Earlier this month, the Wall Street Journal reported
that, according to the CIA’s deputy director, Michael Morell, “Syria’s
volatile mix of Al Qaeda extremism and civil war now poses the greatest
threat to US national security” – indeed, “probably the most important
issue in the world today.” By contrast, Morell described the Iranian
regime’s “merging of...nuclear ambitions with its desire to be a
hegemonic power in the Middle East” as a mere “cause for concern.”
Morell, who is preparing to step down from the CIA soon, has little
reason to dissemble.
Just
two months ago, in mid-June, when the Syrian crisis was the focus of
international attention and the subject of heated policy debate, such a
statement by a senior administration official would have drawn strong
reactions from several quarters. But Syria has since moved from the
center of attention, displaced by the coup and ongoing crisis in Egypt,
the threat of an Al Qaeda terror offensive in Yemen and elsewhere, and
the renewal of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations.
The
apparent (and deceptive) lull in the fighting in Syria has contributed
to this shift. After the government’s military achievements in Quseir
and Homs, there has been some tactical regrouping by the opposition.
Both sides are trading minor blows as they prepare for a major round of
fighting in Aleppo, Syria’s largest city, now held by the opposition.
Overall, and despite the regime’s recent victories, the fighting remains
at a stalemate.
So
this is a convenient time for the international community to look away
from a crisis that seems to have no good solutions. But this does not
diminish the gravity of what is happening in Syria, or lessen the
seriousness of Morell’s warning.
As
Morell put it, the most acute danger is that a regime with a large
stockpile of weapons of mass destruction will be supplanted by a regime
affiliated with, or dominated by, Al Qaeda. Pointing to the inflow of
jihadis, Morell said that Syria’s “current track is toward the collapse
of its central government,” after which it would replace Pakistan as Al
Qaeda’s preferred haven.
Morrell
thus placed himself squarely within one of the two principal schools of
thought in the policy debate on Syria (a debate that is articulated
almost exclusively in geopolitical terms and ignores humanitarian
issues).
One
school regards Syria primarily as a theater of battle against Al Qaeda
and other extremists. Its adherents, preoccupied with the prospect of a
jihadi takeover in Syria, argue (sometimes implicitly and sometimes
explicitly) that the US and its allies must not support or intervene on
the side of the rebels and, in fact, should view Bashar al-Assad’s
regime as the lesser evil.
Those
who fear a jihadi takeover cite recent events in Sinai. Just a few days
ago, Israel closed its airport in Eilat after receiving a warning that
jihadis in Sinai planned to attack it with rockets. This, it is argued,
is only a dress rehearsal for what can be expected in a post-Assad
Syria.
The
other school of thought does not take this scenario lightly.
Nonetheless, it argues that a victory in Syria by a coalition of Russia,
Iran, Hezbollah, and Assad’s regime would pose an even greater danger.
Moreover, in the event of the Assad regime’s fall, there would be plenty
of ways to deal with the jihadi groups in Syria.
But
the most appropriate response to Morell’s statement is that the US does
not necessarily have to choose between two sharply defined options.
Yes, Syria’s secular opposition is weak and divided, while the jihadis
are more dynamic; but jihadi supremacy in the event of an opposition
victory is not inevitable. The US and its allies should conduct a robust
policy, make a more significant investment in the secular opposition,
and articulate clear goals.
In
June, Obama announced that Assad’s regime had used chemical weapons
against its own population and had thus crossed his administration’s
“red line.” But no coherent action or policy followed this powerful
statement. For Obama, Syria’s fate simply does not seem urgent; but when
the decisive battle for Aleppo begins, it may be too late. Morell’s
warnings may yet be vindicated – by default, if not by design.