Morsi
never appreciated his tenuous position. Though elected democratically,
he chose to govern undemocratically. He was bent on purging the
judiciary and the public prosecutor’s office, claiming that they were
aligned with the protesters opposing his government and their military
backers, who had been overthrown in 2011. Morsi brooked little
opposition in pushing through a controversial draft constitution. In
doing so, he neglected to focus on the structural problems that
propelled a docile society to pour into the streets two and a half years
ago to bring down his predecessor, Hosni Mubarak.
Just
as damaging as Morsi’s governing style was the Muslim Brotherhood’s
go-it-alone mentality. Decades of persecution have instilled in its
leaders the belief that the world is aligned against them. Assuming
power only stoked their paranoia.
The
Brotherhood’s leaders believed that the United States and Egypt’s elite
were bent on ensuring their failure. For this reason, they refused to
reach out to their secular opponents to offer them a piece of the
political pie. Even members of the more puritanical Islamist Nour Party
were not invited to join the government.
But
it was not only Brotherhood politicians – inexperienced in the ways of
democracy (and skeptical of them) – who stumbled. The debate in the US,
long Egypt’s primary ally and donor, did not center on strengthening
Egypt’s embattled institutions, but focused instead on how to ease the
military out of power by withholding aid. Multilateral lenders like the
International Monetary Fund were fixated on fiscal reforms such as
reducing costly subsidies rather than shoring up a beleaguered economy.
Today,
a democratic transition that the West sought to portray as a model that
other Arab nations could emulate lies in tatters. Egypt’s economy,
bruised by the outflow of foreign investment and a dearth of tourists,
is on life support. Rebuilding the country will require much more than
the cheering from the sidelines that Western countries have offered so
far.
Egypt
has always relied on munificent benefactors to sustain its patchy state
and economy. After the military coup in 1952, the Soviets provided much
of the needed aid. Their “technical” experts turned the country’s
second city, Alexandria, into a Russian country club. After Egypt
pivoted to the West in the wake of the 1973 war against Israel, America
became its main patron.
But America’s ritual annual gift of roughly $1.5 billion
could only dull the pain of Egypt’s problems, not resolve them. The
country can no longer provide enough government stipends in the form of
bureaucratic posts for college graduates. Egypt can only hope for cash
infusions to offset its internal hemorrhaging.
By
making aid conditional on economic reform and democratic transition,
however, the international community risks political triage. It should
instead focus on financial assistance that blunts Egyptians’
frustrations and that contributes to building the institutions that will
facilitate the transition toward democracy.
But, of the $1.56 billion that the US State Department requested for Egypt in 2013,
only $250 million is earmarked for non-military programs. The US should
increase funding for projects that focus on governance, civil society,
and strengthening the rule of law. Such programs receive a paltry $25
million in the 2013 budget.
To
bolster the economy, the US needs to shift its aid policies away from
funding projects toward providing immediate budgetary relief. Though
financing water-efficiency schemes certainly helps society, its effects
are felt years after the aid is initially dispensed.
The
US, and other Western donors, should instead help Egypt to husband its
resources, which are often misspent in an effort to placate its people.
Egypt is the largest wheat importer in the world, and food subsidies
account for approximately 2% of GDP. To preserve its precious
foreign-currency reserves, Egypt needs the US and its allies to provide
foodstuffs. Such a policy was adopted in the aftermath of the 1973 war,
when America offered $200 million annually for wheat procurement.
Embracing such policies will give institutions and the democratic
process the time and space they need to plant firm roots.
Beyond
such questions lies the fate of democracy in one of civilization’s most
ancient lands. Whoever triumphs in future elections will lack the
legitimacy that only a majority can provide. Such a majority spoke last
year, when it elected Morsi. To strip him of his post negates a basic
pillar of democracy and sets a dangerous precedent.
But,
in a country that faces so many problems, the paradox of Morsi’s
removal from power and the dilemmas of democracy that occasioned it are
not among them.
