高樓低廈,人潮起伏,
名爭利逐,千萬家悲歡離合。

閑雲偶過,新月初現,
燈耀海城,天地間留我孤獨。

舊史再提,故書重讀,
冷眼閑眺,關山未變寂寞!

念人老江湖,心碎家國,
百年瞬息,得失滄海一粟!

徐訏《新年偶感》

2012年3月28日星期三

Guardian Editorial: Syria: a devious diplomacy



If government and opposition in Syria can be brought to accept the plan urged on them by Kofi Annan, the special envoy for the United Nations and the Arab League, there is one thing that can be stated with complete certainty. Both sides would be doing so in bad faith, the one with the intention of relinquishing not a shred of real control, the other in the hope of manipulating a post-ceasefire situation in such a way as to soon bring down Bashar al-Assad, his family and his associates.

Assad's side believe that if they give quarter it will be the end of them, while the opposition groups differ on many matters but not at all on the imperative of revenge. That revenge might conceivably be postponed, but it will not be renounced. The question, then, is whether such a patently artificial solution is worth pursuing. The answer is yes, for a number of reasons. First, the diplomacy for which Annan is the point man is an agreed diplomacy, to which all the major powers, as well as the Arab League and Syria's neighbours, are committed. Since they have never managed to agree before, this fragile unity is in itself worth something. Second, if the conflict could be even partially and imperfectly demilitarised, that would be, given the terrible and continuing level of violence, a gain. That violence yesterday spilled over into Lebanon, and might do so into Turkey, so there is a regional danger as well. Third, if large-scale humanitarian assistance were to be provided under United Nations and Arab League auspices, that would both assuage the sufferings of many Syrians and, with its apparatus of expediters and monitors, introduce an informal third party, able to act as a relatively impartial witness, into the conflict.

The success of such a plan, in other words, depends on persuading both sides that it will allow them to set a trap for the other. It also depends on the outside powers continuing to feel that their purposes are served by such a process. Russian and Chinese obstruction has been driven by two perceptions, the first that it was not realistic to expect a rebel victory, even with outside aid, and the second that the United States should not be allowed to get away with another unilateral, domineering act in the Middle East.

America, on the other hand, may feel it has gone too far out on a limb in insisting on Assad's departure without being able to compel it. As the Syrian opposition meets to try to resolve some of its differences, and a big "Friends of Syria" conference convenes this weekend in Istanbul, Annan's diplomacy continues. But nothing is clear, including what the Syrian government has really decided to do. If the plan falls, that would not be a surprise. If it, or something like it, succeeds, it will only extend the conflict in a new form, but one which might reduce its human costs.