This weekend offered a rogues’ gallery of phoney democracy in
action. In Russia
it was announced that Vladimir Putin had been swept back to the Kremlin, after
a suspiciously smashing first-round victory in the presidential election. Iran
staged its first parliamentary elections since the rigged presidential poll of
2009 and the violent suppression of the Green movement. And in China,
the National People’s Congress – the country’s rubber-stamp parliament –
assembled for its annual meeting. It is a coincidence – but perhaps no accident
– that these are the three nations that have emerged as the closest protectors
of Syria’s
murderous one-party state.
The Russians insist with a straight face they have done everything in their power to prevent ballot-rigging. The Iranians trumpet the size of the turnout in their poll. Even in China, where the authorities would not dare to risk a national election (even one with Iranian characteristics), the opening speeches to the National People’s Congress made frequent references to the “democratic” nature of Chinese politics.
The authoritarian urge to cross-dress in democratic clothes is an implied compliment to the democratic nations. That matters, because western democracies are going through a crisis of confidence that is being closely watched.
I am now in China and have been surprised by the degree of interest in the political and economic crisis in Europe. One liberal academic, a strong proponent of democratic reform in China, told me she was now often confronted by the view that Europe’s crisis demonstrates the inherent flaws of democracy. The argument is that Europe’s politicians have bought power by bribing voters with unsustainable welfare benefits. Now, faced with the resulting economic crisis, they are unable to make the necessary reforms. What, I was asked, was the best answer to this critique, for somebody trying to argue for democracy in China?
I must admit that I struggled to frame a coherent response. For there is some truth in the idea that democracy tempts politicians to make unaffordable promises – and dissuades them from attempting difficult reforms. In Greece and Italy, elected politicians were performing so badly in the economic crisis that they have been temporarily replaced by unelected technocrats.
Widespread disillusionment with the democratic process is also visible in the US, where polls regularly show respect for politicians at record lows. Last summer’s spectacle of political bickering in Congress almost leading to an accidental default was depressing. There is little sign of the US summoning the will to deal with its mounting debts. In large part this is because politicians know they will be severely punished if they take the necessary measures.
Democracy has its flaws: populism, the excessive power of lobbyists, the urge to make unaffordable promises and to shirk reforms. But as the Egyptian and Tunisian revolutions reminded us all, authoritarianism tends to produce its own morbid and dysfunctional symptoms: corruption, injustice, police abuse, torture, denial of freedom of speech. Nor were the Arab societies that rose up in revolt exactly adverts for the superiority of authoritarian economic management.
The Arab spring has shocked the pillars of global authoritarianism. The Iranians, as near neighbours, have good reason to fear a revival of their own protest movement. Mr Putin’s victory has been tainted by the protests and mockery he has endured since December, as Moscow demonstrators took to the streets.
Even the Chinese government, fortified by a continuing economic boom, is palpably nervous. The harassment of dissidents has increased since the Arab spring. A surprising number of Chinese and foreign observers in Beijing believe that, as one analyst put it, “this place could blow at any moment”.
The sources of potential Chinese instability are many and various. They include anger at corruption, land disputes, economic imbalances and environmental problems. But the root problem is that, without a democratic system, China does not have a safe outlet for dissent.
When ordinary citizens occupied Tahrir Square, it was the beginning of the end for the Mubarak regime in Egypt. Similar demonstrations in Beijing would be immensely threatening to Communist Party rule – which is why incipient protests were swiftly crushed last year. By contrast, when protesters occupied Wall Street, they got a lot of attention – but only the most overheated of them believed the US system of government was seriously under threat. Democracy can roll with the punches, but authoritarian systems have a glass jaw.
Even in Greece, demonstrators are arguing for new policies and politicians – not to abandon the democratic system. By contrast, all China’s economic success cannot change the perception, both in China and around the world, that the current political system will have to change. China’s ability to get things done has excited interest and envy, but it is hard to think of any nation where there is popular demand to adopt China’s political system.
No matter how debt-ridden and dysfunctional they look, the world’s democracies are still winning the global beauty contest.
Gideon Rachman: 歐債危機和民主缺陷
上周末，各色虛假的民主活動粉墨登場。在俄羅斯總統大選首輪選舉中蹊蹺地以絕對優勢獲勝之后，弗拉基米爾•普京(Vladimir Putin)將重返克裡姆林宮。伊朗舉行了議會選舉，這是自2009年那場有舞弊嫌疑的總統大選和暴力鎮壓“綠色運動”(Green
movement)以來的首次。中國則召開了一年一度的全國人大——中國的“橡皮圖章”議會——會議。巧合的是（但或許並非偶然），這三個國家都是殘暴的敘利亞一黨專政政府最密切的保護者。
這幾場聲勢浩大的“民主”活動，應該會讓那些本想相信民主浪潮正不可阻擋地橫掃全球的人感到躊躇。但俄羅斯、伊朗和中國發生的事件也應該從反面鼓舞了民主人士。因為即便獨裁者們不斷指責西方民主制度的缺陷和虛偽，但他們仍感到有必要模仿西方的做法。
俄羅斯人一本正經地堅稱，他們已經竭盡全力防止選舉舞弊。伊朗人高調宣揚其高投票率。就連在當局不敢舉行全國大選（即便是伊朗那種選舉也不行）的中國，全國人大會議的開幕演講中也多次提及中國政治的“民主”本質。
威權政府迫切希望披上民主外衣是對民主國家的一種變相恭維。這非常重要，因為西方民主國家正在遭受一場備受關注的信心危機。
我寫下此文時就身處中國。中國人對歐洲政治和經濟危機的興趣令我頗感意外。中國一位堅定倡導民主改革的自由派學者告訴我，經常有人和她說，歐洲危機表明民主存在內在缺陷。這種觀點認為，歐洲政客們通過承諾不可持續的福利待遇賄賂選民上台。現在面對由此導致的經濟危機，他們無力實施必要的改革。這位學者問我，對於試圖倡導中國施行民主制度的人來說，對這種說法的最佳回應是什麼？
我必須承認，我很難給出一個條理清晰的答案。因為認為民主誘使政客們做出一些不切實際的承諾、由此阻礙了他們嘗試艱難改革的觀點有一定道理。在希臘和意大利，民選政客們在經濟危機中表現極為糟糕，均已被未經選舉產生的技術官僚們臨時取代。
美國民眾也普遍對民主進程越來越不抱幻想——民調經常顯示，民眾對政客們的尊敬程度處於歷史低點。去年夏，美國國會內部政治扯皮幾乎導致政府意外違約的鬧劇令人沮喪。幾乎沒有跡象顯示美國會全力以赴地應對其日益增長的債務。這在很大程度上是因為政客們知道，如果他們採取必要措施，就會受到嚴厲的懲罰。
民主體制的確存在缺陷：民粹主義、游說勢力過大、政客們很容易做出不切實際的承諾並逃避改革。但正如埃及和突尼斯革命提醒我們的那樣，威權主義往往也會產生自己的問題，也會功能失常：腐敗、社會不公、警察濫用職權、刑訊逼供、禁止言論自由。那些奮起反抗的阿拉伯社會同樣如此——他們爆發起義正是為了反抗獨裁者在經濟管理方面的特權。
“阿拉伯之春”撼動了全球威權主義的支柱。伊朗與其鄰國一樣，有充分的理由擔心本國抗議活動重演。自去年12月莫斯科的抗議者走上街頭以來，不斷爆發的抗議活動和嘲弄也給普京的勝利蒙上了一層陰影。
就連因經濟持續增長而地位得到鞏固的中國政府也明顯感到不安。自“阿拉伯之春”爆發以來，異見人士加大了抨擊力度。北京數量驚人的中外觀察家們相信——借用一位分析師的話——“這裡隨時可能失控”。
中國存在眾多潛在的不穩定源頭，這些源頭包括對腐敗的不滿、土地糾紛、經濟失衡和環境問題。但根本問題在於，由於沒有民主體系，中國缺乏一條表達異議的安全途徑。
埃及普通市民佔領開羅解放廣場(Tahrir Square)之時，拉開了穆巴拉克政權倒台的序幕。北京若爆發類似的抗議活動，將嚴重威脅共產黨的統治——正因為如此，去年初露苗頭的抗議活動迅速遭到了鎮壓。相比之下，當抗議者佔領華爾街時，他們獲得了極大的關注，但隻有最狂熱的抗議者才會相信，美國政府體系嚴重受到了威脅。民主可以忍受抨擊，但威權體制則容不得半點異議。
即便在希臘，抗議者也隻是在呼吁出台新的政策並選出新的領導人，而不是拋棄民主制度。相反，中國的經濟成功不可能改變國內外的看法，即當前的政治體制必須加以改革。中國強大的執行能力激起了人們的興趣，也引起了人們的嫉妒，但很難想象有哪個國家的民眾會要求推行中國的政治體制。
無論看起來如何負債累累和運轉失常，民主體制仍會贏得全球各國的青睞。