BERLIN – There
can be little reasonable doubt today that the People’s Republic of China
will dominate the world of the twenty-first century. The country’s rapid
economic growth, strategic potential, huge internal market, and enormous
investment in infrastructure, education, and research and development, as well
as its massive military buildup, will see to that. This means that, in
political and economic terms, we are entering an East and Southeast Asian
century.
Lest we forget, the outcome for the world would have been
far worse if China’s
ascent had failed. But what will this world look like? We can foresee the power
that will shape its geopolitics, but what values will underlie the exercise of
that power?
The official policy of “Four Modernizations” (industrial,
agricultural, military, and scientific-technological) that has underpinned
China’s rise since the late 1970’s has failed to provide an answer to that
question, because the “fifth modernization” – the emergence of democracy and
the rule of law – is still missing. Indeed, political modernization faces
massive opposition from the Chinese Communist Party, which has no interest in
surrendering its monopoly of power. Moreover, the transition to a pluralist
system that channels, rather than suppresses, political conflict would indeed
be risky, though the risk will grow the longer one-party rule (and the endemic
corruption that accompanies it) persists.
Ideologically, Chinese leadership’s rejection of human
rights, democracy, and the rule of law is based on the contention that these
supposedly universal values are a mere stalking horse for Western interests,
and that repudiating them should thus be viewed as a matter of self-respect. China
will never again submit to the West militarily, so it should not submit to the
West normatively either.
And here we return to the concept of “Asian values,”
originally developed in Singapore
and Malaysia.
But until this day, three decades later, its meaning remains unclear.
Essentially, the concept has served to justify collectivist-authoritarian rule
by aligning it with local tradition and culture, with autonomy defined in terms
of otherness – that is, differentiation from the West and its values. Thus,
“Asian values” are not universal norms, but rather a self-preservation strategy
harnessed to identity politics.
Given the history of Western colonialism in Asia, the desire
to maintain a distinct identity is both legitimate and understandable, as is
the belief in many Asian countries – first and foremost China – that the time
has come to settle old scores. But the effort to preserve one’s power, the need
for a distinct “Asian” identity, and the desire to settle historical scores
will not solve the normative question raised by China’s
emergence as the century’s dominant power.
How that question is answered is crucially important,
because it will determine the character of a global power, and thus how it
deals with other, weaker countries. A state becomes a world power when its
strategic significance and potential give it global reach. And, as a rule, such
states then try to safeguard their interests by imposing their predominance
(hegemony), which is a recipe for dangerous conflict if based on coercion
rather than cooperation.
The world’s acclimation to a global hegemonic structure – in
which world powers guarantee an international order – survived the Cold War.
The Soviet Union wasn’t ideologically anti-Western,
because Communism and Socialism were Western inventions, but it was
anti-Western in political terms. And it failed not only for economic reasons,
but also because its internal and external behavior was based on compulsion,
not consent.
By contrast, the United
States’ economic and political model, and
that of the West, with its individual rights and open society, proved to be its
sharpest weapon in the Cold War. The US
prevailed not because of its military superiority, but because of its soft
power, and because its hegemony was based not on coercion (though there was
some of that, too), but largely on consent.
Which path will China
choose? While China
will not change its ancient and admirable civilization, it owes its
re-emergence to its embrace of the contemporary Western model of modernization
– the huge achievement of Deng Xiaoping, who put the country on its current
path more than three decades ago. But the decisive question of political
modernization remains unanswered.
Clearly, national interests, and sometimes pure power, play
a part in how the US and other Western countries apply values like human
rights, the rule of law, democracy, and pluralism. But these values are not
mere ideological window dressing for Western interests; in fact, they are not
that to any significant extent. They are indeed universal, and all the more so
in an era of comprehensive globalization.
The contribution of Asia – and of China,
in particular – to the development of this universal set of values is not yet
foreseeable, but it will surely come if the “fifth modernization” leads to China’s
political transformation. China’s
course as a world power will be determined to a significant extent by the way
it confronts this question.
Joschka Fischer was German Foreign Minister and Vice Chancellor from
1998-2005, a term marked by his strong defense of Germany’s
participation in NATO’s intervention in Kosovo in 1999, followed by his strong
opposition to the war in Iraq.
Fischer entered electoral politics after participating in the
anti-establishment protests of the 1960’s and 1970’s, and played a key role in
the establishment of the German Green Party, which he led for nearly two
decades.
中國價值觀？
柏林——中華人民共和國會在21世紀主導整個世界已沒有多大存疑。該國高速的經濟增長，戰略潛力，龐大的國內市場以及對基礎設施，教育和科研的巨額投資，還有大規模軍備建設都確保這一事實。無論在政治和經濟，我們正進入一個東亞和東南亞的世紀。
我們切勿忘記，如果中國沒有成功崛起，這個世界肯定更糟糕。但如今這個世界又是怎麼樣？可以預期這股勢力將塑造自己的地緣政治格局，但在這些勢力行使的背後是一種什麼樣的價值觀？
於1970年代後期以來為中國崛起打下基礎的“四個現代化”（工業、農業，軍事和科學技術）政策並不能提供答案，因為“第五個現代化”——民主的崛起以及法治——依然缺乏。事實上，政治現代化進程遭到了中國共產黨的極力反對，因為他們根本不想放棄權力的壟斷。此外，轉型到一個多黨（而非專制）政治,
疏導而非壓制衝突, 本身也充滿風險，然而一黨制（以及附之而來的內部腐敗）繼續統治亦會增加風險。
在意識形態上，中國領導層對人權，民主和法治這類事物的抵制是認為這些普世價值是西方為利益而巧立名目的藉口，因此對這些事物的否定也應該被視為一種自尊之舉。既然中國已經不會再屈服於西方軍事力量之下，因此也不能再度就範於西方的標準。
現在讓我們回到這個起源於新加坡和馬來西亞的“亞洲價值觀”概念。但時至該概念提出整整30年後的今日，其意義依然不清。從本質上，這一概念是為了確立集體專制主義統治是糅合當地傳統和文化，而自治則被定義為是一種不一樣的東西，一種與西方及其價值觀完全不相同的事物。因此，“亞洲價值”並不是普世規範，而是一種緊扣於身份認同政治的自保策略。
考慮到西方在亞洲的殖民歷史，這種希望保持獨特身份的意願合情合理，對許多亞洲國家, 尤其是中國, 現在是時候算一下舊賬了。但企圖維護自身實力，營造獨特“亞洲”身份以及渴求清算歷史舊賬都不能解決由中國崛起成為本世紀支配力量所帶來的規範問題。
而這個問題的答案極端重要，因為它將決定一個世界強國的特性，並以此決定它將如何與那些比它弱小的國家相處。一個國家成為世界強國是由於它的戰略重要性和潛力無遠弗屆。而一般來說，這類國家隨後將加強其對弱小國家的支配（霸權主義）來維護自身利益，此舉若基於威迫而非合作的話，實是產生危險衝突的方程式。
世界對一個全球霸權架構的順從, 一個由世界強國維護的國際秩序在冷戰後幸存了下來。蘇聯並非在意識形態上反對西方，因為共產主義和社會主義其實都是源自西方，但它在政治層面上卻反西方。其崩潰並不僅僅是由於經濟原因，更因為它國內外的行為都是出於威逼而非協同。
相比之下，美國（以及西方）的經濟和政治模式，及其對個人權利和公開社會的倡導，成為了冷戰中最有力的武器。美國的獲勝並不來自其軍事優勢，而是出自其軟實力，出自其支配地位並不是來自於威脅強迫（雖然某些時候也有類似情況出現）而大致上是基於協同。
那麼中國會選擇哪條道路呢？中國一方面沒有更換其令人敬仰的古老文明，另一方面也因為採取了西方現代化模式而重新崛起, 這正是鄧小平的豐功偉績，30多年前讓中國走上了這條道路。但政治現代化的關鍵問題依然沒有答案。
明顯地國家利益以及其他純粹權力的行為是美國和其他西方國家在推行人權、法治，民主和多黨制過程中會計算其中, 但這些價值觀不僅是西方利益的門面粉飾﹔而其功用事實上並沒有那麼收效。它們就是一種普世的東西﹔尤其是在這個廣泛全球化的時代。
我們無法預計亞洲,
尤其是中國將對這一整套價值觀有什麼貢獻，但當“第五個現代化”為中國帶來政治轉型的話, 必將貢獻良多。中國晉身成為世界強國的進程將取決於它如何面對這個問題。
