Indeed, that supposed solution leaves half the eurozone relegated to the status of Third World countries that have become highly indebted in a foreign currency. Instead of the International Monetary Fund, it is Germany that is acting as the taskmaster imposing tough fiscal discipline on them. This will generate both economic and political tensions that could destroy the European Union.
I have proposed a plan that would allow Italy and Spain to refinance their debt by issuing treasury bills at around 1%. I named it in memory of my friend Tomasso Padoa-Schioppa, who, as Italy’s central banker in the 1990’s, helped to stabilize that country’s finances. The plan is rather complicated, but it is legally and technically sound. I describe it in detail in my new book Financial Turmoil in Europe and the United States.
European authorities rejected my plan in favor of the LTRO. The difference between the two schemes is that mine would provide instant relief to Italy and Spain. By contrast, the LTRO allows Italian and Spanish banks to engage in a very profitable and practically riskless arbitrage, but has kept government bonds hovering on the edge of a precipice – although the last few days brought some relief.
My proposal is to use the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) to insure the European Central Bank against the solvency risk on any newly issued Italian or Spanish treasury bills that it may buy from commercial banks. This would allow the European Banking Authority to treat these various T-bills as the equivalent of cash, because they could be sold to the ECB at any time.
Banks would then find it advantageous to hold their surplus liquidity in the form of T-bills as long as these bills yielded more than bank deposits held at the ECB. Italy and Spain would then be able to refinance their debt at close to the ECB’s deposit rate, which is currently 1% on mandatory reserves and 25 basis points on excess-reserve accounts.
This would greatly improve the sustainability of these countries’ debt. Italy, for instance, would see its average borrowing cost decline from the current 4.3%. Confidence would gradually return, yields on outstanding bonds would decline, banks would no longer be penalized for owning Italian government bonds, and Italy would gradually regain access to the market at more reasonable interest rates.
One obvious objection to this strategy is that it would reduce the average maturity of Italian and Spanish debt. I believe that, on the contrary, this would be an advantage in the current exceptional circumstances, because it would keep the Italian and Spanish governments on a short leash; no country concerned could afford to lose the ECB facility.
In the case of Italy, the short leash would dissuade former Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi from seeking to topple Mario Monti’s new government (which has only a fragile majority), because if Berlusconi precipitated an election, the electorate would punish him. This would help to reestablish political stability and accelerate Italy’s return to the market.
My proposal fulfills both the letter and the spirit of Article 123 of the Lisbon Treaty. The ECB’s task is to provide liquidity to banks, while the EFSF and ESM are designed to absorb solvency risk. The ECB would not be facilitating additional borrowing by member countries; it would merely allow them to refinance their debt at a lower cost.
Together, the ECB and the EFSF could do what the ECB cannot do on its own. This would provide temporary relief from a fatal flaw in the euro design’s until the member countries devise a more permanent solution.
The EFSF would have practically unlimited capacity to insure eurozone T-bills in this way, because no country could default as long as the scheme was in operation. Nor could a country abuse the privilege, lest it be automatically withdrawn, causing the country’s cost of borrowing to rise immediately.
For the first time in this crisis, the European authorities would undertake an operation for which they have more than sufficient resources. Coming as a positive surprise to the markets, it would reverse their mood. After all, markets do have moods; indeed, that is what the authorities have to learn in order to deal with financial crises.
Contrary to the current discourse, the long-term solution must provide a stimulus to get Europe out of a deflationary vicious circle – structural reform alone will not do it. The stimulus must come from the EU, because individual countries will be under strict fiscal discipline. It will have to be guaranteed jointly and severally – and that means eurobonds in one guise or another.
George Soros is Chairman of Soros Fund Management and of the
Open Society Institute.
George Soros: 新的一年，危機不變
達沃斯——去年12月份，歐洲央行推出的措施，尤其是“長期再融資操作”，緩解了歐洲各銀行的流動性問題，但是並沒有消除高負債成員國的融資劣勢。自從政府債券的高風險溢價危及各銀行的資本充足性以來，治標不治本的解決辦法已經不夠。
實際上，這種解決辦法使一半歐元區成員國淪為了第三世界的國家，背負了大量以外幣計價的債務。迫使它們實行嚴厲財政紀律的不是國際貨幣基金組織而是德國，德國充當了監管者的角色。這會導致經濟和政治關系緊張，破壞歐盟。
我提出了一個計劃，它能夠通過發行收益率約為1%的國庫券為其債務重新融資。我有一位朋友叫托馬索•派多亞•夏歐帕，他在20世紀90年代曾任意大利央行行長，幫助穩定了該國的金融業。為了紀念他，我用他的名字命名了我的計劃。這個計劃相當復雜，但是從合法性和技術上來說都是相當不錯的。我在自己的新著《歐洲和美國的金融亂局》中詳細介紹了這個計劃。
歐洲當局拒絕了我的計劃，採用了“長期再融資操作”。這兩個方案的不同之處在於，我的方案能夠立即為意大利和西班牙紓困。相比之下，“長期再融資操作”能夠讓意大利和西班牙各銀行參與利潤豐厚、實際上毫無風險的套利活動，卻讓政府債券的收益率徘徊在危險的邊緣——盡管最后一段時間會有所緩解。
我的提議是，利用歐洲金融穩定基金和歐洲穩定機制確保歐洲央行為意大利或西班牙新發行的國庫券的償付能力風險提供擔保，歐洲央行可能會從各商業銀行購買這些債券。這將允許歐洲銀行管理局把各類國庫券當做現金，因為這些國庫券可以隨時賣給歐洲央行。
隻要這些國庫券的收益率比歐洲央行的銀行利率高，各銀行就會發現以國庫券的形式持有過剩的流動性有優勢。那時意大利和西班牙就能以接近於歐洲央行存款利率的收益率為其債務重新融資了。目前強制性存款的利率為1%，非強制性存款的利率要高25個基點。
這將大大改善這些國家的債務的可持續性。比如，意大利的平均借貸成本將從當前的4.3%降下來。信心將逐漸回升，未償還債券的收益率將下降，各銀行也不會再因持有意大利政府的債券受到懲罰，意大利將以比較合理的利率逐漸重返市場。
這項戰略的一個明顯目標是，將縮短意大利和西班牙債務到期的平均時間。相反，我認為，在當前的特殊時期，這是一種優勢，因為這將使意大利和西班牙政府暫時受到約束﹔沒有一個相關國家能夠脫離歐洲央行。
就意大利而言，暫時的約束將打消前首相西爾維奧•貝盧斯科尼推翻馬裡奧•蒙蒂新政府（新政府隻有脆弱的絕大多數）的念頭，因為如果貝盧斯科尼倉促進行選舉，選民將懲罰他。這將有助於重建政治穩定並促進意大利回歸市場。
我的提議體現了《裡斯本條約》第123款的內容和精神。歐洲央行的任務是為各銀行提供流動性，而歐洲金融穩定基金和歐洲穩定機制旨在承受償付能力的風險。歐洲央行不會助長成員國增加借貸，隻允許它們以較低的成本為其債務重新融資。
歐洲央行和歐洲金融穩定基金一起能夠完成歐洲央行自身無法完成的任務。在成員國沒有想出更加永久的解決辦法之前，這能夠紓一時之困，減弱歐元設計中致命缺陷的影響。
這樣的話，歐洲金融穩定基金實際上就有無限的能力擔保歐元區的國庫券了，因為隻要這個方案在運行，沒有一個國家會違約。也沒有一個國家能濫用這項特權，否則會自動退出該方案，導致該國的借貸成本立即上升。
在這次危機中，歐洲當局將首次在沒有足夠資源的情況下採取行動。對市場來說，這是一個積極的驚喜，扭轉了市場情緒。畢竟，市場是有情緒的﹔實際上，要應對金融危機，這是當局必須知道的。
與當前的論斷相反，長期的解決方案必須提供刺激，讓歐洲擺脫通貨緊縮的惡性循環——單單進行結構性改革無濟於事。必須由歐盟推出刺激計劃，因為每個成員國都將遵守嚴肅的財政紀律。它必須獲得共同和單獨擔保，而這意味著要採用歐元區債券的某種形式。
喬治•索羅斯是索羅斯基金管理公司和開放社會研究所的主席。