Excerpt from
Inequality and the 1% by Danny Dorling
Conclusion: Towards a Fairer Society
Revolutions break out on ships, and utopias are lived on islands.
Judith Schalansky, 20121
José Gonzalo Rodríguez Gacha, a Mexican drug lord, was reputed to be so
rich that he had his four initials embossed in gold leaf on the toilet paper he
used. But, despite all the advantages of money, his life came to a horrible
conclusion. He killed himself in 1989 by detonating a grenade by the side of
his face, just after watching his son being shot dead by police. We have a
fascination with stories of great wealth, but clearly it is not always better
to be rich.2
To counter our older concepts about rich men – and their despair at
camels failing to fit through the eye of the needle – there exists a new, often
subconscious, message that existence is only fully realised with the aid of
great wealth. It is a message disseminated through the smiling faces on
magazine covers and on primetime television. Contrast these with the miserable
faces of the poor, or merely ‘normal’, that the media presents every day. Many
well-known television dramas in both the UK and US have at their heart the
implicit message ‘the rich only have your best interests at heart’. Think of
Downton Abbey.3
Our grandparents’ generation created the National Health Service while
ours came up with the National Lottery. That is a sad indictment of our times,
but it does at least allow a natural experiment to be carried out to answer the
question of what happens to people if they are simply given a large amount of
money. The answer, most often, is that they become rapidly and sometimes
rabidly more right-wing. In particular, lottery winners who live in poorer,
more left-leaning areas appear most likely to shift towards the right in their
political beliefs after having ‘come into’ some money. The relationship has
been shown to be ‘of a “dose-response” kind: the larger the win, the more
people tilt to the right’.4 Can it be so different for the very
rich?
Some 1 per cent of the UK’s top 1 per cent are lottery winners. In
October 2012 Camelot, the organisation that runs the UK National Lottery,
published research claiming that, since 1994, the 3,000 lottery winners who had
won over £1 million each – who had claimed a total of £8.5 billion between them
– had contributed £750 million to GDP, because each millionaire winner
generated roughly six jobs – servants, cleaners, gardeners and, in 5 per cent
of cases, personal beauticians.5 At no point did this study mention
the money taken out of the economy to buy lottery tickets – nearly £7 billion
in the year 2012/13 alone. Furthermore, the list of jobs created is hardly
edifying.
The Camelot-sponsored report made no mention of how often winning large
sums of money ruins people’s lives, despite the often heard story of the family
torn apart by its windfall. In November 2013 that story was of Adrian and
Gillian Bayford, divorcing a year after winning £148 million in the Euro
lottery – a win that, at the time, they said would bring their family closer
together. They had celebrated ‘with a pizza with their daughter, eight, and
son, six, before heading off on holiday to a Scottish caravan park’.6
Now their children see them separately. The Sun reported a neighbour commenting
on Adrian and Gillian: ‘It’s such a shame because they are a lovely family with
two young kids. And everyone around here was so happy for them when they won.
They worked hard all of their lives and then came into this wonderful bit of
good fortune. That’s why it’s so sad it’s ended like this.’7 But, of
course, such stories are as old as the hills.
In 1961, Viv Nicholson and her then husband won a small fortune on the
football pools, and vowed to ‘spend, spend, spend’. Since then, Viv has gone
through both widowhood and her third, fourth and fifth marriages. In 2007, at
the age of 71, having finally managed to conquer her alcoholism, she was living
on a pension of £87 a week, had an overdraft, and was searching for work.8
Even more extreme stories are now routinely told in the US, where it sometimes
seems as if people will do anything for the chance of a fortune and routinely
have their lives ruined through the ill effects of gaining riches.9
For millennia, we have known that greed harms and having too much can be
damaging; but we seem able to forget faster than we can remember.
In November 2013 Boris Johnson, Conservative mayor of London, made a speech
in which he explained why he believed that greed was good:
Like it or not, the free market economy is the only show in
town … No one can ignore the harshness of that competition, or the
inequalities that it inevitably accentuates [but] the top 1 per cent
contributes almost 30 per cent of income tax; and indeed the top 0.1 per cent –
just 29,000 people – contributes fully 14 per cent of all taxation.10
The implication is that those who grab the most for themselves also
somehow give the most back, even if unwillingly, through taxation.
The rich do not, in fact, pay tax very willingly, and certainly take far
more than they pay in tax. It is also very hard to argue that they have really
earned what they pay tax on through hard work, rather than guile. Income tax is
only 26 per cent of total government revenue – national insurance contributions
raise 18 per cent, and VAT raises 17 per cent.11 The rich pay such a
large proportion of income tax because their incomes are now so extraordinarily
large, because they have worked so hard to raise their take and swallow up so
much of what is available. Owing to VAT and other regressive levies, the 20 per
cent least well-off of all households pay 36.6 per cent of their income in tax,
while the wealthiest 20 per cent pay 35.5 per cent.12 Boris
Johnson’s figure of 30 per cent of all income tax revenue equates to under 8
per cent of all government revenues, so there is no way that the top 0.1 per
cent can be contributing 14 per cent of all taxation. Boris was wrong. When it comes
to numerical rather than verbal dexterity, he is not a ‘top cornflake’.
Boris went on to say that he wanted more social mobility: ‘to get back
to my cornflake packet, I worry that there are too many cornflakes who aren’t
being given a good enough chance to rustle and hustle their way to the top’.
His analogy is more apt than he realised. As with people, there is not that
much difference between one cornflake and another. To go on to suggest that
only the ones at the top are really worth very much would be absurd. You can
try to dismiss Boris Johnson as a buffoon, but he has many supporters and a
realistic hope of becoming the next Conservative leader. His words were
carefully chosen to appeal to the beliefs of his core supporters, although we
cannot know whether he believes them himself or is being consciously deceptive.
He may just crave power, and choose his words and shape his demeanour as a way
of winning votes.
The day after Johnson’s speech, the European Banking Authority issued
figures showing that 2,714 bankers in the UK in 2012 had each earned more than
€1 million (£833,000) – 11 per cent more people than in 2011, by far the
highest number of any country in Europe, and ten times the number in Germany,
which came second on the list. Average total pay – including salaries, pensions
and bonuses – for London’s top-earning bankers surged by 35 per cent to €1.95
million (£1.6 million) in 2012.13 In Sweden, only eleven
‘investment’ bankers earned more than €1 million that year; in Spain,
thirty-seven; in France, 117; in Germany, just one hundred – and in the United
Kingdom, 2,188.14 Of the 526 non-investment bankers in Europe
earning this amount, all were in the UK. The UK is not normal.
Similar trends were found among UK FTSE 100 chief executives, whose
total annual remuneration increased fivefold between 2000 and 2012 to hit an
average of £4.2 million. The pay of the next-best-off 150 UK CEOs also rose
quickly, but not quite as quickly, to average £1.1 million by 2012. Reporting
these statistics, and in contrast to Boris, Conservative MP Jesse Norman
explained that ‘no reputable study has found a significant correlation between
senior executive pay and long-term corporate performance’.15 The UK
has a very expensive problem that the rest of Europe has managed largely to
avoid: an overpaid and underachieving 1 per cent. They are expensive not just
in direct financial terms, but in terms of the damage they go on to cause. Pay
the most and you are likely to get the greediest, who in turn are unlikely to
curb the greed of those around them (lest their own greed be exposed). These
exceptionally highly paid bankers are the people who caused the financial
crisis in the UK. The subsequent Libor scandal dwarfed all previous financial
scams in the history of markets, and now there is a possibility that the Forex
scandal could be just as serious. And the UK’s banks are still by far the most
indebted in Europe.16 So much for paying the most to get the best.
In the UK, unlike anywhere else in Europe, bankers are protected by law
through the Corporation of the City of London, which is governed by a plethora
of unelected bodies including the Worshipful Company of International Bankers.17
The only place in the world where similar if even more bizarrely named bodies
can be found is the US, where organisations such as Kappa Beta Phi operate.
This is a semi-secret fraternity that was founded at the start of the Great
Depression, around 1929, and which includes among its members ‘both incredibly
successful financiers (New York City’s Mayor Michael Bloomberg, former Goldman
Sachs chairman John Whitehead, hedge-fund billionaire Paul Tudor Jones) and
incredibly unsuccessful ones (Lehman Brothers CEO Dick Fuld, Bear Stearns CEO
Jimmy Cayne, former New Jersey governor and MF Global flameout Jon Corzine)’.18
In early 2014 the fraternity was exposed in the British newspapers, one of
which reported that ‘the upper ranks of finance are composed of people who have
completely divorced themselves from reality’.19 The journalist did
not make the obvious connection to financiers in London. He was writing in the
Daily Mail.
Why does the UK appear determined to continue to be such an exception?
It is not just that the UK is home to almost all of Europe’s most greedy
bankers and highest-paid chief executives. The UK, and especially southern
England, is also the European exception when it comes to private education. As
we saw in Chapter 2, simply by segregating rich children from poor children,
private education encourages a sense of personal superiority.20
The sense of superiority engendered by private education is closely
related to that fostered in a segregated society – not least because the most
expensive schools could not continue to function as they do without a small
number of very highly paid individuals to pay the huge fees. Exclusive private
education, of which the UK has by far the most in Europe, often instils the
belief that others – educated by state or lesser private schools – are inferior
to your classmates, and that self-interest and the exploitation of those others
is good business. It is hard to see how it could avoid fostering a ridiculous
level of conceit. Why else would it be worthwhile for the parents spending so
much on their children if they did not believe that their children were, or
should be, worth far more than other children?
Private education is basically a financial investment expected to
generate a financial return. The existence of such a large private sector
compared to the rest of Europe makes other unusual divisions within UK
schooling appear normal. A number of Christian sects and Jewish state-funded
schools have existed for years. The new UK free schools policy allows any
religion or educational ethos to establish state-funded schools. All private
schools could apply to become free schools with government backing, unless of
course they want far more spent on their children than on others’. Variety is
not bad, except where the purpose is to push others down and your little group
up. We should not condone many times more being spent on the education of a
select few. By the same token, when there is less to go round, why do the poor
have to suffer the greatest cuts (see Figure 6.1)?
The UK is an oddity compared to the rest of Europe. The Coalition
government now plans tougher benefit cuts for the poor, having already reduced
the top rate of tax to 45 per cent for the very richest. It plans to reward the
top 1 per cent, giving a few of the rest of the top fifth slight increases in
their take-home pay in the years up to 2016 while everyone else is
impoverished. This conclusion is based on the Office for Budget
Responsibility’s own assessments of government policy.21 In the UK
the elite is unashamed of its selfishness. Elsewhere in Europe, where austerity
has been better shared out, the result has been that overall suffering has been
far less.22
Figure 6.1 Planned UK tax and benefit changes 2012
to 2015/2017
In the long term it is children who will suffer most from spending cuts,
rather than working adults or pensioners. The effects of the tax, benefit and
other spending measures now under way are far greater for households with
children, which make up only a third of all households in England, but which
will suffer around two-thirds of the cuts. On average, couples with no children
will lose 4 per cent, couples with children 9 per cent, and lone parents 14 per
cent of their net income. The spending cuts alone are equivalent to 2 per cent
of net income for couples with children in the top income decile, but 9 per
cent of net income in the bottom decile; for lone parents, these figures are 2
per cent and 11 per cent, respectively.23 Because of this, the
children’s commissioner for England remarked in June 2013: ‘We consider that
the overall impact of the tax-benefit reforms is likely to be in breach of
Article 2 of the UNCRC – non-discrimination.’24 A tiny number of
government measures will help a few children through early years and increase
some school spending, but the vast majority of measures will harm many more,
especially the children of the poorest and second-poorest tenths, and lone
parents’ children will suffer far more than those with two parents (see Figure
6.2).
There is a group that is even worse hit than those with children in the
UK: the youngest of adults. Already,since the recession, it is no surprise to see that the household incomes
of adults in their 20s have been falling faster than those of any other age
group since 2007–08. This is despite the fact that about 40 per cent of the
group live with their parents, and that this has tended to cushion the impacts
on their household incomes.25
In real terms, the median income of households containing those young
adults fell by 12 per cent over the following four years, after no growth in
the previous six years.26 But when it comes to suffering through
poor health, it is those over sixty-five, and especially poorer elderly women,
who have seen their life expectancy falling despite pensions being maintained.
As documented above, cuts to home visits have coincided closely with the
deteriorating health of the very elderly. Increased suffering can be identified
in almost every group – excluding the 1 per cent.
Figure 6.2 Relative effects of spending reduction of £29 billion by 2016
on families in England
When a society becomes as unequal as the UK now is, avarice rises. As inequalities increase, people already at the top become ever more motivated solely by greed. The source of inequality is a failure to control the greedy. Often they feel that they need more money despite all their wealth. They are made to feel that way because status and respect are increasingly measured in purely financial terms. Just over thirty years ago, Neil Kinnock, then Labour Party leader, remarked: ‘If Margaret Thatcher wins on Thursday, I warn you not to be ordinary. I warn you not to be young. I warn you not to fall ill. I warn you not to get old.’ What he did not add, which would have been most prescient, was: ‘I warn you not to reach adulthood alongside Thatcher’s grandchildren. I warn you not to be young then, not to want to study then, not to want a rewarding job then, or to grow old then.’ Years after Thatcher’s policies have made the rich so much richer and stripped so much power from the poor, Kinnock’s words are no longer a warning but a description. Had he known, he could have explained that in more equal societies there is much less need to be mercenary. When inequality rises, more people become less concerned about how their behaviour impacts on others.
Following the financial crash in the rich world, only six out of thirty
OECD countries saw a reduction in market (pre-tax and benefit) income
inequalities. Of all OECD countries, it was in Spain that disposable income
inequality rose fastest in the first three years after the financial crash.27
Ireland saw the highest increase in market income inequality, but state action
resulted in the increase in disposable income inequality being modest (see
Figure 6.3). The greedy used the crash to become richer, to buy assets cheaply,
and to make new profits out of others’ impoverishment. But it doesn’t have to
be this way. State action resulted in disposable income inequality falling in
another dozen countries, most dramatically in Iceland, reversing the changes in
market income inequality. Around the rich world the same shock is being handled
very differently from one country to another. The crash tended to increase
inequality, but there were large differences in how well various countries
succeeded in tempering that increase.
Source: European Centre for Disease and prevention
Control, ‘Health, Inequalities and the Financial Crisis’, 2013
Figure 6.3 Change in income inequalities in rich countries between 2007
and 2010
What is to be done? One option is simply to let things carry on as they
are, wait until the average price of property in London doubles to £1 million a
house, step back, and eventually watch the greatest bubble in history burst,
along with what is left of the credibility of London’s banks and finance
sector, which did nothing to stop the new bubble growing – and then hope that a
chastened and poorer country becomes more equal again. But that is a giant
gamble that might result in a poorer and even more unequal future.
What will it take for those towards the top of the 99 per cent who are
losing out, as well as those who are falling out of the 1 per cent, to realise
that even many people with healthy lifestyles and relatively well-paid jobs are
heading for a fall? Currently they just blame it on bad luck when someone like
themselves goes under, but eventually they will realise that it is due to an
unsustainable system – especially when they look at the dramatically varying
economic fortunes of their children and wider family.
In the world’s most affluent and unequal of countries, those at the top
often say that people are poor because there are too many of them, either too
many being born or too many immigrating. This is a common refrain of the elite.
David Attenborough recently put it more subtly: ‘We are such a densely
populated country … The world is only so big. You simply can’t go on
increasing forever, so something’s going to stop it. Either we can stop it or
the natural world will stop it for us.’28
David is wealthy enough to be a member of the 1 per cent, and he was quoted on
the BBC website having said this on the Today programme. When he says ‘we can
stop it’, he may not have a very wide conception of ‘we’. I think we can stop
inequality rising, and I know population growth is rapidly slowing; but part of
stopping the crises to come will involve confronting the views of many people
in David’s economic position.
Research published in Behavioural Ecology finds that elites like the 1
per cent can emerge when a lack of free-flowing information gives a few a
growing advantage. The effect of such rising elitism on the group as a whole is
doubly harmful. It is not only that less good gets done as the gaps between us
are widened, but that ignorance is fostered. Those with power simply know very
little about the lives of the majority. They can come to see ‘the masses’ as a
seething sea of out-of-control bodies; but, looking up from below, the powerful
appear to have very poor vision.
Technically speaking, rising elitism has harmed us all in the past
because ‘the loss of efficiency of stratification is due to the lengthened
information channels, whereas the additional loss of efficiency in the elite network
is due to the information bottleneck emerging between the elite clique and the
rest of the group’.29 The result is a rising culture of entitlement
that is damaging to all. Increasingly, the rich feel that they are entitled to
as much as they can possibly get away with – that they are entitled to say
outrageous things and that no one else is entitled to anything much.
In the US and UK, the culture of entitlement among the richest has
arisen that is not found to be as strong in other rich nations. Elitist views
and behaviour are now seeping into the mainstream, so that even the poor are
heard to call for lower taxes. That is how deep the confusion goes. A 2011
study of eighteen OECD countries found that the optimal top tax rate for the
marginal earnings of the very rich might be over 80 per cent. With that, a
country could increase productivity (which could be green productivity), while
‘no one but the mega rich would lose out’.30
The authors of the study show top tax rates to have fallen since the 1970s, and
the income share of the richest 1 per cent to have grown in almost perfect
correlation (see Figure 6.4).
Source: Figure 4 in: Alvaredo, Atkinson, Piketty
and Saez (2013) ‘The Top 1 Percent in International and Historical
Perspective’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 27: 3 (Summer 2013), pp. 3–20
Figure 6.4 The effect of top tax rates on pre-tax incomes of the top 1
per cent since 1960
Countries that have not reduced top income tax rates since the 1960s
have also prevented their elites from taking too much. It is clear that higher
taxation can reduce greed at the top more effectively than any other mechanism.
Put simply, if taking more for yourself gains you very little (because of what
the government takes), it pays to let that money go to people paying much lower
tax rates. High taxes at high incomes help the greedy to be less greedy. The
alternative is to see the 1 per cent become richer and richer, pollute more,
and lecture the rest of us on our behaviour, while they plot ever more
elaborate ways of behaving badly. This might include taking personal trips into
space – which makes flying private jets to Necker Island look like
environmental awareness. But a new mood is developing. The Wall Street Journal
asks: ‘Why do Leonardo DiCaprio and Richard Branson lecture us about carbon
consumption while plotting trips to space?’31
There are many positive signs that people are coming to realise that the
rich must be helped to take less. But we face a major problem that often
hinders progress: self-congratulation. In order to achieve long-term
improvement, it is necessary to retain a sense of anger. Stop to celebrate one
small victory (the locksmiths in Spain, the peoples’ parliament in Iceland, the
land tax in Ireland, new forms of protest in the US) and, before you know it,
the greedy have snatched back that little part of the wealth you had liberated,
and found another tax loophole. The left, greens and anarchists can appear a
dour bunch, because of their fear of being complacent and compliant. All of us
need to believe more strongly that better outcomes can be achieved – just as
feminists, anti-racists and democrats have done in the past.
A Slow Revolution
[The 1 per cent] have been able to divide everyone else by geography and
by identity. They have produced an unequal market system, and have privatised
public resources, pushing the costs on the rest of society … People
need to be citizens again, not consumers. They need to have more choices and
they need to demand more.
Elvin Wyley, speaking at Occupy Vancouver, 201132
What we need is a slow revolution. The 1 per cent cannot control itself.
It is easy to blame its members, but blaming them may exonerate others who,
while not having been so greedy themselves, could have acted and could still
act to curtail the greed of others. To gain entry into the 1 per cent often
requires a certain lack of self-restraint. It is up to the rest of us to
control these people – for their own good as well as ours. We can document
their greed, the size of their yachts, the frequency with which they fly and
the pollution caused by all the expensive vehicles they use to move around as
fast as they can; but documentation is not enough.33 This stupidity
needs to be halted. In the past it has not been revolution, in most cases, but
war that has quickly relieved the 1 per cent of much of its assets. Today a
non-violent war of attrition on concentrated wealth is needed, and it is
beginning.
In the US in 2013, the president finally acted. Top tax rates for the richest 1 per cent were increased from 35 per cent to 39.6 per cent of income received over a high threshold, and capital gains tax was increased from 15 to 20 per cent in that same year.34 There are now many calls to increase these rates even more, raising capital gains taxes up to a maximum rate of 50 per cent for the very richest Americans. Many of these calls are coming from much nearer the mainstream than has been the case for decades. Celebrate ever so slightly, have a beer, smile a bit more – but above all else do something to help build the momentum.
Why did the US president act in 2013? One answer is that in the US it
became clear by the summer of 2012 just how enormous the fallout from the
financial crash was:
median wealth plummeted over the years 2007 to 2010, and by 2010 was at
its lowest level since 1969. The inequality of net worth, after almost two decades
of little movement, was up sharply during the late 2000s. Relative indebtedness
continued to expand [from 2007 to 2010], particularly for the middle class,
though the proximate causes were declining net worth and income rather than an
increase in absolute indebtedness. In fact, the average [new] debt of the
middle class (in real terms) plunged by 25 percent.35
In other words, the middle were becoming poorer through no fault of
their own – and falling into ever greater debt to the richest despite not
having asked to borrow more.
The calls to curtail the excesses of the 1 per cent in the US are not
made now in obscure outlets, but – at the extreme – in Forbes, the favoured
journal of the rich.36 Even Forbes writers who have been hedge-fund
managers, and have headed the Fortunes and Options Division of Lloyds TSB bank,
can see what is coming and say: ‘We can’t afford another Dust Bowl.’37
It is not hard now to collect hundreds of calls for change coming from all
directions, but will they be enough? A slow revolution is hard to sustain, and
it has many enemies.
How are the very richest in the US reacting to the threat to their
wealth? Some are playing the markets and try to move their money abroad;38
others are writing directly to their employees recommending that they do not
vote Democrat. Until 2010 it was illegal for companies to act in this way, but
corporate executives lobbied to change the law so that they could spend part of
their profits on trying to entice their employees to vote to keep company profits
high and their employer’s wage and tax bills low. A slow revolution requires
repeatedly exposing such bullying attempts to persuade people to act against
their own interests.
Major US companies now send their employees letters recommending that
they vote Republican. Before the last US presidential election, ‘some letters
warn[ed] that if President Obama [was] re-elected, the company could be harmed,
potentially jeopardizing jobs’.39 Simply expressing slightly
progressive views in the office will mark you out as a threat not only to your
bosses, but also to your peers. One lawyer who commented on the story noted,
‘By hinting at the possible loss of employees’ jobs, [it] appeared to cross the
line into improper coercion.’
In the US Obama may be no saint, but he ‘enrages the 1 per cent’40
because he explains to the wider population that it has been their business
strategies which have enriched the elite and impoverished the middle of
American society. He is also finally starting to act because his policy advisors
can now show him so easily how far countries like the US and the UK are out of
step. Information about the 1 per cent has entered the public domain, touching
off a ferocious response, and a level of vitriol not seen for decades. Between
1981 and 2002 the attitudes of the majority of Americans had no significant
impact on public policy.41 Now that is changing.
The UK is different. In the UK the prime minister was a member of the 1
per cent by dint of his wealth long before he entered parliament. He presides
over a cabinet containing more members of the 1 per cent than has been the case
for decades, and has appointed a series of close advisors not just from the 1
per cent, but often from his own school; and, hardly surprisingly – and unlike
Mr Obama – he does not explain to his electorate how the business strategies of
his friends have impoverished the middle of British society. As even Cameron’s
secretary of state for education, Michael Gove, complains: ‘Mr Cameron, who
went to Eton, numbers four Old Etonians among his inner circle: Oliver Letwin,
minister for government policy; Jo Johnson, head of his policy unit; Ed
Llewellyn, chief of staff; and Rupert Harrison, George Osborne’s chief economic
adviser.’42 Is it any wonder inequalities in the UK continue to
rise?
In the UK the leader of the opposition, Ed Miliband, although to the
left of Obama, takes conspicuous care not to enrage the 1 per cent. Instead, he
speaks very tentatively: ‘The early signs, Miliband claims, are that the
greatest beneficiaries of a recovering economy will also be a privileged few.
Rewards in the banking sector in London grew nearly five times faster than the
wages of the average worker last year. He argues this is not an accident, but a
function of how the coalition views growth can be achieved.’43 Such
carefully worded statements are more than a generation away from Denis Healey’s
promise of February 1974 to ‘squeeze property speculators until the pips
squeak’ – and Healey was to the right of Labour at the time.44
When you hear of slow progress in the UK and US, it may surprise you to
learn that income inequality may not be rising everywhere. Globally, according
to the World Bank, inequality has been falling since 2000. In Brazil income
inequality peaked in the 1980s. In the US it is currently at a peak, but in
Sweden it appears to have been falling again just as it has fallen worldwide
(see Figure 6.5).45 Such claims for falling worldwide inequality
are, of course, disputed; and measures of inequality that are more sensitive to
the 1 per cent taking an ever greater share may not be as forgiving of extreme
greed as the Gini coefficient; but inequalities within the middle of the
distribution can nonetheless fall.
Source: Branko Milanovic, 2012
Figure 6.5 Global and selected countries’ income inequality Gini
coefficients 1966–2006
Shortly after the release of the 2012 World Bank report suggesting that
global income inequality was falling, another organisation published its major
findings, stating: ‘Poverty has not declined to the extent claimed and inequity
has risen.’46 It may be that, between the mildly rich and the
relatively poor, some equalisation is occurring. Whatever the precise global
trend is, it remains the case that inequality has risen more in the US and the
UK than elsewhere, and that, because other places have had more success in
preventing this trend, it is not inevitable that it should continue.
Increasingly, inhabitants of the US and the UK are learning from the example of
other countries, coming to conclude, as Uffe Elbaek and Neal Lawson recently
did: ‘For the first time in a long time, radical egalitarian democrats face a
future in which there is hope, real hope.’47
Less than one hundred years ago we had very little idea just how unequal
our society was. Hugh Dalton, a boy from Eton, was awarded a PhD in 1920 from
the University of London, and wrote an academic paper on income inequality in
the UK.48 He concluded his study with a declaration that ‘the chief
practical necessity is the improvement of existing statistical information,
especially as regards smaller incomes’. He described measures of variance and
distribution that were only just being discovered. In 1945 he became chancellor
of the exchequer, where he helped the UK to become more equal, and helped the 1
per cent to contribute more and to become less of a drain on the nation,
continuing a tradition that had begun in 1918 and would run through to 1978.
Orthodox economics suggests that, in the long run, prices and incomes
will come back into alignment. It also provides a bizarre justification as to
why some nations are rich and others are not.49 Marxists say that
price and value are a product of underlying social relations, not free-floating
market forces. Keynesians say that in the long run we are all dead, and thus
need to do something about the short run. All should know that the rich are
currently being let off the hook, all those from the bottom of the 1 per cent
up to those in control of the largest corporations. In 2012 Barclays ‘secured a
non-prosecution agreement and agreed to pay a penalty of more than $450
million, a comparatively paltry sum for a bank that had more than £32 billion
($50 billion) in revenue in 2011’.50 But in 2013 Barclays was forced
to begin to reveal more of its activities in order to avoid paying part of a
$4.3 billion EU antitrust penalty.51 The 1 per cent is finding it
progressively harder to hide its money and its corruption.
Many people argue that concerted political action, including much more
effective banking regulation, is needed to address the problem of increasing
inequality. A global tax on capital was seriously proposed in 2014 by Thomas
Piketty, one of the world’s leading economists, and a best-selling author in
the US and UK that year.52 But successful social movements in the
past, rather like the victors in wars, wrote their own history, and may have
overstated the importance of overt politics. Campaigners want to say why they
mattered; academics want to try to influence policy, and so look for evidence
of their personal impact. But much change consists of gradual, almost
imperceptible, transformation – a slow revolution of the wheel, a change in the
mood, a subtle shift in what becomes morally acceptable, one that is almost
never due to any great leaders or great speeches. Gradual transformations in
societal motivations are not easily monitored. It is often not obvious how they
occurred, and usually difficult to quantify their extent.
Today, another such transformation may be under way – a slow revolution
in attitudes to greed. The highest-ever level of concern about rising
inequality in Britain was recorded by Ipsos MORI in their winter polling of
2013.53 Trends can form without the necessity of a lobby group or an
organisation trying to profit from them. ‘Societal motivation’ and ‘changing
fashion’ are almost synonyms. By December 2013, further polling evidence
revealed that most UK voters believed any recovery was likely to favour the
wealthy few rather than ‘families like them’, and that a majority favoured
taxing the rich more rather than further cuts, especially to protect key
services like health and education.54 By that year we were no longer
surprised that the majority thought this way – only that the rich still did not
get it.
As pointed out earlier in this book, but well worth considering again in
conclusion, in 2009 the ailing commentator and journalist Clive James
predicted: ‘Getting rich quick – and having much more money than you ever need
– will look as pointless as taking bodybuilding too seriously.’55 He
helped begin the slow revolution. He explained how this kind of change has
happened before, using the example from long ago of when the codpiece went out
of fashion. That item of clothing, designed to create the illusion of a large
penis, went from being normal in one era to the object of ridicule in the next.56
James mocked the greediest of bankers: they were not just bad, they were
embarrassments.
But it may not be us, or any activism at all, or any great change in mood or huge social transformation that changes things, and it may be that a slow revolution is not enough. But the rise in the income and wealth of the 1 per cent will come to an end, because it always does.
Just before he died, another veteran commentator, Alexander Cockburn,
wrote: ‘Is it possible to reform the banking system? There are the usual
nostrums – tighter regulations, savage penalties for misbehaviour, a ban from
financial markets for life. But I have to say I’m dubious. I think the system
will collapse, but not through our agency.’57 Alexander was
certainly correct that, if the greed of the 1 per cent is not controlled, then
the system will collapse. But just as the Elizabethan age did not end with men
wearing larger and larger codpieces until they could no longer stand, so our
current world may not come to an abrupt halt when – one day – a company
realises that the severance pay it has promised a departing chief executive
equals all of its turnover, and it has to close, triggering a cascade of more
closures until all the pay-outs are worthless.58
These two points of view, both offered by people towards the end of
their lives, are widely varying in prescription. One says that salvation is
already upon us – it is just that we have not yet noticed that getting rich
quick has lost its lustre. The other says that the end is nigh because of
greed, and all will not end peacefully. Both agree that in the UK and US we
cannot continue to allow the 1 per cent to take ever more, and drive inequality
up ever higher (see Figure 6.6). Both predictions agree that it will end. The
only question is how.
Source: Equality Trust, 2012
Figure 6.6 The price of inequality, four countries, 2012