By Jonathan Fenby
If troops go to deal with Hong Kong protests it could get out of control, says Jonathan Fenby
At the end of the last century, as Indonesia held its democratic presidential election following the fall of the Suharto dictatorship, a colleague at Hong Kong’s South China Morning Post asked me plaintively: “Why can those Indonesians choose their ruler and we cannot?” It is a question that takes on a special resonance as the former colony bridles at the price of its history.
The transfer to Chinese sovereignty 17 years ago last week was calm as Beijing treated its new golden goose with caution and pursued the policy of “one country, two systems”. But there was always a central misunderstanding. Hong Kong people (and the outgoing British) stressed the second part of the formula advanced by the late paramount leader, Deng Xiaoping, as a guarantee that their way of life would continue for the 50 years laid down in the handover agreement. But, for Beijing, the first two words counted for more.Hong Kong was now Chinese and, in Beijing’s eyes, it had signed up in the Joint Declaration of 1984 to take over Hong Kong as it was when Britain had ruled it as a colony, with no thought of extending democratic rights to its residents.
But many of those 7m people thought that, as inhabitants of an advanced, law-abiding city, they were entitled to exercise democratic rights. They grew resentful at the way central authorities sought to exercise control of the Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) of Hong Kong through three ineffective chief executives selected by a small circle of electors approved by Beijing. That resentment deepened by the prospect of the next choice of chief executive in 2017, with a wider franchise, still being controlled from the centre by the stipulation that only candidates who “love China” be allowed to stand.
The publication of a White Paper in Beijing last month raised the temperature significantly by stating that China’s central government had “comprehensive jurisdiction” over local administrations and that “the high degree of autonomy of the HKSAR is not full autonomy nor decentralised power” but only “the power to run local affairs as authorised by the central leadership”. There was particular concern at the assertion in the 14,500-word document that judges should be “patriotic”.
The strength of feeling was shown when nearly 800,000 people voted in an unofficial online poll for a democratic system for selection of the next chief executive. More than 100,000 joined a rally to call for democracy. Further protests are planned. Beijing criticised “outside forces” for interfering in Hong Kong’s affairs after the British and US consuls-general spoke about democracy. Business is worried at the effect of the protests on its links with the mainland. The big four global accounting firms ran a joint advertisement in local newspapers opposing the democracy movement. Ming Pao, a Chinese-language HKSAR newspaper,worried that the “one country, two systems” concept had become an “empty shell”with Hong Kong likely to turn into an “ordinary Chinese city”.
That is the underlying concern. Hong Kong regards itself as different. Polls show most residents think of themselves as“Hong Kong Chinese” rather than simply “Chinese”. They believe that the handover arrangements give them the right to make their opinions known. The fact that Beijing reacts in such a hostile fashion is bound to increase their frustration. This also constitutes a tricky issue for the UK government given its responsibilities for preserving the Hong Kong system at a time when it is trying to nurture commercial relations with Beijing.
Why the Chinese leadership under Xi Jinping decided to set out its stall so emphatically in the White Paper is, as with so much in the People’s Republic, not clear. It may be simply the result of Mr Xi’s muscular governing style. The danger is that Beijing may now go too far in asserting the primacy of “one country”. If, for instance, its People’s Liberation Army troops stationed in Hong Kong were sent out to deal with swelling protests in Central, as has been suggested, the stakes could spiral out of control.
For 17 years, China and the HKSAR (and London) have maintained the status quo, but the tide of events poses a risk of over-action and reaction that would imperil the golden goose and the values it embodies.
The writer edited the South China Morning Post from 1995 to 1999
