NEW YORK –
Central banks on both sides of the Atlantic took
extraordinary monetary-policy measures in September: the long awaited “QE3”
(the third dose of quantitative easing by the United States Federal Reserve),
and the European Central Bank’s announcement that it will purchase unlimited
volumes of troubled eurozone members’ government bonds. Markets responded
euphorically, with stock prices in the US,
for example, reaching post-recession highs.
Others, especially on the political right, worried that the latest monetary
measures would fuel future inflation and encourage unbridled government
spending.In fact, both the critics’ fears and the optimists’ euphoria are unwarranted. With so much underutilized productive capacity today, and with immediate economic prospects so dismal, the risk of serious inflation is minimal.
Nonetheless, the Fed and ECB actions sent three messages that should have given the markets pause. First, they were saying that previous actions have not worked; indeed, the major central banks deserve much of the blame for the crisis. But their ability to undo their mistakes is limited.
Second, the Fed’s announcement that it will keep interest rates at extraordinarily low levels through mid-2015 implied that it does not expect recovery anytime soon. That should be a warning for Europe, whose economy is now far weaker than America’s.
Finally, the Fed and the ECB were saying that markets will not quickly restore full employment on their own. A stimulus is needed. That should serve as a rejoinder to those in Europe and America who are calling for just the opposite – further austerity.
But the stimulus that is needed – on both sides of the Atlantic – is a fiscal stimulus. Monetary policy has proven ineffective, and more of it is unlikely to return the economy to sustainable growth.
In traditional economic models, increased liquidity results in more lending, mostly to investors and sometimes to consumers, thereby increasing demand and employment. But consider a case like Spain, where so much money has fled the banking system – and continues to flee as Europe fiddles over the implementation of a common banking system. Just adding liquidity, while continuing current austerity policies, will not reignite the Spanish economy.
So, too, in the US, the smaller banks that largely finance small and medium-size enterprises have been all but neglected. The federal government – under both President George W. Bush and Barack Obama – allocated hundreds of billions of dollars to prop up the mega-banks, while allowing hundreds of these crucially important smaller lenders to fail.
But lending would be inhibited even if the banks were healthier. After all, small enterprises rely on collateral-based lending, and the value of real estate – the main form of collateral – is still down one-third from its pre-crisis level. Moreover, given the magnitude of excess capacity in real estate, lower interest rates will do little to revive real-estate prices, much less inflate another consumption bubble.
Of course, marginal effects cannot be ruled out: small changes in long-term interest rates from QE3 may lead to a little more investment; some of the rich will take advantage of temporarily higher stock prices to consume more; and a few homeowners will be able to refinance their mortgages, with lower payments allowing them to boost consumption as well.
But most of the wealthy know that temporary measures result only in a fleeting blip in stock prices – hardly enough to support a consumption splurge. Moreover, reports suggest that few of the benefits of lower long-term interest rates are filtering through to homeowners; the major beneficiaries, it seems, are the banks. Many who want to refinance their mortgages still cannot, because they are “underwater” (owing more on their mortgages than the underlying property is worth).
In other circumstances, the US would benefit from the exchange-rate weakening that follows from lower interest rates – a kind of beggar-thy-neighbor competitive devaluation that would come at the expense of America’s trading partners. But, given lower interest rates in Europe and the global slowdown, the gains are likely to be small even here.
Some worry that the fresh liquidity will lead to worse outcomes – for example, a commodity boom, which would act much like a tax on American and European consumers. Older people, who were prudent and held their money in government bonds, will see lower returns – further curtailing their consumption. And low interest rates will encourage firms that do invest to spend on fixed capital like highly automated machines, thereby ensuring that, when recovery comes, it will be relatively jobless. In short, the benefits are at best small.
In Europe, monetary intervention has greater potential to help – but with a similar risk of making matters worse. To allay anxiety about government profligacy, the ECB built conditionality into its bond-purchase program. But if the conditions operate like austerity measures – imposed without significant accompanying growth measures – they will be more akin to bloodletting: the patient must risk death before receiving genuine medicine. Fear of losing economic sovereignty will make governments reluctant to ask for ECB help, and only if they ask will there be any real effect.
There is a further risk for Europe: If the ECB focuses too much on inflation, while the Fed tries to stimulate the US economy, interest-rate differentials will lead to a stronger euro (at least relative to what it otherwise would be), undermining Europe’s competitiveness and growth prospects.
For both Europe and America, the danger now is that politicians and markets believe that monetary policy can revive the economy. Unfortunately, its main impact at this point is to distract attention from measures that would truly stimulate growth, including an expansionary fiscal policy and financial-sector reforms that boost lending.
The current downturn, already a half-decade long, will not end any time soon. That, in a nutshell, is what the Fed and the ECB are saying. The sooner our leaders acknowledge it, the better.
Joseph E.
Stiglitz: 貨幣迷局
紐約—大西洋兩岸的央行在9月份都採取了不同尋常的貨幣政策措施：讓人們久等的“QE3”（美聯儲的第三輪量化寬鬆），以及歐洲央行宣布將無限量購買受困歐元區成員國的國債。市場對此反應熱烈，比如，美國股市重新回到危機前的高點。
其他人，特別是政治右翼，擔心最近的貨幣措施會助長未來通脹、鼓勵不受約束的政府支出。
事實上，批評者的擔心和樂觀者的熱情都不是板上釘釘之事。如今，未利用產能規模龐大，而即期經濟前景黯淡，這意味著嚴重通脹的風險極小。
儘管如此，美聯儲和歐洲央行的行動給出了三個本應讓市場冷靜下來的信號。首先，它們說，此前的動作並未取得成效﹔事實上，主要央行要承擔危機的主要責任。但它們收回錯誤的能力太差了。
其次，美聯儲宣布將在2015年之前將利率維持在極低水平，這意味著它預期短期內不會有復蘇發生。對於經濟遠弱於美國的歐洲來說，這是個警示信號。
最後，美聯儲和歐洲央行說，市場不可能很快自力更生恢復充分就業。必須予以刺激。這不啻完全否定了歐洲和美國關於採取相反措施——進一步緊縮的呼聲。
但大西洋兩岸所需要的刺激是財政刺激。貨幣政策已証明是無效的，更多貨幣手段並不會讓經濟回到可持續增長上來。
根據國際經濟學模型，流動性的增加會增加借貸——主要流向投資者，也有一些流向消費者——從而增加需求和就業。但考慮以下西班牙的例子。大量資金從西班牙銀行系統中出逃，而隨著歐洲在共同銀行系統的問題上繼續扯皮，外逃之勢還在延續。在維持目前緊縮政策的局面下增加流動性並不能提振西班牙經濟。
美國也是如此，主要向中小企業提供貸款的小銀行被完全忽視了。聯邦政府——不管是小布什政府還是奧巴馬政府——用數千億美元支持大銀行，卻放任數百家具有關鍵重要性的小貸款商倒閉。
但即使銀行變得更加健康，貸款也不會有很大起色。畢竟，小企業依賴於抵押貸款，而房地產——最重要的抵押品——價格距離危機前水平仍有三分之一。此外，房地產業產能嚴重過剩，這意味著低利率並不能提振房地產價格，從而不能吹起新的消費泡沫。
當然，邊際效應是不可忽視的：QE3所帶來的長期利率的微小變化可能會催生更多的投資﹔一些富人會利用暫時性的股票價格高企更多地消費﹔也有一些家庭能夠得以進行按揭再融資，下降的按揭負擔則有助於刺激他們的消費。
但大部分富豪明白，暫時性手段隻能造成股價的暫時波動，遠遠不足以支持炫耀性消費。此外，報告顯示，長期利率下降的好處隻有很少一部分流向了屋主﹔最大的受益者似乎是銀行。許多想對按揭進行再融資的人並沒有成功，因為它們的房產仍然“在水面以下”（即他們欠銀行的錢比房屋的當前價值還多）。
在其他環境中，美國可以從低利率導致的匯率貶值中獲利——即以鄰為壑式的競爭性貶值，受害者將是美國的貿易伙伴。但是，由於歐洲利率也很低，而全球經濟正在減速，美國得到的好處將十分有限。
一些人擔心新的流動性會帶來更糟糕的結果——比如相當於對美國和歐洲消費者征稅的商品繁榮。勤儉節約、將錢都投給國債的老一輩人將承受更低的回報，從而進一步抑制他們的消費。低利率還會鼓勵正在做投資的企業將錢投給固定資本，比如高度自動化的機器，這意味著即使經濟復蘇，失業率也會相對較高。簡言之，就是好處極其有限。
在歐洲，貨幣干預提振經濟的潛力更大，但也存在類似的讓情況更糟糕的風險。為了減輕人們對政府恣意揮霍的憂慮，歐洲央行在其債券購買計劃中加入了條件。但如果這些條件實施起來和緊縮政策無異——沒有相應的增長措施作為補充——則更有可能起到放血的作用：病人很有可能在獲得真正的靈藥之前就死掉了。擔心失去經濟主權讓然各國政府不願向歐洲央行求助，而隻有他們開口求助，才會有真正的效果。
歐洲還有令一個風險：如果歐洲央行過度關注通脹，那麼當美聯儲試圖刺激美國經濟時，利差會導致歐元升值（至少相對於不那麼做的情形），從而破壞歐洲的競爭力和增長前景。
對歐洲和美國來說，現在的危險是政客和市場相信貨幣政策可以拯救經濟。不幸的是，目前貨幣政策的主要效應將是將人們的注意力從真正可以刺激增長的措施（包括擴張性財政政策和提振貸款的金融部門改革）上移開。
此次衰退已經延續了五年，而且仍不會馬上結束。這其實就是美聯儲和歐洲央行晦澀地表達的意思。我們的領導人越早承認這一點越好。
