Yuriko Koike (小池百合子): Japan’s Fiscal Crisis Comes of Age

TOKYO – Has Japan’s political paralysis finally lifted? The recent agreement, after a long debate, between the government and leading opposition parties to double the consumption tax – from 5% to 8% in 2014, and then to 10% in 2015 – suggests that it has. But there is a real risk that the government will mistake this measure for the end of the reform process. In fact, it is – or should be – only the beginning.

By virtually any measure, official Japanese debt is the highest in the world. The total outstanding volume of Japanese Government Bonds (JGBs) is an almost unfathomable $9 trillion, only just below the $10.5 trillion in outstanding debt for the full 17-country eurozone, which has more than triple the population.

So grim has Japan’s fiscal position become that bond issuance has exceeded tax revenue since 2009. Taxes cover less than half of government spending. And last year’s earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear disaster only made a grim fiscal picture worse by requiring huge new spending on reconstruction. Japan issued a record ¥55.8 trillion ($693.5 billion), or 12% of nominal GDP, in government bonds during the last fiscal year.

Of course, Japan’s fiscal problems have been mounting for decades. Annual tax revenue has fallen 30% since the country’s property bubble burst in 1989, owing to slow growth and deflation, with tax cuts implemented as stimulus measures during the 1990’s recession playing a subsidiary role.

The only reason that Japan has been able to sustain its fiscal position is that 93% of its debt is domestically held (with the Bank of Japan now buying close to one-third of the JGBs issued each year). Indeed, in contrast to the foreign capital flight that has so damaged Europe, willing foreign buyers of JGBs are currently plentiful, pushing interest rates to their lowest levels ever.
Moreover, Japan’s private sector – its households and companies – sits atop a mountain of savings, which is mostly used to purchase JGBs. Because the government can still borrow mainly from the Japanese people, its balance sheet remains stable. But, given Japan’s aging population, how long can that continue?

Most leading Japanese economists believe that the situation cannot be sustained, given that the large number of households formed by pensioners is increasingly drawing down savings. The share of those aged 65 or over has nearly doubled over the past two decades, to 23%, compared to 13% for the United States and 16% for Europe. If this trend continues, as seems likely, the captured market that JGBs have had for decades will begin to shrink dangerously. At that point, foreign purchasers are unlikely to pick up the slack.

In reaching the agreement to raise the consumption tax, the opposition Liberal Democratic Party insisted that the main squeeze on the budget deficit – the amount spent on social-security benefits for Japan’s retirees – begin to be addressed. But the agreement actually does nothing to fix that problem.

The large number of elderly and retired people means that spending on health care and social security now consumes 29.2% of the budget, a one-third increase since 2000. To meet these demands, Japan’s government has been slashing spending on education and research, the two areas in which the country’s post-war economic rise was forged. And the old jibe that Japan cannot resist building bridges to nowhere if the government is paying rings less true nowadays. Public works and pork-barrel spending fell to 5.1% of the budget this year, from 13% in 2000.

Of course, the tax system will also need to be addressed. Just as Japan’s deficit is monumental by any measure, Japanese income earners are clearly under-taxed. Even after the proposed doubling of the consumption tax, the rate will remain half the 20% (or more) that almost all European countries levy. Overall tax revenue is roughly 27% of GDP, putting Japan in 28th place among the 35 OECD countries.

The government must not overestimate how much revenue can be gained by the consumption-tax increase, and thus how much of the budget hole can be closed. Moreover, it has so far shrugged off any concern that the tax increase might have a chilling effect on consumption, and thus on economic growth.

Hiromichi Shirakawa, the chief economist at Credit Suisse AG in Tokyo, suggests that the revenue increase from the consumption-tax hike will soon begin to evaporate – and disappear completely in 5-7 years. If he is right, the increase will turn out to be little more than a finger in the dyke of Japan’s budget problems.

Despite its two decades of economic malaise, Japan remains the world’s third-largest economy, and will grow by about 2% this year and 1.5% in 2013. Given the economic doldrums in which the world finds itself, that may not seem so bad. But, if Japan is ever to address its fiscal dilemma effectively, it will need to sustain faster growth than that.

Such growth presupposes a credible strategy to pare the deficit, which means a plan that recognizes the reality of the growing cohort of pensioners. Japanese authorities will also need to launch bold liberalizing reforms to unshackle the many areas of the economy that are shielded from competition. These reforms must aim to boost greater workforce participation by women; induce corporations to invest more at home; and increase competition in cosseted sectors of the economy.

If any country has the political tools to undertake a program of comprehensive reform, it is Japan. The unity with which the Japanese population met last year’s disaster demonstrated once again that, when called upon, the national spirit can work miracles. And Japan’s “greatest generation” – the men and women who rebuilt a war-shattered country into an economic powerhouse – should not be deemed unwilling to sacrifice for the greater good. After all, they saved their country once; they are more than capable of doing it again.

Yuriko Koike (小池百合子), Japan's former Minister of Defense and National Security Adviser, is a former chairwoman of Japan's Liberal Democrat Party, and currently an opposition leader in the Diet.

Yuriko Koike: The Ghost of North Korea

TOKYO – At 7:39 a.m. on April 13, North Korea fired a missile (which it called a satellite launch) in the face of opposition from almost the entire international community. In a perverse way, the world got its way, because the vehicle exploded a minute after takeoff, its debris falling harmlessly into the sea.

North Korea typically goes silent after such episodes: “failure” does not exist in its political lexicon, so it cannot be reported or discussed. The country’s media routinely meets any failure with outpourings of patriotic music and bombastic praise for the regime.

But this time was different. Behind the scenes in North Korea, failure does have consequences. In the coming weeks, we will most likely learn of a purge of those responsible. Indeed, the engineers and scientists involved in the launch probably put their lives on the line.

Moreover, North Korea could not deny failure this time, because the regime invited international media to attend the event – even allowing foreign reporters into the mission-control room – in order to legitimize it as a “satellite” launch and not a weapons test. The “failure” could not be concealed, so it was quickly admitted.

What was supposed to be a celebration of the 70th anniversary of the late Kim Jong-il on April 15, and of the regime’s new beginning under his successor, his youngest son, Kim Jong-un, ended up being a funereal salute. Supposedly ordinary people in Pyongyang told foreign media, with a practiced spontaneity, that “success is born of repeated failure.”

That is a chilling sentiment. The missile launch is believed to have been a legacy of Kim Jong-il, who fervently believed that the North’s survival required it to develop nuclear and biochemical weapons. So the failed missile launch probably means that a resumption of nuclear testing is inevitable, following tests in 2006 and 2009.

However, radioactive elements, such as Krypton-85 or Xenon-135, were not detected in the atmosphere after previous tests. Just as the North called the recent missile a “satellite,” an underground explosion caused by conventional explosives cannot be used as a bargaining chip unless it is called a “nuclear test.” The next one probably will occur as soon as 500-1,000 tons of dynamite have been secured.

The failed launch also marked a security fiasco for the North, as a South Korea think tank obtained the final orders for it. These instructions casually referred to Kim family business, indicating that “the teachings should be executed by Kim Kyong-hui” (Kim Jong-il’s sister), that “Kim Kyong-hui and Kim Jong-un should take care of the family,” and that “Kim Kyong-hui should handle management of all assets inside and outside the country.”

Foreign media often focus on Kim Kyong-hui’s role as the wife of regime insider Jang Sung-taek, but, as Kim Jong-il’s sister, she has been firmly in control of personnel changes since her brother’s death. Of the 232 members on Kim Jong-il’s funeral committee, she was listed 14th; her husband was 19th. She is routinely ranked higher than her husband in terms of protocol. Indeed, Jang Sung-taek’s promotion to General was her decision.

The problem is that Kim Kyong-hui is in poor health, owing to years of alcohol abuse. Moreover, she is so capricious and self-centered that even Kim Jong-il had trouble keeping her in check. Due to her poor health, it is unclear how long she will be able to continue advising Kim Jong-un, now surrounded by military personnel in their seventies and eighties who supported past generations. He needs advisers closer to his own age, but none is at hand.

Dynastic concerns now seem to be paramount for the regime. Speculation is growing, for example, about whether Kim Sol-song – the second daughter of Kim Jong-il’s third wife – will be appointed when Kim Kyong-hui is no longer able to perform her duties.

Before his death, Kim Jong-il reiterated that at least three nuclear reactors should be built. He also warned that China, despite being North Korea’s closest ally, is also the country that merits the most caution. North Korea, he insisted, must not allow itself to be used by China.

When Kim Il-sung (the “Eternal Great Leader”) died in 1994, Kim Jong-il relied on his father’s teachings to reinforce his authority. Indeed, there is no way of knowing whether his ideas and policies throughout his reign were actually Kim Il-sung’s. Perhaps Kim Jong-il’s “Ten Principles for the Establishment of the One-Ideology System” should now be viewed as an official document that stipulates which instructions are to be followed when, where, and by whom. In that case, his successor, the callow Kim Jong-un, can claim to be bound to do as he was told.

North Korea routinely pushes the international community around. But the North is itself being pushed around by the teachings of a ghost, conveniently used by the people who remain in charge in Pyongyang. How long will the rest of the world allow itself to be pushed around by a ghost?

Yuriko Koike, Japan's former Minister of Defense and National Security Adviser, is a former chairwoman of Japan's Liberal Democrat Party, and currently an opposition leader in the Diet.

Yuriko Koike (小池百合子): The Young General’s Old Tricks

TOKYO – Brinkmanship seems to be congenital in North Korea. Under the late Kim Jong-il’s pudgy young successor – his third son, Kim Jong-un, dubbed “the Young General” – threats and mendacity still mark the Hermit Kingdom’s diplomacy.

With North Korea’s announcement of plans to use an Unha-3 rocket to launch its Bright Star-3 satellite into earth orbit in mid-April, the newest threat is a continuation of an old one. Indeed, it signals a quick demise for the agreement reached with the United States just weeks ago.

The decision to launch the satellite, which had been planned by Kim Jong-il, is clearly intended to provide a “heroic” martial achievement for a new leader who lacks any military experience. The regime aims to boost North Korea’s international prestige and domestic morale simultaneously, with the population supposedly keen to support this show of the country’s technological and military might.

And, no surprise, North Korea’s leaders also claim that what they propose to launch is a “peaceful” satellite. But no one, particularly in the region, where North Korean missiles pose the gravest threat, accepts this claim at face value. It is clear that the rocket to be launched is effectively a long-range ballistic missile, which might be able to reach Guam, the site of an important US military base.

So doubtful is the world of North Korea’s claim of peaceful intent that not only did the United Nations, South Korea, the US, Japan, and the European Union immediately express concern; so did China and Russia – perhaps the only two countries in the world that are on good terms with the Kim regime.

Despite the international community’s almost unanimous demand for restraint, North Korea is highly unlikely to roll back its launch plans. Halting such missile tests is simply not an option for a regime whose only claim to legitimacy is the military threat that it poses to others.

The announcement of the forthcoming launch is timed, as always seems to be the case with North Korea’s provocations, to the regime’s need for food and funds from around the world to prevent the reemergence of mass starvation at home. Moreover, 2012 is a special year for North Korea, starting with the 70th anniversary of Kim Jong-il’s birth on February 16. That occasion will be followed by the 100th anniversary of Kim Il-sung’s birth on April 15 and the 80th anniversary of the creation of the People’s Army on April 25. The country’s undernourished masses are not being invited to the capital, Pyongyang, for the extravagant parades that will be held at enormous cost. The missile launch, it seems, will have to suffice for them.

The regime uses food as the currency of its domestic power and foreign policy. For the commemoration of Kim Jong-il’s birthday in February, a kilogram of fish was provided to residents in one district, but nowhere else. At the same time, the regime sought 240,000 tons of nutritional support in its recent negotiations with the US and South Korea, though the North was forced to return 30,000 tons of rice from a previous food-aid package as part of its recent agreement with the US.

Indeed, the North lets few diplomatic occasions pass without strong-arming its interlocutors for more. For Kim Jong-un, even a meeting with Japanese officials in Ulan Bator, Mongolia’s capital, to discuss the return of Japanese women who went to North Korea with their Korean husbands thinking that they were journeying to a socialist paradise, served as a platform to secure food aid from Japan.

The negotiations were to be held between Song Il-ho, North Korea’s ambassador responsible for normalizing relations with Japan, and Hiroshi Nakai, a former minister who negotiates officially for the release of Japanese citizens abducted by the North. But Nakai was unable to leave Tokyo, and a university professor replaced him as Japan’s negotiator. Rank-conscious North Korea would normally send a lower official than Song if his counterpart were substituted, but no change was made, so desperate is the North for food.

North Korea then asked Japan for economic aid and food supplies in exchange for returning not only the Japanese wives in question, but also seven Japanese known to have been abducted by the North. The Japanese aid, like the ransom paid to a kidnapper, must be provided by April 15, just in time for the commemoration of Kim Il-song’s birth – a clear indication of North Korea’s true intentions, and desperation.

And now, given the potential cost of scuttling the recent agreement with the US, the decision to launch a long-range missile takes that desperation a step further. In fact, it has been suggested that the launch is intended to be a demonstration to Iran of the North’s missile prowess, as the Islamic Republic could become a customer for the illicit missile and nuclear-technology sales that are one of the regime’s few sources of hard currency.

Thus, the North Korean drama, now starring Kim Jong-un, plays on, relying on extorted proceeds from manufactured crises abroad to finance spectacular kitsch and brutal repression at home. It is up to China, the real director of the North Korean production, to drop the curtain on this abominable show and its rogue star.

Yuriko Koike, the first woman to serve as Japan’s defense minister and the country’s first-ever National Security Adviser, currently chairs the opposition Liberal Democratic Party’s executive council. In 2008, she was the first woman ever to seek the Japanese premiership, and from 2003-2006 served as Minister of the Environment. Fluent in Arabic, she is a Middle East specialist, as well as one of Asia’s leading geo-strategists.

小池百合子: 小將軍的老把戲

東京—邊緣政策似已深入朝鮮骨髓。在金正日又矮又胖的繼承人——即其三太子、人稱“小將軍”的金正恩——治下，威脅和謊言仍是這一隱遁王國外交的特征。

朝鮮宣布計劃在4月中旬用銀河三號（Unha-3）火箭將光明行三號衛星送入地球軌道，這一新威脅是舊威脅的繼續。事實上，這表明幾周前才與美國達成的協議將迅速失效。

該衛星發射計劃在金正日時代就已開始謀劃，顯然，該計劃是為了給缺少軍隊經驗的新領導人提供“威武”的軍事成就。當局意在同時提高朝鮮的國際地位和國內士氣，朝鮮人民想必將熱烈支持這一計劃，並將之視為朝鮮技術和軍事實力的展示。

此外，毫不奇怪，朝鮮領導人還說，這次發射的是“和平”衛星。但沒人會把這句話當真——特別是在將朝鮮導彈視為最大威脅的東北亞地區。顯然，即將發射的火箭實際上是遠程彈道導彈，其射程可能可達美軍重要駐地關島。

國際社會對朝鮮“和平目的”的宣告根本不信，不僅聯合國、韓國、美國、日本和歐盟立刻表示關注，就連中國和俄羅斯也持有這一立場——中俄大概是僅有的兩個替朝鮮體制說好話的國家。

盡管國際社會異口同聲要求朝鮮保持克制，但朝鮮基本不可能收回發射計劃。對朝鮮政權來說，維持其合法性的唯一辦法是對他人施加軍事威脅，停止導彈試射絕不是可行的選擇項。

宣布發射計劃的時間是精心選擇的——朝鮮的挑舋行為一貫如此——即在該國需要國際糧食和資金以防國內大飢荒重現的時候。此外，2012對朝鮮來說是一個特殊的年份。2月16日是金正日誕辰70年紀念。接著，4月15日將迎來金日成誕辰100周年，4月25日是人民軍成立80周年。營養不良的朝鮮群眾並未獲邀前往首都平壤參加花費靡巨的奢華游行。導彈的發射大概是為了滿足他們。

朝鮮當局將糧食作為國內權力和對外政策的通貨。2月份，為紀念金正日70誕辰，某區居民獲發每人一公斤魚（其他地方的居民無此待遇）。與此同時，朝鮮當局還在於美國和韓國的最新談判中獲得24萬噸營養物資，但與此同時，朝鮮也被迫從先前的糧食援助計劃中返還3萬噸，作為與美國最新協議的一部分。

事實上，朝鮮基本上不會錯過任何外交機會在對話者身上充分榨取好處。就拿金正恩來說吧，就連與日本官員在烏蘭巴托的會面——本來目的是討論遣返帶著奔赴社會主義天堂的美好願望與朝鮮丈夫共同前往朝鮮的日本婦女的問題——也可以被他用作保証從日本獲得糧食援助的平台。

該談判本應在朝鮮負責對日關系正常化的大使宋日昊與負責釋放羈押在朝日籍人士談判的前政府大臣中井洽之間展開。但中井洽無法離開東京，因此由一位大學教授替他擔任日方談判員。按注重級別的朝鮮的一貫作風，如果對方改換談判員，朝方也將派遣級別不及宋日昊者與其會面。但這一幕並沒有發生，由此可見朝鮮對糧食的渴望。

接著，朝鮮要求日本給予糧食和經濟援助，作為交換，朝鮮不但可以遣返日本所要求的日籍親眷，甚至還可以釋放被朝鮮羈押的七名日本人。日本的援助——與人質贖金無異——必須在4月15日前落實，以趕上金正日誕辰紀念——顯然，這才是朝鮮的真正目的，而且極為迫切。

而在眼下，考慮到撕毀新近達成的朝美協議的潛在代價，朝鮮發射遠程導彈的決定更加顯示了其急不可耐的心理。事實上，朝鮮的這次發射是為了向伊朗展示自己的導彈實力，而伊朗可能成為朝鮮非法導彈和核技術——朝鮮當局唯一的硬通貨——的客戶。

如此看來，輪到金正恩粉墨登場的朝鮮鬧劇還在繼續，它利用人造危機大行敲詐之事，為其國內的庸俗紀念儀式和殘酷鎮壓融資。作為朝鮮一言一行的真正指導者，中國應該站出來讓這場鬧劇及其流氓主演消停消停。

Yuriko Koike: Japan’s Rubble Economy

TOKYO – On March 11, a year will have passed since Japan was struck by the triple tragedy of an earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear accident. According to figures announced by the country’s National Police Agency, the Great East Japan Earthquake left behind 15,848 dead and 3,305 missing – the largest loss of life due to natural disaster in Japan since World War II. Searches for the missing – mainly at sea – are still continuing.

The number of buildings affected by the earthquake or the tsunami include 128,582 completely destroyed, 243,914 partly destroyed, 281 completely or partly burned, 33,056 flooded (including 17,806 above the ground floor, and 674,641 with other types of damage.

Approximately 320,000 people lost their homes, of which more than 90% continue to live in temporary housing. Where to rebuild their homes remains undecided.

The Great Hanshin Earthquake that struck western Japan in 1995 took 6,343 lives, in part because the city’s mazelike streets prevented access by emergency workers. In the aftermath, the city was reborn in a dramatically different and safer form.

Despite numerous difficulties, recovery from that earthquake was faster than expected: there was no tsunami to complicate matters, and rebuilding efforts could be focused on buildings that had collapsed in the earthquake. Moreover, the government provided strong leadership and official agencies responded rapidly, ensuring, among other things, a rapid cleanup of the rubble.

Indeed, aside from fiscal issues, disposal of rubble is the greatest obstacle preventing reconstruction after natural disasters everywhere. The rubble produced in the Great Hanshin Earthquake was equivalent to the amount that Japan normally processes in roughly eight years. Difficulties like damaged waste-disposal facilities were overcome by local governments’ cooperation and burden-sharing. And, fortunately, plans to build Kobe Airport on an artificial island near the coast ensured demand for landfill.

In Japan, waste disposal relies mainly on incineration, but use of landfill off the coast made it possible to process the waste more quickly. Even so, disposal of the waste took approximately three years, at a cost to the central government of ¥324.8 billion.

Compared to the Great Hanshin Earthquake, reconstruction after the Great East Japan Earthquake is moving at a snail’s pace. Rubble is equivalent to 11 years of waste in Iwate prefecture, and 19 years of waste in Miyagi prefecture – enormous volumes that exceed these regions’ disposal capacity. The cost of waste disposal, estimated at ¥776.7 billion, will be more than double the disposal cost following the Great Hanshin Earthquake.

Unlike the relatively rapid cleanup after the Great Hanshin Earthquake, only 5% of the total amount of rubble created by last year’s disaster has been processed so far. Temporary sites for rubble in affected areas are being piled with the remnants of building materials and domestic appliances and furnishings, creating little mountains here and there, as rules on recycling instituted since 1995 require sorting waste by material. Moreover, there are no plans to build an artificial island to use up the rubble, as was done with Kobe airport.

Owing to the tsunami, some of the refuse will ride the waves of the Pacific, reaching Hawaii and the West coast of the United States in a year or so. But the damage caused by the tsunami also caused significant delays in reconstruction. Local governments worry about how far from the coast new residential areas should be built, amplifying concerns about the future for people who are being forced to live with strangers in temporary housing in an unfamiliar area.

But the main reason for reconstruction delays is concern about radiation from the destroyed Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant. Fear of radioactive contamination has stoked strong opposition from residents in areas that would need to accept rubble – even when the rubble is from areas nowhere near Fukushima. In addition, although incineration greatly decreases the volume of waste, the concentration of radioactive cesium has been increasing over the past year, making it difficult to find suitable final disposal sites.

The heads of local governments in various regions are attempting to convince residents not to fear radiation and to allow for dispersal of rubble. But the unseen enemy has aroused concerns – particularly among mothers of young children – that are more a matter of psychology than of science. As the world’s only victim of a nuclear attack, Japan’s allergy to radiation is stronger than anywhere else.

Nevertheless, with the exception of the special circumstances caused by the Fukushima catastrophe, Japan is hardly the only country with a mess to clean up before it can reconstruct. Thailand, which earlier this year suffered prolonged flooding, is also facing the need to dispose of rubble as it works to rebuild. Measures to prevent flooding and steps to repair damaged areas of Bangkok cannot even begin until the rubble is cleared. Haiti and New Zealand have also encountered similar problems.

Reconstruction constitutes a special kind of public-works project. The disposal of rubble, given its labor-intensive character, has a particularly marked effect on job creation, at least in the short term. One might call this “rubble economics.” It is the inevitable formula for recovery – one shovel load at a time.

Yuriko Koike (小池百合子) is Japan’s former Minister of Defense and National Security Adviser.

Yuriko Koike (小池百合子) : China’s Soft-Power Offensive in Taiwan / 中國大陸對台灣的軟實力攻勢

TOKYO – China’s behavior during the recent presidential election in Taiwan demonstrates that its leaders have learned some lessons, if only the hard way. They have learned that China can have a greater impact on Taiwanese voters through trade and making people feel richer than by threats – even threats to fire missiles – which had been China’s electoral tactics in previous Taiwanese elections, particularly when a pro-independence candidate looked popular enough to win.

Indeed, fearing the popularity of Lee Teng-hui, who ran in the 1996 presidential election on a pro-independence platform, China’s People’s Liberation Army actually fired missiles close to the nearby coast of Keelung. But this saber rattling backfired. Lee won.

The presidential election on January 14 was the first of the transfers of power in China and Taiwan that will take place this year. Later this year, China’s President Hu Jintao and Prime Minister Wen Jiabao will be succeeded by men chosen by the Communist Party long ago. Avoiding new tension with Taiwan appears to have been a calculated decision by China’s leaders as they begin their own – perhaps not yet fully settled – changing of the guard.

For almost two decades, Taiwan’s presidential elections have attracted global attention not only for the robustness of Taiwan’s democratic culture, but also for the perennial question of whether the winner would seek formal independence for Taiwan. This time, Tsai Ing-wen, the woman nominated by the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), mounted a late charge on the Kuomintang incumbent, Ma Ying-jeou. But China did not bluster as Tsai surged in the polls.

Instead, China did all that it could do boost Ma, who has presided over a massive increase in economic ties with the mainland. For example, China provided cheap airplane tickets to roughly 400,000 of the one million Taiwanese living on the mainland to enable them to return home to vote. Given that Ma won by 800,000 votes, this tactic may not have been decisive, but it most likely played a considerable part in determining the outcome.

Paradoxically, the strong performance of James Soong Chu-yu of the People First Party, which split from the Kuomintang, helped Ma by giving voters a second alternative to him. And America’s quiet instructions to all candidates to avoid nationalist provocation undoubtedly also played a role in dampening tension with China – another factor that probably benefited Ma.

As part of China’s new “soft” approach to Taiwan, Wen emphasizes “conceding interests” to Taiwan. In Taiwan’s south, long a DPP stronghold, that approach appears to have paid off. The Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) between China and Taiwan has enabled farmers and fishermen in southern Taiwan to prosper by selling agricultural and fisheries products to the enormous Chinese market, and the Kuomintang received higher support in the region than in past elections.

Of course, promoting economic interaction with Taiwan is not China’s ultimate goal; unification is. China’s government appears to believe that Ma’s victory is a step in this direction.

But economic integration is one thing, and political integration quite another. After experiencing the benefits of democracy and freedom of expression, Taiwanese are unlikely to want to settle for anything less than the open society that they have today. Indeed, with increased contact between Taiwan and the mainland, ordinary Chinese could begin to envy the modern democracy that the Taiwanese people have built – and spread the idea of an open society to the Chinese mainland. Ma’s role in his second term should be to serve as just such an evangelist for democracy in China.

Well aware of this “danger,” China is implementing five policies. The first is to expand the ECFA, so that more Taiwanese companies feel its benefits. Second, and similarly, China will try to shake up the DPP’s base by further targeting the commercial interests of Taiwanese farmers and fishermen in the south. Third, China will emphasize common Chinese culture in order to reduce Taiwanese fear of unification. A fourth goal is to win over young legislators elected during this presidential election. Finally, China will seek to prevent the use of the name Taiwan and force the international use of the awkward name “Chinese Taipei.”

But the greatest issue affecting cross-strait relations is the Chinese economy itself. Signs of decline in China’s economy, which has racked up double-digit growth for decades, would affect all of its Taiwan policies. When Shanghai stocks fell by about 20% last year, Taiwanese stocks fell by a similar amount almost simultaneously – proof of how synchronized the Chinese and Taiwanese economies have become. China will not be able to get its way if the profitability of this synchronization breaks down.

So, will Taiwan become more like the mainland, or vice versa? To ask that question is to reprise a debate that was heard when Hong Kong and Macau reverted to China, but that is seldom encountered nowadays. Whether serious moves toward unification change that fact will depend on the effectiveness of China’s soft-power approach, which cannot be limited only to the attractiveness of its economy if it is actually to succeed.

Yuriko Koike is Japan’s former Minister of Defense and National Security Adviser.

 

小池百合子: 中國大陸對台灣的軟實力攻勢

東京——中國大陸在最近台灣總統大選期間的所作所為顯示出該國的領導人已經在過往的失敗經歷中得到了一些教訓。他們認識到大陸可以通過貿易或者提升令台灣民眾富裕感來對選民施加影響，而不是像以往歷屆大選（特別是台獨派候選人有望勝選的時候）那樣採取威脅性策略——甚至聲稱要威脅導彈。

事實上，出於對李登輝這位極受歡迎的台獨派總統候選人的恐懼，中國人民解放軍曾於1996年台灣大選期間向基隆港附近海域發射了導彈。但這一炫耀武力的舉動卻產生了反效果，李登輝最終贏得了大選。

而1月14日的那場大選則是兩岸政權各自實施權力交接的第一幕。隨后，中國國家主席胡錦濤和總理溫家寶將被中國共產黨早已選定的接班人所取帶。防止對台出現緊張態勢看上去似乎是中國領導人早已計算好的決定，特別是他們開始自己的——或者尚未完全塵埃落定的——權力交接之時。

近20年來，台灣的總統選舉吸引了全球的注意：這一方面是源自於其生機勃勃的民主文化，另一方面則是出於一個懸而未決的問題——選舉的勝者是否將謀求台灣的正式獨立。在本次大選中，在野台灣民主進步黨所推舉出來的候選人蔡英文在選舉最后階段對執政的國民黨總統馬英九造成了極大威脅，但大陸方面卻並未對此作出過激舉動。

相反，中國不惜一切代價去支持馬英九這位在第一任期間大力增強兩岸經濟紐帶的總統。例如目前有大概100萬台灣人居住在中國大陸，而中國則向其中約40萬人提供廉價機票以便他們回鄉投票。鑒於馬英九本次以80萬票的優勢勝選，這一策略或許並非是決定性的，但卻很可能在決定選舉結果方面扮演了一個重要的角色。

而奇怪的是，從國民黨分裂出來的親民黨候選人宋楚瑜的優異表現幫助了馬英九，因為前者提供了一個馬英九之外的第二選項（因此那些不喜歡馬英九的選民也不一定非要投給蔡英文）。與此同時，美國為免激怒大陸民族主義者而對所有候選人採取的沉默態度也無疑在緩和與中國大陸的緊張態勢中發揮了作用——這也是另一個可能對馬英九有幫助的因素。

所謂中國大陸對台新的“軟性”策略的一部分，溫家寶強調要“出讓利益”給台灣。而在長期以來一直是民進黨大本營的台灣南部地區，這一策略似乎獲得了成功。大陸與台灣之間的經濟合作框架協議（簡稱ECFA）使得南部地區的農民和漁民能將自己的收獲銷往廣闊的大陸市場，而國民黨在這些地區所獲得的支持也比以往歷次大選更多。

當然，大陸的最終目標並不是推動兩岸經濟互動，而是統一。大陸當局似乎相信馬英九的當選似乎是想這一目標又邁進了一步。

但經濟整合是一回事，政治整合又是另一回事。在經歷過了民主制度以及言論自由的好處之后，台灣民眾不會接受一個比當前開放程度更低的社會。事實上，隨著兩岸接觸的日益增加，大陸普通民眾將開始羨慕台灣人所建立起來的現代民主制度——並將開放社會的理念在大陸散播開來。而馬英九在其第二任期間所扮演的角色則應當是一個像大陸傳播民主的傳道者。

而大陸方面對這一“危險”也有充分認識，並採取了五項應對政策。首先是進一步擴大ECFA的范圍，使得更多台灣企業能從中受益。與之類似的第二項則是繼續瞄准台灣南部地區農民和漁民的商業利益，並以此動搖民進黨的基礎。第三則是強調共同的中國文化來緩解台灣人對統一的恐懼。第四項目標是爭取那些在本次總統選舉期間選舉出來的新立法委員的支持。最后，大陸將試圖阻止國際社會使用“台灣”字樣，並以拗口的“中華台北”取而代之。

但影響兩岸關系的最大事務其實是中國經濟本身。在經歷了數十年的兩位數增長之后，中國經濟放緩的跡象將影響其全面對台政策。當上海股市在去年下跌20%之時，台灣股市幾乎在同一時間下跌了同一幅度——也証明了兩岸經濟的同步一致性。而一旦這一同步利益紐帶出現破裂，大陸也無法繼續按自己的想法行事。

因此，台灣是否會變得更像大陸，還是反其道而行之？問這樣一個問題實際上等於重啟當年香港澳門回歸大陸時的討論，但在今天已經不多見了。是否能在統一方面實現重大進展將取決於中國軟實力政策的效力，而這一政策要取得成功的話，也不能僅僅被局限於經濟方面的吸引力。

小池百合子，曾任日本防衛大臣以及國家安全顧問