BERLIN – Two
years after popular uprisings began to convulse the Middle East,
few people speak of an “Arab Spring” anymore. Given Syria’s bloody civil war,
the rise to power of Islamist forces through free elections, the ever-deepening
political and economic crises in Egypt and Tunisia, increasing instability in
Iraq, uncertainty about the future of Jordan and Lebanon, and the threat of war
over Iran’s nuclear program, the bright hope of a new Middle East has vanished.
Add the region’s eastern and western peripheries – Afghanistan
and North Africa (including the Sahel
and South Sudan) – and the picture becomes even grimmer.
Indeed, Libya
is increasingly unstable, al-Qaeda is actively engaged in the Sahel
(as the fighting in Mali
shows), and no one can foresee what will happen in Afghanistan
after the US
and its NATO allies withdraw in 2014.All of us tend to make the same mistake repeatedly: we think at the beginning of a revolution that freedom and justice have prevailed over dictatorship and cruelty. But history teaches us that what follows is usually nothing good.
A revolution not only overthrows a repressive regime; it also destroys the old order, paving the way for a mostly brutal, if not bloody, fight for power to establish a new one – a process that affects foreign and domestic policy alike. Normally, revolutions are followed by dangerous times.
Indeed, exceptions to this pattern are rare: South Africa is one, owing to the genius of one of the century’s most outstanding statesmen, Nelson Mandela. The alternative option can be observed in Zimbabwe.
Central and Eastern Europe after 1989, though a very interesting reference point for analysts of the Arab revolutions, is not an appropriate reference point, because the region’s new domestic and foreign order resulted from the change in external conditions stemming from the collapse of Soviet power. Internally, nearly all of these countries had a very clear idea about what they wanted: democracy, freedom, a market economy, and protection from the return of the Russian empire. They wanted the West, and their accession to NATO and the European Union was logical.
Nothing of the sort applies to the crisis belt of the Middle East. No power anywhere, within the region or without, is willing and able to implement the barest vision of a new regional order – or even a vision for parts of it. Chaos is a constant threat, with all of its accompanying risks and threats to world peace.
In addition to poverty, backwardness, repression, rapid population growth, religious and ethnic hatred, and stateless peoples (such as the Kurds and the Palestinians), the region has unstable borders. Many were drawn by the colonial powers, Great Britain and France, after World War I, and most, with the exception of Iran’s and Egypt’s, have little legitimacy.
As if this were not enough, some countries – including Iran, Saudi Arabia, and even tiny (but very rich) Qatar – have ambitions to be regional powers. All of this worsens an already tense situation.
All of these contradictions are currently exploding in Syria, whose population is suffering a humanitarian catastrophe, while the world stands by, up to now unwilling to intervene. (If chemical weapons are deployed, intervention will become inevitable.) Although intervention would be temporary and technically limited, everyone seems to be avoiding it, because the stakes are very high: not only a devastating civil war and massive human suffering, but also a new order for the whole of the Middle East.
Any military intervention would entail a confrontation not only with the Syrian military (supported by Russia and China), but also with Shia Iran and its Lebanese proxy, Hezbollah. Moreover, no one can guarantee that intervention would not quickly lead to another war with Israel. The dangers of both action and inaction are very high.
The most likely outcome in Syria is that the human catastrophe will continue until President Bashar al-Assad’s regime collapses, after which the country very likely could be divided along ethnic and religious lines. And Syria’s disintegration could further balkanize the Middle East, potentially unleashing new violence. Frontline states like Lebanon, Iraq, and Jordan will not manage to remain aloof from a disintegrating Syria. What will happen with Syria’s Kurds and Palestinians, or its Christians, Druze, and smaller Muslim minorities? And what about the Alawites (the backbone of Assad’s regime), who could face a terrible destiny, regardless of whether the country splits up?
Unanswered questions abound. Of course, even in the face of this misery, we should not lose hope in agreements reached by diplomatic means; but, realistically, the chances are dwindling every day.
The whole of the Middle East is in motion, and a new and stable order will take a long time to establish. Until then, the region will remain very dangerous, not only internally, but also for its neighbors (including Europe) and the world.
阿拉伯革命的現實考驗
震撼中東的群眾暴亂爆發兩年後，如今已不再有人大談“阿拉伯之春”了。敘利亞血腥內戰、伊斯蘭通過自由選舉上台、埃及和突尼斯不斷加深的政治和經濟危機、伊拉克的日漸動蕩、約旦和黎巴嫩未來的不確定性以及伊朗核計劃頭上的戰爭陰影，這些因素讓新中東的美好前景消失殆盡。
若再考慮東西方邊緣——阿富汗和北非（包括薩赫勒和南蘇丹），前景就更加悲觀了。事實上，伊比亞正在日漸動蕩，基地組織在薩赫勒活動頻繁（馬裡內戰就是明証），沒人可以預見阿富汗在2014年美國和北約盟軍撤走後會發生什麼。
我們所有人都反覆犯著同樣的錯誤：革命一開始，我們認為自由和公正會壓倒獨裁和殘暴。但歷史告訴我們，隨之而來的往往不會有好結果。
革命不但席卷了鎮壓性政權，也摧毀了舊秩序，造成殘酷（如果不是血腥的話）的新權力爭奪——這一過程會影響國內和國外政策。通常，隨革命而來的是危機四伏的歲月。
事實上，很少有國家能逃出這一宿命：南非是一個例外，這是因為南非出了一位不世出的偉大政治家納爾遜·曼德拉。其他選擇可以看看津巴布韋。
1989年後的中歐和東歐是阿拉伯革命分析的有趣參照點，但卻不是合適的參照點，因為該地區的新國內外秩序來源於外部條件的變化——蘇聯解體。從內部而言，幾乎所有中東歐國家都有著非常明確的願望：民主、自由、市場經濟以及免收俄帝國卷土重來的威脅。它們希望西方，希望被北約和偶們接納，這是自然而然的需求。
中東危機地帶則完全不是這樣。中東內外沒有任何一股勢力願意也能夠推行哪怕是最原始的新秩序，連帶來新秩序部分要素的打算都沒有。混亂是永遠的威脅，給世界和平也帶來了風險和威脅。
除了貧困、退步、鎮壓、快速人口增長、宗教和種族仇恨以及無家可歸的民族（比如庫爾德人和巴勒斯坦人），該地區還存在邊境不穩定。大量邊境又殖民國家（英國和法國）在一戰後劃定，除了伊朗和埃及之外，大部分邊境毫無合理性可言。
一些國家——伊朗、沙特甚至蕞爾小國（但極其富有）卡塔爾——好像還嫌不夠亂，對地區權力雄心勃勃。所有這些讓已然緊張的局面進一步惡化了。
所有這些矛盾目前在敘利亞出現了大爆發。敘利亞人民正在遭遇人道主義災難，而世界冷眼旁觀，到目前為止不願施以援手（如果動用了化學武器，則干預將不可避免）。儘管干預可以是暫時性的、技術上也存在限制，但所有人都在避免這麼做，因為干預的代價極高：不但包括災難性內戰和大規模人道傷害，也包括整個中東的新秩序。
任何軍事干預都將不但面對敘利亞軍隊（有俄羅斯和中國支持），還將面對伊朗什葉派及其代理人黎巴嫩真主黨。此外，沒人能保証干預不會立刻導致另一場與以色列的戰爭。作為和不作為的危險都很高。
敘利亞最有可能的結果是，人道災難將一直持續到總統巴沙爾·阿薩德政權倒台，此後，敘利亞極有可能會因種族和宗教原因分裂。敘利亞的分裂將導致中東的進一步巴爾干化，形成新的保暴力。前線國家，如黎巴嫩、伊拉克和約旦等國，不可能在敘利亞分裂時獨善其身。敘利亞庫爾德人和巴勒斯坦人，或基督徒、德魯茲派以及人數更少的穆斯林少數派命運會如何？阿拉維派（巴沙爾政權的基石）將面臨可怕的命運，不管敘利亞是否分崩離析。
有待回答的問題很多。當然，即使如此悲觀，我們也不能失去通過外交途徑達成協議的希望﹔但從現實角度看，希望在日漸渺茫。
整個中東都在震動，新的穩定秩序要很長時間才能建立。在此之前，該地區將一直非常危險，不僅對國民是如此，對鄰國（包括歐洲）和世界也是如此。