Indonesia
has reason to be confident. Less than two decades after the 1997-1998
Asian financial crisis ravaged the economy and provoked a social and
political upheaval that ended President Suharto’s three-decade-long
rule, Indonesia is a member of the G-20 and boasts the world’s 15th
highest GDP.
Moreover,
Indonesia’s mainly Muslim population is predominantly moderate, and the
country has been able to overcome most of its internal security
problems, including the secessionist movement in Aceh and various
large-scale communal conflicts. East Timor’s independence in 2002 ended
years of violent struggle.
But
Indonesia still faces domestic challenges. For example, the country’s
reputation as a model of Muslim moderation has recently been undermined
by intolerance and violence against religious minorities. And, after
eight years under President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, the country faces
elections next year.
Nevertheless,
Indonesian leaders’ primary concerns – and ambitions – lie in the
country’s foreign relations. In particular, China’s territorial claims
in the South China Sea have divided ASEAN member countries, forcing
Indonesia to perform a difficult balancing act as it seeks to maintain
stable relations with China while addressing the rift within the region.
Since
achieving independence after World War II, Indonesia has pursued a
“free and active” foreign policy, preferring to protect its own
interests rather than align itself with more powerful countries.
Indonesia’s activist approach, whereby it assumes a leadership role both
in the region and globally, has been driven simultaneously by supply
(domestic popular sentiment) and demand (the country’s international
partners).
Two
distinct foreign-policy legacies inform the Indonesian public’s
expectations and the government’s choices. Sukarno, Indonesia’s first
president after independence, adopted a confrontational stance, making
Indonesia a leader of the Non-Aligned Movement. But, while this
“lighthouse” foreign-policy approach increased Indonesia’s international
clout, it led to encirclement by hostile Western powers – and to
bankruptcy.
Sukarno’s
successor, Suharto, embraced a more pragmatic and low-profile foreign
policy aimed at creating an environment in which Indonesia could develop
economically. This included working toward regional stability in
Southeast Asia, as well as nurturing relations with the United States,
Japan, and key European countries, in order to gain access to external
markets, foreign investment, and technical assistance. But, while
Suharto’s approach supported economic progress, critics charged that it
betrayed the spirit of the 1945 constitution, which calls for Indonesia
to play an active role in fostering world peace.
Seeking
to reconcile often-contradictory demands for idealism and pragmatism,
Indonesia has once again adopted a more activist approach to foreign
policy. But staying on course has not been easy. Although some analysts
argue that Indonesia has outgrown ASEAN and should chart an independent
course, the government has remained firm: ASEAN will remain the
cornerstone of its foreign policy.
That
stance is driven less by a sense of insecurity than by confidence in
“ASEAN centrality” – that is, its member states’ ability to shape the
regional order and realize a common destiny on their own terms, without
foreign meddling. Viewing ASEAN as indispensable for managing relations
with major powers, Indonesian policymakers believe that the bloc should
be ambitious about spreading its code of conduct, and that it should
drive initiatives for creating a regional architecture in East Asia.
Given
this, Indonesia’s opposition to the idea of an East Asian community –
comprising ASEAN, China, Japan, and South Korea – was unsurprising.
Instead, it backed the more inclusive East Asia Summit, which brings
together leaders from ASEAN and its eight key partners – China, the
United States, Japan, India, Russia, Australia, South Korea, and New
Zealand. Indonesia hopes to create a looser and more pluralistic
grouping that would not be dominated by one or more powers, thereby
allowing ASEAN to continue to play the central role of convener.
By
contrast, Indonesia’s role in the G-20 remains limited, as does its
potential to act as a representative for developing countries. But,
unlike the more confrontational BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and
South Africa), Indonesia hopes to foster cooperation among developed
and developing countries. It has also sought a leadership role on such
strategic global issues as climate change and inter-faith dialogue.
Furthermore,
Indonesia has worked to promote democracy. For example, since 2008, it
has hosted the annual Bali Democracy Forum, at which representatives of
established and aspiring democracies share their experiences. Such
initiatives underscore the global attention focused on Indonesia, a
Muslim-majority democracy, in the wake of the Arab Spring. Indeed,
various Arab countries, notably Egypt and Tunisia, are seeking
Indonesian leaders’ advice on balancing Islam and politics.
Such
efforts have not always been popular with Indonesia’s ASEAN partners,
owing to concerns that they breach ASEAN’s rule of non-interference in
other countries’ internal affairs. But they have contributed to progress
in important areas. For example, Indonesian officials have encouraged
reform in Myanmar, helped to bring about an end to the border conflict
between Thailand and Cambodia, and pushed for democracy and human rights
to be enshrined in an ASEAN political and security community.
Ultimately,
however, Indonesia’s clout stems from its soft power. So, while
Indonesians may court the global spotlight, their chief concerns should
be fostering strong and stable economic growth, stemming domestic
religious intolerance, and preserving ASEAN unity in the face of China’s
increasingly assertive policy in the region. Indonesia should not allow
its newfound confidence to become foreign-policy arrogance.
Dewi Fortuna Anwar is Deputy Chair for Social Sciences and Humanities at
the Indonesian Institute of Sciences and Chairman of the Institute for
Democracy and Human Rights at the Habibie Center.