ABU DHABI – In
1896, the social psychologist Gustave Le Bon warned his contemporaries of the dangers of
crowds, writing that, “It is necessary to arrive at a solution to the problems
offered by [crowds’] psychology, or to resign ourselves to being devoured by
them.” As spontaneous protest overtakes organized political movements across
the Arab world, the leaders of Tunisia,
Egypt, and Libya’s
nascent democracies should heed Le Bon’s warning.
Since crowds took to the streets of Tunis,
Cairo, Benghazi,
and other Arab cities, toppling decades-old regimes, spectators and analysts
have wondered where the Arab world is headed. But they have focused almost
exclusively on the events’ political dimension: Who are the leaders, and what
are their demands?In fact, the persistence, intensity, and frequency of protests – exemplified in September, when local militia in Benghazi killed US Ambassador to Libya J. Christopher Stevens – demonstrate the role that the culture and psychology of crowds are playing in determining the Arab world’s trajectory. After decades of authoritarian rule, citizens, frustrated with discredited institutions and paralyzed political parties, have begun to employ social media to organize civil resistance.
As a result, countries affected by the Arab Spring now face political spheres that are shaped by crowd dynamics, rather than by genuine political or ideological movements. Indeed, much of what is happening in the Arab world today can be best understood through the study of crowds.
Crowds are the opposite of organizations; rather than being dominated by rigid hierarchies, they are often led by individuals with no formal rank. And, unlike political movements, crowds tend to form quickly and organically, like dark clouds gathering to form a storm, and their objectives are immediate: surround this police station, seize that ministry, etc. In “crowd politics,” emotions often supersede goals.
Lebanon was perhaps the first Arab country to experience crowd politics. After Prime Minister Rafic Hariri was assassinated in February 2005, crowds led by various political parties filled Martyrs’ Square in downtown Beirut.
But non-organized crowds eventually eclipsed structured groups, becoming a dominant force in Lebanese politics. In fact, Lebanon’s two competing political coalitions, the March 8 alliance and the March 14 alliance, take their names from major crowd gatherings that occurred on those dates in 2005.
Lebanon’s experience reveals the discord between the psychology of crowds and the goals of the political elites who rally behind them – a conflict that can also be seen in Egypt’s Tahrir Square, Tunisia’s Sidi Bouzid, and Tripoli, Libya, where crowds have stormed the parliament building several times in the last few months. This discord is threatening to derail these countries’ burgeoning democratic processes, owing to growing competition between what Le Bon called the “sovereignty of the crowds” and the sovereignty of political elites.
Under these conditions, the real challenge facing the Arab Spring countries, at least in the short term, is not ideological, but institutional. Governments must find a way to prevent small groups from using the crowd effect as political capital, thereby causing crowd sizes to become more decisive than the number of ballots cast. But traditional democratic institutions, such as political parties, parliaments, and consultation committees, are not experienced in coping with such challenges.
Social media are both part of the problem and part of the solution. Unlike Eastern Europe in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s, the crowds of the Arab Spring formed on the Internet before hitting the streets – the first movement of its kind. The Arab Spring, following the lead of Iran’s Green Movement in 2009, ushered in the era of “iCrowds” – attracted, mobilized, and organized through social media.
But social media can also be used effectively to demobilize people, by reducing the chasm between the psychology and power of political leadership and that of the masses. The emerging political class must improve its understanding of iCrowd politics, and learn to harness the power of tools like Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, blogs, apps, and text messages.
In the United States, President Barack Obama’s election campaigns recognized this opportunity, using social media extensively to communicate political messages, and to energize and mobilize supporters. Once in office, Obama launched the White House app, designed to give citizens a new way to connect with their leaders in Washington, including updates on the latest events, insight into administration initiatives, and access to high-resolution photos and live streams of White House events.
Private enterprises, too, benefit from an understanding of iCrowd politics. In their research, Quy Huy and Andrew Shipilov of INSEAD have shown that business leaders who use social media build so-called “emotional capital” within their employees. This helps leaders to develop and maintain human bonds with a large group of people, despite the power gap, while making it easier for employees to identify with the organization.
For the Arab world’s new political elites, the lesson is clear: crowd dynamics cannot be ignored. When observed carefully, social media can be interpreted like clouds portending storms. If detected early enough, solutions can be found to diffuse tempestuous crowds before they inundate fragile new institutions.
Sami Mahroum is Academic Director of Innovation and Policy at INSEAD.
阿拉伯之春的群眾心理
阿布扎比—1896年，社會心理學家勒龐（Gustave
Le Bon）警告他當代的人關於群眾引起的危險，他寫道：“必須就來自（群眾）心理的問題給出一個解決方案，要麼我們就會被這些問題所吞噬。”隨著阿拉伯世界自發的示威取代有組織的政治運動，初生的民主社會像突尼斯、埃及和利比亞領導人應該小心聽從勒龐的警告。
自群眾走向突尼斯、開羅、班加西和其他阿拉伯城市街頭、推翻幾十年的舊制度以來，觀察家和分析家一直不能確定阿拉伯世界將何去何從。但他們的注意力幾乎全部集中在這些事件的政治規模：他們的領袖是誰? 他們的需求又是什麼？
事實上，示威的持續時間、激烈程度和頻率——如9月份班加西地方武裝份子刺殺美國駐利比亞大使史蒂文斯（J. Christopher Stevens）表明文化和群眾心理在阿拉伯世界事態發展中尤為關鍵。在經歷了數十年的獨裁統治後，阿拉伯人民厭倦了聲名狼藉的制度和癱瘓了的政黨，開始通過社交媒體來組織公民抵抗運動。
結果，受阿拉伯之春影響的各國現在面臨著由群體動力左右的政治局勢，而不是地道的政治和意識形態。事實上，阿拉伯世界的現狀中有很大一部分可以用群體心理研究來理解。
群體與組織相反﹔他們不是通過僵化層級的主宰，而通常不由有正式職級的人領導。與政治運動不同，群體總是很快而整體地組織起來，就像烏雲堆積形成暴風雨那樣，他們的目標也即時：包圍這個警察局、活捉那位部長等等。在“群眾政治”中，激情通常取代目標。
黎巴嫩可能是第一個經歷群體政治的阿拉伯國家。2005年2月，黎巴嫩總理哈裡裡（Rafic Hariri）被刺殺後，由眾多政黨領導的群眾將貝魯特市中心的烈士廣場擠得水泄不通。
但無組織的群眾最後還是壓倒有組織的集體成為主導黎巴嫩政局的力量。事實上，黎巴嫩兩大相互競爭的政治聯盟——3·8聯盟（March 8 alliance）和3·14聯盟（March
14 alliance）便是以2005年群眾集會日期命名的。
黎巴嫩的經驗揭示了群眾心理和鼓動群眾的政治精英的目標之間的分歧——在埃及解放廣場、突尼斯西迪布濟德（Side Bouzid）和利比亞的黎波裡也可以見到這一現象，群眾在過去幾個月中數度洗劫議會大樓。這一分歧讓這些國家方興未艾的民主進程時刻面臨停頓，因為勒龐所謂的“群眾威權”和政治精英威權之間的斗爭越來越激烈。
在這樣的環境下，阿拉伯之春的真正挑戰並不是思想上的，而是制度上的，至少在短期是如此。政府必須找出防止一小撮人利用群體效應作為政治資本的辦法，從而防止群體規模膨脹到比選票數量還要大的程度。但傳統民主制度，比如政黨、議會和顧問委員會並無應對這些挑戰的經驗。
社交媒體既是問題的一部分，也是解決辦法的一部分。與20世紀80年代末、90年代初的東歐不同，在阿拉伯之春中，群體現在互聯網上形成，然後才走上街頭——這是這種群體運動第一次出現。繼2009年內伊朗綠色運動（Green
Movement）之後發生的阿拉伯之春開啟了“iCrowd”時代——通過社交媒體吸引、動員和組織。
但社交媒體同樣可以通過消弭政治領袖和大眾之間的心理和力量差異被用來有效地分散人們。新出現的政治階級必須強化他們對iCrowd政治的認識，學會駕馭Facebook、Twitter、YouTube、博客、應用和手機短信等社交媒體的力量。
在美國，總統奧巴馬的競選活動就認識到了這一機會，利用社交媒體全面地傳播政治消息以及激發和動員支持者。當選後，奧巴馬推出了“白宮”（White House）應用，該應用為公民提供了與華盛頓領導人溝通的新方式，及時更新最新事件、深度了解政府措施，還能獲得高分辨率的白宮實時照片和現場直播。
私人企業也可以從理解iCrowd政治中獲益。INSEAD的胡伊（Quy Huy）和施皮洛夫（Shipilov）的研究証明，使用社交媒體的商業領袖能夠在員工中間建立所謂的“情感資本”。這有助於領袖發展和維持與一大群人的人際關系，盡管他們之間的權力有別，與此同時，也可以讓員工更用以地認同組織。
對阿拉伯世界的新政治精英來說，這其中的經驗是顯而易見的：群體動態不可忽視。仔細觀察可以發現，社交媒體就像是預兆暴風雨的烏雲。如果發現得足夠早，是可以找到在有暴亂之勢的群體摧毀脆弱的新制度之前找到消散之法的。