光明頂, 串 2012-04-02 -------> 2012-04-06

光明頂 2012-04-02 通識考試題

 

 

光明頂 2012-04-03 大陸政局

光明頂 - 2012-04-04 - 趣談英文

光明頂 - 2012-04-05 - 論港政

光明頂 2012-04-06 文學文化

串 - 2012-04-02 - 溫州金融試驗區方案，係民形企業福音？

串 - 2012-04-03 - 中國民企缺乏法律保障，要生存唯有靠奇蹟？

串 - 2012-04-04 - 網上傳言北京政變，當局即刻「拉人封網」，突顯心虛！  

串 - 2012-04-05 

串 - 2012-04-06

 

Sinan Ulgen: Erdoğan the Peacemaker?

ISTANBUL – Turkey’s Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has taken on a daunting challenge. After participating in the nuclear-security summit in South Korea at the end of March, he went to Tehran to urge Iran’s leaders to make a deal during the next round of nuclear talks between Iran and the United Nations Security Council’s five permanent members (Britain, China, France, Russia, and the United States) plus Germany. And Erdoğan will host those talks in Istanbul in mid-April.

Erdoğan last traveled to Tehran in May 2010 to finalize an agreement that he had negotiated under which Iran was to send large quantities of its low-enriched uranium to Turkey in exchange for nuclear fuel for Iran’s research reactor. The deal, mediated by Turkey and Brazil, was presented to the rest of the world as a groundbreaking confidence-building initiative.

But the US and its allies quickly rejected the agreement as an Iranian ploy designed to halt the growing momentum for additional sanctions. Turkey’s insistence on pressing ahead with the deal caused tension with the US and fueled criticism at home and abroad that Erdoğan’s government was shifting away from its long-standing alliance with the West.

The memory of this short-lived crisis with the US is still fresh in Turkish government circles. So why, despite having burned his fingers two years ago, is Erdoğan taking up the issue again? What did he hope to accomplish in Tehran?

Much has changed in the Middle East during the past two years, and not to Turkey’s advantage. As a result, Turkey is now seeking to contain a rapidly deteriorating regional security situation.

Events in Syria are forcing Turkish authorities to accept the harsh reality of the Assad regime’s resilience – and now its hostility towards Turkey. Iraq, another of Turkey’s neighbors, faces the risk of a protracted sectarian power struggle following withdrawal of US troops.

Given this, Turkey’s main objective now is to prevent a military intervention against Iran. From Turkey’s perspective, an Israeli or American strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities would destabilize the region further, as Iran would undoubtedly retaliate by fueling sectarian tensions and undermining the prospects of a settlement in both Syria and Iraq.

As a result, Turkey wants to prolong, at all costs, the time available for diplomacy. But Erdoğan’s specific objective was more modest this time than it was in 2010, because Turkey does not want to play the role of mediator and will not seek to negotiate the details of an agreement.
Instead, Erdoğan emphasized to his Iranian counterparts the international community’s resolve to bring transparency to Iran’s nuclear program, and insisted on the importance of concrete progress in the next round of the nuclear talks. He warned that Iranian intransigence would doom the talks to failure, raising the prospects of yet another military confrontation in the Middle East.

In particular, Erdoğan stressed the need for Iran to offer a gesture of goodwill about its nuclear program. The Iranian regime should, at the very least, commit itself to halt uranium enrichment at 20%, a figure short of the threshold needed to produce weapons. Having had direct meetings with both Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Erdoğan was in a unique position, as a prime minister of a NATO country, to convey these critical messages to a regime whose top-level decision-making processes remain as opaque as ever to the West.

Paradoxically, however, Erdoğan’s task, while more modest than in 2010, is also more difficult, owing to the prospect of new sanctions on Iran, including a ban on oil exports, that are to enter into force in July. Advocates of sanctions argue that they are having a crippling effect on the Iranian economy. The value of the Iranian rial has fallen by 50% against the US dollar since the beginning of the year, and the country is suffering from a severe shortage of foreign exchange. So now is not the time to pull back.

Moreover, US President Barack Obama, facing an election in November, does not wish to be accused of being soft on Iran, making it difficult for the West to reciprocate potential Iranian overtures.

Yet Erdoğan’s best ally in his risky gambit may be the US consumer. Faced with rising gasoline prices as a result of the ongoing crisis with Iran, Americans’ concerns about the cost of driving have contributed to Obama’s shaky popularity ratings. Thus, the Obama administration may find it more politically expedient to seek a deal with Iran. If Iran displays a real willingness to compromise, the West should hold off on the new sanctions.

It will soon become clear whether Erdoğan’s visit succeeds. If Iran decides to engage the international community with concrete confidence-building measures at the next round of multilateral talks, Erdoğan will take much of the credit for giving diplomacy a last chance – and quite possibly for averting a disastrous military confrontation in the Middle East.

Sinan Ulgen, Chairman of the Istanbul-based Center for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies (EDAM), is a visiting scholar at Carnegie Europe.

Sinan Ulgen: 埃爾多安是和平締造者嗎？

伊斯坦布爾 —— 土耳其總理雷杰普·塔伊普·埃爾多安已經開始了一項艱巨的挑戰。在三月底參加了韓國核安全首腦會議后，他便前往德黑蘭，敦促伊朗領導人在與聯合國安理會五大常任理事國（英國、中國、法國、俄羅斯和美國）及德國進行的下一輪核談判中達成協議。四月中旬，埃爾多安將在伊斯坦布爾主持這些會談。

埃爾多安上次前往德黑蘭是在2010年5月，目的是與伊朗最終達成某項協議，該協議規定伊朗向土耳其提供大量低濃縮鈾，而土耳其為伊朗研究核反應堆提供核燃料。該協議是在土耳其和巴西的調解下達成的，作為一項突破性的信心建設倡議呈現在世界面前。

但美國及其盟國很快就拒絕了這項協議，因為它們認為伊朗是在採取伎倆減弱國際社會對其實施額外制裁的增長勢頭。土耳其堅持推行該項協議，結果造成本國與美國關系緊張，引發國內外人士的指責——埃爾多安政府正在脫離與西方國家結成的長期聯盟。

這場與美國相持的短暫危機在土耳其政界仍然聞所未聞。兩年前埃爾多安就曾提出該問題，結果是自討苦吃，那麼為什麼現在又將該問題重提呢？他希望在德黑蘭達到什麼目的呢？

在過去兩年中中東發生了很大變化，但這一狀況對土耳其非常不利。因此，土耳其正努力遏制地區安全形勢迅速惡化的形勢。

敘利亞事件迫使土耳其當局接受這一嚴酷的現實——阿薩德政權具有很大柔韌性，而且對土耳其充滿敵意。土耳其的另一鄰國伊拉克在美軍撤離之后，面臨著一場曠日持久的教派權力斗爭。

鑒於此，現在土耳其的主要目的是為了防止對伊朗進行軍事干預。從土耳其的角度來看，以色列或美國打擊伊朗核設施，將進一步破壞該地區穩定，伊朗無疑將通過加劇教派斗爭的緊張局勢、破壞敘利亞和伊拉克的和解前景進行報復。

鑒於此，土耳其希望不惜一切代價延長外交時間。但埃爾多安這次的具體目標與2010年相比較為溫和，因為土耳其不希望發揮調解的作用，也不會就該協議的具體細節進行談判。

相反，埃爾多安向伊朗領導人強調國際社會使伊朗的核計劃透明的決心及下一輪核問題會談具體進展的重要性。他警告說，如果伊朗不妥協，那麼會談將難逃失敗的厄運，中東地區將很可能面臨新一輪軍事對抗。

埃爾多安特別強調，伊朗必須對其核計劃表現出善意姿態。伊朗政權至少應承諾濃縮鈾生產減少20％左右——小於武器生產所需的閾值。同時，埃爾多安同伊朗總統內賈德和最高領袖哈梅內伊曾經直接會晤，作為一個北約國家的總理，他的地位非常獨特——他需要將這些重要消息傳遞給一個頂層決策過程同以往西方一樣不透明的政權。

然而，奇怪的是，埃爾多安的任務雖然比2010年更溫和了，但同時也更困難了，因為伊朗可能會面臨新的制裁措施，包括七月份生效的石油出口禁令。支持對伊朗實施制裁的人認為，這些措施會對伊朗的經濟可能陷入癱瘓。自年初以來，伊朗裡亞爾（伊朗貨幣單位）對美元的匯價下跌了50％，外匯短缺嚴重。

此外，美國總統奧巴馬面臨著11月的選舉，不希望被指責對伊朗採取姑息態度，因此西方國家很難對伊朗伸出援手。

然而，埃爾多安在冒險開局中最好的盟友可能是美國消費者。由於伊朗危機持續，面對汽油價格上漲，美國人對駕駛成本特別關注，這也導致了奧巴馬的民意支持搖搖欲墜。因此，奧巴馬政府可能會認為，設法與伊朗達成協議是政治上的權宜之計。如果伊朗真正願意妥協，西方應該推遲實施新​​的制裁。

埃爾多安的訪問是否成功，很快就會變得清晰。如果伊朗決定在下一輪多邊談判中參與國際社會，制定具體的信心建立措施，埃爾多安將會因為給外交創造機會——很可能會因為避免一場中東的災難性軍事對抗而獲得好評。

James A. Goldston, Yonko Grozev: Who’s Afraid of Europe’s Human-Rights Court?

SOFIA – At a time when the ongoing European debt crisis is fracturing public faith in the continent’s political and economic institutions, one would expect Europe’s leaders to strengthen as many unifying symbols as they can. Instead, they have allowed one of the jewels of post-World War II European integration – the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) – to come under threat as well.

Unlike the Brussels-based European Union, long beleaguered by its democratic deficit, the Strasbourg-based ECHR is, if anything, too well loved. In 2011, more than 60,000 people sought its help – far more than can expect a reasoned decision. (By contrast, the United States Supreme Court receives roughly 10,000 petitions a year.)

To save the ECHR from this crushing burden, some member states have proposed changes that could weaken it, even if unintentionally. Those of us who passionately believe in the Court and its achievements must speak out now to persuade the protagonists of misguided reforms to reverse course. Instead, the ECHR’s 47 member states – with 800 million people – need to shoulder more responsibility to make the existing system work.

Launched in the aftermath of the Holocaust, the ECHR has become a potent symbol of Europe’s commitment to government by law, not force, by vindicating the rights to life, humane treatment, free expression, and access to a lawyer. For example, the Court ruled that the infamous “five techniques” – an early form of “enhanced interrogation” employed by the British in Northern Ireland in the 1970’s – constituted inhuman treatment, and condemned racial segregation of Roma children in Czech schools.

Because of their quality, the ECHR’s opinions have a profound impact beyond Europe. When Strasbourg speaks, the world’s judges and lawyers listen. Even the US Supreme Court cited its reasoning when striking down anti-homosexuality laws in Texas in 2003.

Nonetheless, the ECHR’s future is in serious jeopardy. As the only impartial check on abuse of power in some countries, the Court is swamped with complaints – more than 60% come from Russia, Turkey, Italy, Romania, and Ukraine.

Some argue that the answer to the flood of cases is to limit the Court’s powers. But that approach seems unwise.

British Prime Minister David Cameron, for example, has told the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe that national decisions “should be treated with respect” – code for less judicial oversight. Similarly, other senior officials have called for new restrictions on cases that the ECHR may hear, including deferral to those national courts which have supposedly taken full account of European human-rights law.

In the United Kingdom, the Court’s 2005 ruling against a blanket withdrawal of voting rights for prisoners, on the grounds that disenfranchisement can be disproportionate to the offense, provoked official wrath. And, earlier this year, the Cameron government was incensed by a decision that barred the deportation of an Islamic preacher to Jordan on terrorism charges, because his trial there might be tainted by evidence obtained under torture.

Even under new rules, such cases might still come before the Court, because they raise fundamental questions that require interpretation of the European Convention. Indeed, there is no evidence that proposed Convention amendments aimed at limiting the court’s authority would reduce its caseload. But they send a dangerous message that some governments should be exempt from standards that apply to everyone else.

Reducing the flow of complaints depends, above all, on governments doing more to entrench the rule of law at home – even if they must be pushed and shamed into it. Authoritative and binding Court judgments, many of which require governments to compensate victims, are among the most effective tools for constructive pressure – and may well provide better value in promoting the rule of law than the millions of euros invested annually in technical assistance and training in the erring states.

In addition, legislative reforms enacted in 2010 must be given time and resources to work. All agree that the ECHR is making progress in reducing the backlog of pending applications.
More can be done. The Court can increase the number of “pilot judgments” concerning systemic harm, prescribe more specific measures of redress, and stiffen monetary awards where repeated violations reflect persistent failure to heed prior judgments. The Committee of Ministers, which oversees implementation, should issue public sanctions where appropriate. And states must take more seriously their obligations to remedy violations before cases reach Strasbourg.

To be sure, no court gets every decision right, or pleases all parties. But even democratic governments sometimes make big mistakes. Some political leaders seem too preoccupied with their own disagreements with individual decisions to see the larger interest in preserving a European institution that commands widespread admiration.

The next two months will be telling. The UK, which currently holds the rotating Council of Europe Chair, has announced that it will seek adoption by April of a ministerial declaration on Court reform. Though a draft is now circulating in national capitals, the role of civil-society groups remains unclear. It is crucial that those who have the greatest stake in the ECHR – Europe’s people – participate meaningfully in these discussions.

In a time of financial constraint, the Court’s judges issue more than 1,000 rulings annually, many of great importance, for less than the cost of the EU’s publications budget. A half-century after its birth, the ECHR provides an invaluable public good, not just for Europeans, but for all people concerned with human rights anywhere. In the coming weeks, Europe’s governments will be measured by their commitment to the preservation of this vital global resource.

James A. Goldston is the executive director of the Open Society Justice Initiative. From 2007–2008 he served as coordinator of prosecutions at the International Criminal Court.

Vaira Vike-Freiberga, Antonio Vitorino: A German Europe?

LISBON/RIGA – Is the Europe that is emerging from the euro crisis a German one? During the euro crisis, power in the European Union seems to have shifted towards national capitals in general, and towards one national capital in particular: Berlin. But, with Germany introverted, France downgraded, and Britain semi-detached, the big story in European foreign policy is that the time has come for the little guy who thinks big.

In this Europe, the important moves are now sometimes made in Stockholm or Warsaw, not only in Berlin, Paris, or London. And, with major foreign-policy issues on Europe’s doorstep – whether in Egypt, Belarus, or now Syria – useful European initiatives are to be welcomed, regardless of where they originate.

Germany, in foreign policy as well as in economics, can exert decisive leadership in the EU – when it wants to. For example, together with Poland, it led the EU’s attempt to develop a coordinated approach to Russia, and it flexed its muscles on Serbia. But, on other issues – for example, Libya – Germany did not so much lead as use its newfound room for maneuver to follow its own preferences in the face of other EU members.

So the answer today to Henry Kissinger’s famous question about whom he should call when he wants to speak to Europe, is not necessarily “the German chancellor.” While Berlin is increasingly imposing its economic preferences on others in the eurozone, it is not prepared to use military force as a foreign-policy tool, as it demonstrated in the case of Libya.

Moreover, Germany, it seems, is becoming a “geo-economic power” driven by the needs of its export sector. By using economic means to pursue its foreign-policy ends, Germany is gradually turning its back on its European partners.

Meanwhile, as France experiences a loss of power relative to Germany on economic issues, it continues to play a decisive role in foreign policy. France led the Libya operation, and is doing much the same with attempts to impose stronger sanctions against Iran and provide support for the United Nations in Côte d’Ivoire.

But France’s unilateral approach often antagonizes its European partners. For example, French President Nicolas Sarkozy preempted a common European position on the Palestinian statehood bid at the UN in September. In other words, even when France leads, it does not always do so in a constructive way.

Apart from the decisive role that it played in Libya alongside France, Britain is becoming increasingly marginal in European foreign policymaking. Even before it vetoed a plan by eurozone countries to create a “fiscal union” at the European summit in December 2011, it was playing less of a leadership role than it traditionally has on key European foreign-policy issues.
Britain has continued to support EU enlargement, closer links with Turkey, and development in Africa, but it has not launched any creative initiatives to bring other member states along or change the terms of the EU debate. On other issues, such as engaging “strategic partners” – China and Russia in particular – the United Kingdom is often a follower as well.

As the “big three” increasingly pursue their own narrowly defined national interests, however, other EU member states are emerging as leaders in key foreign-policy fields. For example, Sweden – the 14th largest member state in terms of population, and eighth in terms of GDP – under the leadership of Prime Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt and Foreign Minister Carl Bildt punches considerably above its weight. Last year, it increased annual aid to North Africa by SEK100 million (€11.1 million), proposed an EU mission to Tunisia just a week after the revolution to support democratic aspirations there, and was an early and strong backer of UN resolutions in support of the uprising in Libya.

Poland, too, is emerging as a foreign-policy leader. Prime Minister Donald Tusk and Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski have particularly taken the initiative on the EU’s strategy towards Russia, where Poland has largely overcome its differences with Germany and is now at the forefront of efforts to develop a genuinely comprehensive approach. Poland has also led on European defense (though it declined to take part in the military intervention in Libya). This reflects the strength of the Polish economy, which is expected to grow by more than 3% in 2012 – faster than almost anywhere else in the EU.

Germany might be getting all of the attention in this time of crisis, but the last year has been a reminder that Europe is most effective and influential when the small countries get involved and join forces with – and even lead – the big ones. For example, on Iran (with exceptions like Greece), Europeans have united around a clear policy and collective positions, such as an oil embargo.

So, Poland and Sweden:  Europe needs your leadership. But that might not be enough in an EU with more than 500 million citizens. Other EU states need to follow their example in order to make European foreign policy truly effective and influential.

Vaira Vike-Freiberga is a former president of Latvia and Antonio Vitorino is a former Portuguese EU Commissioner for Justice and Home Affairs.

Vaira Vike-Freiberga, Antonio Vitorino: 德國的歐洲？

裡斯本/裡加——歐元危機中的歐洲成了德國的歐洲？歐元危機期間，歐洲聯盟的力量似乎已經向主要國家首都轉移，尤其是柏林。但是，德國轉內，法國降級，英國半獨立，在歐洲外交政策的大故事Ａ是，讓小家伙有大作用的時候到了。

在歐洲，這一重要舉措不僅出現在柏林、巴黎或倫敦，現在也有時出現在斯德哥爾摩或華沙。 歐洲門檻上的重大外交政策問題 - 無論是在埃及，白俄羅斯，或現在的敘利亞 – 實用的歐洲倡議是受歡迎的，無論它們源於何方。

德國無論在外交政策還是在經濟上，都可以在歐盟中發揮決定性的領導地位。例如，它與波蘭一起，帶領歐盟試圖建立與俄羅斯的協調關系，並延伸向塞爾維亞。但是，在其他問題上，例如利比亞，德國沒有為了自身利益在其他歐盟成員面前太多地使用回旋的新余地。

所以，今天對於基辛格著名問題有關當他想與歐洲對話時該找誰的答案不必再是德國總理了。雖然柏林在歐元區不斷加強其經濟上對別國的影響，但它不准備使用武力作為外交政策工具，正如它在利比亞所做的那樣。

此外，德國似乎因其出口部門的需求驅動而成為一個“地緣經濟力量”。用其經濟手段來實現外交政策目的，德國正逐漸背向其歐洲伙伴。

與此同時，法國經歷了相對德國來說在經濟問題上權力的損失，它仍在外交政策上發揮決定性的作用。法國引導利比亞運作，並試圖對伊朗實施更嚴厲的制裁，正如其提供對聯合國在科特迪瓦的支持一樣。

但法國的單邊主義做法往往使其與歐洲伙伴敵對。例如，9月份，法國總統薩爾科齊在聯合國巴勒斯坦建國投票中搶佔了歐洲共同立場。換句話說，即使由法國來領導，它也並不總是用這樣建設性的方式.

除了與法國一起在利比亞發揮了決定性的作用，英國在歐洲外交決策中變得日益邊緣化。盡管之前，在2011年12月的歐盟首腦會議上它否決了一項由歐元區國家提出的創建“財政聯盟”計劃，它在歐洲關鍵外交政策上的影響與其以前的傳統領導地位相比正在逐漸減弱。

英國支持歐盟東擴，發展與土耳其更密切的聯系及對非洲的開發，但還沒有推出任何創造性的舉措，使其他成員國支持或改變歐盟爭論的條款。在其他問題上，如搞“戰略伙伴”——特別是對中國和俄羅斯——英國往往也是支持者。

“三巨頭”越來越追求自己狹隘的國家利益，而其他歐盟成員國正在成為重要外交政策領域的領導者。例如，瑞典——成員國中人口排列第14位，GDP第8位——在首相賴因費爾特和外交大臣卡爾·比爾特的領導下，其影響力遠遠大於其排位。去年，它對北非的年度支援增加了100萬克朗（11.1百萬歐元），突尼斯革命一周后，它提出派一個歐盟代表團以支持那裡的民主意願，也是聯合國有關支持利比亞起義決議的早期和強大的支持者。

波蘭，也逐漸成為外交政策的領導者。總理圖斯克和外長西科斯基尤其在歐盟對俄羅斯的戰略上採取主動，波蘭已經在很大程度上克服了與德國的分歧，現在正努力發展真誠廣泛的途徑。波蘭也領導了歐洲防務（盡管它拒絕參加在利比亞的軍事干預）。這反映了波蘭經濟的實力，預計在2012年增幅將超過3％ - 比歐盟別的大部分國家更快。

德國可能在危機時刻得到更多的注意，但去年的情況証實，當小國同大國一起參與、甚至是領導時，歐盟會產生最大的效力和影響力。例如，對伊朗（希臘除外），歐洲各國都共有一個明確的政策和一致的立場，如石油禁運。

因此，波蘭和瑞典：歐洲需要你們的領導。但在一個擁有500多萬公民的歐盟來說這是遠遠不夠的。歐盟其他成員國需要以他們為榜樣，使歐洲的外交政策有真正的效力和有影響力。

Joseph E. Stiglitz: Whose World Bank?

NEW YORK – US President Barack Obama’s nomination of Jim Yong Kim for the presidency of the World Bank has been well received – and rightly so, especially given some of the other names that were bandied about. In Kim, a public-health professor who is now President of Dartmouth University and previously led the World Health Organization’s HIV/AIDS department, the United States has put forward a good candidate. But the candidate’s nationality, and the nominating country – whether small and poor or large and rich – should play no role in determining who gets the job.

 

The World Bank’s 11 executive directors from emerging and developing countries have put forward two excellent candidates, Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala of Nigeria and Jose Antonio Ocampo of Colombia. I have worked closely with both of them. Both are first-rate, have served as ministers with multiple portfolios, have performed admirably in top positions in multilateral organizations, and have the diplomatic skills and professional competence to do an outstanding job. They understand finance and economics, the bread and butter of the World Bank, and have a network of connections to leverage the Bank’s effectiveness.

Okonjo-Iweala brings an insider’s knowledge of the institution. Ocampo, like Kim, brings the advantages and disadvantages of being an outsider; but Ocampo, a distinguished professor at Columbia University, is thoroughly acquainted with the World Bank. He previously served not only as minister of economics and finance, but also of agriculture – a critically important qualification, given that the vast majority of the developing countries’ poor depend on farming. He also brings impressive environmental credentials, addressing another of the Bank's central concerns.

Both Okonjo-Iweala and Ocampo understand the role of international financial institutions in providing global public goods. Throughout their careers, their hearts and minds have been devoted to development, and to fulfilling the World Bank’s mission of eliminating poverty. They have set a high bar for any American candidate.

Much is at stake. Almost two billion people remain in poverty in the developing world, and, while the World Bank cannot solve the problem on its own, it plays a leading role. Despite its name, the Bank is primarily an international development institution. Kim’s specialty, public health, is critical, and the Bank has long supported innovative initiatives in this field. But health is only a small part of the Bank’s “portfolio,” and it typically works in this area with partners who bring to the table expertise in medicine.

Rumors suggest that the US is likely to insist on maintaining the perverse selection process in which it gets to pick the World Bank’s president, simply because, in this election year, Obama’s opponents would trumpet loss of control over the choice as a sign of weakness. And it is more important for the US to retain that control than it is for emerging and developing countries to obtain it.

Indeed, the more powerful of the emerging markets know how to live within the current system, and they may use it to their advantage. They will, in effect, obtain an IOU, to be cashed in for something that is more important. The Realpolitik of the moment makes fighting over the presidency unlikely; America may well prevail. But at what cost?

Should America continue to insist on controlling the selection process, it is the Bank itself that would suffer. For years, the Bank’s effectiveness was compromised because it was seen, in part, as a tool of Western governments and their countries’ financial and corporate sectors. Ironically, even America’s long-term interests would be best served by a commitment – not just in words, but also in deeds – to a merit-based system and good governance.

One supposed achievement of the G-20 was an agreement to reform the governance of the international financial institutions – most importantly, how their leaders are selected. Since expertise on development by and large lies within the emerging and developing countries – after all, they live development – it seems natural that the World Bank’s head would come from one of those countries. To maintain a cabal among developed countries, whereby the US appoints the World Bank president and Europe picks the International Monetary Fund’s head, seems particularly anachronistic and perplexing today, when the Bank and the Fund are turning to emerging-market countries as a source of funds.

While the US, the international community, and the Bank itself repeatedly emphasize the importance of good governance, a selection procedure that de facto leaves the appointment to the US president makes a mockery of it.

Okonjo-Iweala put the matter forcefully in an interview with the Financial Times: what is at stake is a matter of hypocrisy. The integrity of the advanced industrial countries, which have a majority of the votes at the World Bank, is being put to the test.

Joseph E. Stiglitz, a Nobel laureate in economics, has pioneered pathbreaking theories in the fields of economic information, taxation, development, trade, and technical change. As a policymaker, he served on and later chaired President Bill Clinton’s Council of Economic Advisers, and was Senior Vice President and Chief Economist of the World Bank. He is currently a professor at Columbia University, and has taught at Stanford, Yale, Princeton, and Oxford.

林和立: 馬上解散中聯辦！

中聯辦的權力與操控香港的力度在7月1號梁振英「登基」後勢將繼續膨脹，香港絕對冇運行！

中聯辦（全名乃中央人民政府駐香港特別行政區聯絡辦公室）肆無忌憚地干預香港內部事務已經不是新聞。值得關注的是，因為CY在低民望、低票下勉強當選，以習近平為首的中央港澳領導協調小組為了維持特區穩定，一定會指令西環加碼「捍衛」特首的權威。同時，梁特首在缺乏民意、大財團、甚至大部分公務員的支持下，極可能越發倚重中聯辦的龐大資源，落實「中聯辦治港」這恐怖政治藍圖。

之所以倡議立刻解散中聯辦，基於以下三大原因。

第一，中聯辦和一國兩制與《基本法》的「立法原意」與「指導思想原意」何止南轅北轍！「立法原意」這概念最近很時髦，親北京的政客都主張用這玩意來解決「雙非」孕婦等燙手山芋。但還有人記得鄧小平對成立特區的「理論原意」嗎？儘管發生了1989年的「動亂」後，老鄧很擔心「境外反華勢力」把香港演變成 「反共前哨基地」，但這位改革總設計師一直堅持他有關一國兩制的指導思想：特區除了國防與外交領域外擁有高度自治權，中央各單位不可以插手特區內政、不可以隨便在港設立機構。

這些考量都彰顯在《基本法》第二十二條，即中央與地方各部門「均不得干預香港特別行政區根據本法自行管理的事務」；「中央各部門、各省、自治區、直轄市如需在香港特別行政區設立機構，須征得香港特別行政區政府同意並經中央人民政府批准」等。還記得97前後，中南海大員曾認真考慮撤銷中聯辦的前身，即新華社香港分社。 90至97年擔任國務院港澳辦主任的魯平在內部會議便力主解散新華社；他的理由很簡單：「要充分體現一國兩制精神。」當然，亦有其他比魯平更左的官員反對幹掉新華社。但不可以說「解散派」輸了，因為「新記」的編制與人員在回歸後頭幾年的確精簡了不少，而且他們在特區的活動範圍與程度亦相應縮減。

2003年七一超過50萬人上街，中央在震驚兼震怒下揚棄了老鄧的遺訓，決定成立港澳領導小組來直接操控香港的政制發展與其他百分之百的內部事務。中聯辦遂「順理成章」地開始「西環統領中環」的勾當。 必須指出，《基本法》二十二條明文規定中央與地方在香港的機構及其人員「均須遵守香港特別行政區的法律」。但中聯辦在近屆立法會與區議會選舉期間多次明目張膽地為「愛國愛港」候選人拉票、配票，甚至涉嫌種票，不是抵觸了香港的選舉法例嗎？雖然「當奴」曾蔭權對西環眾多嚴重出位行為視若無睹，而且以其招牌式「見怪不怪」回答試圖推卸責任，但中聯辦屢次蹂躪香港的法治精神，應該馬上關門。

第二，就算從大陸一貫「無法無天」的法制與行政觀念看，中聯辦都可說是一頭怪胎！中國有三十一個省、自治區與直轄市，試問中南海在哪個地方設有如中聯辦這樣的「內派」機構？

當然，有評論界指出，在大陸每一個行政單位都有黨與政兩套班子。例如上海市便有中共上海市委與上海市人民政府等兩個衙門。根據這個邏輯，中聯辦「等同」香港特別行政區中國共產黨黨委或稱「香港區委」。儘管中南海在六四屠城後已叫停所有政治改革，但在行政領域倒做了些變革與精簡工作。例如每個省、市的黨與政 班子儘量避免重疊：一來減少資源浪費，二來防止黨政部門互相攻訐等內耗情形。幾年前中組部更規定，除了西藏與新疆外，省委與市委的領導層儘量簡化，一般不可以超過一名書記配兩名副書記。

從這標準看，中聯辦這個「香港區委」簡直是龐然大物！中聯辦有一主任與九名副主任，而且這號稱「聯絡辦公室」的巨無霸居然有23個包括宣傳文體部、協調 部、社團聯絡部、社會工作部、警務聯絡部等單位，聲勢浩大、蔚為奇觀，令人有 「阿爺臨天下」的震撼感。而且有為數不少的隱秘單位附設在中聯辦大樓內：除了安全與情報部門外，還有廣為人知的「心戰室」或「黑料收集發放中心」。有香港媒體更聲稱此神秘單位在近月的特首泥漿戰與廉政風暴扮演了某種腳色。反觀同時處理香港問題、同屬「部級」的國務院港澳辦，只有一主任配三個副主任，而且下 面只有如綜合司、聯絡司、交流司等五、六個部門而已！

第三，多隻香爐多隻鬼。尤其是在2003年前後，北京派了起碼幾千人員進駐中聯辦與其他駐港或明或暗的機構。這些幹部都視駐港工作為優差：除了享受特別津貼外，他們的配偶、子女與「關係戶」都可以利用其特權在香港大做生意。這就是為什麼中聯辦的幹部經常向中央誇大「反中亂港」分子與「外國反華勢力」如何聯 手在香港發動「顏色革命」等陰謀論，並勸北大人萬萬不能放鬆對特區的控制。中央一天擔心香港會失控，中聯辦的大官小官便可以繼續興風作浪、並利用其政治資源在港發大財！

鄧公在世時經常說香港五十年不變，他亦經常教誨涉港幹部要自律、不要破壞香港的法治、更不要利用他們與香港的關係經商等等。同時，小平同志亦反復強調，治港班子「應包括左、中、右人士」，且不妨多吸收些「中」、「右派」分子參加治港團隊。不到十五年什麼都變了。中聯辦諸公在港不但也文也武、囂張跋扈，有時 更大揮棍子教訓真正愛港愛國的民主派人士、知識份子、甚至特區官員！中聯辦一天不解散，香港的核心價值與國際大都會的優點絕對會在CY執政的五到十年間煙消雲散！

信報社評：保留QE3幻想 擺弄政策彈性

美國聯儲局發布公開市場委員會（FOMC）三月十三日會議紀要，顯示無意進行更多債券購買計劃，使聯儲局推出第三輪量化寬鬆措施（QE3）的預期進 一步降溫。在消息刺激之下，加上意大利和西班牙國債收益率飆升拖累歐羅，令美元指數回升。照當前美國經濟復蘇形勢看，本月底舉行的議息決策例會，相信聯儲 局也不會有新一輪的寬鬆措施動作。

會議紀要指出，基於今年一月和二月就業市場改善速度快於去年第四季、首次申請失業救濟人數持續下降、家庭實際可支配收入增加、製造業活動繼續擴張，使推出新一輪資產購置計劃的支持度較上次會議進一步減弱。

從這次議息例會後迄今，美國經濟復蘇步伐趨穩再得到支持。美國供應管理學會（ISM）周一公布的數據，三月份製造業採購經理指數由二月五十二點二，上升至五十三點四，顯示製造業擴張之勢不墜。

至於拉動美國經濟復蘇舉足輕重的消費環節，同樣處於改善路徑上。據商業部最新數據，二月份消費者支出創去年七月以來最快增速，消費開支總額約十一萬億美元，增幅為百分之零點八；個人收入也有進賬，較前一個月增加零點二個百分點。

再印證三月密歇根大學消費信心指數終值攀升至七十六點二，為去年二月以來最高水平，連串數據顯示消費情況續有改善；加上商務部對GDP的修訂數據，去年第四 季增長按年率計算實際上升百分之三，是自二○一○年第二季以來最佳的表現，相信令反對推出QE3的聯儲局「鷹派」更振振有詞。

然而，經濟增 速反覆的風險無疑也存在，其一是房地產市場「觸底」的穩定性基礎脆弱。如今抵押貸款的違約率明顯下降，但建築開支、新屋銷售仍然於低位徘徊。二月新屋開工 數量環比下跌一點一個百分點，房地產市場反覆未穩，制約了投資對經濟增長的貢獻。另一方面，消費雖好轉，但就業市場依然有隱憂。

據會議紀要，部分聯儲局理事對就業市場前景有保留。按紀要透露，「儘管最近就業數據振奮人心，但也有數據讓人感到有不可忽視的風險，亦即就業改善狀況可能隨着今年時間的推移而消失」。這一點，明顯與聯儲局主席貝南奇日前在全美商業經濟協會（NABE）發表的講話口徑一致。

貝南奇認為，要進一步改善就業，便需要加快經濟增長速度，繼續維持寬鬆政策，這番話一度刺激市場對聯儲局推出QE3的預期升溫。

看深一層，目下美國失業率由去年一月百分之九，下降至今年二月百分之八點三。不過，勞動參與率依然低企，持續退出勞動力市場的人口趨勢整體不變，今年一月比 率從去年十二月百分之六十四，降至百分之六十三點七，便一度令人質疑失業率回落與勞動參與率下降相關。二月份雖回升至百分之六十三點九，但仍然處於相對低 位。若比率回升，失業率不易下降。

另一方面，長期失業（逾二十七周或以上）的勞動力，佔總失業人口比重自二○一○年以來，一直徘徊約四成水 平，二月為百分之四十二點六，較一九八三年經濟低沉時百分之三十九還高。可以說，勞動參與率下降、長期失業人口佔總失業量比例改善速度緩慢，難免令人對就 業市場繼續好轉產生疑慮。

很明顯，美國消費動力改善，若得到就業市場好轉支撐，則QE3出台的概率繼續弱化。照目前形勢看，從貝南奇日前講話到昨天公開的三月上旬會議紀要，以「改善失業」作為進一步推出寬鬆措施的「缺口」，令市場對QE3的幻想不滅，聯儲局也據此繼續擺弄貨幣政策的彈性。

Joseph E. Stiglitz: 誰的世界銀行？

紐約—美國總統奧巴馬提名金辰勇為世界銀行行長之舉受到了廣泛好評——理應如此，特別是其他提名也已昭告天下之時。金辰勇是公共衛生專家，現任達特茅斯大學校長，此前曾擔任過世界衛生組織艾滋病部門。這是一個相當好的候選人。但候選人的國籍以及提名國——不管是大是小、是窮是富——不應該在人選決定中起到任何作用。

世界銀行的11名新興和發展中國家執行董事已經提出了兩位優秀的候選人：尼日利亞的奧孔喬-伊韋拉和哥倫比亞的奧坎波。我和這兩人都有過共事。兩人都是第一流的人才，在多個部門擔任過部長，在多邊組織擔任過要職且取得過令人稱道的表現，也擁有出色勝任所需要的外交技能和職業素養。他們懂金融和經濟、明了世界銀行的基本結構，也擁有能改善世行效率所需要的人脈。

奧孔喬-伊韋拉很了解世界銀行的內幕。奧坎波和金辰勇都是外部人士，這有利也有弊﹔但奧坎波作為哥倫比亞大學的杰出教授對世界銀行是相當熟悉的。他以前不但是經濟和財政部長，也當過農業部長——考慮到發展中國家的大部分窮人都得依靠務農生活，這是相當重要的資歷。他在環境方面也有令人印象深刻的經歷，這契合世行的另一大關鍵職責。

奧孔喬-伊韋拉和奧坎波都明白國際金融機構在全球公共品供給方面的重要作用。在兩人的職業生涯中，大量心血都奉獻給了發展和完成世行消除貧困的任務。對於任何美國候選人，他們都是相當高的標杆。

需要考慮的方面很多。發展中國家仍有20億人口生活在貧困之中，世界銀行不可能單槍匹馬解決這個問題，但需要擔起領導之責。世界銀行雖然挂著一個“銀行”的名字，但其主要職責是國際發展機構。金辰勇的專長——公共衛生——相當關鍵，世行產期以來也一直支持著該領域的創新活動。但衛生在世行的“組合”中隻是一個次要部分，而且通常隻是配合其他在醫藥領域領先的專業伙伴。

各路消息表明，美國可能會堅持要求有悖常理的選人程序，堅持世行行長人選由它確定，這樣做的唯一原因是2012是選舉年，奧巴馬的對手會將美國人不能問鼎世行行長寶座夸大為奧巴馬示弱的表現。此外，保持對該職位的控制之於美國要比獲得該職位之於新興和發展中國家更重要。

事實上，新興市場中實力較強者知道如何在現有體系中生存，並能利用現有體系。它們可以獲得一張白條，用之換取更加重要的東西。眼下，現實政治已使得行長人選指正毫無懸念，美國人將最終獲選。問題是代價多大。

如果美國堅持死握行長選擇過程控制權不放，那麼受害的將是世行自身。多年來，世界銀行的效益一直受著牽累，因為它在一定程度上被視為是西方政府及其金融和公司部門的工具。諷刺的是，就算是從美國的長期利益出發，最優選擇也是作出唯才是舉、改善治理的承諾——不僅僅是口頭承諾，還要見諸實踐。

G20的一個預期成果是達成關於國際金融機構治理改革的協議，其中最重要的部分就是領導人的選擇。如今，發展專家大體上都來自新興和發展中國家——畢竟，這些國家生活在發展中——因此，世界銀行行長應該出自這些國家中的一個似乎是理所當然的。維持發達國家的小算盤——美國人把持世界銀行、歐洲人把持IMF——在今天看來早已落后與時代，實在令人難以理解，因為世界銀行和IMF正在日益依靠新興市場作為資金來源。

美國、國際社會和世界銀行自身一再強調改善治理的重要性，但行長任命權實際歸屬美國總統這一事實讓這一切看上去頗為可笑。

奧孔喬-伊韋拉在接受《金融時報》採訪時強有力地批評了這一問題：一切充滿了偽善。發達工業國——它們在世界銀行投票中佔據著多數——的團結度正在接受考驗。

洪清田：「大和解」前先補補課

中國治港一直要學英人治港的「行政主導」，卻沒有進入「英人治港」的背境和內容裏觀照和理解，沒有客觀抽離的跨文化比較，只是從「中國世界觀」的 「前現代」主觀認知體系粗放式看，看到的是「行政專權君臨天下、操控整個政府運作、由上而下安排社會的繁榮穩定」。這樣看法和「指導思相」的每個組成概念 都是「中國化」，「行政主導」變為橘越淮而枳。

二三十年中國由內地到香港上上下下這樣「想」，十五年來這樣「做」，不得要領，梁振英五年以 新方式再試一次。糾正中國源遠流長、根深柢固的「指導思相」的盲點和誤區似是不可能的，只能期望較少犯錯或犯較輕的毛病。梁唐政綱都提「行政學院」和「文 化部」，如進入這層面，正確取向、認真規劃和落實，或許有所裨益。

香港成果 貢獻世界

香港對中國（及世界）的 一大價值是，在二百年的中西文化交流、衝突和融化過程中，混合中英的政經、法治行政、社會和生活方式、文化情理和身份認同，以較低的代價、較順遂處理人類 文化交流、衝突和融化常見的「深層次矛盾和問題」，形成獨特的「第三種文化」，成績斐然，不但成就自己，也貢獻中國和世界。

人類歷史上罕見 香港這樣長期穩定活在中西方這麼大文化差距和矛盾之中，而又產生這麼大的、完整的奇迹。眾多成因之一是，英人殖民秉承文藝復興（尤其是蘇格蘭文藝復興）以 來的理性、多元、開放、自由、科學和民主精神，在世俗實利私慾和倫理道德驅使下，一方面發揮人（個體和群體）的主觀能動和意識形態，一方面自覺人（個體和 群體）的魔性獸性、不足和局限，自覺分權制約和自制（這就是科學民主法治體制、文化和精神），相對維持均衡和公正。

英人文化較善於抽離事態 的進程，在歷史中順應大勢找尋內外各個階段的接駁和契合，追趕落後和避免過激過分、走向反面，較少長期積壓問題和危機總爆發、自造危機和自我折騰（這就是 科學民主開放體制、文化和精神）；又較不容由一時一地一人的成功者和建制精英，以「優勢壟斷優勢」（這就是科學民主自由法治多元體制、文化和精神）。

香港百多年成為世界級的自由港，得益於英國文化的科學民主自由法治多元開放體制、文化和精神，「（化外）中國人」和「香港人」和中國文化和各地文化的優點在 這體制、文化和精神中發揮中國幾千年沒有的燦爛成果。中英無意間讓雙方不同歷史發展階段的人、事、物和情理在香港「務實」接駁，由實踐檢驗成果是非優劣。

香港自由港是資本主義、帝國主義和英式殖民的產物，為英國主導的全球自由貿易而開埠，為自由經濟和商業服務輔以法治，在「相對（不）公平」下自由競爭。英人「行政主導」專注政治、管治和行政的專權壟斷，經濟和商業則（相對）放開，政府較少理，但要理也無（大）難度。

和解之前 須有自知

九七前的「行政主導」有二重性，一是英人的專權壟斷，一是社會大眾的自由空間、多元開放。兩者之間是法治、秩序和有效管治的紐帶。港人到七八十年代的黃金 期，也沒有政治、管治和行政的參政自由和自治權，三權分立不清晰。香港百多年本地培育的管治和行政精英（AO和工商和專業界的從政者）都算不上「政治人 才」。

「行政主導」包括：一、操作政府（行政機構）的日常社會運作、施政和政策；二、行政和廣義政府（立法司法）的關係；三、政治、管治和 行政人才的培育和人員的選罷和管理；四、行政機構與官員、社會和媒介的關係、公共行政和政策溝通；五、政治、管治體制和人員、公共決策和政策制定；六、政 治和管治、決策和政策的理念原理和人文價值；七、中西文化比較和中英關係；八、歷史湍流中的大環境、大氣候，向世界開放，接受全球的危機和風險的實踐檢 驗。這些層面之間有機聯繫，並「與時俱進」。

中國口講要「行政主導」，其實「政治主導」，又在「主權」保護下拒絕接受實踐的檢驗，結果一塌 糊塗，「行政」、「政治」和「管治」三失，強董建華和曾蔭權所難。現在治港的幾重概念、原理和實務系統交叉衝突下已亂了套，須從最根本處撥亂反正，系統化 理順關係和規律、遊戲規則。曾鈺成講的那種「大和解」是「最低消費」，但之前要補補課，坦然誠意務實面對時代和社會的認識和自覺的不足未知，開放一起學習 和總結。

蔡子強：政治板塊的撕裂與重組（後特首選舉的政治生態，系列之三）

上星期談過後特首選舉政治生態的兩大趨勢，即是：（一）中聯辦作為第二支管治隊伍從幕後走到台前；以及（二）階級矛盾超越政治矛盾，今天再談（三）政治板塊的撕裂與重組。

大和解未必會被輕易取信

這場醜陋的選戰，造成唐梁兩營怎樣的撕裂，相信不用我多費唇舌。這不是梁振英當選後喊幾句「大和解」的口號，說些「沒有梁營、唐營、何營，只有香港營」之類的漂亮說話，又或者邀請工商界多作幾次會面，出席一次半次「建制派飯局」，就可以順利化解的，那只不過是任何勝選者都會擺出的政治姿態而已。

反之，唐營一定會一段時間內抱觀望態度，看看梁營和中聯辦會否「秋後算帳」，剷除異己。第一個看點，一定是半年後的立法會選舉，看看梁營會否派人爭奪唐營核心支持者長期盤踞如金融、地產、工商界別的功能議席。

回歸後的工商界蜜月期已過

香港一線資本家及其利益體系是唐營背後的最大本地靠山，這點在唐英年最初遞交的提名中，完全可以反映得到。而他們對梁振英當選特首，以及其民粹主義路線，本來已經忐忑不安，而近日發生牽涉許仕仁和郭氏兄弟的廉政風暴，雖說可能只是廉署調查上時間上的巧合，很難說是梁營的部署，但卻始終會為工商界蓋上一層陰霾，各種小道消息不脛而走，對梁的猜忌只會有增無減，上個禮拜本欄談及的所謂「普京模式」，只會在中環更加被傳得繪影繪聲。

過往，工商界要買「政治保險」，多透過與北京疏通關係，建立多層次的溝通、游說管道。今回特首選舉，管道卻失靈，令他們在最後關頭才知押錯注，被殺個措手不及，就算紛紛北上陳情，卻無功而還。今次終於讓他們明白，畢竟「天心難測」，更重要的是，回歸早年北京要千方百計安撫資本家、不惜言聽計從的蜜月期早過，畢竟今天說的已改為「大國崛起」、「你要撤資，大陸資本多的是，幾多個香港都買得起」、「以我為主」等豪情壯語。再加上對「普京模式」的恐懼，會讓資本家明白到，建立一股強大、可預測、摸得透的民主制衡力量，才是辦法。所以，我相信他們今後會分散投資，投放更多資源於民主派身上。

「分組點票」的死穴被攻克

1980年代，北京在規劃九七後香港憲政體制時，經「高人」（種種迹象顯示是已故的羅德丞）指點，在《基本法》中引入「分組點票」，讓工商界可以通過功能組別議席，利用這個機制，對直選議員提出的訴求行使否決權。過去10多年來，這可說是無往而不利，縱使民主派取得近六成的直選議席。

9月立法會選舉的兩難

但若然工商界倒戈的話，那又會怎麼樣？答案就是，那會成了這個鐵桶政府體制的死穴。事實上，在梁的「西九漏報利益風波」中，唐營的功能組別議員，便已經和泛民的直選議員合作，雙劍合璧，攻破分組點票機制，通過引用《權力及特權法》傳召梁及其他證人作供，為梁平添不少麻煩。如果這種情况在梁上台後持續，他將面對持續的突襲和煩擾。

種種迹象顯示，選舉中梁的主要靠山是中聯辦。梁營雖被形容為一個營，但卻是人丁單薄，在議會中稱得上堅實的票，更可謂寥寥無幾。如果梁不在9月立法會選舉有所作為，藉這難得機會搶奪議席，建立自己的議會勢力，那麼便「蘇州過後無艇搭」，在議會內舉目無親，孤立無援。

但梁的兩難是，若然他真的要搶佔「橋頭堡」，那麼就會應驗了前述唐營「秋後算帳」的預言，指摘他剷除異己，有違北京「大和解」的期許。

由董治到曾治再到梁治 建制板塊的緣來緣去

九七回歸後的15年，香港政治版圖分成泛民vs.建制的兩大板塊。正如練乙錚先生所說：「當權派本來就是拼湊成軍，根本沒有在思想、利益等方面統一過；內裏有階級矛盾、財團矛盾、新老愛國矛盾、真誠為港與愛國為糖之間的矛盾。」

董建華早年，他尚算勉強能夠整合到建制板塊裏工商界與傳統愛國陣營這兩大塊，直到2003年七一50萬人上街後，田北俊所領導的自由黨出走，再加上民怨沸騰，民意強力反彈，形勢才急轉直下，讓他最終含恨「腳痛」下台。

到了曾蔭權上台，因為他被傳統愛國陣營視為殖民地年代有份打壓他們的「港英餘孽」，以及那個陷害自己高貴上司奧塞羅（Othello）的伊阿古（Iago），因而不被信任，「面和心不和」；再加上他心胸狹窄、刻薄寡恩、「寸嘴」壞事，因此自由黨等與他也關係緊張，但總算未鬧到反目成仇的地步。

但到了梁振英當選，情况就更加糟糕。他無疑得到中聯辦的一力支持，甚至讓港人出現「西環治港」的恐懼（見本系列之一的分析），但把中聯辦等同民建聯和工聯會的傳統愛國陣營這一塊，這無疑昧於形勢，後兩者與梁的互信和合作基礎，可謂仍然薄弱，梁營收集曾鈺成黑材料一事，仍是他們心頭上的一根刺。而工商界那一塊，不少勢力，或意憤難平，或惴惴不安，隨時會借題發揮，蓄勢而發。

比起董治年代，梁振英將發現自己需要駕馭一個暗潮洶湧的建制板塊，甚至稍一不留神，隨時一裂為二，再加上泛民板塊，形成「三國時代」，甚至「孫劉聯合抗曹」的局面。

施政將舉步維艱

而泛民板塊對梁振英，更是敵愾同仇，因為「西環治港」的威脅，再加上23條立法、普選特首高門檻等盛傳中梁的「政治任務」，泛民與梁班子開戰更是一觸即發。何俊仁選後更第一時間表態，除了官式場合之外，與梁的私下會面和交誼，敬謝不敏。

選後的民調顯示，梁仍只得四成的民望支持，比起當年曾蔭權選後的八成，及董建華的四成多五成，都遠遠不如。近兩個禮拜，他頻頻落區作親民show，但即使類似姿態能夠為他爭回一些民望，除非他能通過大幅度分享權力，諸如讓出大量政治助理、副局長、局長，以至副司長的職位作政治酬庸，給那個只是選前才勉強押注於他身上的傳統愛國陣營，拉攏他們組成管治同盟，否則的話，在薄弱的政治板塊基礎，以及議會支持下，相信他的施政仍然會舉步維艱。

孔捷生: 談談李鵬女兒的皮膚

當面讚李鵬女兒李小琳的「皮膚實在太好了」，涉嫌性騷擾；背後談論某女性的皮膚如何細膩白嫩，涉嫌「三俗」。但當事人李小琳覺得很受用，自己當之無愧，這就另議了。確有記者讚美李小琳容顏保養極佳，博得她嫣然一笑。記者讚美詞為「一點也不像四十三歲」，她這身皮就是佐證，「皮膚實在太好了」。

李小琳每次出鏡都令人驚艷，風姿綽約，雍容華貴，她早就說過，自己注意儀表，源於家教，母親朱琳諄諄教導她要舉止端莊，動靜得宜。李小琳說的應該沒錯，這一脈傳承來自母親，因為她父親行止很不得宜，八九年五月二十日宣佈戒嚴令時，李鵬面目之猙獰，肢體語言之凶狠，令天下人都難以忘懷。我自己也曾近距離觀察過李鵬，某年我從北京返粵，用政協委員（我曾係省政協委員）證辦理登機，本持經濟艙機票，卻不知為何被安排到頭等艙。前邊兩排空着，到起飛時間始見時任副總理的李鵬和一眾隨從警衞登機。於是全程將此公動靜收諸眼底，面對空姐殷勤服務，本係親民機會，卻博不來李鵬隻言片語，連茶水都是隨從代接。當時我就對他印象甚差，六四之後更不用說了。

話說今春兩會，李小琳身穿粉色套裝，如映日芙蓉，加上「實在太好」的皮膚，真是回眸一笑百媚生。就在兩會上李小琳提出給每個人「建立道德檔案」，讓每個公民都知恥，引來網議嘩然，有心者去搜索，發現她的粉色套裝是國際名牌 Emilio Pucci今年春夏新款，價錢折合人民幣一萬四千多元。

日前美國大使駱家輝出席「博鰲亞洲論壇二○一二年會」，下榻酒店超過了美國政府的公務出差標準，因而轉投另一酒店。李小琳也出席這次年會，她在「定義幸福和幸福社會」的專題圓桌會議上侃侃而談：「幸福是一種感覺」，為甚麼會產生不幸福之感，她稱：「很多都是從攀比心來的，所以產生了煩惱。」她進而指出：「社會上一個量入為出，提倡勤儉節約、健康的生活方式。」此說再度引起坊間民情洶洶。

原來一介屁民就要安於做螻蟻，不能有太多慾望，不要和別人攀比，否則就煩惱多多，失去幸福。不如建立「公民慾望檔案」，將人列為三六九等，量入為出，戒掉超前慾望和攀比之心，穿不起 Emilio Pucci套裝，就穿地攤貨，謂之反璞歸真；沒錢做皮膚保養，就風吹日曬，謂之親近大自然；吃不起山珍海味，就吃地溝油炒剩菜冷飯，謂之「勤儉節儉」；坐不起轎車就兩條腿走路，謂之「健康的生活方式」。如此每個中國人都將幸福得無以倫比。