Mohamed A. El-Erian: From Argentina to Athens? / 希臘會重蹈阿根廷悲慘的覆轍？

NEWPORT BEACH – Let me set the scene: an increasingly discredited economic policy approach gives rise to growing domestic social and political opposition, street protests and violence, disagreements among official creditors, and mounting concerns among private creditors about a disorderly default. In the midst of all of this, national leaders commit to more of the same harsh austerity measures that they have been unable to implement for two years. Official creditors express skepticism, in private and public, but hold their collective nose and get ready to disburse yet another tranche of money into what they fear is a bottomless pit.

Sound familiar? It should, but not just because it encapsulates Greece today. It is also what Argentina faced in 2001. Unless Europe reflects on key lessons from that experience, the parallels that extend to Greece may also end up including a financial meltdown, a deep output collapse, and social and political turmoil.

I remember 2001 well. I was serving on PIMCO’s Emerging Market desk, where we were closely following developments in Argentina. In August of that year, the country was again begging the International Monetary Fund for more money in order to avoid a default. The authorities were willing to enter into yet another set of commitments knowing that they had consistently over-promised and under-delivered, and that the country had failed to make any progress on restoring growth, halting its competitiveness decline, and containing the rise in debt.

A blame game broke out over who was responsible for “losing” Argentina. Official creditors, led by the IMF, pointed to the Argentine government’s repeated policy failures. The government countered that official creditors were nickel-and-diming the country, rather than providing the financial cushion needed to restore confidence and re-engage private capital. Neither side seemed willing to acknowledge what was obvious to many: the country’s economic and financial framework gave it little chance of addressing the dual problem of too little growth and too much debt.

Not surprisingly, Argentine citizens were becoming increasingly fed up with the whole lot, caring little about distinctions between the government and official creditors. They had lost trust in an approach that continued to sell austerity as the price of stability, even as virtually every economic and financial indicator had worsened in the meantime, with scant hope of a brighter future.

Then there were Argentina’s neighbors – particularly fellow members of Mercosur, the regional political and economic agreement – which feared a tidal wave of contagion. Having experienced technical dislocations in their financial markets, they were urging Argentina to get its act together – while also building stronger defenses in case it did not. Meanwhile, Argentina complained that other Mercosur countries’ policies were magnifying its economic challenges.

To understand much of what is happening today in Europe, one need only replace Argentina with Greece, and Mercosur with the eurozone. Of course, Greece is a more advanced economy than Argentina. It is part of a far stronger regional arrangement than Mercosur, with vastly greater financial resources and better-developed economic and institutional underpinnings. Yet the similarities are strong enough to ask whether Europe can learn from Argentina’s experience a decade ago.

After the Argentine parliament approved yet another new austerity package, the IMF agreed to release its financing tranche. But it was too late to save a discredited approach, further undermining the Fund’s standing.

Indeed, rather than engendering confidence, Argentine citizens withdrew their bank deposits over the next few months. Capital flight accelerated. The government again failed to deliver on its policy commitments. Most important of all, social and political pressures mounted, reaching a tipping point.

Argentina defaulted in December 2001, closed its banks, and experienced the mother of all “economic sudden stops.” The country was forced to dismantle its economic framework in a highly disorganized manner, staging a messy, unplanned transition to a new currency system in the midst of capital controls and domestic-asset confiscation.

Greece’s future will resemble that of Argentina if its government and official creditors (namely, the European Central Bank, the European Union, and the IMF) fail to internalize some of Argentina’s lessons and do not undertake an urgent mid-course correction.

Specifically, they should take four steps. First, they should stop repeating the claim that there is no “Plan B.” Telling people that there is no alternative to a discredited policy merely pushes them either to resist an approach that does not work, or to opt for mayhem. Recent official remarks heard in Greece (“We must show that Greeks, when they are called on to choose between the bad and the worst, choose the bad to avoid the worst”) do little to engender hope.

Second, Greece and its foreign interlocutors must recognize that Plan B, while not easy, has become critically necessary. It entails much deeper economic and debt restructuring, as well as institutional changes so that Greece can gain greater policy flexibility, improve competitiveness, and promote investment. All of this inevitably involves short-term risks, but it also promises brighter prospects for growth, employment, and the restoration of financial soundness.

Third, Greece’s official creditors should be more attentive to the expected return on their assistance. Every euro disbursed to Greece under the current approach is diluted in many ways. Rather than a general approach implying multiple “leakages,” official creditors would do better to target the country’s key needs more directly. Moreover, given Europe’s worries about its banking system, interventions should be coupled with greater pressure on banks to raise capital and improve asset quality.

Finally, the integrity and credibility of the ECB and IMF require much greater protection. Europe’s opportunism undermines the future effectiveness of these two key institutions at a time when they will be needed not only to stabilize Greece, but also to prevent liquidity problems from turning into solvency crises in other European countries and elsewhere, as well as to limit global contagion.

Greece need not continue to follow Argentina’s miserable example of ten years ago. Yet, unless Greek and European officials reflect on that example and adapt accordingly, Greece will be driven down the same dangerous dead-end path.

Mohamed A. El-Erian is CEO and co-CIO of PIMCO, and author of When Markets Collide.

Mohamed A. El-Erian: 希臘會重蹈阿根廷悲慘的覆轍？

先讓我設置一個場景：名聲越來越差的經濟政策方針導致國內社會和政治反對層出不窮、出現街頭抗議 和暴力活動、官方債權人之間出現分歧、私人債權人對無序的債務違約日益擔憂。在這種情況下，國家領導人仍然致力於實施更多同樣嚴厲的財政緊縮措施，兩年來 這些措施一直沒有得到落實。官方債權人在私下裡和公共場合都表達了懷疑的態度，但是他們都忍了下來並准備再次向他們所恐懼的無底洞注一筆資金。

似曾相識吧？應該是，但不僅僅是因為它就是今日希臘的寫照。它也是2001時阿根廷面臨的困境。如果歐洲不反思那次經歷的主要經驗教訓，希臘面臨的同樣危機可能還包括金融危機，產出一瀉千裡、社會和政治動蕩。

2001年讓我印像深刻。當時，我在太平洋投資管理公司的新興市場部門工作，在那裡我們緊密關注了阿根廷事態的發展。那年8月，阿根廷政府再次請求國際貨 幣基金組織注資以避免債務違約。當局願意作出一系列新的承諾，盡管知道自己一直允諾過多而無法兌現承諾，本國在重振經濟增長上沒有取得任何進展，無法阻止 競爭力下降，債務增多。

一場關於誰該為輸掉阿根廷負責的推脫責任的遊戲爆發了。由國際貨幣基金組織率領的官方債權人指出是阿根廷政府一再失敗的政策。阿根廷政府反駁說，官方債權 人是在剝削自己的國家，而沒有為自己國家提供重振信心和重獲私人資本所需的金融緩衝。雙方似乎都不願意承認對於許多人而言顯而易見的事實：阿根廷的經濟和 金融框架無力解決增長緩慢和債務過多的雙重難題。

阿根廷人民越來越厭倦這一切，對政府和官方債權人之間的區別關心甚少就不足為奇了。他們對如下做法失去了信任：即使在實際上幾乎各項經濟和金融指標都惡化、更加光明的未來希望渺茫的情況下，繼續以穩定為代價推行財政緊縮。

緊接著就是阿根廷的鄰國——尤其是南方共同市場（區域政治和經濟協定）的成員國，它們害怕受到影響。經歷了本國金融市場的技術混亂後，他們敦促阿根廷共同 採取行動，與此同時以防萬一還建造了更強的防御體系。同時，阿根廷政府抱怨，其他南方共同市場成員國的政策正在加大其經濟挑戰。

如要了解今天發生在歐洲的危機，人們只需將阿根廷更換為希臘，南方共同市場更換為歐元區。當然，希臘的經濟實力要強於阿根廷，它也是一個更為強大的區域組 織的一員，歐元區要比南方共同市場要強大得多，擁有更多的金融資源和更為成熟的經濟和制度基礎。然而，其相似性足以提出這樣的問題：歐洲是否能從十年前阿 根廷的危機中吸取教訓。

阿根廷議會再次批准一攬子新的財政緊縮政策後，國際貨幣基金組織同意了對其融資。然而要挽救焦頭爛額的經濟狀況為時已晚，這進一步破壞了國際貨幣基金組織的信譽。

事實上，在接下來的幾個月裡，民眾信心不僅不增，他們還取出了銀行存款，加速了資本外逃。政府又一次未能兌現其政策承諾。最重要的是，社會和政治壓力增加，已經不堪重負。

2001年12月，阿根廷違約，關閉了銀行，這是所有經濟突然停止的始祖。該國被迫以一種高度混亂的方式拆分其經濟體系，在資本控制和國內資產沒收中混亂、無計劃地採用了新貨幣。

如果希臘政府及其官方債權人(即歐洲中央銀行、歐盟、國際貨幣基金組織)無法吸取阿根廷危機的一些教訓，也不進行緊急的中期調整，希臘的未來將重蹈阿根廷的覆轍。

具體地來說，他們應該採取四個步驟。首先，它們要停止不斷聲稱沒有B計劃。告訴人們除了採用失信的政策外別無選擇會迫使他們抵制這種毫無作用的做法，或者 選擇混亂。近日，希臘的官方說法「我們必須表明，當希臘人被迫面臨在壞與最壞之間選擇時，希臘人會選擇壞以避免最壞」並沒有帶來什麼希望。

其次，希臘及其外國對話者必須認識到B計劃盡管艱難，但至關必要。希臘需要深入得多的經濟和債務重組，以及體制變革，這樣希臘就可以獲得更大的政策靈活 性，提高競爭力，並促進投資。不可避免的是，這一切都有短期風險，但是也預示著更加光明的增長、就業和恢復金融健康的前景。

再次，希臘的官方債務人應該更專注於其援助所帶來的回報。按照目前的做法給希臘提供的每一個歐元都大打折扣了。與遍地撒網式的救援相比，集中財力解決關鍵問題更值得推崇。此外，鑒於歐洲國家擔心其銀行體系，在干預的同時，要給銀行施加更大的壓力以便其融資並提高資產質量。

最後，歐洲中央銀行與國際貨幣基金組織的誠信和信譽需要更悉心地維護。這兩大機構不僅可以穩定希臘，還可以防止歐洲其他國家及其他地方的國家的流動性問題 轉變成償還債務的危機，限制危機在全球蔓延。正當需要這兩大機構發揮這樣的作用時，歐洲的機會主義破壞了這兩大關鍵機構的效率。

希臘不必繼續走十年前阿根廷走過的悲慘之路。然而，如果希臘和歐洲官員不反思相關教訓並作出相應調整，希臘將重蹈覆轍，走上不歸路。

作者是太平洋投資管理公司首席執行官兼聯席首席投資官，著有《When Markets Collide》

Mohamed A. El-Erian: Egypt’s Unfinished Revolution Will Succeed / 埃及未竟革命必將成功

NEWPORT BEACH – A year ago, Egyptians of all ages and religions took to the streets and, in just 18 days of relatively peaceful protests, removed a regime that had ruled over them with an iron fist for 30 years. Empowered by an impressive yet leaderless movement – largely of young people – the country’s citizens overcame decades of fear to reclaim a voice in their future.

While much has been achieved since those euphoric times, Egypt’s revolution today is, unfortunately, incomplete and imperfect – so much so that some now doubt whether it will fully succeed. I believe that the doubters will be proven wrong.

Over the last year, Egyptians have voted in their first free and fair parliamentary elections. They have discovered and used freedom of expression in a way that, not so long ago, would have been deemed unthinkable. Participation in civic activities is on the rise. And Egyptians are learning a lot about who they are as a society, and what they can achieve collectively.

For the first time in decades, millions of Egyptians now feel that they “own” their country, and that they are directly responsible for its well-being, and for that of future generations. This is a priceless accomplishment for a country that had underachieved on so many fronts for so many years, in the process losing its self-confidence, failing to meet its considerable economic and social potential, and falling in international development rankings.

But greater ownership does not translate into full contentment. Dissatisfaction today is high and rising, and understandably so. Institutions are failing to adapt quickly enough. The legal system lacks sufficient legitimacy and agility. Everyday security, while improving, is still far from adequate.

Not surprisingly, the economy is struggling, and it will likely get worse in the months ahead. Growth is sluggish, amplifying alarmingly high youth unemployment. Shortages of some goods have started to appear, and the country is turning to the International Monetary Fund and other creditors for emergency financing.

So it is no less surprising that Egyptians now feel that, after an exhilarating start, their revolution has become stuck in a muddled purgatory. Moreover, many now believe that the future is as uncertain as ever, which is naturally fueling frustration with anyone deemed responsible for the lack of forward movement. Indeed, with increasing domestic tensions diverting energy from forward-looking initiatives, some Egyptians are even beginning to wonder whether it would not have been better to stick with the prior system.

What Egyptians are experiencing today is not new; it is familiar to many countries that have gone through a fundamental systemic change. After all, revolutions go far beyond popular uprisings and the overthrow of old regimes. They are dynamic processes that must navigate a number of critical pivot points, including, most importantly, the move from dismantling the past to establishing the basis for a better future.

Some contend that Egypt will not be able to undertake this shift. But, while I acknowledge their arguments, I think that they misunderstand what is fundamentally at play in the country today.

Doubters note that what remains of Egypt’s internal and external institutional anchors serve to retard the revolutionary process rather than to refine and accelerate it. They believe that the country’s growing economic malaise will strengthen the argument for sticking with what Egyptians know, rather than opting for a more uncertain future. Finally, they point to the wait-and-see attitude of Egypt’s friends and allies.

These are all valid and important considerations, but they are not overwhelming. Rather, they are headwinds that can and will be overcome, for they fail to capture a reality that is evident from the sentiments of a broad cross-section of society. Egyptians will not settle for an incomplete revolution – not now, and especially not after all of the sacrifices that have been made.

Completing their revolution will be not an easy, quick, or smooth process, but it will happen. Egyptians’ collective determination will ensure that, in the revolution’s second year, the country will get a new constitution, hold proper presidential elections, and benefit from a functioning and representative parliament. Having completed the transition, the armed forces will return to their barracks and to safeguarding the country from foreign threats.

Any attempt to divert this legitimate process will be met by millions of Egyptians taking to the streets in protest. Make no mistake: Egyptians are committed to completing their impressive revolution, and they will.

Mohamed A. El-Erian is CEO and co-CIO of PIMCO, and author of When Markets Collide.


 

Mohamed A. El-Erian:   埃及未竟革命必將成功

紐波特海灘—一年前，埃及人民部分年齡、部分信仰，全部走上街頭，在經歷了為期18天的短暫而相對和平的示威后，推翻了鐵腕統治他們30多年的體制。這場令人矚目的運動並沒有明確的領導人，參與者大多是年輕群眾。這場運動讓埃及人民獲得了力量，克服了數十年的恐懼，重新掌握了自己的未來。

但是，盡管此后埃及人民取得了極大的成就，但埃及革命如今仍然沒有完成，也遠稱不上完美，以至於已經有人開始懷疑它到底能不能徹底成功。我相信，質疑者最終將被証明是錯誤的。

在過去的一年中，埃及人民首次在自由公平的議會選舉中投下了選票。他們獲得並行使了言論自由權，而這在不久前還是無法想象的。民眾參與公共活動的熱情也在高漲。埃及人民在如何用社會的思維思考自己、如何以集體行動方式獲得成功等方面取得了長足的進步。

幾十年來，數百萬埃及人民第一次感到他們“擁有”了祖國，對祖國狀況的好壞和子孫后代的福祉有著直接責任。對於這個多年來在多個方面大大落后、自信心不斷下降、經濟和社會的巨大潛力一直得不到開發、國際發展排名不斷下滑的國家來說，這是了不起的成就。

但更大的主人翁感覺並沒有轉變成更高的滿意度。如今，不滿情緒高企，而且在不斷上升，這是不難理解的。制度調整太慢，跟不上人民的要求。法律體系缺乏足夠的合理性和靈活性。日常安全盡管在改善，但仍不能令人滿意。

毫不奇怪，埃及經濟陷入了困境，在未來幾個月中，可能會愈加困難。增長停滯不前，加劇了已然值得警惕的青年人高失業。一些商品也出現了短缺，因此埃及正在求助IMF和其他債權人給予緊急融資。

因此，埃及人民現在感到革命在一個愉快的開頭后陷入了一團亂麻停滯不前，這並不令人奇怪。此外，如今很多人認為，未來如同以前那樣充滿了不確定性，因此，被對認為應對缺乏進步負責者的不滿情緒不斷高漲也就不足為奇了。事實上，隨著國內緊張局面使得能量無法集中於“向前看”，一些埃及人甚至開始質疑，堅持原有體制是不是會更好。

埃及人民今天正在經歷的一切並不新鮮，大量曾經經歷過基本體系變革的國家對此一點都不陌生。畢竟，革命並不僅僅是揭竿而起推翻舊王朝那麼簡單。這是一個動態過程，需要經歷一系列臨界關鍵點，包括（最重要的）從推翻過去到建立美好未來新基石的轉變。

有人認為，埃及無法實現這一變遷，但是，盡管我承認他們的話不是完全沒有道理，但我仍然認為，他們誤解了當今埃及局面的基本點。

質疑者指出，埃及內部和外部的制度之錨對革命進程是一種妨礙，而不是一種提煉和加速。他們認為，埃及經濟的不斷惡化將強化國內堅持熟悉道路的聲音，而不是選擇更具不確定性的未來。最后，他們還指出，埃及的朋友和盟軍無不持有“靜觀其變”的態度。

這些顧慮非常現實，也非常重要，但並不是壓倒性的。反之，這些都是可以也必將被克服的困難，因為它們與當今埃及顯而易見的橫掃一切的情緒相悖。埃及人們不會滿足於一場不完全的革命——現在不會，在付出了大量犧牲之后更加不會。

完成革命也不會是一件輕易、快捷而平穩的事情，但終究將發生。埃及人民的集體意願將確保在革命的第二年，這個國家將出現新的憲法、進行合適的總統選舉並得益於一個運轉良好的代議制議會。完成轉型后，武裝力量將回歸本職——保衛埃及不受外敵入侵。

任何試圖從這條合理之路引開的圖謀都將受到數百萬埃及人民的街頭抗議。不要弄錯了，埃及人民已下定決心要把這場引人注目的革命完成，他們必將得償所願。

Mohamed A. El-Erian 是太平洋投資管理公司首席執行官兼聯席首席投資官，著有《碰撞》。

Mohamed A. El-Erian: Repairing the Global Plumbing / 修補全球金融渠道

NEWPORT BEACH – More than three years after the global financial crisis, the world still has a nasty plumbing problem. Credit pipes remain clogged, and only central banks are working to clear them. But their ability to do so is waning, posing yet another set of risks for Western economies blocked by too little growth, too much unemployment, deepening inequality, and debt in all the wrong places. Fortunately, it is not too late to build broader pipes that compliment and replace the damaged infrastructure.

The current situation embodies two narratives that seem contradictory, but are not. One speaks to the reality that most large companies with access to capital markets have no problem securing new funding. In fact, they have been remarkably successful in lengthening their debt maturities, accumulating cash, and lowering their future interest payments. In sum, they now have “fortress” balance sheets.

The other narrative speaks to an opposing, but equally valid reality. Too many small companies and households still find it difficult to borrow at reasonable terms. This includes those reliant on bank credit, as well as many mortgage holders with very high legacy interest rates and balances that exceed their homes’ market value.

From every angle, the extremity of this state of affairs – in which those with access to credit do not need it, and those who do cannot get it – is highly problematic. If left unattended, it leads to a gradual, and then accelerated, renewed deleveraging of the economic system, with the highest first-round costs – a longer unemployment and growth crisis – borne disproportionately by those least able to suffer them. In the next round, as the system slowly implodes, even those with healthy balance sheets would be impacted, accelerating their disengagement from a deleveraging world economy.

All of this slows social mobility, tears already-stretched safety nets, worsens inequality, and accentuates genuine concerns about the functioning and sustainability of today’s global economic system.

This is not just about socio-economic issues. There is also a political angle. With two competing, yet simultaneously valid narratives, ideological extremes harden. The result is even greater dysfunction in both process and content, ruling out any sustained policy attempt to make things better.

The problem has become acute in Europe, whose crisis has been belatedly recognized as reflecting something more than turmoil in the eurozone’s weakest countries. It also reflects broad-based contamination, resulting, most recently, in France’s loss of its vaunted AAA sovereign credit rating.

In the process, the efficacy of pan-European rescue mechanisms is being undermined. And, as fragilities increase – and as a financial wedge is driven into the eurozone’s core (Germany and France) – growth and employment prospects dim.

Central banks have recognized all of this for some time, prompting them to take enormous reputational and operational risks to slow the process. They have implemented a host of “unconventional policies” that previously would have been deemed unthinkable, even outrageous – and that can be seen in the enormous growth in their balance sheets.

In the last four years, the United States Federal Reserve’s balance sheet has more than tripled, from under $1 trillion to a mammoth $3 trillion. The growth relative to the size of the economy is even more stunning – from slightly more than 5% of GDP to 20%. The Bank of England’s balance sheet is also at 20% of GDP. And both seem to be itching to do even more.

The European Central Bank is often viewed as a laggard. No longer. Its balance sheet has now doubled, to a whopping 30% of GDP – and it, too, appears set to do even more. Mario Draghi, the ECB’s new president, recently said that he expects heavy take-up on the next three-year long-term refinancing operation, a powerful tool to pump cheap liquidity into the banks.

Unfortunately, the economic outcomes have come nowhere close to matching the intensity of these efforts. Effectively, the central banks have been unconventional bridges to nowhere, owing mainly to their imperfect tools and other government agencies’ inability or unwillingness to act. At some point – and we are nearing it – bridges to nowhere become a standalone risk: they can topple over.

Rather than just pumping liquidity into clogged pipes, countries can and should do more to build a more effective network of compensating conduits. In doing so, their main objective (indeed, the test for effectiveness) would be the extent to which new private-sector investment is “crowded in.”

It is high time to move on five fronts, simultaneously:

·         Countries such as Spain and the US need to be more forceful in unblocking the housing sector by making overdue decisions on burden sharing, refinancing, and conversion of idle and foreclosed housing stock.

·         Countries with excessive debt, such as Greece and Portugal, need to impose sizeable “haircuts” on creditors in order to have a reasonable chance to restore medium-term debt sustainability and growth.

·         In several Western countries, public-private partnerships should be formed to finance urgently needed infrastructure investment.

·         Regulators should stop bickering about the future configuration of key financial institutions, and instead set a clearer multi-year vision that is also consistent across borders.

·         Finally, governments should inform their electorates explicitly and comprehensively that a few contracts written during the inadvisable “great age” of leverage, debt, and credit entitlements cannot be met, and must be rewritten in a transparent way that strikes a balance between generations, labor and capital, and recipients and taxpayers.

Such policies would allow healthy balance sheets around the world, both public and private, to engage in a pro-growth and pro-jobs process. They require leadership, focus, and education. Absent that, plumbing problems will become more acute, and the repairs more complex and threatening to virtually everyone – including both the “one percenters” and those who worrisomely are struggling at the margins of society.

Mohamed A. El-Erian is CEO and co-CIO of PIMCO, and author of When Markets Collide.

 

Mohamed A. El-Erian: 修補全球金融渠道

全球經濟危機爆發至今已歷3年，但我們的世界依然面臨著棘手的渠道堵塞問題。信貸管道依舊不甚通暢，只有靠中央銀行來回疏通，然而這些央行的能力也正逐漸減弱，使得被增長率過低，失業率過高，收入不平等惡化以及錯位債務絆住了手腳的西方經濟體面臨著另一系列的風險。但幸運的是，我們還有機會去建立更多的管道來補償和替代這個受損的體制。

當前的狀況中存在著兩種看似互相矛盾卻同時存在的述事。第一種述事描述了這樣一個現實：大多數大型企業都能毫不費力地從資本市場獲得新融資。它們成功地延長了自身債務的到期日，積累了現金，還降低了未來所要支付的利息數額。總而言之，它們的資產負債表如今“堅如磬石”。

而另一種述事則描述了一個截然相反卻同樣符合邏輯的現實。太多小型企業和家庭依然無法以合理的條件獲得貸款。這包括那些依靠銀行信貸的企業以及許多過去高利率抵押貸款的持有者，有些人的剩余還貸額甚至比房子當前的市場價格還高。

從各個角度看來，這種事態的窘迫境地——那些能融資者的不屑一顧，融不到資者的求之不得——本身就意味著巨大的問題。如果不加理會的話，就將引發一個逐步成形並隨後加速的經濟重新去杠杆化過程，同時還伴隨著最為高昂的首輪成本——更漫長的失業和增長危機——不相稱地降臨在那些最缺乏承受能力的人身上。而在接著那一輪進程中，隨著這個系統逐漸解體，即便是那些擁有健康資產負債表的人們也會遭到波及，並加速他們脫離這個去杠杆化世界經濟的進程。

而上述這一切都將減緩社會流動，撕裂原本已經出現漏洞的社會安全網，使收入不平等狀況進一步惡化，並令人嚴重憂慮當今全球金融系統的運作功能和穩定性。

這可不僅僅是社會-經濟事務，同時也是一個政治視角。在兩種互相競爭又同時合理存在的述事之下，意識形態的極端性被不斷強化。結果將是政治進程和議程內容兩方面的進一步機能失調，使任何著眼長遠的政治嘗試都被排除在外。

這個問題已經惡化到一定程度的歐洲，人們花了很長時間才意識到這場危機可不僅僅反映了歐元區某些最弱勢國家的混亂。它同時也反映了大範圍的金融危機傳染狀況，而最近的後果則是導致法國失去了其最引以為豪的AAA級主權信用評級。

在程序上，泛歐洲拯救機制的效力已經遭到了腐蝕。而隨著脆弱性不斷上升——也隨著一個金融楔子正被插入歐元區的核心地帶（德國和法國）——增長和就業的前景都逐漸黯淡。

各國中央銀行意識到上述這些問題已經有一段時間了，也冒著極大的聲譽和操作風險去減緩這一進程。它們實施了一系列原本根本無法想像，甚至離經叛道的“非常規政策”，而這在他們資產負債表的巨大增長中也有所體現了。

例如在過去四年中，美聯儲的資產負債表已經膨脹了三倍，從近1萬億美元增長到無比龐大的3萬億美元。而這個增長與經濟規模相比之下則更令人震驚——從相當於GDP的5%上升到20%。英格蘭銀行的資產負債表也相當於GDP的20%。而兩者似乎還意猶未盡。

歐洲中央銀行常常被視為慢人一步。但這種情況已經不復存在了。它的資產負債表也已經翻了一番，擁有相當於GDP30%的龐大比例——同時似乎也擁有更大的胃口。該行的新行長馬裡奧·德拉吉最近說希望在下一個三年長期重新融資運作中大展拳腳，而該運作則是一個向銀行系統注入廉價流動性的有力工具。

但不幸的是，這些密集出台的行動卻沒能產生與之相稱的經濟成效。這主要是因為工具的不完善以及其他政府機構的無能或者不情願，使得各國中央銀行都有點異乎尋常地找不著方向。在某些點上——而我們也在接近這些點——找不著方向將成為一個獨立的風險：它們會引發崩潰。

而與其單純向淤塞的管道注入流動性，各國可以也應當付出更多的努力去建立一個更有實效的補充性導管網絡。通過這樣做，它們的主要目標（實際上也是對其成效的檢測）應該是要實現新的私人部門投資“充斥著”整個渠道。

因此也是時候在五個方面同時展開行動：

·類似西班牙和美國這樣的國家必須實施更有力的措施，通過在負擔分享，重新融資方面做出遲來的決定，同時將空置和銀行提前收回的房屋儲備實現轉化，來為住房部門解鎖。

·那些債務負擔過高的國家，比如希腊和葡萄牙，必須對債權人實施相當規模的“減免”以獲取一個合理的機會去重新獲得中期的債務可持續性和經濟增長。

·在各大西方國家，應該組建公共-私人伙伴關系來為急需的基礎設施投資提供資金。

·監管者們應該停止為主要金融機構的未來架構而爭吵，轉而設置一個更清晰的多年期遠景，並確保這個遠景能在各國之間一視同仁地推行。

·最後，各國政府應當明確而全面地告知自己的選民：一些在不理智的“偉大時代”時所簽訂的杠杆，債務和信用授權合同都將無法履行，而且必須通過某種透明公開的方式來重新簽訂另一套合約，並在不同年齡層次，勞動力和資本，接受者和納稅人等因素之間取得平衡。

這些政策應該令到全世界各國的資產負債表（無論是公共還是私人）都恢復健康，並因此孕育一個促進增長和就業的環境。這些政策需要領導力，專注和教育。如果缺乏這些的話，世界的渠道堵塞問題將進一步惡化，並使修復工作變得更為復雜並實際上威脅到每一個人——那些在社會邊緣掙扎的人們，還有那些“富有的1%”。

作者為美國大型債券經紀公司太平洋投資管理有限公司(PIMCO)首席執行官兼聯席首席投資官，著有"When Markets Collide"一書