on Sunday, it was known on Thursday afternoon. By then it became clear that the number of ballot papers ruled ineligible had not been enough to dent the one million strong lead Morsi had over the army's candidate, Ahmed Shafiq.
The Brotherhood then met the military council and made its three principal demands – that parliament be reinstated, the military's right of arrest of civilians be rescinded, and a new constitutional assembly formed. The Brotherhood offered to put the military's constitutional decree to a referendum. The military refused, and the Brotherhood returned to Tahrir Square.
The three days that followed were a battle of wills that Morsi won. His first act as president-elect was to resign his membership of the Brotherhood. His vice-presidents will all come from other groups, including Egypt's Coptic Christians. All these moves are vital if a government of national unity is to be created.
The battle of wills between Morsi and the generals will continue. And as reaction poured in from the region – notably, Binyamin Netanyahu, Israel's prime minister, said he respected the outcome – the US, Britain and Europe were all notably silent in the hours immediately after the victory, considering this is a triumph not just of one candidate but of democracy. Not for the first time in the Middle East, western powers could have found themselves on the wrong side of history.
Ian Black: Mohamed Morsi victory is a landmark for Egypt – but a qualified one
In the end, of course, only one candidate could win – though the
cliffhanging, nail-biting tension was maintained until the very last
moment. Victory for Mohamed Morsi in Egypt's presidential race is a
landmark in a dramatic post-revolutionary transition and a defining
event of the Arab spring.
For the man representing the Muslim Brotherhood, the world's oldest Islamist movement, to win a free and fair election for the presidency of the Arab world's most populous country is a triumph that will resonate around a turbulent region. It will be recognised as an historic achievement. But it is a flawed and qualified one.
Morsi will be Egypt's first civilian president since Gamal Abdel-Nasser and his fellow officers overthrew the monarchy in 1952. Hosni Mubarak was forced to quit in February 2011 though the generals who had backed him stayed on. Morsi's biggest problem is that the military are still there – the real power behind the throne.
Still, much about Egypt is already different. Expectations of change are now greater than before the great drama of Tahrir square began last year. It is not possible to go back to "square one." But political polarisation is clearer too: no one should underestimate the impact of the Brotherhood's success for a movement that was suppressed and feared for decades. The defeated Ahmed Shafiq, Mubarak's last prime minister and the candidate seen as representing the old regime, still won 48% of the vote. It was, for many millions of Egyptians, a choice between unpalatable extremes.
Morsi's victory followed parliamentary and presidential elections that were freer and fairer than anything in the preceding 60 years, though for some the whole process has always been a sham: "Wow, all this suspense in this joke of an election, imagine if it was actually real," tweeted one cynic before the result was announced on Sunday.
But the vote-rigging of the Mubarak years has given way to fixing at a higher level. Egyptians describe a "soft coup" anchored in a constitutional declaration that gives the supreme council of the armed forces (Scaf) unprecedented powers after a court ruling dissolved the Islamist-dominated parliament. The new constitution, crucially, remains to be written. Morsi's own authority looks like being extremely limited.
The secrets of behind-the-scenes bargaining between the Brotherhood and Scaf remain to be told. It will be surprising if the generals do not retain their financial clout and privileges, and their powers to make war, conduct foreign policy and maintain internal security – the holy trinity of Egypt's deep state. It will suit them perfectly to blame the civilian president for the parlous state of the economy.
In a curious twist of recent days, Shafiq supporters accused the US of quietly encouraging a Morsi win – as a way of cementing the dominance of Scaf and securing the strategically important peace treaty with Israel.
On balance, Morsi's victory is the better outcome. It creates the possibility of continued bargaining between the army and the Brotherhood, whose well-organised rank and file remain ready to take to the streets to maintain pressure on the generals. A Shafiq win would have immediately reignited protests and made it easier for the army to crack down in the name of stability.
Morsi's biggest challenges start now. Will he stand up to the army? His claim to represent "all Egyptians" will be tested by how he reaches out to the liberal and independent candidates who fell away in the first presidential round.
Who will he choose as a prime minister? A non-Brotherhood figure – Mohamed ElBaradei is being mooted – could signal pluralism and help deflect heat on the economy. Nervous Copts and women will need reassuring. Not everyone believes the Brotherhood's newfound spirit of inclusiveness: after all, it backed Scaf's transition plan for most of last year and then reneged on its own promises not to field too many candidates for parliament or any for the presidency.
Morsi's victory is not the end of Egypt's turbulent post-revolutionary game. But it is perhaps the end of the beginning.
For the man representing the Muslim Brotherhood, the world's oldest Islamist movement, to win a free and fair election for the presidency of the Arab world's most populous country is a triumph that will resonate around a turbulent region. It will be recognised as an historic achievement. But it is a flawed and qualified one.
Morsi will be Egypt's first civilian president since Gamal Abdel-Nasser and his fellow officers overthrew the monarchy in 1952. Hosni Mubarak was forced to quit in February 2011 though the generals who had backed him stayed on. Morsi's biggest problem is that the military are still there – the real power behind the throne.
Still, much about Egypt is already different. Expectations of change are now greater than before the great drama of Tahrir square began last year. It is not possible to go back to "square one." But political polarisation is clearer too: no one should underestimate the impact of the Brotherhood's success for a movement that was suppressed and feared for decades. The defeated Ahmed Shafiq, Mubarak's last prime minister and the candidate seen as representing the old regime, still won 48% of the vote. It was, for many millions of Egyptians, a choice between unpalatable extremes.
Morsi's victory followed parliamentary and presidential elections that were freer and fairer than anything in the preceding 60 years, though for some the whole process has always been a sham: "Wow, all this suspense in this joke of an election, imagine if it was actually real," tweeted one cynic before the result was announced on Sunday.
But the vote-rigging of the Mubarak years has given way to fixing at a higher level. Egyptians describe a "soft coup" anchored in a constitutional declaration that gives the supreme council of the armed forces (Scaf) unprecedented powers after a court ruling dissolved the Islamist-dominated parliament. The new constitution, crucially, remains to be written. Morsi's own authority looks like being extremely limited.
The secrets of behind-the-scenes bargaining between the Brotherhood and Scaf remain to be told. It will be surprising if the generals do not retain their financial clout and privileges, and their powers to make war, conduct foreign policy and maintain internal security – the holy trinity of Egypt's deep state. It will suit them perfectly to blame the civilian president for the parlous state of the economy.
In a curious twist of recent days, Shafiq supporters accused the US of quietly encouraging a Morsi win – as a way of cementing the dominance of Scaf and securing the strategically important peace treaty with Israel.
On balance, Morsi's victory is the better outcome. It creates the possibility of continued bargaining between the army and the Brotherhood, whose well-organised rank and file remain ready to take to the streets to maintain pressure on the generals. A Shafiq win would have immediately reignited protests and made it easier for the army to crack down in the name of stability.
Morsi's biggest challenges start now. Will he stand up to the army? His claim to represent "all Egyptians" will be tested by how he reaches out to the liberal and independent candidates who fell away in the first presidential round.
Who will he choose as a prime minister? A non-Brotherhood figure – Mohamed ElBaradei is being mooted – could signal pluralism and help deflect heat on the economy. Nervous Copts and women will need reassuring. Not everyone believes the Brotherhood's newfound spirit of inclusiveness: after all, it backed Scaf's transition plan for most of last year and then reneged on its own promises not to field too many candidates for parliament or any for the presidency.
Morsi's victory is not the end of Egypt's turbulent post-revolutionary game. But it is perhaps the end of the beginning.
