Ian Buruma: Chinese Shadows / 中國的陰暗面

NEW YORK – These are interesting times in China. A senior Communist Party official, Bo Xilai, is brought down – accused of offenses that include wire-tapping other party bosses, including President Hu Jintao – while his wife is investigated for her alleged role in the possible murder of a British businessman. Meanwhile, a blind human-rights activist escapes from illegal house arrest, finds refuge in the United States’ embassy in Beijing, and leaves the compound only after claims that Chinese authorities in his hometown had threatened his family.

Despite exhaustive press coverage of these events, it is remarkable how little we actually know. The British businessman’s body was allegedly cremated before any autopsy was conducted. None of the lurid tales about Bo’s wife have been proven. And the reasons for her husband’s political disgrace remain murky, to say the least.

Things always tend to get interesting in China before a National People’s Congress, where the Party’s next leaders are anointed. Leadership change in most democracies is a relatively transparent process; it follows national elections. To be sure, even open democracies have their share of opaque jockeying and deal-making in what used to be called smoke-filled rooms. This is particularly true in East Asian countries, such as Japan.

But, in China, everything takes place out of sight. Because leaders cannot be ousted through elections, other means must be found to resolve political conflicts. Sometimes, that entails deliberate public spectacles.

The disgrace of Bo, Chongqing’s former Party leader, certainly falls into this category. A handsome, charismatic populist born into the Party elite, Bo was known as a tough official, whose methods in fighting organized crime – and others who got in his way – were often unrestrained by law. Bo’s ex-police chief, who is said to have done the dirty work, embarrassed the Party by fleeing to the US consulate in Chengdu in February, after he fell out with his boss. Despite Bo’s nostalgia for Maoist rhetoric, he is conspicuously wealthy. His son’s expensive lifestyle as a student at Oxford and Harvard has been described in lavish detail in the press.

In other words, Bo bore all the hallmarks of a gangster boss: corrupt, ruthless towards his enemies, contemptuous of the law, and yet moralistic in his self-presentation. But the same could be said of most Party bosses in China. They all have more money than can be explained by their official pay. Most have children studying at expensive British or American universities. All behave as though they are above the laws that constrain normal citizens.

What was unusual about Bo was his open ambition. Chinese party bosses, like Japanese politicians – or, indeed, Mafia dons – are supposed to be discreet in their appetite for power. Bo behaved more like an American politician. He liked to throw his weight around in public. That was enough to annoy other party bosses.

Since factional rivalry inside the Party cannot be handled discreetly, some of Bo’s colleagues felt that he had to go. The way that party bosses, in China no less than in Japan, get rid of irksome rivals is to bring them down through public scandals, leaked to an obedient press, which then fans the flames.

The appearance of a wicked wife in Chinese public scandals is a common phenomenon. When Mao Zedong purged his most senior Party boss, Liu Shaoqi, during the Cultural Revolution, Liu’s wife was paraded through the streets wearing ping-pong balls around her neck as a symbol of wicked decadence and extravagance. After Mao himself died, his wife Jiang Qing was arrested and presented as a Chinese Lady Macbeth. It is possible that the murder accusations against Bo’s wife, Gu Kailai, are part of such political theater.

In fact, Bo’s fall from grace involves not only his wife, but his entire family. This, too, is a Chinese tradition. The family must take responsibility for the crimes of one of its members. When that individual falls, so must they. On the other hand, when he is riding high, they benefit, as was the case with many of Bo’s relatives and his wife, whose businesses thrived while he was in power.

There has been a great deal of speculation about the consequences of Bo’s fall, and of the daring escape of the human-rights activist, Chen Guangcheng, after 18 months of house arrest. Will his flight to the US embassy harden the attitudes of China’s leaders? Will it force the US to get tougher on human rights in China? If so, what will follow from that?

Since Bo presented himself as a populist critic of modern Chinese capitalism and an authoritarian promoter of Maoist ethics, his natural enemies inside the Party leadership would seem to be the more “liberal” bosses, who favor free-market capitalism and perhaps even some political reforms. The current premier, Wen Jiabao, would seem to be this faction’s leader. He has made speeches about the need for democratic reform, and has been openly critical of Bo. Chen asked him to investigate abuses against him and his family.

So, could the fall of Bo lead to a more open society, less hostile to dissident voices? It is possible that Chinese Communists who favor more economic liberalism would also be more receptive to a more open society. But the opposite could also be true: the wider the disparities in wealth, and the more people protest against economic inequality, the more the regime will crack down on dissidents.

Such repression is not meant to protect communism, let alone what little is left of Maoism. On the contrary, it is meant to protect the Chinese Communist Party’s brand of capitalism. That may be why Bo had to be toppled, and certainly why dissidents like Chen, as well as his family, have to suffer so much that refuge in a foreign embassy is their final, desperate option.

Ian Buruma, Professor of Democracy, Human Rights, and Journalism at Bard College, is a recipient of the Erasmus Prize, awarded to those who have made “an especially important contribution to culture, society, or social science in Europe.” He is the author of many books, including Murder in Amsterdam: The Death of Theo Van Gogh and the Limits of Tolerance and Taming the Gods: Religion and Democracy on Three Continents.

中國的陰暗面

紐約——這是中國一段觸目的時期。一名共產黨高官薄熙來被撤職，罪名包括對國家主席胡錦濤及其它黨內大佬進行竊聽, 而其妻子則因為牽涉一宗英國商人的謀殺案而受到調查。與此同時，一名盲人人權分子從遭到非法軟禁的家中逃了出來，跑到了美國駐北京大使館避難，聲稱自己家人被當地政府威脅後離開了使館。

雖然媒體對兩件事的報道鋪天蓋地，但我們真正知道的卻寥寥無幾。那名英國商人的屍體據說未經剖驗就被火化。那些關於薄熙來妻子的離奇故事全都未經証實。至少在目前來說，她丈夫究竟因何倒台還是撲朔迷離。

中共下任領導人通常都由全國人民代表大會開會選定，而在會議召開之前情況往往會變得詭異無比。大多數民主國家領導人的更替都是相對開誠布公﹔服從全國大選結果。當然，即便是公開的民主制度也會有不透明角力和暗中交易，或是所謂“煙霧室”裡的討價還價。特別是在日本這樣的東亞國家，這類情況尤為常見。

但在中國，一切都是暗中進行的。由於無法用選舉來罷免領導人，於是必須用其他方式來解決政治爭端。有時這就意味著刻意導演一場公開的鬧劇。

重慶前市委書記薄熙來的隕落顯然屬於這類。他是一個英俊，富有魅力的民粹派，從小就在中國政治精英階層浸淫成長。他也是一個鐵腕領導，在打擊有組織犯罪（黑社會）以及任何敢跟他對著干的人, 經常使用一些非法手段。薄熙來手下的前公安局長，也就是傳言為他干這些臟活的人，在與他關系徹底破裂後於今年1月潛逃到了美國駐成都領事館，讓中共丟盡了臉。雖然薄熙來看上去無比懷念過去那套毛澤東理論，但他自己顯然富有非常。其子在牛津和哈佛上學期間的奢侈生活方式也都被媒體不厭其煩地披露。

換句話說，薄熙來身上擁有一個黑幫老大的所有特質：腐敗，對敵人毫不留情，蔑視法律，但滿口都是人義道德, 大多數中共領導人來說都是如此。他們收入與官職不相稱。許多人的子女都在英美那些學費昂貴的大學就讀。他們的行為似乎都凌駕於法律之上，仿佛法律只是用來管制普通公民的。

但薄熙來的不尋常之處在於他那不掩飾的野心。中共大佬們，跟日本政客還有黑手黨教父—那樣，本應盡力隱藏自己的權力慾。而薄熙來則表現得像一個美國政治家, 喜歡公開叫板, 而這也足以激怒其他黨內大佬了。

由於黨內的派系爭端無法暗中調和，因此薄熙來的某些同僚覺得是時候讓他走人了。無論是中國還是日本，黨派大佬消滅惱人對手就是利用醜聞讓他們倒台，先把消息透露給手下順從媒體，然後再興風作浪。

而在中國醜聞中邪惡的妻子登場是一個常見的情境。當年毛澤東在文化大革命中整倒身邊最高的黨內大佬劉少奇時，劉妻子就戴上乒乓球做成的項鏈游街，以示其生活奢靡墮落。在毛澤東死後，其妻江青旋即被捕並被描繪成中國的麥克白夫人（莎士比亞悲劇人物，慫恿其夫弒君篡位）。而對薄熙來妻子谷開來的謀殺指控很可能就是這出政治戲劇的其中一幕。

事實上，薄熙來的倒台不僅牽涉到他的妻子，還包括其整個家庭。這也是一項中國傳統。家族必須為其中一位成員的罪行負責。一個人倒台了，所有人都無法幸免。另一方面，當一個人扶搖直上，其他人也隨之雞犬升天，正如薄熙來大權在握的時候其妻子以及許多親戚都生意興隆那樣。

外界對薄熙來倒台以及盲人人權分子陳光誠在遭受18個月軟禁後大膽逃脫所產生的後果有諸多猜測。陳逃亡到美國大使館是否會使中國領導人的態度轉趨強硬？這一事件是否會迫使美國在中國人權問題上立場更堅定？如果是的話，接著又會發生些什麼？

由於薄熙來把自己塑造成對當代中國資本主義的民粹派批判者，與提倡毛澤東式道德的權威，因此他在黨內的當然敵人似乎就是那些更傾向“自由化”的大佬們，後者偏愛自由市場資本主義，或許甚至會歡迎某些政治改革。現任國家總理溫家寶似乎就是該派系的領袖，也曾多次發表有關民主改革的迫切並公開批評薄熙來。而陳光誠也請求溫家寶下令調查自己和家人所遭受的迫害。

因此，薄熙來的倒台是否會催生一個更開放，對異見聲音更包容的社會？是否那些偏愛經濟自由主義的共產黨人也更傾向於接受一個更加開放的社會？但事情的反面也可能出現：隨著財富分配不均現象逐漸惡化，越來越多人起來抗議經濟分配不均，該政權對異見分子的鎮壓也會更嚴厲。

這樣的鎮壓並不是為了維護共產主義，更別提什麼毛澤東主義了。相反，這是為了維護中國共產黨特色的資本主義。這可能是薄熙來被罷免的原因，也是陳光誠及其家人為何要遭受如此多的苦難，以致藏身一外國使館為最終無可奈何的選擇。