Yu Yongding (余永定) : China’s Rebalancing Act

BEIJING – China’s 12th Five-Year Plan calls for a shift in the country’s economic model from export-led growth toward greater reliance on domestic demand, particularly household consumption. Since the Plan’s introduction, China’s current-account surplus as a share of GDP has indeed fallen. But does that mean that China’s adjustment is on track?

According to the IMF, the fall in China’s current-account surplus/GDP ratio has largely been the result of very high levels of investment, a weak global environment, and an increase in prices for commodity imports that has outpaced the rise in prices for Chinese manufactured goods. So the fall in China’s external surplus/GDP ratio does not represent economic “rebalancing”; on the contrary, the Fund predicts that the ratio will rebound in 2013 and approach its pre-crisis level thereafter.

The IMF’s explanation of the recent fall in China’s current-account surplus/GDP ratio is broadly correct. Experience suggests that China’s external position is highly sensitive to global conditions, with the surplus/GDP ratio rising during boom times for the world economy and falling during slumps. Europe’s malaise has hit China’s exports badly, and undoubtedly is the most important factor underlying the current decline in the ratio.

By definition, without a change in the saving gap, there will be no change in the trade surplus, and vice versa. Furthermore, the saving gap and the trade balance interact with each other constantly, making them always equal. In response to the global financial crisis in 2008, China introduced a RMB4 trillion ($634 billion) stimulus package. While the increase in investment reduced the saving/GDP ratio, the resulting increase in imports lowered the trade surplus/GDP ratio. As a result, China’s external surplus/GDP ratio fell significantly in 2009.

In 2010, China’s government adjusted its economic policy. In order to control inflation and real-estate bubbles, the central bank tightened monetary policy and the government refrained from another round of fiscal stimulus. China’s real-estate investment accounted for 10% of GDP, and slower investment growth in the sector necessarily reduces import demand, directly and indirectly. But, because the fall in import growth had yet to turn into a rout, while China’s exports to Europe plummeted, China’s current-account surplus fell further in GDP terms in 2011.

This situation is likely to change in 2012. The negative impact of the fall in real-estate investment since 2010 has been deeper and longer than expected; indeed, almost all categories of imports that fell by 10% or more in August were related to real-estate investment. As a result, it is possible that the fall in investment growth will reverse the declining external surplus/GDP ratio in 2012, unless the global economy deteriorates further and/or the Chinese government launches a new stimulus package.

Perhaps most important, China must now export more manufactured goods to finance imports of energy and mineral products. The worsening terms of trade have been a major factor contributing to the decline in the current-account surplus in recent years.

Nevertheless, despite the merits of its analysis, the IMF underestimates China’s progress in rebalancing. In my view, China’s rebalancing is more genuine – and more fundamental – than the Fund recognizes, and the prediction of an eventual rebound in China’s external surplus/GDP ratio will most likely turn out to be wrong.

First, the roughly 30% real exchange-rate appreciation since 2005 must have had a serious impact on exporters, reflected in the bankruptcy – as well as the upgrading – of many enterprises in coastal areas. Though the market shares of Chinese exports seem to have held up quite well, this is attributable to price-cutting in foreign markets, which is not sustainable. Over time, real exchange-rate appreciation will cause a shift in expenditure, making China’s rebalancing more apparent.

Second, China’s wage levels are rising rapidly. According to the 12th Five-Year Plan, the minimum wage should grow by 13% per year. Together with real appreciation, the increase in labor costs is bound to weaken the competitiveness of China’s labor-intensive export sector, which will be reflected in the trade balance more clearly in the coming years.

Third, China has made significant progress in building its social-security system. The number of people covered by basic old-age insurance, unemployment insurance, workers’ compensation, and maternity insurance has risen substantially. Moreover, universal medical insurance is emerging, and a comprehensive system for providing aid to students from poor families has been established. As a result, the motivation for precautionary saving has been weakened somewhat, while some researchers have found statistical evidence that the consumption rate is rising, which is supported by China’s emergence as the world’s fourth-largest importer of luxury goods.

Finally, the worsening of China’s terms of trade will play an even more fundamental role in reducing its trade surplus in the future. Given weak demand, which may be prolonged, Chinese exporters must accept increasingly thin profit margins to maintain market share. However, China’s large size and low per capita income and capital stock imply continued rapid growth in its demand for commodities. Thanks to supply constraints, China’s import bill for commodities and metals is likely to offset its processing-trade surplus in the near future.

In short, as long as China’s government is not so unnerved by the slowdown in output growth that it changes its current policy stance, the current-account surplus is more likely to continue to fall relative to GDP than it is to rebound in 2013 and thereafter. In fact, such an outcome is not only likely, but also desirable. After all, faced with “infinite quantitative easing,” being a large net creditor means being in the worst position in today’s global economy.

Yu Yongding was President of the China Society of World Economics and Director of the Institute of World Economics and Politics at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. He has also served as a member of the Monetary Policy Committee of the People's Bank of China, and as a member of the National Advisory Committee of China’s 11th Five-Year Plan.

Yu Yongding (余永定): Greece-Proofing China

BEIJING – Despite repeated assurances by European Union leaders, after more than two years, there is still no light at the end of Europe’s debt-crisis tunnel. Recently, the president of the European Commission, José Manuel Barroso, referring to a possible Greek exit from the eurozone, told the European Parliament that there is no “Plan B.”

Barroso’s statement was meant to be reassuring. But, after so many disappointments, China cannot accept at face value the assurances of European politicians, which even they themselves do not know whether they can redeem. China should have its own Plan B in case Greece has to leave the eurozone.

Indeed, it is increasingly likely that Greece will renege on its bailout obligations. If that happens and the “troika” (the European Commission, the European Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund) cuts off financial support, Greece’s exit from the euro will become all but inevitable. In that event, China must be prepared for any ensuing global financial turmoil and longer-term consequences.
For starters, Chinese officials should be under no illusion that the country will be immune to financial contagion. A “Grexit” would hit European banks that hold peripheral eurozone countries’ sovereign bonds. Shock waves from the deleveraging would, in turn, spread to emerging markets like China.

Although the exposure of Chinese banks and financial institutions to eurozone sovereign and banking-sector assets is negligible, post-Grexit capital flight from risky markets could rival, or even surpass, that in the weeks following Lehman Brothers’ collapse in September 2008. Compared to 2007 and 2008, foreign investors’ holdings in emerging markets are much higher, owing to these countries’ relative economic strength in recent years and rock-bottom returns on developed-market financial assets.

In fact, China already experienced the impact of deleveraging late last year, when the European financial system seemed on the brink of collapse. With European banks hunkering down, the renminbi’s exchange rate fell for 11 consecutive days, even though China was running a current-account surplus.

The performance of emerging-market currencies and other assets so far in the second quarter suggests that deleveraging has begun once again. Disappointing first-quarter growth data have already led foreign investors to have second thoughts about keeping money in China. A Grexit could prove to be the last straw, and would surely lead to a tightening in domestic monetary conditions at a very precarious point in the economic cycle.

As such, the timing could not be worse to float the idea of speeding up capital-account liberalization. On the contrary, the Peoples Bank of China (PBoC) and other relevant authorities should consider capital controls, market suspensions, and emergency liquidity provision.
These measures are not dissimilar to those that the eurozone will pursue if Greece exits. Ideally, the response would be coordinated with China’s international partners in the G-20. The infrastructure for such cooperation has developed strongly since 2008, and China must not shy away from advocating its deployment.

Moreover, China must have a medium-term plan to deal with the economic aftermath of a Grexit. Should contagion prove to be limited, with Greece the only casualty, the drop in eurozone output may be severe, but not catastrophic. Nonetheless, the EU is China’s most important trading partner, and China must be braced for serious job losses in the export sector.
Japan’s experience shows that a recession that results from a financial crisis can be extremely prolonged, because deleveraging is a long process. It is highly likely that today’s recession will drag on for many more years in both America and the EU. So China’s government must have a medium- and long-term plan to address problems caused by a drawn-out global slump.

The problems include a surge in unemployment, and the need to reallocate fiscal resources to these individuals, whose welfare is critical to the preservation of social stability. More importantly, the Chinese government should not retreat from efforts to implement structural reforms aimed at shifting China’s growth model to one that places much greater emphasis on domestic demand.

In addition, net foreign capital inflows are likely to dwindle for several quarters at least, affecting domestic monetary conditions while aggregate demand is weak. As such, the PBoC will need to maintain counter-cyclical policies in order to avoid a deflationary spiral.

Although bound to be controversial, especially in an election year in the United States, enough flexibility should be given to the renminbi in both directions when it is needed. One of the biggest failures of the eurozone periphery is a loss in competitiveness, hidden by a wall of credit that has been leveraged from Germany’s balance sheet. This is always unsustainable. Any loosening by the PBoC should not be used to avoid painful structural reforms.

Finally, China should be ready to extend a helping hand. To ensure that the post-Grexit eurozone’s integrity faces no further immediate threats, China must join international partners in establishing a fully credible firewall, via the IMF. However, the eurozone, and Germany in particular, must fully acknowledge the fundamental causes of Greece’s exit and pledge to move towards fiscal union, while acknowledging that an austerity-only approach towards other at-risk members is a dead end.

An adequate firewall and a European commitment to structural reform would go far toward calming markets and reducing the risks to any Chinese contribution. In other words, any assistance that China provides must be “throwing good money after good potential results.”
Of course, IMF governance reform will also need to be part of the discussion. Meanwhile, the eurozone will likely be more open to foreign investment out of necessity, and cash-rich Chinese companies should continue to pursue opportunities via FDI or corporate acquisitions.
A potential Grexit will present entirely new challenges to China in the coming months, and the country must avoid complacency over its own exposure. A battle plan for both the present and the future is needed now.

Yu Yongding, President of the China Society of World Economics, was formerly Director of the Chinese Academy of Sciences Institute of World Economics and Politics. He has also served as a member of the Monetary Policy Committee of the Peoples’ Bank of China, and as a member of the National Advisory Committee of China’s 11th Five-Year Plan.

Yu Yongding (余永定): China’s Struggle to Slow

BEIJING – At the opening of the annual session of China’s parliament, the National People’s Congress (NPC), Premier Wen Jiabao announced that the government’s target for annual economic growth in 2012 was 7.5%. With the global economy still struggling to recover, Wen’s announcement of such a significant dip in China’s growth rate naturally sparked widespread concern around the world.

But it is important to note that Wen was expressing a policy rather than forecasting performance. The purpose of targeting a lower growth rate, he explained, is “to guide people in all sectors to focus their work on accelerating the transformation of the pattern of economic development and making economic development more sustainable and efficient.”

Fixed-asset investment is the most important engine of China’s growth. As a developing country with annual per capita income of less than $5,000, there is still significant room for China to increase its capital stock. But the growth rate of investment is too high. The issue is not whether China needs more investment, but whether China’s absorption capacity can continue to accommodate the rapid investment growth of the past decade.

In this sense, the investment rate, which in China approaches 50% of GDP and is rising, can be regarded as a measure of the stress that fixed investment places on the economy. It is not entirely an exaggeration to say that the economy’s capacity for investment growth has reached its limit.

The recent high-speed rail debacle is a case in point. In 2003, China built its first high-speed-rail project. As a key component of the RMB4 trillion ($630 billion) stimulus package introduced during the 2008-2009 global financial crisis, investment in high-speed-rail construction increased by leaps and bounds. By the end of 2010, China’s operational high-speed-rail network surpassed 8,000 kilometers, with an additional 17,000 kilometers under construction. By contrast, all Western countries combined took a half-century to build a total of 6,500 kilometers. Built in such haste, catastrophe was almost inevitable.

Investment growth that surpasses an economy’s absorption capacity will lead to a rapid deterioration in the efficiency of investment, which in turn will harm long-term growth prospects. Evidence of this in China today is all too prevalent. To reverse this trend, some respite in investment growth is not only necessary, but also inevitable in a profit-driven economy.

While China’s investment rate should be brought down to a sustainable level, an equally, if not more, important challenge is to adjust the structure of investment. For many years, the single most important category of investment in China has been real-estate development, which accounts for roughly 10% of GDP and a quarter of total investment. But resources need to be allocated to projects that build up human capital, provide public goods, and foster creativity and innovation. Adjusting the investment structure, however, will inevitably cause investment growth to decelerate, at least in the transitional period, thus leading to a slowdown in overall GDP growth.

International trade has played a pivotal role in China’s economic development over the past 30 years. However, the global market is no longer able to absorb China’s massive exports, not to mention the immediate impact of economic malaise in Europe and the United States on export demand. Moreover, rising labor costs and a stronger renminbi will also undermine China’s export sector, causing GDP growth to slow this year.

Few would argue against China’s need for slower but better growth. The problem is that if China wishes to lower the GDP growth rate to 7.5% in 2012, from 9.2% in 2011, without worsening the growth pattern by raising the high investment rate even further, the annual growth rate of investment must be equal to or less than 7.5%.

A back-of-the-envelope calculation suffices to show that, unless the government is prepared to tolerate a further increase in the investment rate, achieving a GDP growth target of 7.5% implies a significant fall in the growth rate of investment. To compensate for the negative impact on GDP growth, and with export growth constrained by weak global demand, consumption must rise even more sharply, which is hard to imagine. In other words, lowering the GDP growth rate to 7.5% without making China’s growth pattern even more irrational is an impossible mission.

So a more likely growth scenario for 2012 is that China’s growth will be lower than in 2011, but still significantly higher than 7.5%. Correspondingly, its investment-driven growth pattern will be strengthened further, though at a slowing pace. Otherwise, a policy-induced hard landing would be difficult to avoid.

Indeed, how to achieve a more moderate growth rate without causing a hard landing is one of the most severe challenges confronting the Chinese government. A hard landing is simply not an option.

With the country’s fiscal position still positive, it is difficult to image that the Chinese leadership would be so headstrong about “accelerating the transformation of the pattern of economic development” as to risk such an outcome. Even if it is, GDP-obsessed and debt-ridden local governments are likely to strive to achieve the highest possible growth rates for themselves, while paying lip service to Wen’s call for a slowdown. That is why, despite the official target, most Chinese economists still bet on a growth rate well above 8% for 2012.

Yu Yongding, President of the China Society of World Economics, was formerly Director of the Chinese Academy of Sciences Institute of World Economics and Politics. He has also served as a member of the Monetary Policy Committee of the Peoples’ Bank of China, and as a member of the National Advisory Committee of China’s 11th Five-Year Plan.

余永定: 中國：減速的糾結

北京—在一年一度的人大會議開幕時，溫家寶總理宣布，中國政府2012年的年經濟增長目標為7.5%。在全球經濟依然在掙扎著復蘇的時候，溫家寶宣布中國增長率的大幅下降自然而然地引起了全世界的廣泛關注。

但需要指出的一個要點是，溫家寶所表達的更多的是一種政策姿態，而不是在預測經濟表現。他解釋說，降低增長率目標是為了“引導各方面把工作著力點放到加快轉變經濟發展方式、切實提高經濟發展質量和效益上來。”

固定資產投資是中國增長的最重要引擎。中國是一個發展中國家，年人均收入不足5000美元，仍有重組的空間可用於資本存量的增加。但投資增長率顯得太高了。問題不在於中國是否需要更多的投資，而在於中國的吸收能力是否能像過去十年那樣適應快速的投資增長。

出於這樣的考慮，投資率——在中國，投資佔GDP的比重超過50%，而且還在不斷上升——可以作為固定投資對經濟的壓力的指標。說中國經濟的投資增長耐受力已經到達了極限並不是很夸張的說法。

最近的高鐵項目問題就是這一問題的寫照。2003年，中國上馬了第一個高鐵項目。作為2008—2009年全球金融危機時出台的4萬億人民幣刺激項目的關鍵部分，高鐵建設投資可謂一日千裡。到2010年底，中國運營高鐵網絡超過8000公裡，另有17000公裡在建。與此形成對照的是，西方國家花了半個世紀的時間才建造了6500公裡高鐵線路。如此匆忙上馬，災難在所難免。

超過一國吸收能力的投資增長會快速惡化投資的效益，進而危害長期增長前景。現今在中國出現的跡象一點都不令人奇怪。為了扭轉這一趨勢，適當放緩投資增長不僅必要，而且是利潤驅動的經濟所不可避免的過程。

中國的投資率必須下降到一個可持續水平，與此同時，另一個重要性有過之而無不及的挑戰是調整投資結構。多年來，房地產開發在中國的投資中獨佔鰲頭，大約可佔到GDP的10%和總投資的25%。但更多的資源應該被配置到建設人力資本、提供公共品和促進創造力和創新的項目中。但是，調整投資結構將不可避免地引起投資增長放緩，至少在過渡期內是如此，因而會拉低總體GDP的增長率。

過去30年來，國際貿易在中國的經濟發展中扮演著關鍵角色。但是，全球市場已經無法吸收中國龐大的出口了，何況歐洲和美國的經濟低迷立刻會對出口需求形成沖擊。此外，勞動成本的增加和人民幣升值也將不利於中國出口部門，造成今年GDP增速放緩。

毫無疑問，中國需要較慢但更好的增長。問題在於，如果中國希望將GDP增長率由2011年的9.2%放緩為2012年的7.5%，同時又不想通過進一步提高投資率來惡化增長方式，那麼年投資增長就必須不高於7.5%。

無需復雜的計算就可以得出，除非政府已做好了忍受投資率進一步攀升的准備，否則達到GDP增長7.5%的目標意味著投資增長率的大幅下降。為了補償由此產生的對GDP增長的不利沖擊，在出口增長仍受全球需求萎靡約束的情況下，消費必須出現迅速增加，而這一點很難實現。換句話說，降低GDP增長率至7.5%而又不讓中國增長模式更加非理性是一個不可能完成的任務。

因此，更可能的2012年增長劇本是經濟增長率低於2011年，但仍顯著高於7.5%。相應地，投資驅動的增長模式將被進一步強化，盡管速度有所放緩。否則就難以避免政策引發的硬著陸。

事實上，如何實現增長率放緩而不導致硬著陸是中國政府所面臨的最嚴峻的挑戰。硬著陸絕不是可選項。

中國的財政狀況依然堅挺，因此中國領導人不太可能不惜風險一根筋地“加速經濟發展模式轉型”。就算中央政府確實如此，迷信GDP又債務纏身的地方政府仍有可能勉力追求盡可能高的增長率，同時在口頭上鼎力支持溫家寶的減速呼聲。這就是為何大部分中國經濟學家在官方目標大幅下調的情況下仍預測2012年的增長率將遠高於8%。

Yu Yongding: Rattling the Renminbi / 好動的人民幣

BEIJING – From July 2005 until this past December, China’s renminbi (RMB) appreciated steadily. But then the RMB fell unexpectedly, hitting the bottom of the daily trading band set by the Peoples’ Bank of China (PBoC) for 11 sessions in a row. Though the RMB has since returned to its previous trajectory of slow appreciation, the episode may have signaled a permanent change in the pattern of the exchange rate’s movement.

As long as China was running a trade surplus and receiving net inflows of foreign direct investment, the RMB remained under upward pressure. Short-term capital flows had little impact on the direction of the RMB’s exchange rate.

There were two reasons for this. First, thanks to an effective – albeit porous – capital-control regime in China, short-term “hot money” (capital coming into China aimed at arbitrage, rent-seeking, and speculation) could not enter (and then leave) freely and swiftly. Second, short-term capital flows usually would strengthen rather than weaken upward pressure on the RMB’s exchange rate, because speculators, persuaded by China’s gradual approach to revaluation, bet on appreciation.

So why, if China was still running a decent current-account surplus and a long-term capital surplus, did the RMB suddenly depreciate, forcing the PBoC to intervene (though not very vigorously) to prevent it from falling further?

Many economists outside of China have argued that the December depreciation resulted from betting by investors that Chinese policymakers, facing the prospect of a hard landing for the economy, would slow or halt currency appreciation. But if that were true, we would now be seeing significant long-term capital outflows and heavy selling of RMB for dollars in China’s foreign-exchange market.

We see neither reaction. More importantly, the RMB’s slow appreciation resumed fairly promptly after December’s dip, while investors’ bearish sentiments about China’s economy remain consistent.

In fact, the RMB’s sudden fall in December reflects China’s liberalization of cross-border capital flows. That process began in April 2009, when China launched the pilot RMB Trade Settlement Scheme (RTSS), which enables enterprises, especially larger ones, to channel their funds between Mainland China and Hong Kong. As a result, an offshore RMB market, known as the CNH market, was created in Hong Kong alongside the onshore market, now dubbed the CNY market.

But, in contrast to the CNY, the CNH is a free market. Given expectations of RMB appreciation and a positive interest-rate spread between Mainland China and Hong Kong, the RMB had a higher value in dollar terms on the CNH than on the CNY market. That difference led to active exchange-rate arbitrage by mainland importers and multinational firms – one form of capital inflows from Hong Kong to the mainland. Correspondingly, RMB liabilities owed by mainland Chinese and multinationals increased, as did RMB assets held by Hong Kong residents.

Exchange-rate arbitrage by mainland importers and multinationals creates upward pressure on the CNY and downward pressure on the CNH. In an economy with flexible interest and exchange rates, arbitrage eliminates the exchange-rate spread quickly. But, because China’s exchange rate and interest rates are inflexible, the CNH-CNY spread persists, and arbitragers are able to reap fat profits at the economy’s expense.

Last September, however, financial conditions changed suddenly in Hong Kong. The liquidity shortage caused by the European sovereign debt-crisis led developed countries’ banks – especially European banks with exposure in Hong Kong – to withdraw their funds, taking dollars with them. As a result, the CNH fell against the dollar. At the same time, the shortage of dollars had not yet affected the CNY, which remained relatively stable.

The CNH therefore became cheaper than the CNY. Consequently, mainland importers and multinationals stopped buying dollars from the CNH market and returned to the CNY market. At the same time, mainland exporters stopped selling dollars in the CNY market and turned to the CNH market.

The dollar shortage created depreciation pressures on the CNY, which the PBoC declined to offset. The CNY was thus bound to fall, which it did last September.

Reverse arbitrage meant capital outflows from the Chinese mainland. Correspondingly, RMB liabilities owed by mainlanders and multinationals decreased, as did RMB assets held in Hong Kong. In fact, increases in financing costs and uncertainty about RMB appreciation prompted a partial sell-off of RMB assets by Hong Kong residents.

In short, because the RTSS made cross-border capital movements much easier, short-term flows have become a major factor in determining the RMB’s exchange rate. External shocks affect the offshore exchange rate first, and then feed through to the onshore exchange rate.
The RMB will continue to appreciate in the near future, owing to strong economic fundamentals, but the inherent instability of short-term capital flows will make its exchange rate more volatile. This change is bound to pose new challenges for decision makers in the United States and China, particularly as they engage in a fresh round of debate about China’s exchange-rate policy.

Yu Yongding, President of the China Society of World Economics, is a former member of the monetary policy committee of the Peoples’ Bank of China and former Director of the Chinese Academy of Sciences Institute of World Economics and Politics.

余永定: 好動的人民幣

北京—從2005年7月到去年12月，人民幣一直在逐漸升值。但此后人民幣出現了出人意料的貶值，連續11個交易日觸及中國人民銀行設定的日交易下限。盡管此后人民幣又重新回到了緩慢升值的軌道，但其匯率變動的軌跡也許已經發生了永久改變。

隻要中國存在貿易順差和淨外國直接投資流入，人民幣就會承受升值壓力。短期資本流對人民幣匯率幾乎沒有影響。

原因有二。其一，由於中國卓有成效（盡管漏洞很多）的資本管制，短期“熱錢”（即流入中國以套利、尋租和投機為目的的資本）無法迅速自由地進出。其次，短期資本流通常加強而不是削弱了人民幣的升值壓力，因為投機者在中國漸進的升值態度的指引下，都在賭人民幣會升值。

那麼，既然中國仍然存在漂亮的經常項目順差和長期資本盈余，為什麼人民幣會突然貶值，迫使人民銀行出手干預（盡管力度不是很大）以防止其進一步下跌呢？

許多外部經濟學家指出，12月貶值的原因是投資者認為中國決策者在面臨經濟硬著陸的前景時，將延緩甚至叫停人民幣的升值。但如果這種觀點正確，那麼我們現在應該看到大量長期資本流出以及中國外匯市場上出現大量拋售人民幣換取美元的現象。

但這兩種現象一個都沒有出現。更重要的是，在12月的貶值之后，人民幣又相當穩健地回到了緩慢升值的軌道上，而與此同時，投資者看熊中國經濟的情緒並沒有緩解。

事實上，12月人民幣的突然貶值反應出中國跨境資本流的自由化。這一過程始於2009年4月，當時中國開始試點人民幣貿易結算機制（RTSS），企事業單位（尤其是大型企事業單位）可以在大陸和香港之間轉移資金。結果，離岸人民幣市場，即CNH市場，在香港被建設起來，與在岸市場（現在稱為CNY市場）並行。

但是，與CNY不同，CNH是一個自由市場。在人民幣升值以及大陸-香港正利差的預期下，人民幣的CNH市場美元價值要高於CNY市場。這一差別促使大陸進口商和跨國公司開展了積極的套利活動——即資本從香港流入大陸的一種形式。相應地，大陸中國居民和跨國公司的人民幣債務增加了，香港居民持有的資產亦然。

大陸進口商和跨國公司的匯率套率行為在CNY市場上造成了升值壓力，而在CNH市場上造成了貶值壓力。在一個具有彈性利率和匯率的經濟體中，套利會迅速消除利率差別。但是，由於中國的匯率和利率缺乏彈性，因此CNH-CNY利差持續存在，套利者得以賺取豐厚利潤，而代價則由經濟承擔。

但是，去年9月，香港財金融況急轉直下。因歐洲主權債務危機導致的流動性短缺使得發達國家銀行——特別是對香港存在風險敞口的歐洲銀行——以美元的形式抽回了資金。結果，CNH開始對美元貶值。與此同時，美元短缺尚未影響到CNY，CNY市場繼續保持相對穩定。

於是，CNH變得比CNY更便宜了。其結果是，大陸進口商和跨國公司不再通過CNH市場買入美元再通過CNY市場換回人民幣。與此同時，大陸出口商也不再在CNY賣出美元然后通過CNH市場換回美元。

美元短缺造成了CNY市場的貶值壓力，而人民銀行拒絕對此有所反應。於是，CNY不可避免地要出現貶值，這就是去年9月的情形。

反向套利意味著資本從中國大陸流出。相應地，大陸居民和跨國公司持有的人民幣債務下降了，香港居民持有的人民幣資產亦然。事實上，融資成本的上升以及人民幣升值的不確定性觸發了香港居民單方面甩賣人民幣資產。

簡言之，因為RTSS的出現，跨國資本流動變得更加容易，短期流動成為決定人民幣匯率的主要因素。外部沖擊首先影響離岸市場，然后影響在岸匯率。

在短期未來，人民幣還將繼續升值，這是強勁的經濟基本面決定的，但短期資本流的內在不穩定性將會導致人民幣匯率更加波動。這一變化將不可避免地給美國和中國的決策者帶來新的挑戰，特別是在他們准備開展新一輪中國匯率政策辯論的當口。

余永定是中國世界經濟學會主席，前中國人民銀行貨幣政策委員會成員，前中國社會科學院世界經濟與政治研究所所長。