The pace of transformation is breathtaking. According to Internet World Stats, the number of Internet users in China has more than tripled since 2006, soaring to 485 million in mid-2011 – more than three times that in 2006. Moreover, China’s rush to connectivity is far from over. As of mid-2011, only 36% of its 1.3 billion people were connected – far short of the nearly 80% penetration rates seen in South Korea, Japan, and the United States.
Indeed, with the cost of connectivity falling sharply – China’s mobile users are expected to surpass PC users by 2013 – and, with urbanization and per capita incomes also rising sharply, it is not unreasonable to expect China’s Internet penetration rate to cross the 50% threshold by 2015. That would be the functional equivalent of adding about three-fourths of all existing Internet users in the US.
Nor are the Chinese casual and infrequent Internet users. Consistent with what the social-network theorist Clay Shirky has dubbed a society’s penchant for unlocking the “cognitive surplus” embedded in net-based activities, survey data from the China Internet Network Information Center suggest that Chinese netizens log an average of 2.6 hours per day online – a full hour longer than the average 15-49-year-old Chinese citizen spends watching television.
China’s microblogs, or social networks, where usage tends be most intense, were estimated to have approximately 270 million users as of late 2011. And there is plenty of upside. Worldwide, about 70% of all Internet users currently engage in some form of microblogging, which is the fastest-growing segment of the Internet. In China, this share is just 55%.
When it comes to analyzing China, it is always easy to get carried away with numbers – especially those driven by the country’s sheer size. But the real message here concerns the implications of connectivity, not just its scale.
A key implication is the Internet’s potential to play a significant role in the emergence of China’s consumer society – a critical structural imperative for a long-unbalanced Chinese economy. With connectivity comes a national awareness of spending habits, tastes, and brands – essential characteristics of any consumer culture.
The consumption share of China’s economy, at less than 35% of GDP, is the lowest of any major country. Surging Chinese Internet usage could well facilitate the pro-consumption initiatives of the recently enacted 12th Five-Year Plan.
The Internet could also enable freer and more open communications, upward mobility, transparent and rapid dissemination of information, and, yes, individuality. China’s leadership has been increasingly vocal in raising concerns about growing inequalities that might otherwise hinder the development of what they call a more “harmonious society.” Online connectivity could be a powerful means to help China come together and achieve this goal.
Finally, there is the Internet’s potential as an instrument of political change. That is hardly an inconsequential consideration for any country in the aftermath of last year’s Arab Spring, which was facilitated in many countries (especially Tunisia and Egypt) by network-enabled mobilization.
While reform of China’s single-party state has always been viewed as an important objective in modern China – from the so-called Fifth Modernization of Wei Jinsheng in the late 1970’s to recent speeches by Premier Wen Jiabao – meaningful progress has been limited. Is this likely to change as China embraces the Internet?
China is no exception in requiring leadership, accountability, and responsiveness as conditions of political stability. Its rapidly expanding Internet community has repeatedly raised national awareness of tough local issues. This was especially evident in the aftermath of the Sichuan earthquake of 2008, ethnic violence in Xinjiang in 2009, and the high-speed rail crash in Wenzhou in 2011.
As the Arab Spring demonstrated, the Internet can quickly transform local incidents into national flashpoints – turning the new connectivity into a potential source of political instability and turmoil. But that has been the case only in countries ruled by highly unpopular autocratic regimes.
By contrast, China’s leadership is viewed with a much greater degree of public sympathy. Their quick and direct response to the recent incidents in Sichuan, Xinjiang, and Wenzhou are important cases in point. Senior Party leaders – especially Premier Wen – were quick to lead an empathetic national response that was largely effective in countering the outpouring of concern expressed on the Internet.
None of this is to deny the dark side of the Chinese Internet explosion – namely, widespread censorship and constraints on individual freedom of expression. China’s “SkyNet” team (rumored to be greater than 30,000) is the largest cyber police force in the world.
Moreover, while China is not alone in censoring the Internet, self-policing by many of the nation’s largest portals amplifies official oversight and surveillance. Recent restrictions on microbloggers – especially denial of access to those who use untraceable aliases – have heightened concerns over Chinese Internet freedom. Such restrictions, of course, cut both ways – potentially limiting personal expression, but also constraining disguised and reckless vigilante attacks.
Filtered or not, a long-fragmented China now has a viable and rapidly expanding network. The power of that network – especially insofar as economic, social, and political change is concerned – is hard to predict. But connectivity adds a new dimension of cohesion to modern China. That can only accelerate the speed of its extraordinary development journey.
Stephen S. Roach, a member of the faculty at Yale
University,
is Non-Executive Chairman of Morgan Stanley Asia
and the author of The Next Asia.
Stephen S. Roach: 中國的互聯革命
紐黑文——作為一個有著悠久碎片化歷史的國家，中國正被一種新的聯系工具以前所未有的方式連結在了一起。該國的網絡社區正急速擴大，不但深刻影響了整個經濟，還對社會行為模式和政治體制造成了沖擊。這是一個無法被趕回神燈的幽靈：一旦聯通起來，就沒有回頭路可走了。
這條轉型之路是非常激動人心的。根據世界互聯網統計中心（Internet World Stats）的數字，中國的網民數量自2006年以來已經翻了三倍有多，並於2011年中期達到4.85億人。此外中國面向互聯性的狂飆還遠未停止：在2011年中期，13億中國人中隻有36%能夠上網——這個數字相比韓國，日本和美國等地高達80%的滲透率來說還是偏低。
事實上，隨著互聯成本大幅下降——中國的手機用戶數量預計將在2013年超過個人電腦用戶——還有城市化以及人均收入大幅上升，中國的互聯網滲透率將在2015年越過50%的門檻就毫不意外了，而因此增加的人數相當於美國當前所有網民數量的3/4。
中國那些不常使用互聯網的人數也是如此。正如網絡理論家克萊·舍奇（Clay Shirky）所說，社會具有開啟基於網絡行為“認知過剩”現象的強烈嗜好，而中國互聯網信息中心的調查數據也與該理論不謀而合：中國網民平均每天上網近2.6個小時，比15~49歲中國人平均每天看電視的時間還多出整整一個小時。
中國使用最為頻密的微博（或者是社會網絡）估計在2011年年末達到2.7億的用戶量，而且還擁有極大的上升空間。在全球范圍內大約有70%的互聯網用戶也在使用某種形式的微博，也是當前網絡增長最快的部分。而在中國，這個比例只有55%。
當對中國進行分析的時候，我們往往容易被數字所迷惑，尤其是其龐大的基數。但真正有價值的信息則著眼於互聯性，而不僅僅是其規模。
其中一個關鍵的含義就是互聯網在中國消費社會的崛起中可能扮演某種重要角色的潛力——而消費社會恰恰是長期不平衡的中國經濟所急需的重要架構。隨著互聯性而生的則是一種關於消費習慣，品味和品牌的國家意識——這也是任何消費文化所必備的特質。
消費佔中國GDP的比例還不夠35%，在世界幾大國之間是最低的。而不斷增加的中國互聯網使用量將極大有利於最近推行的第十二個五年計劃中的消費促進方略。
互聯網同樣也能實現更自由也更開放的溝通，階層流動，透明和迅速的信息傳播，還有毫無疑問的一點：個人主義。中國的領導層也逐漸認識到不斷加劇的貧富不均現象可能阻礙他們所謂“和諧社會”的發展。而網上互聯則可成為一個幫助中國團結起來並實現這一目標的有力工具。
最後，互聯網也有成為政治變革工具的潛力。這是所有反思過去年“阿拉伯之春”的國家都認真考慮的問題，而網絡所賦予的動員性也確實對許多國家（尤其是突尼斯和埃及）的變革有所助力。
雖然中國這個一黨制國家的改革常常被視為現代中國一個最重要的目標——從1970年代末魏京生所說的“第五次現代化”到最近國家總理溫家寶的講話都有涉及——但所取得的進展卻極為有限。那麼隨著中國擁抱互聯網，變革也會因此而生嗎？
政治穩定的實現需要領導力，可靠性和責任心，中國也毫不例外。該國迅速擴大的互聯網社區使得民眾對重大區域性事件的關注度迅速提升。而這一點在2008年四川地震，2009年新疆暴亂和2011年溫州高鐵等事件中則顯得尤其突出。
正如阿拉伯之春所顯示的那樣，互聯網能將本地事件迅速轉化為全國性的爆點——將新的互聯性轉化成引發政治不穩定和混亂的潛在源頭。但這些個案僅僅發生在那些由不受民眾擁戴的獨裁政權統治的國家。
相比之下，中國領導層所獲得的公眾支持看上去更高。他們對最近在四川，新疆和溫州等事件所作出的迅速直接反映說明了這一點。面對網上噴涌而出的關注之聲，黨的高級領導人——尤其是總理溫家寶——迅速做出了國家層面的感人回應，並起到了極大作用。
但上述一切也無法掩蓋中國互聯網爆炸過程中的陰暗面——也就是對個人自由表達權利的廣泛審查和限制。中國的“天網”團隊（據說人數超過3萬人）是全世界最大的網絡警察力量。
此外，雖然中國不是唯一進行網絡審查的國家，該國許多大型門戶網站的自我審查也強化了官方的監管和盯梢。最近對微博作者的監管——尤其是禁止那些使用化名且無法追查的人登錄——也令人更加關注的中國的互聯網自由。當然，這類管制在雙方面都起到了作用——既限制了個人表達的自由，也遏制了某些在網上的惡意造謠抹黑行為。
但不管是否存在網絡過濾行為，一個長期碎片化的中國如今擁有了一個切實存在並迅速擴張的網絡。而這個網絡的力量——尤其在經濟，社會和政治變革都被關注的情況下——將難以預測。但互聯性為現代中國的凝聚力增加了一個新的維度，而這也隻會加速其超常規發展的速度。
Stephen S.
Roach，耶魯大學講師，摩根士丹利亞洲有限公司非執行主席，同也是《下一個亞洲》一書的作者。
