In:
Taiwanese Identity in the 21st Century: domestic, regional and global
perspectives edited by Gunter Schubert and Jens Damm, (2011) Routledge: London,
pp. 258-279
Over the past decades, Hong Kong and Taiwan
have both developed a unique local or national identity. These have become a
subject of great scholarly interest since the 1990s, coinciding with
democratization in Taiwan and the handover of Hong Kong to the People’s
Republic of China (PRC) in 1997. These political changes have influenced the
formation of identities in both areas. Although the individual identities
remain strong, they are faced with the challenges of globalization and the
consequences of interaction with a powerful China.
Hong Kong and Taiwan serve as excellent
examples for a cross case analysis of identity formation in the so-called
Greater China area. Both entities share a similar socio-economic background and
development, and an authoritarian past that de-emphasized political
participation through a strong emphasis on traditional Chinese (political)
culture. The issue of identity plays an important role in society and politics,
although with different strengths and emphases. The democratic development of
Hong Kong and Taiwan and their relations with China offer good opportunities
for the comparison of national identity issues in both places.
This article will analyze the formation of
the Hong Kong identity, the changes it has undergone and the challenges it
faces. The study will reveal similarities to and differences from the
development in Taiwan and show to what extent identities are constructed
through and based on ethno-cultural and civic identity. Today, the Hong Kong
identity has to assert itself against a variety of threats and changes, most
notably, rapid integration with the Chinese mainland in economic and,
increasingly, in socio-political terms. This paper concludes that the civic
part of the Hong Kong identity has remained the most resilient, despite the
absence of full democracy in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
(HKSAR). The Hong Kong case does provide valuable insights for the Taiwan
identity, in times of wide-ranging cooperation with China. Taiwan’s civic
identity possesses the additional components of a successful democratic
struggle and nationhood and thus will likely prevail in the foreseeable future.
The theoretical framework for this paper is
provided by theories of national identity construction, followed by an
examination of identity formation in the 2 ethno-cultural and civic realm in
Hong Kong. Quantitative studies offer insights into changes in citizens’
identification after 1997. Finally, a comparison with Taiwan looks at the
similarities and differences in identity formation in both places.
THEORIES
OF NATIONAL IDENTITY
Today, the national identity of Hong Kong as
a part of the PRC is unquestionable. However, the majority of the people still
identify themselves as either Hong Kongers or Hong Kong Chinese and not as
Chinese. The distinct identity that evolved in the city is more than a
metropolitan identity, such as, the Shanghainese in China or the New Yorkers in
the USA. For more than 150 years, Hong Kong was a separate political entity
(Lau 2005). The Hong Kong identity connotes affluence, openness to the world,
professionalism and pragmatism and in this it has remained distinct from and to
some extent “opposed to Chinese identity with its attachment to a particular
tradition, ethnicity, and nationality” (Mathews, Lui and Ma 2008: 11).
Research on national identity has produced
numerous theoretical approaches to this subject. Regarding the definition of
origin and nature of national identity, the debate is positioned between
essentialist and constructivist approaches. The essential or primordial view of
national identity assumes that certain group identities and attachments are given,
based on blood, race, language and territory which possess a deep
“coerciveness” (Geertz 1963: 259). On the other hand, the constructivist
approach to the study of national identity views the nation as an “imagined
political community,” stresses its invention and creation and refuses any
primordialism (Anderson 1983: 6).
The influential dichotomy in the understanding
of the national identity of civic identity versus ethnic or cultural identity
is located along these lines. Anthony D. Smith argues that the civic model
entails a historic territory, a legal-political community of equal members,
articulated in a set of rights and duties and a common civic culture and
ideology. On the other hand the ethnic concept emphasizes a community of birth
and native culture including vernacular languages, customs and traditions
(Smith 1991: 11-12). However, he also acknowledges that most states and nations
contain both “civic and ethnic elements in varying degrees and different forms”
(ibid. 13). Smith’s definition contains a dual notion of culture1–native
culture in the ethno-cultural realm and civic culture in the civic realm. Civic
culture always includes an element of participation in the political sphere,
while native culture can be understood as the experience of day to day life in
the neighborhood or at grassroots level. Related to this, is the idea of
lifestyles understood as “routines incorporated into habits of dress, eating,
modes of acting and favorite milieux for encountering others” (Giddens 1991:
81). Borders between the realms of civic and ethno-cultural identity are a
matter of degree. When Western (political) values become entrenched in the
lifestyle of the population, they can foster the desire to participate and help
to develop a civic identity. Anthony Smith’s research on national identity is
valuable in the context of this analysis which makes an argument for a unique
civic and ethno-cultural identity of the Taiwan and Hong Kong people vis-à-vis
the Chinese on the mainland.
EVOLUTION
OF HONG KONG IDENTITY
In the first decades of the colony, there
were few signs of a distinct local identity and one key feature of the Chinese
living there prior to the Second World War was, in fact, their “sojourner
mentality”: most of them were economic migrants or refugees who intended to
return to China after they had made sufficient money for a more comfortable
life back home (Tsang 2003: 222). This ended in 1950 when the border to China
was effectively closed (Ku 2004: 335). Those born in Hong Kong after 1949 did not
have any first-hand experiences of the PRC, until it opened up in the late
1970s. Separation from the Chinese mainland for the following decades2 allowed
Hong Kong to develop a political culture and an identity of its own (Tsang
2003: 223).
ETHNO-CULTURAL
IDENTITY
Economic Development One major structural
development that provided a great impetus for the advance of a local identity
was the transformation of Hong Kong’s economy from an entrepôt economy to a
capitalist economy (Lau and Lee 1988: 24). An early attempt to describe an
emerging distinct identity was the “Hong Kong Man”; Westernized but Chinese,
yet different from British colonizers as well as mainland Chinese (Baker 1983:
478). The awareness of the vast socioeconomic differences between the crown
colony and the Chinese mainland had developed in a sense of cultural distance
or even superiority to the mainland Chinese. The Hong Kong identity has built
upon this view of a sophisticated, affluent “us” and a poor, backward “other”
(Ku 2002: 356).
Popular
Culture and Education
The importance of the popular culture in the
formation of a distinct cultural identity can be explained by the
non-interventionist attitude of the colonial government: “In the absence of any
hegemonic framework of high culture, national culture, and so forth, popular
culture in Hong Kong must play the role – set the agenda – of ‘culture’ per se”
(Chan 1994: 449). This culture was transmitted through the popular media (Ma
1999: 23) which was discursively entrenched in Western values. It transformed
the Chinese cultural characteristics particular to Hong Kong, articulated local
experiences and concerns, crystallized images of a distinct “Hong Kong way of
life” (Fung 2004: 401) and popularized the term, “Hong Kong person” (Ma 1999:
13). First and foremost, television and film contributed to the articulation of
a separate Hong Kong identity where the cultural differences between Hong
Kongers and mainland Chinese were particularly emphasized (Ma 2006). Only
through this “othering” of the Mainlanders was a distinctive local identity
made possible (Ma and Fung 1999: 500). Popular culture was the key force which
socialized youngsters to become Hong Kongers, because the Anglicized education
system provided little guidance in terms of identity. It taught a
depoliticized, culturalist version of Chinese identity and was detached from
the local context, with Hong Kong’s own history completely absent from the
curriculum (Vickers and Kan 2003: 206). The meager civic education curriculum
focused on descriptions of social services and other benefits provided by the
colonial administration (Fairbrother 2003) and was largely depoliticized in
order to dampen the political consciousness of young people who might otherwise
question authority (Leung 1996: 291). The government endorsed the image of the
crown colony as an economic city and downplayed the local, civic identity
(Vickers 2003: 196).
Western
Values and the Market
Studies by Eric Ma and Anthony Fung (2007)
illustrated differences in political values between those who identified
themselves as Hong Kongers and those who identified themselves as Chinese.
Being “Westernized” was identified as a key means of differentiation from
China, confirming “that the global or Western element in the Hong Kong identity
is a major component that makes it stand out.” Other top values are press
freedom and freedom of speech – Western concepts of institutional expression.
Furthermore, privacy and equality are ideas concerned with basic individual
rights and also cannot be regarded as indigenously Chinese (Fung 2008: 197).
According to Anthony Fung, the Hong Kong identity is characterized by local
economic values as well as the local consumer culture. Hence the global
capitalist culture is a strong component of the local identity (ibid. 193).
Global values and culture become a protector of local identity against national
intervention from the mainland Chinese side (ibid. 200).
The importance of the market for identity
construction has inspired the thesis of the “market mentality” of Hong Kong
people with regard to their attitude toward national identity (Mathews, Lui and
Ma 2008). Accordingly, the emerging local identity was influenced by the rapid
socio-economic development of the time. The so-called Hong Kong dream – a bit
of luck and hard work, and you can make it – created a market mentality,” and
thus many citizens did not subscribe to the idea of “belonging to a nation” as
the basis of their lives (ibid. 13). A market-based sense of national identity
is characterized by individual choice, and by self-interest paralleling
national interest. The “patriotism of the rational” is based on the
“individual’s investment of loyalty to the country for his or her own benefit”
(ibid. 161).
Cultural
Memory
The 2003 respiratory disease SARS, and a mass
demonstration against the government and the proposed national security law on
1 July, marked the appearance of a community spirit embodying greater civic
awareness (Yeung 2007) as well as a new surge in social movements, organized
not by political parties but a by wide range of grassroots organizations. For
the most part, the so-called third and fourth generation of Hong Kongers who
were involved in these movements refrain from ideologically motivated actions
(Lü2007: 49, 66). The cultural critic, Chan Koon-chung, points to the visceral
level at which “locals have an unmistakable sense of their identity and rooted
common culture” (Chan 2007: 384). At this level, personal memories are
connected to the space and sites of daily life. In Hong Kong, where the culture
has been described as a “culture of disappearance”3 (Abbas 1997),
identification with the material environment has always been difficult. In Ming
K. Chan’s analysis, Hong Kong people were looking for anchors and places of belonging
in the decade after 1997, when the local identity came under threat. When
reconstructing and affirming their own past as an integral part of the Hong
Kong community, this past was expressed through “collective memory
construction.” Collective memory construction and movements are often linked to
old artefacts, public sites and long existing structures, such as the Star
Ferry in Central District (Chan 2008: 18). The heritage conservation movement
was therefore tied to concerns about the erasure of a part of Hong Kong’s
cultural identity, implying a common destiny and values that have to be
preserved (Lo 2007: 436) The importance of heritage preservation for the local
identity is further emphasized by the involvement of the late teenage and early
twenties generation of Hong Kong youth, which is actively seeking local
contexts for identity formation (Cartier 2008: 76). By comparing it to the
1960s movements An argues that the Star Ferry protests are a means for the
Handover generation to establish an identity of its own, which is intrinsic to
the Hong Kong identity (An 2007). Eric Ma echoes this view and sees a new city
consciousness surfacing through the struggle over harbor protection,
participation in the West Kowloon Cultural District project and the rebuilding
of Wan Chai. This indicates an increasing desire for political participation as
well as a strengthening of the development of social groups. To be a Hong Kong
person means to be actively involved in Hong Kong affairs since a local
identity can only be created through the continuous recreating of Hong Kong
society (Ma and Liang 2005) With regard to the basis of the Hong Kong identity,
it indicates a paradigm shift in Hong Kong’s local culture. After 1997, the
Hong Kong identity based on popular culture became weaker as sinicization and
globalization exacted a heavy toll on the uniqueness of the popular culture
industry. The new city consciousness might be able to provide a foundation to
strengthen a distinctive cultural identity and to position the territory
internationally, nationally, regionally and locally (Ma 2006).
CIVIC
IDENTITY
Myth of Political Apathy For a long time,
Hong Kong’s political culture was portrayed as being dominated by political
apathy and traditional Confucian culture (King 1981, Lau 1981). Identity in the
colony was formed by a “fear of politics” (White and Li 1993: 18). Hong Kong
was seen as a “lifeboat” offering relative stability, impartial justice, and
economic opportunity in the cruel sea of China. Political activities would only
create unnecessary conflict and dissent (Hoadley 1970: 211). The parochial and
individualistic behavior as well as the political apathy of Hong Kongers were
explained by so-called “utilitarianistic familism” – individuals putting their
families’ interests and materialistic concerns before the interests of society
(Lau 1981: 201). The perceived lack in the sense of community spirit, political
involvement, and hence the non-existence of the Western notion of citizenship,
justified the denial of democratic self-determination (Turner 1995: 36).
Research since the late 1990s has adopted a broader definition for the
political participation of Hong Kong people, thus the “myth of political
apathy” (DeGolyer and Scott 1996) has largely been refuted. Important acts of
political participation, such as strikes, participation in social movements and
demonstrations were previously not considered (Lam 2004: 19) and individual
political participation at grassroots level as well as the political awareness
of Hong Kongers were not included in previous analyses (Lo 1999: 51).
Political
Identity
Political
events since the
1960s, however, have
shown the increasing
desire for political
participation and articulation, and have contributed in several ways to the
establishment of a
strong civic Hong
Kong identity. Protests
in 1966 marked
the emergence of a
trend toward local issues
being discussed more
vigorously in the domestic political arena, put forward by
the post-war generation of Hong Kongers (Turner 1995: 26; Mathews, Lui and Ma
2008: 32). The 1967 riots, sparked by the Cultural Revolution
on the mainland,
reinforced the existing
Mainlander versus Hong Konger
dichotomy, reaffirming Hong Kong’s culture, governing ideology and way
of life (Thomas
1999: 85). In
the 1970s, the
government reacted to an
increasingly vocal social
movement (So 1999)
by launching a
broad program of social and
administrative reforms (So
1999; Lam 2004).
By the early
1980s, the
colonial government had transformed into a modern polity
characterized by relative openness, responsiveness, freedom, the Anglo-Saxon
concept of the rule of law, the protection of human rights and stability (Hayes
1996: 281). When the transfer of sovereignty was decided in the Sino-British
Joint Declaration of 1984, this had an important consequence for Hong Kong’s
identity as a fusion of Western and Chinese influences (Bhattacharya 2005: 51).
Hong Kongers hoped for democratization as a means of safeguarding their own way
of life under the principle of “one country, two systems.” The call for more
political participation was rooted in the promise of self-administration for
Hong Kong after 1997 (Cheng 1997: 156) and was also a consequence of the social
changes and demands of the 1970s (Yahuda 1996: 57). More than any other event
in the modern history of Hong Kong, 1989 Tiananmen massacre forced the
territory’s local community to form an opinion as to what constituted their
identity (Thomas 1999: 87). The massive demonstrations in support of the
students and workers in Beijing created a sense of unity among the Hong Kongers
and showed that the people of Hong Kong would respond to a common cause (Yee
1989: 231). When substantial democratic reforms were implemented by the last
governor, Christopher Patten, they served as a catalyst, improving the
political consciousness and democratic aspirations of the Hong Kong people, and
further strengthening their civic identity (Lo 2001: 50-53).
By the end of the colonial era, the Hong Kong
people had developed a strong, distinct identity based on the differences
between Hong Kong and the Chinese mainland in economic, cultural and political
terms (Chan 2007: 383). This Hong Kong identity could best be understood as
“Chineseness plus,” since Hong Kongers are ethnically Chinese and in abstract
cultural and historic terms, most of them
feel that they are part of the Chinese nation4 (Mathews 1997: 9). Yet, at the
same time, they are different. Their unique way of life, the value pertaining
to freedom of expression, the rule of law, transparency, social mobility,
responsible government and democracy were, in the last decades, guaranteed and
provided by the British rulers. Hence, despite years of propaganda and with Chinese
patriotism at a highpoint, only a slim majority stated that they were happy
about the return to China5 (Mathews, Lui and Ma 2008: 49).
Civic
Values
The analysis has shown that local identity is
founded on economic and Western values, which became particularly noticeable
after the handover. The severe economic downturn shattered the self-confidence
of the Hong Kongers (Zhang 2009). Their feeling of superiority vis-à-vis the
mainland, the “Hong Kongism,” was further tested by the failed policies of the
Tung Chee-hwa administration. Anthony Cheung suggests that the prime supporter
of Hong Kong’s values and its identity was the middle class which was seriously
affected by post-handover changes. The Hong Kong identity could, in civic
terms, be understood as a set of core values6 that includes civil liberties,
the rule of law, respect for human rights, accountable government, democratic
institutions, and political pluralism (Cheung 2005: 58). Ensuring certain
upward mobility and ever-expanding job and business opportunities are also part
of this value package (ibid. 65). Government policies for integration with
China were perceived as leading to the increasing dilution of the international character of the city
(Cheung 2005). When the basis of the Hong Kong identity was threatened by
assimilation through this increasing integration, the people resisted with
frequent protests within all sectors of society (Cheung 2007: 89). Anthony
Cheung argues for a linkage between the Hong Kong identity, the city’s core
values and political participation (Zhang 2000: 38). The emergence of the Civic
Party provides a prime example of this connection.7 And obviously, the mass
demonstration on 1 July 2003 marked a turning point and politicized the middle
class (Zhang 2003: 81).
Political
Rituals and Protests
The discourse of social and political
participation as the foundation of a new emerging Hong Kong identity is based
on the idea that unified actions will create a sense of belonging and cultural
identification with the city and its people. Popular imagination and the
practice and memories of certain similar customs and rituals, such as,
participation in replicated events, manifest the cultural identification of the
individual with the community. The people’s collectively shared beliefs and
faiths are the common substance of this community (Lo 2007: 435). The annual
candle-light vigil in memory of the victims of the Tiananmen massacre is a
“secular democratic ritual,” constituting a fundamental part of the political
culture and political identity of Hong Kong. Participation is a way of showing
the conviction that only democracy will maintain the Special Administrative
Region (SAR) identity and way of life (Beja 2007: 7, Loh 2007: 40). 1989 was a
key moment in the development of political awareness and in the formation of a
new political culture. The discourse of June 4 highlights the differences
between the Hong Kong identity with its core values and the official Chinese
national identity, as the latter includes the refusal to acknowledge the
Tiananmen massacre (Beja 2007: 7). In Hong Kong, large scale demonstrations
with a couple of thousand or even one hundred thousand participants have always
been related to political issues – more precisely, they are usually triggered
by the perception that the Hong Kong way of life is under threat (ibid.) as,
for example, in the case of the mass demonstration of 1 July 2003. The
mismanagement of the SARS epidemic had led to weakened trust in the HKSAR
government. The crisis demonstrated that the Hong Kong values of transparency,
freedom of expression and information and freedom of the press, were crucial in
the battling of the disease, but these were constantly undermined by the
government (DeGolyer 2004a). When the bill for a national security law under
Article 23 of the Basic Law was launched, the common perception was that the
Tung Chee-hwa administration was about to destroy these cherished values.8 More than 500,000 people protested against
the government and against Article 23. The demonstration marked a strong
rejection of government attitudes that were associated with mainland Chinese
politics and it also functioned as a reassurance of the Hong Kong identity for
the participants. The demonstrations were a source of pride and thus a resource
for the long-term cultivation of local identification (Chan and Chung 2003).
Collectively, they were an expression of the fact that the Hong Kong people
shared certain values and beliefs (Wu 2003). In 2004, the mass demonstration of
1 July was of similar size and asked for the introduction of universal suffrage
in 2007/8 which had been rejected by the National People’s Congress in Beijing
only months earlier. Hence this movement was a confirmation of the civic Hong
Kong identity vis-à-vis the Chinese understanding of national identity (Li
2004). The 1 July demonstrations have, since then, become an annual event and
part of the collective memory of Hong Kongers and the Hong Kong identity.
IDENTITY
CHANGES
Several studies have traced the changes in
the self-identification of the Hong Kong people. The data used in this article
stems from the Hong Kong Transition Project (HKTP) at the Hong Kong Baptist
University. The HKTP defines “Chinese” as a patriotic statement and “Hong Kong
Chinese” as a regional identity, not stronger than Shanghainese or New Yorker.
“Hong Kong person” or “Hong Konger,” however, connotes a separate identity from
“Chinese” or “Hong Kong Chinese” (DeGolyer 1997, 15). The principal
distinguishing features between the different identity categories are attitudes
towards democracy and patriotism (Lau and Lee 1988, 184). To be a “Hong Konger”
means to be the most liberal and the most supportive of democracy, and the
least supportive of nationalistic values. It also means to put the interests of
Hong Kong over those of China (Wong 1998, Lee and Chan 2005).
TABLE
1 HERE
In general, the survey data indicates a
gradual increase in those holding a “Chinese” or “Hong Kong Chinese” identity.
However, “Hong Konger” still remains the identity choice of the majority. More
precisely, the HKTP has recorded a slight increase in the Chinese identity
category from 20 per cent in 1993 to about 20 per cent throughout the late
2000s (23 per cent in May 2009). At the same time, the category “Hong Kong
person,” has fallen from an average of 40 per cent plus in 2007 to 38 per cent
in spring 2009. The self-description “Hong Kong Chinese,” as a weaker local
identity, experienced a steady rise throughout the transition period from
levels of around 30 per cent to up to 35 per cent in May 2009 (DeGolyer 2009).
Reasons for these changes can be attributed to the policies of the HKSAR
government, which launched a program to promote the patriotism of the citizens
and also made accordant changes in the school curricula. Combined with steady
immigration from China,9 an impact on the Hong Kong identity can therefore be
assumed 10 and a long-term trend towards a rise in the Chinese identity seems
likely.
HONG
KONG AND CHINESE IDENTITY
Hong Kong people identify strongly with a set
of Western liberal-democratic core values and therefore with institutions that
represent these values, such as the ICAC 11 and the judiciary. Trust in the
legislature is, however, low (Wong, Hsiao and Wan 2009) and satisfaction with
the government and political parties fluctuates at levels similar to other
pluralistic states in East Asia or in Western democracies (ibid., Cheung 2009).
The low identification with the political institutions can largely be
attributed to their lack of power and un-democratic nature. Surveys have
indicated that Hong Kong people have a strong need for a responsive and
democratic government and legislature (DeGolyer 2009), a fact which is further
emphasized by the frequent mass protests for universal suffrage and by the
pro-democracy forces always gaining about sixty per cent of the popular vote.
Although the local cultural identity of the
Hong Kong people is strong, it coexists with an abstract identification with a
historic and cultural vision of the Chinese nation and Chinese identity. The
official perspective of the Beijing regime on national identity, however, sees
identification with the Chinese nation as equal to identification with the
Chinese state and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) (Chang 2001). The civic
elements of Hong Kong identity stand in clear opposition to this notion of
Chinese identity, as the Hong Kong people largely reject the idea of “loving”
the CCP or the Communist state.12 This identity clash is further intensified by
the fact that the PRC national identity’s strong ethnic and cultural undertones
include xenophobic and anti-Western sentiments (Chang 2001: 137, Lo 2008: 174).
In fact, Beijing’s understanding of national Chinese culture is a hybrid of
Communist state culture and a perceived monolithic national culture (Chan 2007:
380).
The ethno-cultural identification of many
Hong Kong people with mainland China is blended by the Beijing regime with
political identification with the CCP to form a cultural-political Chinese
identity (Lo 2008: 171). Accordingly, patriotism is defined through loyalty to
the Communist party and the state. In 2004, Xiao Weiyun, a legal expert from
Beijing, explained the official definition of un-patriotic behavior: forging
close links with (Western) foreign countries, aligning with groups deemed
unacceptable to the CCP and questioning the territorial integrity of China
(that is, supporting independence for Taiwan) (Xiao 2004). For many Hong Kong
people, however, being part of a modern open society is part of their identity,
and the pan-democrats promote a Hong Kong style patriotism, including
democratic and participatory elements, such as, the fight for democracy and
concrete patriotic actions (Situ 2004a: 174). Democrats reject the claim of the
CCP to be the only patriotic force, because the party does in fact suppress
China’s people, destroying Chinese culture and all those aspects which are
cherished because they represent the idea of a Chinese nation (Situ 2004b: 66).
They further argue that a liberal democratic expression of the nation is
crucial and should be drawn from a sovereign people because the nation is
composed of neither government nor party (Chen 2004: 81).
Identity
Politics
The new emerging local culture and distinct
civic identity of Hong Kong are however threatened by the forces of
globalization (Choi 2007, Ma 2006), as well as by Chinese nationalism or
sinicization. Nationalism is coming into the Hong Kong context on two levels:
in the official discourse and policies of the HKSAR and Beijing governments,
and also through integration and interaction at grassroots level.
For the regime in Beijing, it is impossible
to approve of the ideological cohesion of a Hong Kong cultural identity
constituted against the mainland Chinese identity. Any manifestation of a
separate, independent cultural identity is viewed as a political threat to the
regime in Beijing (Lo 2007: 436). Immediately after the handover, the Hong Kong
government launched several programs and initiated policies all aimed at
bringing about an active change in the creation of a unified Chinese identity.
The measures in the educational realm included, for example, changes in the
school curriculum. The PRC began to be portrayed in a much more favorable
light, with the focus on economic achievements and rising international status
(Vickers and Kan 2003). The most controversial measure, however, was the
introduction of mother-tongue language teaching at secondary schools.13 English
is seen as a form of cultural and symbolic capital that distinguishes Hong Kong
from the mainland and thus the government’s policy was taken as an attempt to
alter the collective identity (Chan 2002: 283). The government further
strengthened the subject “civic education” in schools (Vickers and Kan 2003)
and the national song and national flag featured prominently at educational
institutions. To boost the general public’s patriotism and identification with
the mainland, the government has produced television announcements in the
public interest (API) entitled “Our Home, Our Country” since 2004, and every
day before the evening news the Chinese national anthem together with a clip
showcasing the achievements and beauty of China and Hong Kong are aired
(Mathews, Lui and Ma 2008: 74). Government Identity Discourses John Flowerdew
(2004) has shown how the administration of Tung Chee-hwa stressed the
“Chineseness” of Hong Kong, downplayed democratic development and emphasized
the sameness of the mainland and the SAR. The economic discourse predominated,
displacing the discussion of democratic reform and constitutional development,
and trying to depoliticize the city through a discourse on stability and
promoting Hong Kong as an economic city (Morris P., Kan and Morris E. 2000).
Hong Kong should also be more culturally integrated with China to prevent
foreign political and cultural influence, including, most notably, ideas like
democracy and human rights, from “subverting” the mainland (Loh and Lai 2007:
29). Tung’s old fashioned governing style, traditional Chinese values and
ethnic definition of identity were, however, not in tune with the majority of
Hong Kongers. When Donald Tsang took over the position of Chief Executive, he
chose a more subtle approach, appearing more open to Hong Kong values and
identity while maintaining the policies of fostering patriotism and integration
with the mainland. The discourse on the so-called “New Hong Konger”
demonstrates, however, that Tsang was carrying forward his predecessor’s
political mission. In the 2007 policy address, he stated that after 1997, Hong
Kongers had been unsure about their identity and the economic prospects
vis-à-vis a rising China. According to his analysis, Hong Kong can only prosper
as a fully integrated part of thePRC and the HKSAR’s citizens must look at the
city’s development “from the perspective of our country’s future” (Policy
Address 2007). Critics have argued that by using the slogan, “New Hong Konger,”
Tsang was trying to evoke an association with the famous slogan, “New
Taiwanese,” which was aimed at reconciling the sub-ethnic conflicts in Taiwan
(An 2007). Yet they point out that the Chief Executive, in fact, attempts to
downplay local identity, because, for Tsang, Chinese national identity should
indeed be equivalent with the “New Hongkonger” identity (Zhang 2007).
Grassroots
Nationalism
In addition to the policies and discourses of
patriotism shaping and defining Hong Kong identity, rapid interaction with the
mainland at grassroots level has created a form of “grassroots nationalism” (Ma
2007: 149). The bottom-up discourses on nationalism are re-shaping the national
imagination of Hong Kong people by bringing the nation closer to the everyday
experience of the general public. The Chinese nation is seen by those Hong Kong
people who have frequent interactions on the mainland as “a great national
territory, a collective of a great diversity of people, an embodiment of
familial networks and a huge consumer market.” These new ideas of the nation
could result in the formation of a regional hybrid culture incorporating Hong
Kong and Chinese components (ibid. 165). He does not, however, pursue this idea
further to explain how this new cultural identity is positioned vis-à-vis the
civic identity of Hong Kong.
EVOLUTION
OF TAIWAN IDENTITY
The notion of a unique Taiwan identity is
closely connected with the island’s history. Taiwan was ruled by the Dutch
(1624-1661), became part of the Chinese Qing Empire (1683-1895) and eventually
a Japanese colony (1895-1945), before the administration of the island was
taken over by the Republic of China (ROC) (Cabestan 2005: 32). The “February 28
Incident” of 1947 marked the affirmation of a unique Taiwanese identity and
created a demand for autonomy and democracy (Chu and Lin 2001: 123). In 1949,
with the KMT forces’ to Taiwan, a sub-ethnic cleavage emerged between those who
had newly arrived from the Chinese mainland and the Taiwanese – Han-Chinese who
had been living in Taiwan for several centuries before 1945. For several
decades, the Taiwanese were completely excluded from political participation and
power in the higher levels of the institutions. The local culture and language
were suppressed because the KMT was intent on propagating its official “great
China” nationalism (Schubert 1999: 54). When cautious political liberalization
began in the 1970s, the Taiwanese national identity arose and was expressed in
native literature which, closely linked with the growing political opposition,
called for democracy and participation (Hsiau 2000: 91). With democratization
in the late 1980s, the idea of Taiwanization became increasingly prominent;
among its aims were to achieve the political and cultural equality of the
Taiwanese vis-à-vis the ruling Mainlanders and the KMT brand of Chinese
nationalism. Policies under the presidencies of Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian
have contributed to the sharp increase in Taiwan identity.14
Theoretically, the discussion on Taiwanese
identity can be divided into three basic discourses (Schubert 1999). Taiwanese
ethno-cultural nationalism states that the Taiwan identity is based on specific
historical experiences and perceived cultural differences between the Taiwan
people and the mainland Chinese; the focus is on the colonial past of the
island and its long separation from the China (Schubert 1999: 55). In the
multi-ethnic nationalism approach, the Taiwanese nation is conceptualized as a
harmonious, democratic and tolerant nation of four ethnic groups, the
Mainlanders, the Hoklo, the Hakka, and the aborigines (Zhang 2002). According
to political or state nationalism, the foundation of a Taiwan nation is in line
with the institutions of a liberal state. The rise of the Taiwan identity is
seen as directly connected to its geographical and political separation from
China and its subsequent democratic development (Cabestan 2005, Schubert 2004).
HONG
KONG AND TAIWAN IDENTITIES
If Smith’s framework of national identity
based on ethno-cultural and civic components is applied to the cases of Hong
Kong and Taiwan, a series of similarities and differences is revealed. For a
long time, both identities were portrayed as rooted in an envisioned homogenous
Chinese race and common ancestry. While in Hong Kong, this ethnic element of
identity remains strong, in Taiwan, there have long been intense discussions on
multiculturalism and ethnic diversity although the idea of an ethnic Taiwanese
nationalism has prevailed in some circles of society. Although traditional
Chinese culture with its festivals and folklore are dominant in both societies,
Hong Kong and Taiwan have both developed cultural identities different to that
on the CCP-ruled mainland. In the economic realm, decades of economic boom in
Taiwan and Hong Kong, starting in the 1960s and lasting until the 1990s,
created affluent societies and generated a sense of pride in these achievements.
Hence differentiation through wealth and sophistication from the, at that time,
backward PRC prevailed during the first encounters with the mainland in the
1970s and 1980s. Local culture and localism were regarded as cornerstones of an
emerging exceptional culture, different not only from the present day mainland
way of life, but also from traditional Chinese culture. Hong Kong’s cultural
uniqueness was based on a newly developed popular culture and focus on local
affairs using the Cantonese language. In Taiwan, the cultural identity also
possesses links to modern popular culture, but the identity is dominated by
native Taiwanese culture and language which were suppressed in the first
decades of KMT rule. Ideas of multiculturalism are common in Taiwan, with its
several Chinese sub-ethnicities and the aborigines. Interestingly, these ideas
have never been given much attention in Hong Kong, despite its international
city image, its strong Indian community and its global workforce. The reason
for this is the perception that Hong Kong is a predominantly Chinese society,
so that the idea of a distinct hybrid culture functions as “demarcation and
territorialization and carves out a distinct subject position for Hong Kong
local Chinese only” (Lo 2007: 436). 15
Scholars have argued that the pillar of the
distinct identities in both cases is the civic realm of national identity
(Mathews 1997, Schubert 2004). During the colonial era, the rule of law, civil
liberties, human rights, a free and vibrant press and a responsive government
were all things in which Hong Kong citizens felt immense pride. With regard to
personal freedoms and institutional guarantees, the city was much more a part
of the Western world than of China. Political participation and the desire for
democratization became an increasingly important part of the Hong Kong identity
after the 1980s. The political reforms of the last governor, Chris Patten,
responded to these demands with the result that Hong Kong core values became
further entrenched in Hong Kong society. Hong Kong people, since then, have
defended their civic identity against real and perceived threats from the
government. Surveys have consistently indicated that although, generally,
identification with the Chinese is slowly increasing, Hong Kong people still
feel distant from China in political and civic terms. This is confirmed by the
solid support given to political parties and organizations that stand for Hong
Kong’s core values and further democratization, as well as by the high attendance
in related political campaigns and rallies.
Within the civic identity of the Taiwanese,
the desire for democracy and the equality of the Taiwanese vis-à-vis the
Mainlanders are closely connected. In the authoritarian era of KMT rule, the
opposition saw the practice of democracy and the democratization of
institutions as the only way of achieving truly equal opportunities for all the
citizens of Taiwan. The civic identity of the Taiwanese was formed through the
struggle of the opposition movement for representation and the democratic
transformation of the KMT government. The experience of a successful and
peaceful democratic transition is a matter of great pride for the Taiwanese.
Compared with Hong Kong, civil liberties and democratic values, as well as group
mobilization and cohesion, are equally, if not more, entrenched in the civic
identity of the Taiwanese. However, the exceptional status of the rule of law
as established by the British and, arguably, the core of the local identity
cannot be observed in Taiwan. On the other hand, the Taiwanese identity is
partially linked to the vision of an independent state under a different name
than the current Republic of China. This adds strong political or ideological
layers to the civic identity and effectively splits the public along lines of
pro-unification with China, pro-Taiwan independence and pro-status quo.16 This extra option of de-jure independence is
significantly different from the Hong Kong situation, because the former colony
never had any say in its future. Yet no matter whether aiming to establish an
independent state under the name of Taiwan or defending the ROC’s sovereignty
and de-facto independence, the Taiwanese have strong emotional ties to their
nation. The existence of a de-facto independent state with its democratic
institutions is crucial for the strength of the civic identity of Taiwan.
Taiwan’s civic identity thus does not only include values related to democracy,
freedom and political participation but also the experiences of successful
democratic struggle and nationhood. These provide an additional tier to
Taiwan’s national identity which Hong Kong does not have.
CONCLUSION
Since the late 1990s, Taiwan and Hong Kong
have been facing the challenge of a rising China rapidly gaining economic and
political influence. The Beijing government regards the unique identities and
democratic aspirations of the Hong Kong and Taiwan people as a danger to its
idea of a uniform Chinese identity. China’s strategies of identity politics and
economic penetration, in particular, pose a significant threat to Hong Kong and
Taiwan identities (Wu 2007: 298).
A study of the formation of the Hong Kong
identity reveals that the local identity developed in relation to an “opposite
other,” the Chinese mainland. The concept of “Chineseness plus” as the Hong
Kong identity has gradually emerged and this is based on ethno-cultural and
civic identity components, demonstrating a superiority over or difference from
China which is perceived in terms of economic achievements, cultural
sophistication and democratic values. When Hong Kong’s edge over the PRC was
weakened by government policies and rapid integration with the mainland, the
citizens reacted in several ways. In the cultural sphere, a new city
consciousness has been emerging, revitalizing a unique local cultural identity.
When people felt that their core values were being undermined by the
government, they reacted swiftly. Massive demonstrations and refreshed social
and democratic movements have highlighted the strength of Hong Kong’s civic
identity. It can be argued that the civic identity is the cornerstone of Hong
Kong’s resilient identity. The values of a civic identity are firmly entrenched
in the collective memory of the city and hence might be able to resist patriotic
education, nationalistic propaganda and the potential “grassroots nationalism”
resulting from interaction and integration with the mainland. The fact that on
the 20th anniversary of the 4 June massacre, more than 150.000 people gathered
for the annual candle-light vigil, among them great numbers of students and
youngsters not born when the events took place, seems to support this argument
(Leung and Wu 2009).
Taiwan, like Hong Kong, is faced with the
option of further economic integration with the mainland. Since the Ma
Ying-jeou administration took over in May 2008, cooperation with the PRC has
taken off at an unprecedented speed and depth. While the majority of the
Taiwanese support constructive cooperation, particularly in the economic
sphere, this development has created fears that if Taiwan moves too fast
towards the mainland, some of its sovereignty could be surrendered to China (Ho
2009). The feeling that the new government is threatening Taiwan’s identity,
particularly its civic components of democracy and Taiwan sovereignty, has led
to several mass demonstrations in late 2008 and 2009. These protests signify
the continuing strength of Taiwanese identity and the resistance of a relevant
part of society against its possible erosion. Nevertheless, up to now, there
have not been any clear indications that any main political party does
fundamentally question Taiwan’s civic identity and its core values, such as the
island’s sovereignty. Differences among parties appear to be more at the
ethno-cultural identity level, with the KMT still committed to some form of a
pan-Chinese identity.
Comparing Hong Kong with Taiwan offers
interesting insights into the development of the local identities under the
concept “one country –two systems.” More than a decade after the handover, the
unique Hong Kong identity is still strongly in existence. This means that,
within the Chinese nation state, Chinese identity is fragmented. For Taiwan,
however, these findings do not have any consequences because “one country –two
systems” does not present either a viable option or an alternative to the
status quo. Taiwan has not only a unique local identity but, as the Republic of
China, it possesses a fully developed national identity and there seems to be
very little likelihood that the Taiwanese will relinquish this in the near
future.
NOTES
1 Anthropologists understand culture as “a
more or less consistent pattern of thought and action” tied to the “emotional
and intellectual mainspring of that society” (Benedict 1934: 46).
2 It was only in 2006 that the border
crossings between Hong Kong and the PRC were opened for 24 hours a day.
3 Abbas argues that disappearance is the key
characteristic of Hong Kong’s culture. Dominated by the fluidity of a
port-mentality and colonialism, Hong Kong did not realize until the late 1970s
that it could have a culture of its own. Yet this culture was disappearing with
colonialism.
4 Surveys show that Hong Kong people identify
strongly with historic and cultural icons of the Chinese nation, like the Great
Wall. Some 70 per cent to 80 per cent of respondents in a 2006 survey
articulated pride for the Great Wall and 60 per cent to 70 per cent felt pride
in the local cultural icon of the night view of Victoria Harbour (Ma and Fung
2007: 177). The former icon symbolizes the abstract historic Chinese nation
while the latter signifies the collective achievements of Hong Kongers in the
economic and cultural area.
5 Even in spring of 2007, a survey carried
out by Radio Television Hong Kong showed that thirty per cent of Hong Kongers
would still prefer to be pre-1997 colonial citizens. “Sancheng Gangren ningdang
zhimindi ren” [Thirty per cent of Hong Kong people prefer to be colonial
subjects], Pingguo Ribao[Apple Daily], 13 April 2007: A06.
6 In 2004, a group of 300 intellectuals,
lawyers, professionals and academics grouped together to publish a declaration
of Hong Kong’s core values, which they asked the government to protect. These
core values include: “liberty, democracy, human rights, rule of law, fairness,
social justice, peace and compassion, integrity and transparency, plurality,
respect for individuals, and upholding professionalism.” See, Hong Kong Core
Values Declaration. (2006) “Hong Kong Core Values Declaration,” 6 June 2004.
Online. Available HTTP: <http://www.hkcorevalues.org.hk> (accessed 28
February 2007).
7 The Civic Party was founded in 2006 and participated
in the elections of 2008. Their platform is strongly focused on the Hong Kong
core values. The party made impressive electoral results and is viewed as one
of the most respected among the Hong Kong parties (DeGolyer 2009).
8 The bill proposed to provide for the
offences of treason, subversion, secession and sedition. Criticism was voiced
particularly against the following two provisions: “the proscription of certain
organizations if it is necessary in the interests of national security and is
proportionate for such purpose” and “the power of entry, search, seizure,
detention and removal by the police without warrant for the investigation of
treason, subversion, secession, sedition and handling seditious publication.”
See, Hong Kong SAR Government, “Views Sought on National Security (Legislative
Provisions) Bill,” 16 April 2003. Online. Available HTTP:
<http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200304/16/0416201.htm> (accessed 18
May 2009)
The daily quota for migrants from the Chinese
mainland is 150 per day. An estimated 518,000 mainland Chinese became HKSAR
citizens between 1997 and 2007 (Lau 2007). At the same time, more than 200,000
people left the city, although the annual emigration figure of Hong Kongers
went down from about 20,000 a year shortly after the handover to close to 10,000
in the 2000s (HKSAR Immigration Department 2009).
10 Research confirmed the impact of education
and immigration, because in socio-political terms, identity choices are
influenced by age and birthplace. A 2004 study points out that being born in
Hong Kong makes one more likely to identify oneself as a “Hong Kong person.”
Youngsters aged eighteen and nineteen predominantly describe themselves as
“Hong Kong Chinese.” People without any patriotic education in school (age 20-25)
and those born after 1949mainly state that they are “Hong Kongers,” while the
elderly (age 70 and above) are largely self-proclaimed “Chinese” (DeGolyer2004 b:
12).
11 Independent Commission Against Corruption
(ICAC), founded in 1974 (Tsang 2003: 228).
12 When a survey asked participants to
measure their love for Hong Kong, the Chinese nation and the CCP on a scale of
0-10, Hong Kong received an average score of 7.52, the Chinese nation 6.49 and
the CCP, a meager 2.91. 24 per cent of the respondents felt uneasy about the
CCP (Mathews, Lui and Ma 2008: 107).
13 In autumn 1997, the government announced
that most secondary schools must use Chinese (spoken Cantonese and written
traditional Chinese characters) as the medium of instruction.
14 According to data compiled by the Election
Study Center of Taiwan’s National Cheng-chi University, the number of people
identifying themselves as Taiwanese has risen from 17.3 per cent in 1992 to
52.4 per cent in 2010. While in 1992, 26.2 per cent of Taiwan’s people
considered themselves to be Chinese, in 2010, it was a mere 3.8 per cent. The
second most frequent identity category is a combined Taiwanese/Chinese
identity, chosen by 40.4 per cent in 2008 (45.4 per cent in 1992). See,
Election Study Center, National Cheng-Chi University Taiwan. Available HTTP: http://esc.nccu.edu.tw/
english/modules/tinyd2/content/TaiwanChineseID.htm (accessed 29 September 2010).
15 Racism and ethnic discrimination continue
to be a serious problem in Hong Kong society, although the HKSAR government
portrays the city as “Asia’s World City” and a multicultural society (Loper
2001). The anti-racism bill of 2008 was widely criticized as being too weak and
excluding the widespread discrimination against the mainland Chinese (Ewing
2008).
16 According to different surveys, the
majority of the Taiwanese prefer the status quo with regard to the question of
independence or unification with China. This has been a constant trend since
1992. In 2010, 36.6 per cent of respondents favored the status quo with a
decision at some point later in the future, while 23 per cent wished the status quo to continue
indefinitely. The second largest group supports independence for Taiwan, either
immediately (6.3 per cent) or after maintaining the status quo first, in the
future (17.0 per cent). The survey results also show that the number of people
supporting unification with China has constantly fallen since 1992. In 1992,
4.4 per cent supported unification as soon as possible; in 2010 it was only a
meager 1.1 per cent. In 2010, 10.0 per cent opted for the status quo and the
movement towards unification in the future; in 1992, it was still 15.6 per
cent. See, Election Study Center, National Cheng-Chi University Taiwan.
Available HTTP: http://esc.nccu.edu.tw/ english/modules/tinyd2/content/tonduID.htm(accessed
29 September 2010).
