The tale is a complicated one, but worth understanding
since this is not the last time that this country and the world will face
serious questions about scientific research and biosecurity. And government
officials must ensure that, going forward, the process of approving such
experiments works a lot more rationally.
The most worrying experiments were carried out by Dutch
scientists and financed by this country’s National Institutes of Health. The
researchers started with the bird flu virus, which seldom infects humans but is
highly lethal when it does. With five mutations they made it transmissible
through the air among ferrets and possibly humans.
Based on statements by the lead scientist that the
virus retained its lethality, we urged in January that it be destroyed or
studied only in a few high-containment laboratories, and that nothing be
published about the experiments or, at a minimum, that details that might help
a terrorist be redacted. In March, after the lead scientist, in a turnabout,
said his new virus did not actually spread all that easily and was not lethal
to ferrets when it did so, we called for clarification by an independent
arbiter, like the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity. That is the
group of nongovernmental experts that originally voted 22 to 0 to recommend
that the paper be published only after details on specific mutations and how
they were made were redacted.
Now that board has changed its mind. In late March,
after reviewing a revised version of the paper and grilling the Dutch
scientist, it voted 12 to 6 to recommend publication with none of the details
excised.
Board members told us that the new virus appeared less
lethal than they first thought; the benefits of letting scientists around the
world keep an eye out for the specific mutations in nature appeared greater
than they first thought; and the risk that a terrorist would use the
information seemed minimal, judging from a briefing they got from intelligence
officials. Many members also felt boxed in when federal officials said that
redacting the details would harm America’s
relations with nations that wanted full access.
The board’s new verdict is not wholly reassuring. The
members had little time to digest a revised version of the Dutch paper and
other new data, and they heard what the board’s leading influenza expert,
Michael Osterholm, described in a letter to the National Institutes of Health
and board members as a very “one-sided” presentation that was “designed” to
push the board to reverse itself without hearing from independent experts with
contrary views.
Even if the new virus is not highly lethal, board
members say that might change should the virus escape confinement and recombine
with other viruses to become both highly lethal and easily transmissible.
Federal officials say they know they must do better in
the future. They recently issued a new policy that will require all federally
financed experiments with bird flu and other worrisome pathogens to be
evaluated for risks and benefits before they start. In this case, the danger of
accidental release was weighed beforehand by Dutch review boards, and the
laboratory was inspected by American experts. But the threat of a terrorist’s
using the information to cause a pandemic was not formally assessed by anyone
until after the experiments were done and papers had been submitted for
publication.
The new policy will need to be monitored closely and buttressed
with more detailed guidance to scientists and review groups on how to weigh the
risks and benefits of experiments that might cause the greatest damage. Federal
officials will also need to persuade other countries to conduct similar
evaluations. The health of millions should not be left to luck.