高樓低廈,人潮起伏,
名爭利逐,千萬家悲歡離合。

閑雲偶過,新月初現,
燈耀海城,天地間留我孤獨。

舊史再提,故書重讀,
冷眼閑眺,關山未變寂寞!

念人老江湖,心碎家國,
百年瞬息,得失滄海一粟!

徐訏《新年偶感》

2012年6月13日星期三

Dani Rodrik: The End of the World as We Know It / 正如我們所預料的世界末日




CAMBRIDGE – Consider the following scenario. After a victory by the left-wing Syriza party, Greece’s new government announces that it wants to renegotiate the terms of its agreement with the International Monetary Fund and the European Union. German Chancellor Angela Merkel sticks to her guns and says that Greece must abide by the existing conditions.

Fearing that a financial collapse is imminent, Greek depositors rush for the exit. This time, the European Central Bank refuses to come to the rescue and Greek banks are starved of cash. The Greek government institutes capital controls and is ultimately forced to issue drachmas in order to supply domestic liquidity.

With Greece out of the eurozone, all eyes turn to Spain. Germany and others are at first adamant that they will do whatever it takes to prevent a similar bank run there. The Spanish government announces additional fiscal cuts and structural reforms. Bolstered by funds from the European Stability Mechanism, Spain remains financially afloat for several months.

But the Spanish economy continues to deteriorate and unemployment heads towards 30%.  Violent protests against Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy’s austerity measures lead him to call for a referendum. His government fails to get the necessary support from voters and resigns, throwing the country into full-blown political chaos. Merkel cuts off further support for Spain, saying that hard-working German taxpayers have already done enough. A Spanish bank run, financial crash, and euro exit follow in short order.

In a hastily arranged mini-summit, Germany, Finland, Austria, and the Netherlands announce that they will not renounce the euro as their joint currency. This only increases financial pressure on France, Italy, and the other members. As the reality of the partial dissolution of the eurozone sinks in, the financial meltdown spreads from Europe to the United States and Asia.

Our scenario continues in China, where the leadership faces a crisis of its own. The economy’s slowdown has already exacerbated social conflict, and recent developments in Europe have added fuel to the fire. With European export orders canceled en masse, Chinese factories are faced with the prospect of massive layoffs. Demonstrations begin in major cities, calling for an end to corruption among party officials.

China’s government decides that it cannot risk further strife and announces a package of measures to boost economic growth and prevent layoffs, including direct financial support for exporters and intervention in the currency markets to weaken the renminbi.

In the US, President Mitt Romney has just taken office, following a hard-fought campaign in which he derided Barack Obama for being too soft on China’s economic policies. The combination of financial contagion from Europe, which has already led to a severe credit crunch, and a sudden flood of low-priced imports from China leaves the Romney administration in a bind. Against the advice of his economic advisers, he announces across-the-board import duties on Chinese exports. His Tea Party backers, who were critical in mobilizing electoral support for him, urge him to go further and withdraw from the World Trade Organization.

Over the next few years, the world economy slumps into what future historians will call the Second Great Depression. Unemployment rises to record-high levels. Governments without fiscal resources are left with little option but to respond in ways that will only exacerbate problems for other countries: trade protection and competitive exchange-rate depreciation. As countries sink into economic autarky, repeated global economic summits yield few results beyond empty promises of cooperation.

Few countries are spared the economic carnage. Those that do relatively well share three characteristics: low levels of public debt, limited dependence on exports or capital flows, and robust democratic institutions. So Brazil and India are relative havens, even though their growth prospects are severely diminished as well.

As in the Great Depression, the political consequences are more serious and hold longer-term significance. The eurozone’s collapse (and, for all practical purposes, that of the EU itself) forces a major realignment of European politics. France and Germany compete openly as alternative centers of influence vis-à-vis the smaller European states. Centrist parties pay the price for their support of the European integration project, and are repudiated in the polls by parties of the extreme right or extreme left. Nativist governments begin to kick out immigrants.

For nearby countries, Europe no longer shines as a beacon of democracy. The Arab Middle East takes a decisive turn towards authoritarian Islamic states. In Asia, economic strife between the US and China spills over into military conflict, with increasingly frequent naval clashes in the South China Sea threatening to erupt into a full-scale war.

Many years later, Merkel, who has withdrawn from politics and become a recluse, is asked whether she thinks that she should have done anything differently during the euro crisis.  Unfortunately, her answer comes too late to change the course of history.
A remote scenario? Perhaps, but not remote enough.

Dani Rodrik is a professor at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government and a leading scholar of globalization and economic development. His writings are a compelling combination of international and development economics, history, and political economy, and often challenge prevailing orthodoxy about which policies best promote growth. His most recent book is The Globalization Paradox: Democracy and the Future of the World Economy.


正如我們所預料的世界末日

劍橋——考慮一下下列情景。在希臘的左翼激進黨派取得勝利後,新一屆希臘政府表示想要與國際貨幣基金組織和歐盟重新商討之前協定中的一些條款。但是德國總理安吉拉·默克爾堅持認為希臘必須遵守當前條件。

由於害怕金融崩潰日益臨近,希臘的存款者們紛紛涌向銀行取錢。這一次,歐洲央行拒絕提供救助,希臘銀行的現金儲備都極度短缺。於是希臘政府建立起資本控制,並且最終不得不發行德拉克馬貨幣以增加國內流動性。

隨著希臘退出歐元區,全世界都把目光投向西班牙。一開始德國和其它國家都信誓旦旦地表示他們將盡其所能來阻止西班牙出現類似的銀行破產情況。西班牙政府也宣布增加財政削減幅度並進行結構改革。在來自歐洲穩定機制的資金的支持下,西班牙的經濟狀況又穩定了幾個月。

但是西班牙的經濟仍然持續衰退,失業率飆升至30%。總理馬裡亞諾·拉霍伊實行的緊縮措施遭到人們的強烈抗議,致使他不得不進行全民公投。由於他所領導的政府沒有得到選舉人的足夠支持,隻好辭職,這樣一來西班牙卻陷入更深的政治混亂之中。此時德國總理默克爾停止了對西班牙進行更多的幫助,她表示辛勤工作的德國納稅者們做的已經足夠多了。僅在很短時間內,西班牙一家銀行破產,金融危機出現,該國也將要退出歐元區。

在一次匆忙召開的小型峰會上,德國,芬蘭,奧地利和荷蘭都宣布他們不會放棄他們的共同貨幣——歐元。這只會給法國,意大利和其它歐盟成員國帶來更多的金融壓力。由於現實中歐元區已陷入了部分解體,金融危機就從歐洲蔓延至美國和亞洲。

在中國這一情景也在發生,因為中國領導人也面臨一場他們自己國家的危機。經濟的下滑已經加劇了社會矛盾,而最近歐洲態勢的惡化又算是火上澆油。隨著出口歐洲的訂單被大量取消,中國的許多工廠都面臨大規模倒閉。一些大城市已經開始了示威活動,要求遏制政府官員中的腐敗行為。

中國政府決定不能進一步冒著加劇沖突的風險,於是宣布實施一系列措施來刺激經濟增長,抑制失業率的增加,包括對出口者進行直接的財政補助,並且干預外匯市場來削弱人民幣。

在美國,剛上任的共和黨總統米特·羅姆尼在隨後進行的艱苦拼搏的競選運動中嘲笑奧巴馬對中國經濟政策的態度太軟弱了。與歐洲經濟的蔓延相結合已經導致了嚴重的信貸危機,而突然間從中國大量涌入的廉價商品都讓羅姆尼的團隊陷入困境中。羅姆尼沒有採取其經濟顧問的建議,而是要求對中國出口物征收進口稅。那些在動員選民支持中起關鍵作用的茶黨支持者們敦促羅姆尼態度應更加強硬一些,甚至要退出世界貿易組織。

再過幾年,世界經濟的衰退程度會被未來的歷史學家們稱為第二次大蕭條。失業率會攀升至前所未有的高度,許多政府由於沒有資金來源,隻能採取一些會加重別國問題的措施——貿易保護以及競爭性匯率貶值。由於各國都進入經濟上的閉關自守,頻繁召開的全球經濟峰會除了能帶來要加強合作的空口承諾,再無其它幫助。

很少有國家能在這場經濟毀滅中幸存下來,而那些相對能較好幸存下來的國家都滿足三個特點:低水平的公共債務,對出口和資本流動的有限依賴,以及強健的民主體系。這麼看來巴西和印度相對而言都屬於天堂之地,盡管他們經濟增長的前景也極大降低。

在大蕭條中,政治上的後果更為嚴重,也會產生更長遠的影響。歐元區的瓦解強迫歐洲政治進行一次重大改組。法國和德國已經公開競爭,看誰能成為對歐洲較小國家產生影響的中心。中間黨派為支持歐洲一體化付出代價,卻在投票中遭到極右或者極左黨派的批判。本土主義者領導的政府開始驅逐移民。

在最近的幾個世紀中,歐洲不再是耀眼的民主的燈塔。阿拉伯中東地區對獨裁的伊斯蘭國家的態度有了決定性的轉變。在亞洲,中美間經濟上的矛盾正擴展為軍事上的斗爭。在中國南海地區兩國間的海軍沖突日益頻繁,潛伏著可能會爆發成全面戰爭的威脅。

許多年後,有人會問已經退出政壇隱居起來的默克爾總理,她認為她是否應該在歐元區危機期間做一些不一樣的事。很不幸的是,她的答案來的太晚,已經無法改變歷史的進程了。

這是否是個遙不可及的場景假設呢?或許吧,但是這並沒有那麼遙遠。