The answer is not hard to find. In all likelihood, these leaders sense, either instinctively or intellectually, an impending crisis that could imperil the CCP’s survival in the same way that the French Revolution ended Bourbon rule.
Telltale signs of anxiety are already visible. Capital flight from China is now at a record high. Polls of China’s dollar millionaires reveal that half of them want to emigrate. Amid intensifying calls for democracy, China’s leader-in-waiting, Xi Jinping, reportedly met with the son of the late Hu Yaobang, a political reformer and icon of Chinese liberals. While one should not read too much into such a visit, it is safe to say that China’s next leader knows that the Celestial Kingdom is becoming unsettled.
The idea that some sort of political crisis could engulf China in the coming years may strike many – particularly Western business and political elites, who have taken the CCP’s strength and durability for granted – as absurd. In their minds, the Party’s hold on power seems indestructible. But several emerging trends, unobserved or noted only in isolation, have greatly altered the balance of power between the CCP and Chinese society, with the former losing credibility and control and the latter gaining strength and confidence.
One such trend is the emergence of independent figures of public moral authority: successful businessmen, respected academics and journalists, famous writers, and influential bloggers. To be sure, the CCP has followed a strategy of co-opting social elites since the massacre in Tiananmen Square in 1989. But people like Hu Shuli 胡舒立 (who founded two influential business magazines), Pan Shiyi 潘石屹(an outspoken real-estate developer), Yu Jianrong 于建嵘(a social scientist and public intellectual), Wu Jinglian 吳敬璉 (a leading economist), and the bloggers Han Han 韓寒and Li Chengpeng 李承鵬, achieved success on their own, and have maintained their integrity and independence.
Taking advantage of the Internet and weibo 微博(the Chinese equivalent of Twitter), they have become champions of social justice. Their moral courage and social stature have, in turn, helped them to build mass support (measured by the tens of millions of their weibo followers). Their voices often reframe the terms of social-policy debate and put the CCP on the defensive.
For the Party, this development is clearly worrying. It is now ceding the commanding heights of Chinese politics to autonomous representatives of social forces that it cannot control. The CCP’s monopoly of public moral authority is long gone, and now its monopoly of political power is at risk as well.
That loss is compounded by the collapse of the Party’s credibility among ordinary people. To be sure, the CCP’s opacity, secrecy, and penchant for untruth always implied a credibility problem. But, in the last decade, a series of scandals and crises – involving public safety, adulterated food and drugs, and environmental pollution – has thoroughly destroyed what little credibility lingered.
One such episode was the sale of tainted baby formula in 2008. Official suppression of news about the incident (which occurred just before the Beijing Olympics) not only led to the deaths of many infants, but also left ordinary Chinese even more distrustful of the authorities. On the environmental front, perhaps the most telling evidence is Beijing residents’ preference for the United States Embassy’s air-quality readings over those of their government.
For a regime whose credibility is gone, the costs of maintaining power are exorbitant – and eventually unbearable – because it must resort to repression more frequently and heavily.
But repression is yielding diminishing returns for the Party, owing to a third revolutionary development: the dramatic decline in the cost of collective action. Autocracies stay in power if they can divide the population and prevent organized opposition activities. Although the CCP faces no organized opposition today, it confronts virtually organized protest activities on a daily basis.
Based on estimates by Chinese sociologists, 500 riots, collective protests, and strikes occur each day, up almost four-fold from a decade ago. With widespread ownership of mobile phones and Internet-connected computers, it is far easier than ever before to organize supporters and allies.
Moreover, growing defiance reflects the public’s perception that the authorities have grown afraid of the people and tend to yield to their demands when confronted by angry protesters. In some of the highest-profile collective protests in the past year – the land dispute in Wukan in Guangdong and the environmental protests in Dalian, Shifang, and Qidong – the government backed down.
If governing by fear is no longer tenable, China’s new rulers must start fearing for the CCP's future. As the country’s silent political revolution continues to unfold, the question is whether they will heed its signs, or attempt to maintain an order that – like the French monarchy – cannot be saved.
中國的「波旁王朝」動亂時代
發自加利福尼亞克萊爾蒙特——有時候一國高層領導所看的書目可以揭示出他們的許多所思所想。而即將進入中共中央政治局常務委員會（中國的最高決策機構）的一些官員最近在看的一本書或許會讓人有些吃驚：亞力西斯·托克維爾（Alexis de Tocqueville）的《舊制度與大革命》。
這些領導人——也是即將於11月8日舉行的中共十八大指定的權力接棒者——據傳不僅自己拜讀托爾維克對於法國大革命前夕社會環境的分析，還把這本書推薦給朋友。如果事實果真如此，那最明顯的問題就是為什麼中國未來的統治者會傳閱一本與社會革命有關的國外著作。
答案並不難找，很可能這些領導人已經憑直覺或憑理智意識到中國即將爆發一場類似法國大革命推翻波旁王朝統治一樣危及中共生存的危機。
焦慮的跡象已經清晰可見了。中國的資本外流現在已經創下歷史新高。對中國百萬美元富翁進行的調查顯示其中有一半被訪者想移民國外。在民主呼聲日益高昂的時候，據報中國的最高領導候選人習近平與已故胡耀邦（政治改革家及中國民主人士的偶像）的兒子進行了會面。雖然我們不應對這樣一次會面做過多的解讀，但可以肯定地說，中國下一代領導人知道「天朝」正在失去安定。
某種政治危機可能會在未來一年席卷中國的看法或許對許多人——尤其是西方商業及政治精英——來說是個笑話，他們認為中國共產黨力量強大而穩固。在他們心目中，中國共產黨對權力的掌控是牢不可破的。但一些新興動態——未被留意或只是被孤立看待——已經在很大程度上改變了中國共產黨和中國社會之間的權力平衡，前者正在逐步喪失信譽和控制力，後者卻正獲得越來越多的力量和信心。
其中一個這樣的趨勢就是獨立公共道德權威人士的涌現，比如成功商人、受人尊敬的學者和記者、著名的作家和具有影響力的博客作者。誠然，自從1989年天安門大屠殺之後，中國共產黨一直奉行拉攏社會精英的策略。但卻有胡舒立（她創辦了兩本極具影響力的商業雜志）、潘石屹（一個直言不諱的房地產開發商）、於建嶸（社會科學家及公共知識分子）、博客作家韓寒和李承鵬以及吳敬璉（重要的經濟學家），這些人憑借自己的力量獲得了成功，並且一直保持著正直與獨立。
利用互聯網和微博（中國版的推特），他們成為了社會正義的捍衛者。他們的道德勇氣和社會地位反過來又幫助其獲得了民眾的支持（以上千萬的微博粉絲數量來衡量）。他們的意見往往能重新界定社會政策討論的方向，使得中國共產黨疲於招架。
對中國共產黨來說，這種發展趨勢顯然堪憂。它現在正把中國政治的制高點讓給其控制不住的社會力量的自治代表。中國共產黨壟斷公共道德權威的時代早已一去不返，如今對政治權力的壟斷也岌岌可危。
中國共產黨在老百姓中的信譽崩潰加速了這種失敗。確實，中國共產黨的缺乏透明，秘密決策以及弄虛作假經常意味著誠信問題。但在過去的十年裡，一系列的丑聞和危機——包括公共安全，黑心食品和假藥，以及環境污染——已經徹底摧毀了它僅存的一點信譽。
其中一件事就是2008年的問題嬰兒奶粉。官方對相關新聞的封鎖（該事件就發生在北京奧運會之前）不僅導致了許多嬰兒的死亡，也令中國老百姓更加不相信政府。在環境方面，也許最有說服力的証據就是北京市民更願意相信美國大使館的空氣質量報告，而不是本國政府的說辭。
對一個失去信譽的政權來說，要維護權力的代價是很高的——最終這種代價將令人無法承受的——因為它必須更頻繁且嚴重依賴武力鎮壓。
但對中國共產黨來說，鎮壓所獲得的收益是遞減的，這是由於第三個革命性的發展：集體行動的成本明顯下降。一個獨裁政府只能靠分裂人民並遏制有組織的反對活動才維持統治。雖然中國共產黨當前並不存在有組織的反對派，但卻幾乎每天都面對有組織的抗議活動。
根據中國社會學家的估計，每天各地都有500場暴動、集體抗議或罷工發生， 數量幾乎是10年前的四倍。隨著手機和互聯網電腦用戶的普及，現在要組織支持者和同盟也比以前要容易多了。
此外，日漸增多的反抗反映了公眾意識到當局已經開始害怕民眾的力量，當面對憤怒的抗議者時趨向於對他們的要求讓步。在去年程度最嚴重的一些抗議活動中——廣東烏坎的土地糾紛和大連、什邡和祁東對環境問題的抗議——政府都讓步了。
如果通過鎮壓來統治不再可行，那麼中國的新一代領導人就得開始為中國共產黨的未來擔心了。隨著該國無聲的政治革命繼續展開，問題在於他們是否留意到了這些跡象，還是企圖維持一種像法國君主制一樣無可救藥的秩序。