Yet there is still much that the world does not know. For example, we do not know whether Iran is conducting secret activities at undisclosed sites, or when Iran could develop a crude nuclear weapon, with estimates ranging from several months to several years. We also do not know whether Iran’s divided leadership has decided to develop nuclear weapons, or to stop just short, calculating that the country could derive many of the benefits of possessing nuclear weapons without running the risks or incurring the costs of actually doing so.
Either way, Iran’s activities confront the world with difficult choices. None is costless or risk-free. Moreover, neither the costs nor the risks are possible to calculate with precision.
One option would be to accept and live with a nuclear or near-nuclear Iran. This assumes that Iran could be deterred from using its weapons, much as the Soviet Union was during the Cold War. Missile defenses could be expanded; the United States could extend security guarantees so that Iran would understand that the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be met with a decisive American response.
But there are significant drawbacks to acquiescing to a nuclear-armed Iran. Given its use of subversion and terrorism against its adversaries, a nuclear-armed Iran might be even more assertive. It might also transfer nuclear-related material, technology, or weapons to allies (Hugo Chávez’s Venezuela, for example) or radical organizations such as Hezbollah and Hamas. And, rather than promoting caution and stability in the region, Iran or Israel could be tempted to strike first in a crisis.
Nor can it be assumed that Iran’s divided and radical leadership would always act rationally, or that proliferation would stop with the Islamic Republic. If Iran develops its nuclear weapons, countries such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt would be tempted to purchase or develop nuclear weapons of their own. A Middle East with multiple fingers on multiple triggers is as good a definition of a nightmare as there is.
At the opposite end of the spectrum of policy choices is a preventive attack: a military strike (most likely by Israel, the US, or both) against sites in Iran associated with its nuclear program. The core objective would be to interrupt the emergence of a threat that is still gathering.
Here, again, there are considerable drawbacks. Even a successful preventive attack would at most set back Iran’s nuclear program a few years. It would almost certainly be rebuilt, presumably in underground, fortified sites that would make future attacks far more difficult to carry out.
Moreover, Iran could well retaliate immediately against targets that could include Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Afghanistan, and other US interests worldwide – as well as sites on American territory. Hezbollah could attack Israel. If all of this happened, the price of oil would skyrocket owing to shortages and fears, possibly driving much of the world economy, already in a precarious position, into recession. An armed attack could also cause the Iranian public to rally around the government, reducing the chances that a more responsible leadership might emerge.
It thus comes as little surprise that the US and much of the world have explored alternatives, including regime change in Iran. But, however desirable that might be, no policy can assuredly bring it about. As a result, the principal policy toward Iran centers on the imposition of increasingly painful economic sanctions. The rationale underlying this policy is that Iran’s leaders, fearful of losing political control as popular discontent increases over the sanctions’ effects, will recalculate the costs and benefits of their nuclear activities and become receptive to negotiated constraints in exchange for removal of sanctions.
That could happen. International support for sanctions is considerable and increasing. It is becoming more difficult for Iran (whose economy depends to a large extent on oil exports of more than two million barrels a day) to find customers – and especially customers willing to pay full price. Meanwhile, Iran’s currency is weakening, pricing imported goods out of many Iranians’ reach.
Additional elements of current policy that seem to be having an effect are clandestine efforts aimed at impeding Iran’s ability to import sensitive technologies. Viruses have infiltrated computers in Iran, reducing the efficiency of the centrifuges central to enriching uranium. It is also possible that the assassination of selected individuals has slowed the advance of Iranian nuclear efforts.
But slowing Iran’s efforts is not the same as stopping them. So one question is whether existing sanctions can be extended and tightened; here, China and Russia must determine their priorities. Another question is whether any sanctions will be enough to persuade Iran’s leaders to accept verifiable limits on their nuclear program. And a third unsettled issue is how long Israel or the US will tolerate Iranian efforts before striking militarily.
Indeed, the only certainty may be that Iran’s nuclear program will be a major international issue in 2012 – quite possibly the most important one.
Richard N. Haass,
formerly Director of Policy Planning in the US State Department, is President
of The Council on Foreign Relations.
Richard N. Haass: 回應伊朗
紐約——我們對伊朗的核計劃有所了解，我們也知道不能加以鼓勵。據報道，伊朗有兩個地方在濃縮鈾——其中一些濃度達到了20%，遠遠超過了民用所需的濃度。國際原子能機構也報道說，伊朗正在研究設計核彈頭。簡而言之，伊朗的官員稱，他們的核計劃隻是用於發電或醫學研究，這一點說服力都沒有。
然而，世界還是有很多東西不知道。比如，我們不知道伊朗是否在未遭披露的地方進行秘密的活動，伊朗何時能研發出粗糙的核武器，據估計是在幾個月到幾年之間。我們也不知道伊朗四分五裂的領導層是否已經決定研發核武器，還是隻是暫時停一段時間，算計著本國可以在獲取核武器的過程中獲得許多好處，又不用承受真正獲得核武器后的風險和代價。
無論是哪種情況，伊朗的活動都讓世界面臨艱難的選擇。所有選擇都是有代價和風險的。此外，代價和風險都不可能准確計算。
一種選擇是接受擁核或接近擁核的伊朗並與之相處。這樣做的前提是能夠威懾住伊朗不使用核武器，正如冷戰期間蘇聯一樣。擴展導彈防御，美國能夠增強安全保障，讓伊朗明白用核武器威脅或使用核武器，美國將堅定加以回應。
但是默許伊朗擁核具有巨大的缺陷。鑒於伊朗對其對手採取顛覆和恐怖活動，擁核的伊朗可能會更加咄咄逼人。伊朗還可能將與核相關的材料、技術或武器轉讓給盟友（比如委內瑞拉的烏戈•查韋斯）或激進組織，比如真主黨和哈馬斯。這樣非但無助於該地區各國更加謹慎和穩定，伊朗或以色列可能在危機中率先發動襲擊。
我們也不能認為，伊朗四分五裂和激進的領導層常常會理智地採取行動，核擴散會僅限於伊斯蘭共和國。如果伊朗研發了核武器，沙特阿拉伯、土耳其和埃及等國也會購買或研發自己的核武器。中東戰事一觸即發是噩夢最好的寫照。
另一個相反的政策選項是防御性的攻擊：對伊朗境內與核計劃相關的基地發動軍事進攻（最有可能由以色列、美國或兩國一起發動攻擊。）。其核心目標是阻礙仍在聚集的威脅出現。
不過這個選項也有很大的缺陷。即使是成功的防御性攻擊也至多隻能將伊朗的核計劃推遲幾年。伊朗幾乎肯定會重建基地，可能會建到地下，加固基地從而使發動未來的襲擊困難得多。
此外，伊朗很可能立即對目標進行報復，這些目標包括沙特阿拉伯、伊拉克、阿富汗以及世界上其他存在美國利益的地方，還有美國本土。真主黨可能會攻擊以色列。如果這一切真發生了，由於石油短缺和恐懼，石油價格將扶搖直上，可能導致許多已經搖搖欲墜的世界經濟體陷入衰退。軍事襲擊也可能導致伊朗人民團結在政府的周圍，降低出現更富責任領導層的可能性。
因此，美國和世界上的許多國家都在探尋其他選擇，其中包括伊朗的政權更迭，這也不足為奇。然而，雖然這有可能實現，但是沒有政策可以確保伊朗發生政權更迭。所以，針對伊朗的主要政策還是強制實行日益嚴厲的經濟制裁。這項政策的原理是，隨著人們對制裁帶來的影響日益不滿，伊朗領導人會擔心在政治上失去控制，進而重新盤算進行核活動的利弊，為了消除制裁接受談判中的約束條件。
這有可能實現。國際社會越來越支持制裁措施。伊朗（伊朗的經濟在很大程度上依靠每天200多萬桶石油的出口）尋找買家——尤其是願意支付全價的買家——越來越難。與此同時，伊朗的貨幣在貶值，導致許多伊朗人買不起進口產品。
當前政策的一些輔助性成分似乎產生了影響，這些輔助性成分是一些暗中的努力，旨在減弱伊朗進口敏感技術的能力。病毒已經入侵伊朗的計算機，降低濃縮鈾至關重要的離心分離機的效率。個別人員遭暗殺也可能減緩了伊朗核計劃的進程。
但是阻礙伊朗的努力與迫使伊朗停止核計劃不是一回事。因此出現了現有的制裁是否應該更加廣泛、更加嚴厲的問題﹔在這方面，中國和俄羅斯必須決定其優先任務。另一個問題是制裁是否足以說服伊朗領導人接受可作証的限制條件，限制其核計劃。第三個未解決的問題是在發動軍事襲擊之前，以色列或美國還能忍受伊朗的核計劃多久。
實際上，或許唯一可以確定的是伊朗的核計劃將成為2012年的一個重要國際問題——很可能成為最重要的國際問題。
Richard
N. Haass，曾任美國國務院政策規劃主任，現任對外關系委員會主席。
