On
February 28, 1954, almost a million protesters besieged Cairo’s Abdin
Palace, then being used by Gamal Abdel Nasser and other leaders of the
July 1952 coup. The protesters’ main demands were the restoration of
Egypt’s fragile democratic institutions, the release of political
prisoners, and the army’s return to its barracks.
The
two-month crisis of 1954 was sparked by the removal of Egypt’s
president, General Mohammed Naguib, by Nasser and his faction. As in
2013, the Muslim Brotherhood was at the center of events, mobilizing on
the side of the deposed Naguib. But, following Nasser’s promises to hold
elections in June 1954 and to hand over power to civilians, one of the
Brotherhood’s leaders, Abd al-Qadr Audeh, dismissed the protesters.
Nasser’s
promises were empty. By November, his faction was victorious. Naguib
remained under house arrest, leftist workers were executed, and liberals
were terrorized. Audeh was arrested, and, in January 1955, he and five
Brotherhood leaders were executed. Egypt lost its basic freedoms and
democratic institutions for the next 56 years, until February 11, 2011,
when Hosni Mubarak was overthrown.
The
similarities between February-March 1954 and June-July 2013 are
numerous. In both crises, zero-sum behavior and rhetoric, mobilization
and counter-mobilization by a divided public, and deception by (and
manipulation of) the media were the order of the day. More worrying are
the similarities in potential outcomes. In 1954, a junta that regarded
itself as being above the state destroyed a weak democratic order; that
outcome is highly probable now as well.
There
are differences between the two episodes, though. In 1954, the conflict
was wider than a power struggle between a president and a junta; it was
also a battle over who would determine Egypt’s future and the
relationship between civilian and military institutions.
Surprisingly,
the army back then was split between officers who wanted a civilian-led
democracy and others who wanted a military-led autocracy. In the first
camp were Khaled Mohyiddin, Ahmad Shawky, Yusuf Siddiq, and others.
Naguib played along. The second camp was led by Nasser and the majority
of the junta represented in the Revolutionary Command Council.
The
Brotherhood’s relationship with Egypt’s military is the result of a few
critical events, including the 1954 demonstrations (and now the 2013
coup). Bloodshed, particularly Nasser’s execution of Brotherhood
leaders, increased the Brothers’ bitterness toward the army. In June
1957, Nasser’s security forces allegedly opened fire on Brotherhood
members in their prison cells, killing 21 and wounding hundreds.
A
Brotherhood intellectual, Sayyid Qutb, started theorizing about a
binary world, in which the forces of good (Party of God) would
inevitably clash with the forces of evil (Party of Satan). His writings
led directly to his execution in August 1966.
The
consequences of the events of 2013, like the consequences of Naguib’s
removal in 1954, may not be recognized quickly. But, once elected
officials are removed by force, the outcomes are rarely favorable for
democracy. In case after case – for example, Spain in 1936, Iran in
1953, Chile in 1973, Turkey in 1980, Sudan in 1989, and Algeria in 1992
– the results were tragic: military domination of politics with a
civilian façade, outright military dictatorship, civil war, or
persistent civil unrest.
Moreover,
the Egyptian military in 2013 has gained more power than the 1954
junta: not just arms and control of state institutions, but also crowds
and media cheering for more repression. And, unlike in 1954, the army is
not divided (at least not yet).
But
supporters of the deposed president, Mohamed Morsi, are not without
their own sources of power. Their mobilization capacity is high. Last
Friday, Cairo was paralyzed, despite an almost-complete lack of coverage
by local media outlets.
And
Ramadan – now underway – is mobilization-friendly. After sunset, there
is a common program. Observant Muslims gather at sundown for iftar (breakfast), followed by evening prayers, tarawih (longer prayers, including a short sermon), social interaction, qiyyam (another late-night prayer), suhur (another collective meal), and then morning prayers.
The last ten days of Ramadan are i‘tikaf (collective
seclusion), during which worshippers gather and spend nights in mosques
and open areas. Overall, the socio-religious culture of Ramadan can
help keep the Brotherhood’s mobilization of its supporters alive for a
while.
This
brings us to the junta’s tactics to force demobilization. Since 2011,
the army’s principal strategy has been to make promises and issue
threats, which are enforced by shooting live rounds and/or tear gas.
These tactics were used, for example, against Christian demonstrators in
October 2011 (28 dead, 212 injured), non-Islamist youth in November
2011 (51 dead, more than 1,000 injured), and again in December 2011
(seven dead).
The
July 2013 massacre was by far the worst (103 deaths so far and more
than 1,000 injured). The army’s goal was not only to intimidate Morsi’s
supporters, but also to disrupt their calculations. The junta wants its
responses to remain unpredictable and to demonstrate its willingness to
use extreme violence. But such tactics during Ramadan can be
problematic, given the potential negative reaction of junior army
officers and ordinary soldiers. Mutiny is a possibility.
Any
resolution to the current crisis should aim to save the remnants of the
only gains made so far in Egypt’s revolution: basic freedoms and
democratic institutions. That will require ceasing violent repression,
stopping propaganda and incitement in pro-junta media and at pro-Morsi
protests, and trust-building measures.
A
credible guarantor, possibly the Obama administration, needs to be
heavily involved in this process, given the absence of trust among
Egypt’s main political actors (indeed, every institution is politicized
and willing to cheat if it can). Finally, a referendum on any final deal
is essential.
In
short, the credibility of ballots and democracy must be restored in
Egypt (and throughout the region); bullets and violence must not be
allowed to rule.
Omar Ashour, Senior Lecturer in Security Studies and Middle
East Politics at the University of Exeter and a non-resident fellow at the
Brookings Doha Center, is the author of The De-Radicalization of Jihadists:
Transforming Armed Islamist Movements and From Good Cop to Bad Cop: The
Challenge of Security Sector Reform in Egypt.
