The
most worrisome underlying threat is the increase in fighting between
Sunni and Shia Muslims. Likewise, pious conservatives and liberal and
leftist secular youth, who joined forces in Cairo and Tunis in 2010-2011
to challenge the dictators, have now turned on each other: witness the
Egyptian security forces’ appalling massacres of Islamist demonstrators
in Cairo recently, following a military coup carried out with liberals’
support. The region’s people are sliding into enemy camps, deepening
their societies’ wounds in the process.
I
have often argued that Turkey should not intervene in the internal
affairs of its neighbors or adopt a Middle East-centered policy. Both
government and opposition should remain steadfastly focused on Europe,
despite the obstacles that the European Union has placed in Turkey’s way
during membership negotiations.
But
Turkey cannot be indifferent to the tragedy engulfing its southern
neighbors. The Arab world’s pain is acutely felt, owing to Turkey’s
historical, religious, and emotional bonds with these countries.
Moreover, economic ties and sheer proximity mean that Turkey’s
prosperity depends, to some degree at least, on that of the Middle East.
In
recent years, there was hope that Turkey could help by serving as a
model of a successful economy and well-functioning democracy; but recent
events have raised doubts. In fact, Turkey must overcome four sources
of internal tension if it is to continue to thrive economically,
consolidate its democracy, and act as a compelling example to others.
The
first and most serious source of tension stems from the need to
recognize Kurdish identity as a fully legitimate part of the Turkish
Republic. Those who wish to express a Kurdish identity, as well as all
other citizens, must be confident that, while all remain committed to
national unity, Turkey is a country in which diversity can thrive.
Second,
there is an underlying historical tension between the large Sunni
majority and the Alevi-Bektashi minority, loosely linked to Shia Islam.
Third,
there is the difference between those who adhere to the tradition of
political Islam and those who uphold the strict secularism that came
with the republic. Often this social “divide” intersects with the
Sunni-Alevi cleavage, as the Alevis have increasingly aligned themselves
with the political left.
Finally,
there is a growing perception of partisanship within the public
administration. Building independent, non-partisan regulatory bodies was
one of the key pillars of the 2001-2002 reform program. But these
reforms have been rolled back recently, with independent regulatory
authorities again coming under the control of government ministries
(though it seems that the central bank has retained much of its
autonomy). As the perception of non-partisanship in public
administration has diminished, proximity to those in power has become
another source of tension.
Turkey
benefits from republican reflexes and values that have been built over
decades, as well as from humanist wisdom anchored in centuries of
history. Yet, given the regional context, Turkey’s internal tensions now
represent a serious threat.
All
sides must manage these tensions with great care and caution. Respect
for diversity and individual freedom, and concern for generating growth
and jobs in an atmosphere of social peace, must be guiding principles.
Healing the wounds to which all sides have at times contributed, and
practicing forgiveness, should be the order of the day. A spiral of
frustration and antagonism must not be allowed to develop.
Turkey
must look carefully at the catastrophe unfolding around it in the
Middle East. Humanitarian help is necessary, and Turkey is providing it
generously, in ways that should serve as an example for Western
countries. But Turkey’s political leaders, opinion shapers, and citizens
must also recognize that the only protection against a similar disaster
at home is a vibrant democracy, a fully professional public
administration, and a tolerant society embodying pride and affection for
the country’s diversity.
Others
will not protect Turkey; some may even promote strife within its
borders (historical examples of such tactics abound). Turkey alone can
protect itself, and only by upholding truly democratic behavior at home
and pursuing an external policy that promotes peace and democracy but
does not take sides in the region’s ongoing battles, particularly
between Sunni and Shia.
Fortunately,
there is hope. The Gezi Park demonstrators who in June protested
peacefully against the use of excessive police force by simply standing
still also protested peacefully, years ago, against the ban on the
headscarf then in effect in Turkey’s universities. This kind of concern
for the rights of all is a hallmark of Turkey’s young generation.
Similarly,
when the outgoing governor of Van sent a farewell message last month to
the largely Kurdish-speaking people in his southeastern province, he
delivered it in Kurdish – and received warm wishes in return.
A
large majority of Turkey’s citizens share such generosity of spirit.
That is why, despite serious difficulties, Turkey has a good chance of
overcoming its internal tensions and becoming the example that its
Middle East neighbors (and perhaps a few of its European neighbors as
well) so desperately need.
