LAHORE – Pakistan
is undergoing three transitions simultaneously. How they unfold matters not
only for Pakistan,
but also for much of the Muslim world, particularly as the Arab Spring forces
change upon governments across the wider Middle East.
Most Muslim countries were governed for decades by autocrats who had either
emerged directly from the armed forces, or had strong “khaki” support. That was
the case in Egypt,
Libya, Yemen,
Syria, and, of
course, Pakistan.The Arab Spring drained away whatever spurious legitimacy that style of governance ever had. But, in Pakistan, delegitimation of military rule had actually occurred three years earlier, and the pressure for change came from much the same source – a restive and mobilized new middle class.
Several decades ago, the American political scientist Samuel P. Huntington argued that economic prosperity in developing countries with weak governing institutions would not necessarily lead to political stability. On the contrary, economic growth in such contexts can be – and often is – politically destabilizing.
That proved to be the case in Turkey and Pakistan in the 1990’s and early 2000’s, and later in much of the Arab world. Indeed, the rising aspirations of Arab youth in Egypt and Tunisia, the wellspring of the Arab Spring, followed impressive economic growth that had failed to trickle down. And such rising expectations have been visible in all large Muslim countries.
As Huntington suggested, when young people see their economies grow, they begin to demand participation in decisions that affect all aspects of their lives, not just their economic well-being. Military-dominated political systems precluded such participation, so, with economic growth, demilitarization of politics became a rallying cry in all large military-led Muslim states, from Indonesia to the Mediterranean coast. Even Iran, where the Revolutionary Guards control roughly one-third of the economy, was affected when the result of the presidential election in 2009 triggered large anti-government protests in Tehran and other major cities.
But demilitarization means more than transferring power and policymaking from the armed forces to elected parliaments. In their recent book Why Nations Fail, the economists Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson suggest that elections – even those that are free and fair – do not necessarily move societies from what they call “extractive” to “inclusive” systems. Indeed, extraction of a country’s wealth for use by the elite can occur even in democratic societies when those who dominate the political system face no constraints other than periodic elections.
This is where the effort to devise institutional mechanisms to check and balance elite behavior enters the picture. Indeed, the search for such mechanisms is precisely what is now underway in Pakistan.
In Pakistan, a discredited military was forced by public opinion to withdraw from power, creating political space for elected representatives. They assumed control (though not over the military), but did not govern wisely. While their personal wealth increased, living standards for everyone else either stagnated or, for lower-income groups, declined. So, as Pakistan negotiated its political transition, it experienced significant economic decline.
As a result, Pakistan’s judiciary, media, and many civil-society organizations are now engaged in attempts not only to keep the soldiers in their barracks, but also to constrain the political establishment’s rapacious behavior.
Three cases before the country’s increasingly assertive Supreme Court promise to take Pakistan from the phase of demilitarization to a system in which meaningful checks can be exercised on those who wield power. One case is an attempt to force Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani’s administration to reopen proceedings in a Swiss court that were examining charges of money-laundering and misuse of public funds by President Asif Ali Zardari. The Swiss proceedings were stopped at the request of the Pakistani government when Zardari became president.
In the second case, the Supreme Court wants Pakistan’s military intelligence agencies to account for hundreds, if not thousands, of missing people who were detained as part of the agencies’ campaign to contain the rise of Islamic extremism, or to undermine separatist aspirations in restive Baluchistan.
The third case opened an old complaint lodged by a politician decades ago against the “troika” – composed of the president, the prime minister, and the chief of army staff – that then governed Pakistan. The plaintiff alleged that large amounts of funds were channeled to the troika’s favored candidates to contest the 1990 general election, in which Nawaz Sharif’s party won a big victory over Benazir Bhutto’s Peoples’ Party.
Finally, Pakistan is undergoing a transition in which power is moving from the central administration to sub-national governments. The 18th amendment to the constitution, adopted in 2010, does precisely that, but implementation is being delayed by parties that prefer a highly centralized political structure.
If Pakistan’s transformation of its political system succeeds, it could serve as a model for other Muslim countries that are attempting to move from extractive to inclusive systems of governance. Turkey has already traveled some distance along this path. If Pakistan also advances, demilitarization of politics elsewhere in the Islamic world might not be far behind.
Shahid Javed Burki, former Finance Minister of Pakistan and Vice
President of the World Bank, is currently Chairman of the
Institute of Public Policy, Lahore.
Shahid Javed
Burki: 救治南亞病夫
拉合爾——巴基斯坦正在同時進行著三大轉型。而這些轉型如何展開不僅事關巴基斯坦人自身，還將影響到穆斯林世界中的大部分人，尤其是在阿拉伯之春令大中東地區的許多政府都發生了更替的情況下。
大多數穆斯林國家都曾長期處於獨裁者的統治之下，這些人要麼直接崛起於軍界，要麼背後擁有強大的軍隊支持。從前的埃及、利比亞，也門和敘利亞都是如此，當然，巴基斯坦也毫不例外。
阿拉伯之春使這種管制風格的虛假合法性喪失殆盡。但在巴基斯坦，軍隊統治的去合法化其實在3年前就啟動了，而這種變革的力量來源也與阿拉伯之春大同小異——那些不願屈服於專制且成功動員起來的新中產階級。
數十年前，美國政治科學家薩繆爾森·P·亨廷頓（Samuel
P. Huntington）指出發展中國家在弱政府管制下的經濟繁榮並不一定會導致政治穩定。相反，在這種情況下的經濟發展可能——而且經常會——導致政治動蕩。
這一推論在1990年代的土耳其以及2000年代初的巴基斯坦都成為了現實，並隨后在阿拉伯世界應驗了。事實上令人矚目的經濟增長帶來的就是埃及和突尼斯阿拉伯青年不斷上升的預期——也隨之推動了阿拉伯之春。而這類上升預期在所有大型穆斯林國家都隨處可見。
正如亨廷頓所說，當青年人見証了經濟增長之后，他們開始要求參與到與生活各方面相關的決策之后，而不僅僅是在經濟方面。但由軍隊佔統治地位的政治系統排斥這類參與，因此隨著經濟不斷增長，政治的去軍隊化成為所有大型軍管穆斯林國家——從印尼到地中海沿岸——的群眾呼聲。即便是伊朗這個革命衛隊控制全國經濟總量1/3的國家也受到了影響——2009年的總統選舉在德黑蘭以其各大城市引發了大規模反政府示威。
但去軍事化意味著將權力和政治決策從軍隊更多地轉移到選舉產生的議會手中。在新書《為何國家會失敗》中，經濟學家達隆·艾瑟莫戈魯（Daron Acemoglu）和詹姆斯·魯賓遜（James Robinson）認為選舉——即便是自由和公平的——並不一定能使社會從一個“抽取性”系統轉型成為一個“包容性”系統。事實上，如果政治系統的支配者們除了周期性選舉之外並未受到其他限制的話，那麼抽取國家財富來為精英服務的情況在民主社會中也會發生。
這也是為何要設計體制性機制來制衡精英階層行為的原因。其實對這類機制的探索也在當今的巴基斯坦也已經開展了。
在巴基斯坦，一個失信的軍隊在輿論壓力下被剝奪了權力，並為民選代表創造了政治空間。他們獲得了控制權（即便不是通過軍隊），卻不懂得如何明智地行使它。於是隨著這些代表的財富與日俱增，其他人的生活水平卻停滯不前，低收入群體甚至更加貧困。因此在巴基斯坦政治轉型的過程中就經歷了嚴重的經濟衰退。
結果巴基斯坦的司法界，媒體和許多公民社會組織如今不僅致力於限制軍隊，還要制止新政治體制中的掠奪行為。
而在將巴基斯坦從去軍事化轉型到一個可以對掌權人物實施有效制衡的承諾方面，自信程度日漸增加的巴基斯坦最高法院審理了三大案件。第一個案件就是要求總理吉拉尼的政府重開一個瑞士法庭指控總統扎爾達裡洗錢以及挪用公共基金的審判進程。該進程在扎爾達裡當選總統后就在巴基斯坦政府的要求下停止了。
第二個案件則是最高法院要求巴基斯坦軍方情報機構交代數百名（可能還不止這個數）失蹤人員的下落，這些人都是在該機構打擊伊斯蘭極端勢力或者搗毀俾路支省分裂勢力時失蹤的。
第三個案件則重新揭示了一位政治家在幾十年前對巴基斯坦“三駕馬車”——總統，總理以及武裝部隊總參謀長——的控訴。原告聲稱有巨額資金被輸送到三人心儀的候選人身上以幫助其進行1990年的議會大選，當時謝裡夫的政黨以極大優勢擊敗了貝布托的人民黨。
最後，巴基斯坦還在進行一個權力從中央政府轉移到區域政府的轉型。2010年生效的憲法第18次修改案是為了這一目的，但具體的實施卻被那些傾向於中央高度集權的黨派拖延了。
如果巴基斯坦的政治系統轉型成功的話，它將成為其他穆斯林國家實現從抽取性向包容性管治系統轉型的楷模。土耳其在這方面已經取得了一些成果。而如果巴基斯坦也能向前推進的話，伊斯蘭世界其他國家的政治去軍事化也不會太遠了。
