GAZA CITY
– Hamas, the militant political movement that has ruled Gaza
since 2007, has emerged from the latest round of fighting with Israel
with its regional status significantly enhanced. At the same time, the movement
faces new questions about its ability to take advantage of the diplomatic
opportunities that it has gained.
Beyond Gaza, the rise of political Islam in the Arab Spring countries, particularly Egypt and Tunisia, has created a more Hamas-friendly neighborhood. Crucially, the negotiations in Cairo that produced a cease-fire with Israel involved direct, high-level diplomatic contact between Egypt and Hamas – a fundamental shift from former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak’s avowedly anti-Hamas stance.
Visits to Gaza by the Emir of Qatar and Turkey’s foreign minister, as well as by other regional leaders, have further buttressed Hamas’s new stature. Demonstrating support for Hamas now means building credibility at home, which creates an opportunity to elicit large donations from Arab and Muslim countries to finance Gaza’s reconstruction.
By contrast, Mahmoud Abbas, the president of the Palestinian Authority (PA), who embraces peace negotiations with Israel and disavows armed struggle, is more isolated than ever, despite his success in upgrading Palestine’s status at the United Nations to that of “non-member observer state” days after the fighting in Gaza ended. Hamas initially reacted skeptically to the statehood bid, but supported it after the cease-fire, owing to its expectation that it will be able to exploit Palestine’s upgraded status.
Nonetheless, recent events, together with the PA’s dwindling resources, have diminished Abbas’s credibility among Palestinians, who increasingly view him as desperate. Israel’s announcement after the UN vote of new settlements around Jerusalem weakened his standing further. Indeed, Abbas’s time is running out. The only question is who will replace him.
Meanwhile, Hamas is seeking to capitalize on its growing popularity by winning elections. In last October’s municipal elections in the West Bank – the first in six years – the largely secular Fatah party technically retained its authority; but voter turnout of only 55%, following Hamas’s call for a boycott, reflected waning support for the party. Hamas is now widely seen as the true representative of Palestinian national ambitions, and is set to unite the Palestinians under its flag.
But can Hamas find a basis for negotiations with Israel? To be sure, Hamas has not abandoned its resistance mantra; even so, it has moderated its stance on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict over time. Indeed, Hamas’s leaders have expressed support for the establishment of a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders, with East Jerusalem as its capital.
This gradual shift, combined with Hamas’s endorsement of Abbas’s diplomatic approach in the UN, suggests that Hamas now believes that a military victory over Israel is not possible. Palestinian and Israeli leaders will have to reconcile their differences and reach a diplomatic settlement.
Signs of Hamas’s shifting perspective are becoming increasingly apparent. While Meshal maintained a hardline stance in his speech in Gaza (see below), in private discussions he expressed a readiness to accept a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders. Meshal even stated that, if Israel reconsidered its attitude toward the Arab Peace Initiative of 2002 – which calls upon the Arab world to recognize Israel’s right to exist in exchange for Israel’s return to its 1967 borders – Hamas would do the same.
But, although Meshal welcomed the idea of future negotiations with Israel, he maintained that the time is not yet right. Hamas is convinced that Israel understands only the language of force and power, and it will not negotiate until Israel accepts the permanence of Palestinian demands.
Israel may be starting to get the message. In fact, the recent fighting drove some Israeli politicians, such as Giora Eiland, former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s national security adviser, to acknowledge that Hamas is a political reality that can no longer be ignored. Eiland even advised Israel’s government to recognize Hamas’s rule in Gaza, lift the siege, and negotiate a prolonged cease-fire directly with the movement. But the success of such an approach depends on Israel’s readiness to engage Hamas, which it continues to regard as a terrorist group, and on the viability of Egyptian mediation.
Here, Israel may come under growing pressure from its principal ally. Indeed, America’s acceptance of Islamist parties in the region, from Ennahda in Tunisia to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, suggests that skepticism of Islamist groups may be losing ground. It also raises doubts about whether the United States will maintain its strict policy of isolating Hamas.
Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi’s success in mediating between Israel and Hamas demonstrated that Islamists can be flexible – even when it comes to Israel. There is room for moderation in both sides’ positions, but their leaders must be given the right platform on which to make the needed adjustments.
Mkhaimar Abusada is Professor of Political Science at Al-Azhar University in Gaza.
哈馬斯崛起
加沙城—軍事運動組織哈馬斯自2007年以來一直統治著加沙，其崛起是在與地區地位大大上升的以色列的最新一輪鬥爭中實現的。與此同時，哈馬斯也面臨著新問題：是否有能力利用其爭取得來的外交機會。
11月，以色列對加沙採取了軍事行動，哈馬斯對此以牙還牙，其火箭打到了特拉維夫和耶路撒冷附近，這表明它將堅定不移地捍衛其核心價值。此外，在八日沖突（eight-day
clash）中，哈馬斯長期流亡的領導人馬沙爾（Khaled Meshal）從埃及進入加沙，此前他從來不敢公開在以色列面前露面。他大搖大擺地出現在街頭游行中，這加強了加沙內外的印象——哈馬斯已經獲勝。
在加沙地區之外，阿拉伯之春國家（被別是埃及和突尼斯）伊斯蘭政治勢力的崛起為哈馬斯創造了有利的周邊環境。最關鍵的是，開羅談判形成了與以色列的停火，這促成了埃及與哈馬斯的直接高層外交契約——與埃及前總統穆巴拉克明確的反哈馬斯立場截然相反。
卡塔爾埃米爾、土耳其外交部長以及其他地區領導人對加沙的訪問進一步鞏固了哈馬斯的新地位。如今，証明對哈馬斯的支持意味著在國內建立信譽，而這又給哈馬斯重建帶來了機會，阿拉伯和穆斯林國家將為此提供重金。
相反，巴勒斯坦權力機構（PA）主席阿巴斯的策略是與以色列和談，告別武裝鬥爭，他受到了前所未有的孤立，儘管他在加沙戰鬥結束數日後成功地將巴勒斯坦在聯合國的地位升格為“非成員觀察國”。哈馬斯一開始對建國計劃頗為狐疑，但在停火協議後給予了支持，因為它期望能利用巴勒斯坦地位升格的機會。
儘管如此，最近發生的一系列事件加上PA資源告竭，阿巴斯在巴勒斯坦人中間的信譽在下降，被看作是在困獸猶鬥。以色列在聯合國關於耶路撒冷問題的新提案的投票表決之後發表的聲明進一步削弱了他的立場。事實上，阿巴斯已是明日黃花。唯一的問題是誰將取代他。
與此同時，哈馬斯在尋求通過贏得選舉最大程度地利用其日益增長的支持度。在去年10月的約旦河西岸市政選舉中——這是六年來的第一次選舉——最大的世俗派法塔赫黨在技術上重新贏得了政權，但在哈馬斯的抵制號召下，投票比例隻有55%，這反映出該黨的支持度在下降。如今，哈馬斯被廣泛視為巴勒斯坦民族雄心的真正代表，是振臂高呼同意巴勒斯坦人民的不二之選。
但哈馬斯能夠找到與以色列談判的基點嗎？平心而論，哈馬斯仍未放棄其反抗大旗﹔但儘管如此，它的巴以沖突立場還是在逐步溫和。事實上，哈馬斯領導人已表明支持基於1967年界線建立巴勒斯坦國，將東耶路撒冷作為首都。
這一逐漸的轉變與哈馬斯對阿巴斯聯合國外交手段的支持一起，表明如今哈馬斯認為對以色列取得軍事勝利希望渺茫。巴勒斯坦和以色列領導人必須協調不同，達成外交和解。
哈馬斯態度的變化信號正在變得日益明顯。儘管馬沙爾在加沙講話中繼續保持了強硬立場，但在私下場合，他已表示准備接受在1967年界線的基礎上建立巴勒斯坦國。馬沙爾甚至表示，如果以色列重新考慮其對2002年阿拉伯和平倡議（Arab
Peace Initiative of 2002，該倡議號召阿拉伯國家承認以色列存在的權利，以換取以色列退回1967年界線）的態度，哈馬斯也將如此。
但是，儘管馬沙爾歡迎與以色列開展談判的觀點，但他仍堅持現在不是時候。哈馬斯認定以色列隻認武力和實力，除非以色列接受巴勒斯坦人民的要求永遠不會屈服的現實，否則它是不會談判的。
以色列可能已經開始得到這一信息了。事實上，最近的戰鬥讓某些以色列政客，如前總理沙龍的國家安全顧問艾蘭德（Giora Eiland），承認哈馬斯是一個不容忽視的政治存在。艾蘭德甚至建議以色列政府承認哈馬斯對加沙的統治，撤去對加沙的包圍，並與哈馬斯直接談判延長停火事宜。但這一方案成功與否取決於以色列是否做好了承認哈馬斯的准備，目前後者仍被以色列視為恐怖組織，隻能通過埃及從中調停。
在這方面，以色列可能要面對來自其主要盟友的越來越大的壓力。事實上，美國接受該地區的伊斯蘭政黨——從突尼斯復興運動到埃及穆斯林兄弟會——這一事實表明對伊斯蘭組織的懷疑正在消退。這還引起了關於美國是否會保持其孤立哈馬斯的嚴格政策的懷疑。
埃及總統穆爾西在以色列和哈馬斯之間的成功調停表明伊斯蘭組織是有彈性的，即便面對的是以色列。雙方的立場都有緩和的空間，但它們的領導人必須得到正確的平台，以便形成必要的調整。