BEIJING – On
November 15 Xi Jinping became General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party
and Chairman of the CCP’s Central Military Commission, giving him supreme
authority over China’s
armed forces. Next March, he will become President of China as well.
How does China’s
new leader see the world, and how will he handle the country’s foreign policy?
Do his style and preferences differ significantly from those of his
predecessor, Hu Jintao? The answers will determine China’s
relations with the world, and vice versa, for the next decade.
China’s
leaders approach power in a very different way than do political leaders in,
say, the United States.
American politicians must sell their ideas and values to voters; China’s
leaders do not need to inform the press and the public directly about anything,
including their foreign-policy positions. Indeed, with the notable exceptions
of Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, China’s
leaders have seldom imposed their own personalities upon Chinese diplomacy.In this sense, Xi’s leadership style will most likely continue in the tradition of his predecessors. Nevertheless, Xi’s outlook and worldview are surely different from Hu’s.
For starters, Xi is part of a generation raised and educated mostly in China’s reform era, which has been a decisive influence in their lives. China opened itself to the world in 1978, when Xi and his contemporaries were young men eager to understand the world outside China. They are a generation inspired by Deng’s realistic approach to shattering the walls that radical leftists had built around China, and one that believes that knowledge can change the destiny of the country and its people.
When this generation assumes the mantle of leadership, its members will turn their passion and curiosity about knowledge and innovation into real work. They are surely willing to learn from the wider world as they seek to promote China’s national interests abroad and encourage gradual change at home.
Xi may address Chinese diplomacy’s thorniest issues – particularly Sino-US relations – with more realism and flexibility than in recent years. His visit to the US in February 2012 was widely regarded as a sequel to Deng’s visit in January 1979. Xi talked to President Barack Obama and visited the Pentagon. He gave a luncheon speech and saw old friends from his brief stay in Iowa as a young man. He showed interest in American culture, just as Deng did in 1979. He ate chocolate and watched NBA games.
Most important, instead of spending countless hours drearily discussing political and strategic topics, he spoke directly and vigorously about the current state of Sino-US relations. “The Pacific Ocean is wide enough to accommodate the two major countries of China and the US,” he declared. Unhappy with America’s “pivot” to Asia, Xi remained calm, but emphasized that “one cannot rely too much on military power regarding Asia-Pacific diplomacy.”
Similarly, Xi tried to avoid major arguments on human rights, saying simply, “There’s no best, only better.” In essence, he sought to demonstrate that however many questions, arguments, and even potential conflicts exist between China and the US, both countries’ leaders should address them with an attitude of cooperation and sincerity. Leaders should not become entangled in details that fuel suspicion of their counterparts’ motives, lest they lose sight of the bigger picture.
Xi’s confidence extends to China’s domestic politics. His generation is more certain of reform than previous leadership cohorts were, owing less to official ideology than to the country’s enormous achievements in the last three decades. In practice, Xi may well prove to be a nationalist; certainly, his generation, like the founding fathers of the People’s Republic, dreams of turning China into a stronger, more prosperous country. The country’s new leaders want the world’s applause, but they are more eager for domestic ovations.
Like previous Chinese leaders, Xi firmly believes that the world should respect China’s authority to manage its own affairs. Thus, he is willing to show diplomatic muscle if China is challenged on a core area of concern. His speech in Mexico in 2009 demonstrated this. “Some foreigners with full bellies and nothing better to do engage in finger-pointing at us,” he said. “First, China does not export revolution; second, it does not export famine and poverty; and, third, it does not mess around with you. So what else is there to say?”
Xi understands that the world expects not only a better China, but also a China that is committed to constructing a better world. He will be a tough and strong-minded leader, but one who understands the world in a pragmatic way and knows how to work well with his foreign counterparts.
Indeed, his 2012 visit to the US left two impressions. First, he is a leader at ease both in front of and away from the television cameras. Second, he is not afraid to have a little fun. With those simple touches of humanity, Xi could bring a revolution to China’s diplomacy.
Zhu Feng is Deputy Director of the Center for International & Strategic
Studies, Peking University.
朱峰: 習近平眼中的世界
中共第十八次黨代表大會產生了第五代領導人，習近平出任中共總書記和中央軍委主席，明年三月他還會出任中國國家主席。這位中國今天最高權力擁有者究竟會如何來看待世界，又將怎樣來處理對外關係，習的外交和他的前任胡錦濤的外交會不會出現甚麼樣的變化和調整，對這些問題的回答顯然對展望未來中國的內政外交都具有重要意義。
中國的領導人獲得權力和運用權力的過程完全不同於美國的領導人。在一個競選政治的環境中，政治領袖學會的基本要領就是如何兜售自己的理念和見解。在中國這樣的「選撥政治」的環境中，領導人公開袒露自己心迹的機會並不多，向公眾展示自己對世界事務認識的機會更是少之又少。除了毛澤東和鄧小平之外，中國領導人很少讓自己的個性和見解直接主導中國的外交政策。從這個意義上來說，「習的外交」，將會繼續是中國政府的外交，而很難期待是習自己的個性和認識主導的外交。
然而，「習時代」的中國外交將必然不同於「胡的時代」。
首先，習近平這一代的中國領導人，接受教育和成長都是在改革開放之後。一九七八年的中國，剛剛開始向世界打開大門。習和他的同齡人是迫不及待地想要學習西方的一代，是強調知識可以改變國家、改變命運的一代，更是深受鄧小平務實主義思想啟發、用於掙脫中國「左」的意識形態束縛的一代。他們年輕時的這種經歷和認識，深深印刻在他們的觀念深處。因此，當這一代中國人成為國家領袖的時候，他們依然將繼續兌現他們年輕時候的那份求知、求新的熱情。可以肯定的是，他們將繼續願意向世界學習，願意在逐步推進中國改變的同時去追求中國的利益。二○一一年九月美國副總統拜登訪華後曾對《紐約時報》記者談到他和習相處五天的印象，那就是習近平對美國的政治體制有興趣。習事實上將對一切能夠讓他的國家強大的事情有興趣。
從他們身上所接受的鄧小平務實主義思想的烙印來看，習將會務實和靈活地處理中國外交中的棘手問題，例如和美國的關係。二○一二年二月習近平對美國的訪問，像鄧一九七九年訪問美國一樣，走進美國白宮，也走進美國的社會，更願意走進美國的文化。他訪美的行程中，並不講時間更多地花在談論已經變得越來越沉重的兩國政治和戰略話題，而是像鄧一樣用自己的語言在表達對中美關係的直觀、但卻更加生動的理解。例如，他說「太平洋足夠寬廣、可以容得下中美兩個大國」。即便對二○一一年十一月美國宣佈的「亞太再平衡戰略」不滿，他也只說「在亞太關係中不應該過多地依賴軍事力量」。在中美人權爭議上，他同樣「避重就輕」，強調「人權發展沒有最好、只有更好」。這些話不多，但卻透露着習的一種信念，那就是不管中美關係有多少問題、爭議、甚至潛在的衝突，領導人的戰略能力之一就是「舉重若輕」─再困難的事究竟如何去處理，首先取決於信念和心態：在信念上要堅信只要合作和誠意，就沒有過不了的「坎」；在心態上，過多地糾纏於爭議和對爭議背後的利益的「盤算」和對方意圖的「猜忌」，只會因為拘泥小節而失掉大勢。（上）
然而，習近平這一代中國領導人，必然也是「中國信念」更加堅定的中國領袖。他們會對中國正在進行的改革開放和發展經濟為中心的路徑選擇將更為自信。這種自信不是來自於對中國現在的官方意識形態和政治制度的信仰，而是中國已經取得的成就和未來仍然將繼續的崛起進程，賦予了他們的自信。從這個意義上，習必定也是一位民族主義情感強烈的中國領導人。在他們的意識深處，繼續「把中國的事情辦好」，讓中國變得更加強大和富裕，不僅是開創「紅色中國」的他們父輩們的期待，也是他們政治生涯的理想歸宿。對於自己的內政和外交，他們更想贏得掌聲的，不是首先來自於世界，而是首先來自於中國。
在習近平對世界的認識中，只要中國繼續堅持「把自己的事情辦好」，世界應該給予中國必要的尊重和應得的禮遇。因此，對於那些挑戰習近平這一代中國領導人正在努力搞好中國的事業時，給予批判和惡意的人或者事，習的反擊可能更加堅定。為此，習近平將是一位肯定在對外關係上願意展露自己個性的中國領導人。二○○九年二月十一日，習近平訪問墨西哥時，和當地華人見面時所說的一席話，典型地反映了習這一代中國領導人對於自身工作和努力的信心。習說：「有些吃飽了沒事幹的外國人，對我們的事情指手畫腳。中國一不輸出革命，二不輸出飢餓和貧困，三不去折騰你們，還有甚麼好說的。」習近平這一代領導人對於把中國變得更好充滿信心。在他看來，一個「更好」的中國，才能「更好」地貢獻於世界。
戲劇性的是，世界對中國的期待，已經並不僅僅是一個「更好的中國」，更是中國應該致力於實現的「更好的世界」；或者是，一個中國人標準中「更好的中國」，可能將帶來的「更壞的世界」。在習時代的中國，一個「更好的中國」和一個「更好的世界」，應該有更加平衡和建設性的理解。
習近平的中國外交肯定將具有習的特色和風采。習不僅是意味可能意志更加堅定的中國領導人，最重要的是，習近平對理解和處理與世界關係時正在變得前所未有的柔和與自如。二○一二年習近平訪問美國留下了兩個特點：一是他是一位經常在鏡頭面前「會笑」和「會放鬆」的中國領導人，二是他是一位在訪問美國時主動去獲取樂趣的中國領導人。他毫不顧忌地說他喜歡美國荷李活的大片，他是ＮＢＡ湖人隊的「粉絲」。這樣一位經常從美國文化中感受到樂趣、並且會自如地放鬆地笑的中國領導人，會怎麼認識和處理與世界的關係呢？我們有理由相信，未來中國與世界的關係，也會因為習近平的到來，而更多地擁有笑容和放鬆。真的如此的話，習將給中國外交帶來革命。
（下）
朱峰 北京大學國際戰略研究中心副主任