BUENOS AIRES –
In January, US
President Barack Obama nominated Marine Corps Lieutenant General John F. Kelly
to head the United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM). Based in Miami,
Florida, USSOUTHCOM runs military
operations throughout Latin America and the Caribbean,
and is the key US
“drug warrior” in the region. Across the region, the key question, among civilian and military leaders alike, is
whether the change in commanders will bring with it a change in focus.
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 paradoxically
reinforced the US
military’s focus on countering illicit drug traffickers. While other US
forces became heavily involved in the “war on terrorism,” USSOUTHCOM scaled up
its “war on drugs,” with its commanders targeting the industry’s bosses in the Andes,
Mexico, and Central
America.
That happened in part because,
following 9/11, Latin America was the only region of the world that did not
witness an attack by transnational terrorists linked to al-Qaeda, so there
seemed to be little need to pursue counter-terrorist activity there. And, with
the US
continuing to be the world’s largest market for illegal drugs, its leaders’
focus on the drug war in Latin America does not appear
misguided, at least not on the surface.
That focus has not only made
USSOUTHCOM a major recipient of federal funds, but has also turned it into
something akin to an autonomous drug-fighting agency. From the region’s perspective,
USSOUTHCOM appears to be a vaguely “independent” military arm of US
policymakers’ global anti-drug strategy, with scant accountability or
congressional oversight, and with significant resources for aggressive
anti-drug operations.
Indeed, USSOUTHCOM has controlled 75%
of the more than $12 billion that the US
government has allocated to anti-drug activities in Latin
America and the Caribbean since 2000. But,
despite this expensive military campaign, all evidence shows that the “war
on drugs” has been a fiasco.
The failure has been dramatic. In Mexico,
roughly 48,000 people have been killed in drug-related violence since Felipe Calderón
was elected President in 2006. And Mexico
is not alone. Drug-trafficking activities have grown significantly throughout Central
America and the Caribbean, fueling an
unprecedented increase in the murder rate – which has doubled in countries like
Guatemala and Jamaica
– over the last decade.
Moreover, the cultivation, processing,
and trafficking of cocaine and heroin continues throughout the Andean Ridge,
despite tough eradication measures and extradition of traffickers by the US.
Simultaneously, new transshipment routes (via Ecuador
in the Pacific and Venezuela
in the Atlantic) have developed, while drug barons, coca
growers, and warlords have proliferated.
South America’s
southern cone – especially Argentina
and Chile – has
not been immune to the vast expansion of organized crime, money laundering, and
demand for narcotics elsewhere in the region. And, throughout Latin
America, the situation has only worsened since the 1990’s. Indeed,
Latin American countries’ US-backed fight against drugs has had universally
destructive consequences in terms of civil-military relations, human-rights
violations, and corruption.
The US
cannot deny this disaster. Its drug warriors must reevaluate their position and
terminate what has become an increasingly senseless and futile struggle. Thus,
the most critical question facing Kelly as he assumes his new command is
whether he can redefine USSOUTHCOM’s role in the fight against illegal drugs.
The military and political challenges
are significant, the risks are considerable, and the benefits are uncertain.
But if USSOUTHCOM does not implement major changes in how it prosecutes the
drug war, the US
will find itself facing an increasingly volatile and dangerous set of neighbors
to the south.
Juan Gabriel Tokatlian is Professor of International Relations at the
Universidad de Di Tella, Argentina.
