BERLIN – More
than a year into the Arab revolts, their outcomes remain highly uncertain. But
some initial lessons for international politics – and for Western, particularly
European, foreign policy – merit serious consideration.
Likewise, the revolts in different
parts of the Arab world have made a mockery of efforts to divide states into
“moderate” and “radical” anti-Western camps. This false dichotomy blinded US
and European leaders to many of the weaknesses that rendered even “moderate” systems
unstable. A better rule of thumb would be: beware of regimes that claim to
guarantee the West’s geopolitical interests.
In fact, Western states had no power
over the revolts’ outbreak, and they cannot determine their outcome. Even in Libya,
despite NATO’s decisive intervention, local actors will decide whether a
democracy, another dictatorship, some kind of communitarian confederation, or
chaos emerges.
This limitation on external influence
may be healthy: the legitimacy of the political and social orders that emerge
from the revolutions in Tunisia,
Egypt, and
elsewhere will largely depend on their being perceived as the outcome of
authentic domestic processes. At the same time, limited influence does not
relieve Europe from its responsibility toward its
southern neighborhood. Benign neglect will lead to unwanted reminders.
This means that the West will have to
learn to deal with and even trust actors who were previously unknown.
But it might help to remind ourselves that the problem in these states were the
well-known elites whom not only Europe and the US, but also Russia and China,
trusted for too long, often against their better judgement – and only out of
fear of the unknown.
Arab countries that have cast off
autocratic regimes will remain unconsolidated democracies for some time. But
their leaders will act with great self-confidence, often refusing the wishes of
Western powers. They will point out that they, too, are accountable primarily
to their own people.
Thus, the US
and Europe will not necessarily gain greater support for their preferred policies just because more
states have become democratic or pluralistic. Rather, democracy itself will
become more pluralistic. Like Turkey,
India, Brazil,
or South Africa,
transforming countries in the Arab world are likely to pursue a rather
nationalist agenda. The US and Europe will have to find common interests with societal actors in these
countries, rather than taking for granted that such interests already exist.
Countries with a youth bulge,
relatively good access to news and information, growing social inequality,
widespread corruption, and authoritarian governments will not remain stable
forever. So autocrats in, say, Azerbaijan,
Ethiopia, and
certainly Iran
should prepare for trouble. At least some of these regimes will regard the Arab
revolts as a warning and step up preventive repression, restrict the flow of
information, or try to divert attention from domestic politics.
Arab autocrats long relied in such
tactics, often using regional conflicts for their own repressive ends. But,
while pointing to external enemies can no longer stop revolts and revolutions,
it would be a mistake to assume that the disappearance of authoritarian regimes
would lead to the swift resolution of regional conflicts. If the Assad regime
in Syria is
toppled, the country’s new leaders would be no less adamant in calling for the
return of the Golan Heights. In fact, they might pursue
the claim more vigorously.
The Assad regime can definitely be
toppled; that is not in doubt. The question is whether or not other states will
intervene to bring about Assad’s downfall.
NATO’s actions in Libya
re-opened the debate about international military interventions in the name of
human rights. For the first time, Al Jazeera’s support was more
important for the regional legitimacy of such an intervention than was the
consent of two veto-wielding powers in the United Nations Security Council. We
may see a similar development with regard to Syria.
Indeed, the question of when the
“responsibility to protect” – the international-law doctrine that was applied
in Libya – not
only legitimizes international intervention, but requires it, will arise in
many contexts. NATO states and others will have to decide whether they are
prepared to act even in the absence of a Security Council mandate if there is
broad regional support for intervention to protect civilians – or even to
overthrow a regime.
The Arab revolts have called into
question the understanding of stability that has long guided European policies
toward the region. Arab (and other) autocrats had long been successful in
presenting political stagnation as stability. Europe
should continue to promote political and social stability in its neighbourhood.
But it needs to develop a concept of stability that allows for dynamism and
change.
Above all, Europe
and the West must recognize that the Arab uprisings demonstrated the vitality
of the desire for democracy, individual freedom, justice, and dignity. The fear
of many Western observers that the rise of China
would nurture a global shift towards authoritarian capitalism has clearly been
exaggerated.
The activists who triggered the Arab
revolts may find little attraction in many European policies, but they regard
the democratic ideas that Europe cherishes as their own.
Europe owes it to itself to support political
transformation in the Arab world as openly as it supported the democratic
transformation of Eastern Europe two decades ago.
Volker Perthes is Chairman and Director of Stiftung Wissenschaft und
Politik, the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Berlin.
